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SUMMARY 
Despite the enormous apparatus of control at the disposal of employers 
and the state in South Africa, working class activity has not been eliminated 
nor organization erased. African migrant workers, such as those employed 
in the Durban docks, have held a leading position within the African working 
class for decades, absorbing the lessons of past struggles and putting forward 
demands which have led strike movements. These struggles demonstrate the 
uncompromising hostility of African workers to their class and national oppres-
sion. With the growth of capital in South Africa an increase in class 
exploitation has been accompanied by intensified national oppression; the 
rule over African workers being enforced through vagrant, master and servant, 
and pass laws wh ich reproduce a cheap migrant labour force. 
Dock workers, for more than a century migrant workers, have shown a 
capacity for resistance in the city equal or higher than the level of class action 
by 'settled' urban workers. Their resilience is explained by their concentra-
tion and commanding position in the labour process of the docks. During 
strikes the workers have laid claim to work and residence in towns in opposition 
to the employer and state strategy of expell ing strikers from th e urban centres. 
Decasualization has been introduced as a 'repressive reform' to reassert 
the control of the employers over an increasingly active workforce. Ironically, 
it has b~en accompanied by increasing priority to the development of contract 
labour in the docks and has also not eliminated the high turnover of workers nor 
the insecurity of employment. 
The consciousness of the dock workers has been shaped by the harsh 
discipline of capitalist production, national oppression, and the daily 
experience of international communications. These factors, combined with 
a long tradition of resistance, have encouraged the formation of a class con-
scious section of the African proletariat. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis has been long in gestation. From being registered for 
a Master of Arts degree at the University of Natal, Durban, it has pro-
gressed with severe interruptions to its final form. These interruptions 
were those of political activity and involvement in the economic agitation 
here described and later in the growth of the trade union movement. The 
two activities, academic and organizational, were linked in a not entirely 
smooth way. But these I inks provided insights and contacts which would 
not otherwise have been possible by adopting a limited 'participant observa-
tion' involvement from an academic stance. A short discussion of these 
issues provides some introduction to the questions of methodology, participant 
observation, and the relationship between the research worker and the 'sub-
;ects' of research. It also provides some understanding of why such emphasis 
has been given to the historical evolution of the dock workers of Durban as a 
central group within the African working class. 
The original intention of the study was a comprehensive presentation 
and analysis of the African labour movement up to the present time, and an 
outline was prepared ranging from the history of the Industrial and Commercial 
Union to the strikes of the 1960s. This research was an attempt both to 
understand the reasons why there have been such enormous upsurges or unioniza-
tion followed by disastrous downswings in the long period of 1919 up to the 
present. Some analysis of the monstrous system of class and national oppres-
sion which has developed in the history of capital in South Africa was made 
in an attempt to understand the phenomenon of 'booms and slumps' in working 
class action and organization. Particular attention was given to the mining 
industry at the turn of the century to come to grips with the huge apparatus of 
employer, legal, and administration control exercised over African workers. 
Considerable time was spent in research into the 'modernization' of contract 
labour under British imperialism at the turn of the century and, looking forward, 
research was made into the labour movement during the Second World War 
.when, it seemed, it was possible that liberal reforms could have secured a 
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gradual transition away from cheap forced labour. Essentially, the orienta-
tion of the study was at that time toward a critique of public administration 
and the gigantic system of labour channelization as being in the interests of 
the monopoly employers. The central focus at this stage was the growth in 
legislation as the basis for the exacting controls over black workers. The 
writer made an extensive study of the I iterature on African wages and in the 
first draft of the thesis evaluated the machinery of wage regulation. A 
preliminary chapter of the first draft of the thesis was published by the National 
Union of South African Students ('Black wages in South Africa') to provide 
student activists with the background material for placing demands before the 
1 Wage Board. 
This general orientation towards the African working class arose from 
the growing disenchantment of politically conscious intellectuals with psycho-
logistic liberal interpretations of apartheid society. This change marked 
the beginning of a tendency to turn away from analyzing South African society 
as a 'race relations situation' with fixed caste/race characteristics maintained 
by a corporatist state, towards one which attempted to unravel the class factors 
at work in a dictatorial, though socially dynamic, regime. This deepening 
social awareness was closely associated with pol itical activity wh ich attempted 
to 'burst the bubble of liberalism' by exposing the exploitation of black workers 
by the liberal bourgeoisie. This took the form of pointing out the contra-
dictions involved in supporting human rights while exploiting black labour, 
and moving on to champion opposition to poverty wages. Intellectually, 
this movement marked a partial resistance to the pervasive strength of bourgeois 
categories over social categories; of the prevalence of psycho logistic and 
structural analysis rather than socio-economic analysis, of the study of race 
rather than class relations, and of an emphasis on nationalism as the only 
ideology of the oppressed rather than an investigation of the specific nature of 
class consciousness. 
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The general study of the history and organization of the African work-
,ing class was deeply influenced by the dock strike of 1969 which heralded 
the revival of autonomous activity on the part of the African working class. 
The forward movement of the workers, the uncompromising stance adopted by 
the employers, and the close support for the employers given by departments 
of state and the police, seemed to illustrate all the essential features of the 
historical struggles of the African working class. Even a superfic ial survey 
of the I imited amount of descriptive material on the Durban dock workers 
indicated a high level of resistance to employers and the state, and a tendency 
for these workers to provide a lead to African workers locally and nationally. 
The history of the dock workers proved extraordinarily rich in resistance and 
illustrations of the growth of the state in response to working class struggles. 
Certain definite advantages appeared in concentrating on a particular group 
of workers rather than marking a genera I historical sweep through all the 
vicissitudes of the African labour movement. The dock workers offered, 
uniquely, material for a history of consciousness and class action over a long 
period of time, insights into the dynamics of social activity by the African 
working class, and gave some idea of the level of self-organization of the 
workers. Over a long historical span, a study of the dock workers also pro-
vided a perspective from the workers· viewpoint of the organizations they were 
associated with: the Natal Native Congress, Industrial and Commercial 
Union, Communist Party of South Africa, Cape Town Stevedoring and Dock 
Workers' Union, Phungula's Dock Workers' Union, South African Congress of 
Trade Unions, and the General Factory Workers' Benefit Fund. From being 
an example of strike action within a general study of the labour movement and 
African workers, increasing attention was paid to the present and past of the 
Durban dock workers. The notes on the origins of contract labour were recast 
around the dock workers as the primary material and supplemented by the 
general perspectives gathered on the African working class and repressive 
legislation. 
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A narrower focus also offered further data on the response of employers 
.and the state to working class action. The evolution of the model apartheid 
institution, the Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company, appeared to have 
its roots in the class struggles of an autonomous working class movement towards 
day labour in the 1870s. The attempts by employers to bring this indepen-
dence of the workers and the rising wages which accompanied the workers' 
resistance under control resulted in the strengthening of an antagonistic muni-
cipal government which policed workers within barracks. While the mining 
industry has been the prime mover in the growth of the economy and the main 
advocate of contract labour and opposer of urban African family life, here 
appeared a group of employers who were similarly wanting the tightest control 
over the workers in the interests of higher levels of exploitation. These 
employers were also adopting the same strategy of extending their powers 
through the growth of the state and making full use of the pol ice in maintain-
ing ul timate control over labour. The history of labour and capital in the 
stevedoring trade in Durban seemed to provide some comparative material to 
the mining industry in this respect; the employers and the state arriving at 
similar conclusions on the need to house the workers in barracks, to develop a 
pol ice force to support the employers' immediate domination over the workers, 
and to maintain a strict control over the supply of liquor to African workers. 
In this sense, as Francis Wilson who read the preliminary draft of this thesis 
observed, the study of dock labour in Durban was possibly as important as that 
of mine labour in ga ining an insight into the dynamics of the contract labour 
system. 
For the writer, however, the issue wa s becoming not so much the possi-
bility of an 'autonomous path' to the super-exploitation of African workers, for 
which there seemed an abundance of material in the history of the state in 
Natal and in the stevedoring trade, but rather the development of class and 
national oppression in relation to the resistance of the African working class. 
It was not so much the particular needs of employers in labour intensive indus-
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tries such as mining and stevedoring wh ich alone were instrumental in the 
. development of an extraordinary class and racially oppressive state but rather 
the violent transition of capital in South Africa towards its monopoly form, 
It is a paradox of apartheid society which many sociologists and even some 
Marxists find difficult to accept that the growth of capital has meant an 
intensification of national oppression because of the crises of class rule, 
National oppression has become more pronounced not because of a hangover 
from the feudal past, nor because of the ascendancy of the Boer Republic tradi-
tion, as liberals explain, but because it is integral to the system of exploita-
tion, Contract labour is extended on a vast scale, African families are up-
rooted and divided, mass movements of population are taking place, in a 
society which is unequivocally and essentially bourgeois and one in which the 
rights of property are indelibly enshrined. This apparent paradox was first 
developed by Engels in relation to the United States where lit is significant of 
the specifically bourgeois character of , .• human rights that the American 
constitution, the first to recognize the rights of man, in the same breath con-
firms the slavery of the coloured races existing in America: class privi leges 
'b d ' 'I 'dl 2 A' h f h U 't d are proscrl e , race pnvi eges sanctlone, s In t e case 0 t e nl e 
States, the development of capital has necessitated the most brutal exploita-
tion of African people, their political subjugation and to an unprecedented 
degree the destruction of family relations by capitalism. But the very 
existence of these inhuman relations in South Africa is necessary to the contract 
labour system secured by capitalism, in which, as Marx wrote, la" family ties 
among the proletarians are torn asunder I , 3 
The writer came to this perspective both from his involvement in the 
working class struggles of 1972-74 and from a study of the contract labour system 
particularly in the docks, In the first draft there was an attempt to develop a 
view of the compatibility between the apartheid state and the Durban Steve-
doring Labour Supply Company, and their common antagonism to the interests 
of the workers. A critical position was taken, in response to the prevailing 
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view of liberal economists of the complete incompatibility of the interests of 
.employers and the racial state in South Africa. The writer endeavoured to 
prove that the development of the company was in fact dependent on state 
institutions and its existence guaranteed against the opposition of the workers 
in the last instance by the deployment of the police to support disciplinary 
action by employers. At this point, it was argued, the interests of the state 
and employers tended to fuse in a form of state monopoly capitalism, one 
solid bloc against the workers. But in fact the interests of even a company 
of the importance of the DSLSC and the state were never completely identical 
and this point is developed in the chapter on mass strikes. The division of 
labour between the employers and the state in the labour process has taken the 
form of the 'front line' of discipline over the workers being maintained by the 
employers with the police as a weapon of secondary resort. 
These perspectives on the nature of power in bourgeois society influenced 
the methodology adopted. The writer anticipated that information from the 
state and employers would be blocked as the study developed and so the first 
approaches were made for permission to have access to the State Archives in 
Pretoria and interviews were initiated with management. The Department of 
Labour files included invaluable material on the struggles of dock workers during 
the Second World War, in particular full transcriptions of the arguments made 
by Zulu Phungula during negotiations with the employers and departments of 
state. While use was being made of these files with the permission of the 
Minister of National Education, a senior Department of Labour official objected 
to my having access, and permission to consult the files was immediately with-
drawn. At the same time the writer had a series of interviews with W. S. 
Dreyer, manager of the DSLSC, which were very productive in gaining insight 
into the labour process and data on employment and wages. The wage 
record cards of the workers for the period up to 1969 were made avai lable to 
the writer and representative samples were made from these cards to assess 
length of contract and average wages. F rom these sources a first draft was 
written making full use of historical data from the 1870s, interviews with 
. W . S. Dreyer, and i nformat ion from the record cards. 
By 1971 the writer came to be involved in the Wages Commission, 
which produced pamphlets directed to the workers, and Isisebenzi, the 
workers' newspaper. From this point contacts were made with the steve-
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doring workers independently of the DSLSC management. With the enor-
mous growth of the General Factory Workers Benefit Fund (GFWBF) in 1972-
73, the writer came in regular contact with the stevedoring workers and was 
assigned the task of developing the members of the GFWBF employed by 
stevedoring companies into an organized section of the fund. The discussions 
and organized meetings held with the workers over the period up to January 
1974 enabled the writer to make an assessment of the information gained from 
historical documents and the data from management. Selected data is drawn 
from the minutes of these meetings. 
Lengthy though this thesis is, a large amount of the data which had 
been collected is not presented here due to the problems of length. One 
of the most serious omissions which has had to be made is on accidents in the 
docks and cases of the workers' response to accidents as instances of the 
employers' neglect of the interests and safety of the workers as well as the 
inefficient operation of the Workmen's Compensation Act. A large amount 
of dater on the impoverishment and growth of commodity relations in the 
countryside of Natal during the nineteenth century has also had to be omitted. 
One of the most unfortunate and unavoidable omissions has been the comments 
and responses of the workers themselves to the conclusions of the writer. The 
thesis has benefited considerably, however, from the comments and criticisms 
of participants in the Institute of Commonwealth Studies seminars at which a 
preliminary chapter, 'Dock workers, labour circulation, and class struggles in 
4 
Durban, 1940-59', was presen ted. 
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1. David Hemson (1971): Black wages in South Africa, Roneoed. 
2. Frederick Engels (1975): Anti-Duhring, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 
p.127. 
3. Marx and Engels (1973): Selected Works, Communist Manifesto, p.50. 
4. This paper was eventually rewritten and published in the Journal of 
Southern African Studies, October 1977, 4 (1): 88-124. 
CHAPTER 1 
TOGT LABOUR AND THE COLONIAL ECONOMY 
The state is 'an organization of the exploiting class ••• 
for the forcible holding down of the exploited class in 
the conditions of oppression (slavery, villeinage or 
serfdom, wage labour) determined by the existing mode 
of production. ' 
Engels, Anti-Duhring 
Togt labour 'creates in the midst of plenty unnecessary 
uncertainty in the supply of daily labour, except at 
exorbitant wages; and it forces, in spite of themselves, 
those householders who engage monthly servants to feed at 
night the jobbing idlers whose unreasonable demands or 
disinclination prevented their employment during the 
day. It discourages orderly and regular monthly service, 
because it exhibits to natives so employed comparatively 
large monthly gains, coupled with an attractive but 
unwholesom liberty ••• ' 
Shepstone, Secretary for Native Affairs, 1873. 
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The subjection of the African working class to a 
regime of national oppression and super-exploitation, and 
the racial divisions 1n the South African working class, 
have been the result of a long historical process which has 
been neither predetermined nor independent of the growth of 
capi.tal on a world scale. Originally South Africa existed 
only as a geographical region within British imperialism, and 
it was only quite slowly that a local bourgeoisie developed to 
demand national boundaries and a state under its immediate 
control. In Natal, as elsewhere in Southern Africa, the brutal 
domination of British imperialism over the indigenous population 
was closely related to the growth of productive relations in 
agriculture, mining, and small-scale industry. The formation 
of a working class in the region was directly related to the 
penetration of commodity relations into tribal communities. 
This unrelenting process (the growth of trade, substitution 
of commodities for African utensils, and the death of African 
handicrafts) was accelerated by wars of conquest which resulted 
in British imperialism securing the land mass and establishing 
general political domination over the area. The power of the 
British state was employed to speed, in a hothouse fashion, the 
integration of the region on the basis of capitalist production 
closely interwoven with the world economy. But the establishment 
of uniform relations of domination and exploitation did not 
proceed in a unilinear manner, and the final outcome at certain 
moments could have taken a number of turns. The imposition of 
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new relations of political and economic domination and 
transformation of traditional societies was by no means even, 
in some instances meeting with the most unrelenting resistance. 
In other areas British imperialism was seen by the traditional 
leaders as a defence against even more rapacious attacks on 
African-occupied land. During the period of traditional 
resistance to British imperialism, however, the formation of 
an African working class continued apace. 
The dominant complaint of the bourgeoisie during the 
period of the colonial economy was that of shortage of labour. 
As imperialism became increasingly associated with the export 
of capital rather than articles of consumption, the supply of 
capital was not the main constraint on the development of 
production. The plantation economy in Natal, mining in the 
Northern Cape and later in the Transvaal, and infrastructural 
development were based on an ever-expanding demand for African 
labour. After the abolition of slavery in the British empire and 
in South Africa in 183~ labour supplies had to be sought in other 
colonies and increasingly in the existing African communities 
which maintained some form of political independence. With the 
discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1867 and gold on the 
Witwatersrand in 1886, the channeling of African labour throughout 
the Southern African region to the farms, plantations, mines, 
and towns, took on an increasingly planned form. As a regional 
labour market developed with workers attracted to the plantation, 
mining, and urban centres, capital searched increasingly in the 
remote areas and even throughout eastern Africa and India for fresh 
supplies of cheap labour. Particularly in Natal, select 
11 
committees of the colonial legislature were established 
to investigate new sources of labour supply from India, 
Portuguese East Africa, and even further north. Because 
African people still had some access to subsistence 
agriculture and, as importantly, to a communal system of 
land tenure and homestead kinship networks, the labour 
supply fluctuated considerably from agricultural season to 
season. 
The dream of capitalists in the colonies to have 
long term contract labour at the lowest wages was fulfilled 
only in respect of Indian indentured workers; African 
labour tended towards shorter contracts and higher wages. 
Having only partially entered the sphere of commodity 
relations (even though burdened by the need to earn cash 
for taxes) and able to fall back on some element of 
subsistence agriculture, African workers were 'undisciplined' 
wage labourers. The colonial administrators and capitalists 
looked longingly at the sharp contrast of discipline in 
tribal organization, in societies in which wage slavery was 
despised. The general tendency of capital on a world 
scale to expropriate producers on the land and force them to 
submit to the discipline of hunger was powerfully reinforced 
by wars, an oppressive state, and regulations such as those 
which compelled Africans to wear manufactured clothes. As 
capitalist production expanded, the colonial state acted 
to 'force-ripen' productive relations by transforming the 
relations of domination. Proletarianization was speeded up 
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1) 
to the p.ce o~ the .nclosure moyement in Brit.in without the 
rural tie. ot the worker. being complet.ly elimin.t.d. Thi. 
contradictory deyelop .. nt was to have deci.iy. i~lic.tions 
~or the deyelopment o~ .egreg.tion and national oppre •• ion ot 
Atrican workers. 
In approaching the proble .. ot .n undisciplined labour 
~orce .nd undertain l.bour supplies the bourgeoisie did not 
.ake inYention. in new ~or.. ot control oyer • tre.h working 
class, but employed .aa.ures to hand which were ayailable tro. 
the deyelopment o~ e.rly capitali •• , in p.rticular yagrancy .nd 
... ter and servant. law.. On the.e ~a.iliar foundations 
increa.ingly coerciYe laws were enacted .s the torce. ot 
production .. tured. This strea. ot legislation and it. r.cial 
~or. indicated the incap.city ot the bourgeoi.i. to .ake retor.. 
corre.ponding to the exp.nsion ot production and cert.inty ot 
capitalist deyelop .. nt in the colonial .r ••• which .ad. up 
Soutb A~rica. With tew exception., the transition ot capitali •• 
in South A~ric. ~rom the period o~ ~ree comp.tition wh.n merch.nt 
intere.ts were dominant to the er. o~ deep leyel .ining, roughly 
from 1870 to the turn o~ the century, was .. rked by an incr •••• 
in national oppression, wars ot conque.t, land contiscation, 
enforced participation in commodity relations, and forced labour. 
The dawn o~ this period was conyeyed in corr •• pondence. 
It seems impo •• ible tor a body ot white men to liYe in 
proximity to the colored races, without adopting a conviction 
that, a. the dominant peopl., they h.ve a right to command 
the service. ot the less ciyilized, that despite the h.bits, 
and the want. ot the Native, his only position is that ot a 
laborer mini.tering to the requirements of the white colonist, 
and that, if he does not naturally, or trom circu .. t.nces, tall 
into this subordinate position, it i. just and proper, by 
co.rcive enactment., to torce him into • .ar. s.rvil. 
condition. 1 
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state interYention from this early period was unashaaedly 
concentrated on inducing a larger supply of labour and 
cheapening labour power. These ai .. were not, however, secured 
by legislation alone, but through .ilitary domination combined 
with the subordination of African producers to the world 
market. The transformation of colonial society did not e .. rge 
evenly, but was marked by cri.es within imperiali •• which 
tended to increase abrupt advances in aggres.ive do.ination and 
the legislation of control. 
The e .. rgence of togt labour 
One of the most interesting, although not necessarily the 
aost significant, contradiction which emerged within the colonial 
economy was that between the growth of day labour and the general 
interests of the colonial employers on the longest possible 
contracts of eaployment. The issue .erYe. as an introduction 
to the aost important .ection of the African working cIa •• in 
Natal, the dock workers, and provides so .. indication of the 
for.. of action taken by African workers before and after the 
decisive wars ot conquest. It al.o provides insight into the 
evolution of the colonial .tate as an instrument ot class 
domination. 
Although day labour under capital is. has generally involved 
severe disadvantages to workers (as is shown in the long struggle 
by dock workers' unions tor decasualization), it is argued here 
that during the early phase ot proletarianization, day labour 
was taken up in Natal by African workers to force up wages and 
escape the draconian .. sters and .ervants regulations. During 
a period of upturn in the colonial economy, the disadvantages 
to workers in terma of uncertain employment were tempered by 
the greater freedom of action in the towns which day labour gave 
.0 long a. there was a viable subsistence econo-r. During 
the early 1810s incre.sing numbers of African workers in 
the towns of Natal, and particularly Durban, refused to enter 
into ~nthly contracts with employers and forced an increase in 
wages through working daily. This apparently minor adjustment 
of contractual relations between workers and employers set 
. in motion a series of reactions within the ruling class 
which intensified the control over African workers as a 
whole, laid the grounds for housing African workers in 
barracks, and provided new sources of revenue for an expanding 
and increasingly repressive state. The response to the rise 
in day labour marked a significant difference in the strategy 
of the bourgeoisie in the colonies and metropole in relation 
to the working class. 2 While in Britain Parliament removed 
criminal sanctions from master and servant legislation in 1867 
and legalized trade unions in 1875 under pressure from 
organized workers, in Southern Africa the massive expanSion ~n 
the forces of production particularly in mining led in an 
opposite direction for the mass of the working class. 3 
The insistence by African workers on working daily contracts 
not only in the docks (where a mixture of daily paid and 
contract labour seems to have been employed) but in other 
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sectors went against the whole current of regulations over 
employment. The fundamental law controlling workers, the 
master and servants Ordinance, No.2 of 1850, did not provide 
for day labour. In Natal, where slavery had not been practiced 
and where wage labour did not have the characteristics of regularity 
and submission, the state dictated the terms of contract 'freely' 
entered into by workers and employers. The Ordinance was 
thoroughly repressive in relation to the formative working 
class, but also an essentially bourgeois measure. It marked 
an advance beyond slavery in that it limited indefinite contract, 
and attacked patriarchal relations by insisting on wage (cash) 
labour, and limiting the apprenticeship of children. These 
the sugar plantations, white households, and public works. 
-Although this resistance was thought possible to overcome 
through importing indentured labour, the problems of 
property owners became more acute with the expanS10n of 
production. Even the importation of about 5,000 indentured 
Indian labourers to Natal between 1860 and 1866, which 
primed the sugar plantations, did not satisfy the total 
demands for labour. 7 An extraordinarily international 
proletariat laboured for Natal employers in an effort to 
overcome the ability of indigenous producers to resist the 
harsh discipline of wage labour. Of some 20,000 African 
workers employed 1n the colony 1n the early 1970s almost 
6,000 were foreign workers who had migrated long distances 
k 1 . 1 8 to see emp oyment 1n Nata • The Lieutenant Governor argued 
that the importation of Indian labourers and other long-term 
contract labourers was 'not to cheapen labor, but to render 
it more continuous and reliable. ,9 But with the expansion 
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of the economy in the l870s and no further large-scale importation 
of Indian labourers between 1866 and 1874, the political 
representatives of local capitalists and plantation owners 
became almost obsessively concerned with labour supply and 
better means of disciplining 'local African workers. 
What evidence there is to hand provides some indication 
of the lack of discipline employers were able to command over a 
fresh proletariat in Natal. Under the harsh conditions of 
employment and low wages it is not surprising that African 
workers did not want to be employed for long periods and could 
not be depended upon by local employers. In the early 1850s 
advances were essential to the widening of commodity relations 
aad the creation of a market for labour, both essential to the 
expansion of capitalism on a world scale. The class nature of 
the law was most evident in the controls it provided over 
workers. Employers could deduct or withhold proportions of 
the wages of the workers,4 did not have to allow the family of 
the worker to live on the premises,S and were strengthened 
by a wide definition of illegal acts by workers. The workers' 
'crimes' were the following: refusing or neglecting work, 
doing work negligently or improperly, causing damage to the 
employer's property, behaving violently or insolently to 
the employer, committing 'scandalous immorality', being drunk, 
deserting, or any 'other gross misconduct,.6 The punishments 
provided for in the law were harsh; imprisonment up to one 
month with or without hard labour and spare diet, whipping up 
to twelve lashes, or a fine of up to five pounds. The wide 
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scope of the offences and these drastic penalties enforced the penal 
servitude of the worker to the employer and made strikes or any 
acts of non-co-operation by workers illegal. The definition of 
servant included 'a boatman, porter, or other occupation of 
a like nature', and it was against this labour regime with its 
minimal wages that the togt workers were rebelling. 
The togt labour phenomenon which took shape ln the 
early 19708 was only one aspect of the resistance of African workers 
to their subordination to employers and a represslve colonial 
regime which was manifest in the labour shortages encountered by 
Russell, who worked for a commercial firm, reported that 
African workers insisted on changing the hours for meal 
times and had arguments with the company which led 
f 1 'k 10 requent y to str1 es. The wife of a farmer reported 
in 1854 that the farm workers struck in demanding mealies 
during a time of fast rising prices. 11 In the towns the 
master-servant relationships prescribed by law took time 
to take the form intended. African male workers refused to 
take wage labour too seriously and were accused of 
'excessive gallantry' when African women came into the towns. 
12 They would leave off work to banter with the young women. 
Faced with such undiscipline employers demanded close 
enforcement of the laws of subordination. An English worker 
employed as overseer of a work gang in Durban in the 18605 
recorded the increasing violence used against African workers 
to intensify their labour. 
A. H. Jones, the overseer who had not shed his working 
class loyalty in the colony, mentions in his diary numerous 
disputes between the African workers and the employers. He 
sided with the workers in a dispute for not being paid 
overtime in April 1864. When the African workers struck 
against being served with bad mea1ies they were taken before 
the magistrate and sentenced to twelve lashes. Three days 
after the lashing little work was possible as the workers' 
backs were slashed, 'every blow of the cats having cut 
the skin'. There were frequent arguments between the 
foreman and workers over food and other issues, and 1n August 
1864 one worker was flogged for hitting the foreman and 
18 
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another for giving 'cheek'. While these conditions were 
. reportedly typical In the plantations and agriculture 
generally, the increasingly oppressive labour contracts In 
the towns marked an increase in the rate of exploitation. 
Not unexpectedly, when an increase in trade provided 
workers with the opportunity, togt labour became a means 
of escaping such rigid control. 
The first reported movement of African workers into 
togt labour was in 1865 when the town council petitioned the 
Secretary for Native Affairs to control the expansion of this 
form of labour. Apparently togt workers were living off the 
rations given to the monthly servants with whom they were on 
good relations, and the town council had demanded executive 
action against 'idly disposed natives under the pretence of 
looking for day labor' being on the premises of householders. 
The Secretary for Native Affairs replied that the authority to 
take action remained with the town council and that restrictions 
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on African workers in the towns could impede labour supply. 
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This deflection of appeals for control was followed by suggestions 
in 1868 by.a committee of the town council that all servants 
should be registered and should carry passes. The contract of 
employment should be entered in the pass and a village planned 
f · . d d 15 or AfrIcan workers, It was recommen e • In the following 
year a vagrant law was promulgated which made it an offence 
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for 'colored'people to be out after 2100. 
By the early l870s there was a tremendous increase 
in shipping and a corresponding increase in the demand for 
African dockers. The tonnage of vessels cleared in 
1874 was almost double that for 1870 and in the following 
years increased rapidly. While the world economy 
entered a long period (1873-96) of depression marked by 
falling prices, in South Africa there was some expanSion 
in the production of raw materials, a spectacular increase 
in the production of diamonds and gold, and an overall 
increase in trade. All these developments placed 
exceptional pressure on harbour facilities in Durban and 
demanded increased capital expenditure and more 
labour. 
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As the number of ships cleared rose from 81 in 1870 to 161 
In 1873, the employment of African workers in Durban borough 
increased from 1,777 in 1871 to 2,297 in 1873, to meet the 
demand for stevedores, servants, wagon drivers, and shop 
workers. Between 1870 and 1876 wages of African workers 
moved persistently upwards as higher wages were demanded 
in conditions of fuller employment. 
TABLE 1.1 
AVERAGE WAGE OF MONTHLY EMPLOYED AFRICAN 
WORKER AND COST OF FOOD, DURBAN 1870-1878 
1870 
1871 
1872 
1873 
1874 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1878 
Source: 
Monthly worker with rations 
(shillings) 
8s 
lOs 
12s 
15s 
16s 
23s 4d 
25s 
l6s 
20s 
Natal Blue Books, Xl7 and X9 
Muid of ground maize 
(shillings 
6s 
12s 
26s 
18s 
20s 
15s 9d 
12s 4d 
21s 
32s 
As the monthly employed African workers were provided with 
rations the sometimes abrupt increases in the price of ground 
maize did not affect them directly, but for the daily paid 
workers rising food prices considerably worsened their 
posi tion. 
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But the general conditions for the working class in 
Natal improved with the expansion of trade and the acute 
labour shortage which resulted. The Natal Almanac reported 
in 1873 that 'every employer is asking for ~ larger supply 
of servants to enable him to give employment to his increased 
capital ••• the demand for labourers which has been made even 
by the more enterprising Kafirs and coolies in the colony, 
proves that trade generally has increased, and that there is 
1 k f . ,17 no ac 0 means to carry it on. Migrant workers were 
also in a better bargaining position because of a good crop of 
maize in 1873 which followed a strong drought in 1872. These 
changes in the colonial political economy encouraged togt 
labour to spread from the docks to other areas of employment. 
The expansion of togt labour outside the strict 
controls of the master and servants regulations and also to 
command higher wages precipitated a drastic response from the 
ruling class which attacked independent wage labour and intensified 
national oppression of African workers. In a measure which had 
subsequently been described as an important forerunner of the 
urban aspects of apartheid, employers and the state acted to blunt 
the forward movement of the African working class, to tax togt 
labourers, and move towards a 'city police state'. Segregation 
of African workers in barracks, constant police control, and a 
further extension of the 'crimes' of African workers, arose not 
from struggles over the land (some of the most decisive wars 
of conquest were to occur later) but from the growing tendency 
towards monopoly capital. But the developments in Durban were 
significant in partly preceding the direct control over 
African workers achieved by the great monopoly companies 
in mining; compound labour, passes, taxes, and police 
control. The evolution of the model and 'modern' system 
of class and national oppression in Durban did not, 
however, follow a unilinear path, and had to overcome 
prolonged resistance from the workers. 
By 1873 some 300 out of 2,297 African workers employed 
in Durban had taken up togt labour. This was hardly a 
large proportion of the total work force, but the reaction of 
the Secretary for Native Affairs, Shepstone, was swift and 
decisive. The growth of togt labour he declared had resulted 
in a demand for wages 'far in excess of the highest rate 
paid to monthly servants, while, with few exceptions, the 
skill and value of the labour so highly paid for are less'. 
The racial measures which followed were thus entirely bound 
up with the activity of the capitalist state in cheapening 
labour. The togt workers were a dangerous class of labourers, 
he argued, who had no fixed place of residence and could move 
I 
about freely, all of which caused insecurity in the towns. 
(Togt.labour) creates in the midst of plenty 
unnecessary uncertainty in the supply of daily 
labour, except at exorbitant wages; and it forces, 
in spite of themselves, those householders who 
engage monthly servants to feed at night the jobbing 
idlers whose unreasonable demands or disinclination 
prevented their employment during the day. 
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Shepstone was arguing that the togt workers were being subsidized 
by the householders. They were able to command a higher wage 
rate without rations, and then live off their comrades.' rations 
ln the backyards of the householders. In this way the 
workers were able to reduce the costs of their reproduction 
to a minimum while pushing wage rates upwards. He followed 
this analysis with a sweeping and violent denunciation of 
.togt labour which threatened to swamp the towns with an 
undisciplined reserve army of labour. 
It discourages orderly and regular monthly service, 
because it exhibits to nativesso employed comparatively 
large monthly gains, coupled with an attractive but 
unwholesome liberty. It destroys or fails to create 
any feeling of mutual interest between master and 
servant, and threatens, if not checked, soon to reach 
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the full development to which it naturally tends, namely, 
a large but fluctuating native population living in the 
towns, but having no home in them, subject to no restraint 
except that of their own convenience, combining to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the householders by 
excessive demands, or by directly dishonest means ••• 
Then, again, the only excuse for these men living in the 
towns at all is the service of the householders. They 
come and go when they please; no official notice is taken 
of their presence; no one knows where they come from, 
where they go to, or to whom they belong; they feel no 
restraint; are subject to none of the checks which 
their homes supply, and suddenly find themselves in the 
midst of temptations to evils without the deterring 
influence of any control or supervision. Such a 
condition must produce demoralisation, lead to 
drunkenness, and tempt to every form of crime. 18 
In the struggle to reduce African wages, Shepstone advanced 
a central tenet of the ruling class in South Africa: that 
African workers were not entitled to be in the industrial centres 
except for the period of wage employment. The extravagant 
language he adopted and his championing of the interests of 
householders were possibly an attempt to win full agreement 
for the strict regulations which were proclaimed to discipline 
the togt workers. 
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His remarks showed how far the bourgeoisie in the colony was 
from an ideology of competitive capitalisa and the free play 
of market forces. Capitalism in Southern Africa required the 
nurturing of an interventionist state, one whose pri.ary task 
wa. the disciplining of African workers. What wa. advanced was 
a rigidly controlled labour market with the employers considerably 
strengthened by the local state. In their essence, the regulations 
provided the framework for channeling and cheapening African 
labour which has persisted to the present. All Africans, apart 
from property owners, were required to register as togt workers 
or enter monthly contracts within tive days of entering the towns. 
Every togt worker was provided with a badge carrying in large 
figures his registration number which had to be conspicuously 
displayed. It offered work at the miniaum rates of daily wages 
laid down by the magistrate, the togt labourer was bound to work. 
Th. togt. workers were required to pay registration fees of 2s 6d 
monthly, equivalent to two and a halt days unpaid labour tor the 
local state each month, as the rate of wages wa. initially set at 
1s a day. The penalties approached those stipulated by the .. sters 
and servant. law. For a first contravention of the regulations a 
togt worker could be fined up to 20s or imprisoned with hard 
labour up to a month. But tor subsequent otfenc.s i~rison .. nt was 
even longer than provided tor under the .. sters and servants lawl 
three months hard labour. Any offenders could be prohibited fro. 
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working as a togt labourer and banished trom town. 
The tax squeezed trom the togt workers went directly on 
the 'cost of supervision, pay, maintenance, and clothing of the 
necessary additional police' needed to enforce the 
regulations. Shepstone instructed the municipalities 
to employ at least ten additional African policemen and a 
h . 20 w 1te constable to control the togt workers. In this 
way the workers were compelled to pay for the specialized 
detachments of the state acting to force them into a 
more subordinate and exploitable position. 
The togt labour regulations were, however, only one 
element in the bourgeois attack on African workers as a 
whole in the towns. The vagrant law of 1869 which had not 
been properly enforced was put into effect with the building 
of a 'substantial house' to accommodate those arrested under 
the law. A curfew was introduced after 2100 and all 
'colored' people had to provide a good account of themselves 
f h · . d h . 21 h .. a ter t 1S tIme an to return to t eIr rooms. T e rIsIng 
income of the togt account (the municipality had £130 6s 10d 
in credit by the end of 1874 even after employing ten 
African constables and a white sergeant) ensured that the 
collective disciplining of African workers would not have to 
be paid for by increases in the rates. A tremendous increase 
in prosecutions of African workers by the reinforced police 
force followed the togt regulations and implementation of the 
vagrant law. There were increases in prosecutions between 
1873-74 in terms of the master and servants law (from 142 to 
197), vagrant law (5 to 261) and togt regulations (0 to 72). 
This sharp increase in the coercion of the local state through 
the police against African workers established their routine 
application of the new laws and marked a general trend 
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towards an increase in arbitrary arres t and 
prosecution. 
FIGURE 1. 2 
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The year following the outbreak of an international 
capitalist crisis, 1874, was the turning point in the application 
of new laws and police force against African workers. While in 
1871 some 5 ,per cent of the African working population was 
prosecuted in terms of labour repressive legislation, by 1877 
this had risen dramatically to 32 per cent. In Durban, as in 
the other major centres of concentration of capital, coercion 
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and exploitation was ripening into the systematic form 
of national oppression characteristic of the 'modern' 
period. The full weight of the state was falling on the 
African workers not in defence of an agrarian patriarchal 
order but in disciplining the workers to overcome a 
crisis in capitalist relations. 
Resistance and development of the barracks 
The high level of prosecutions and state action 
against African workers indicated the persistent 
resistance to the more intense exploitation of African 
workers. This took the form of spontaneous action to 
demand increased wages, to dodge compliance 
with regulations, and most concretely to avoid being 
28 
housed and controlled in compounds. The history of togt labour 
from the inception of the togt regulations to the turn of 
the century was one of growing determination by employers 
and the municipality to squeeze the togt workers into the 
compounds, and an equal determination by these workers to 
defy, wriggle out, or look for alternative forms of housing in 
the town. Their main refuge was in the backyards of employers 
of monthly servants where the rations of these workers 
could be shared. But the municipality also took action 
against shacks built by workers in the dock area in an attack 
on all forms of alternative housing to the compounds. 
Although the togt regulations had given the municipality 
'great satisfaction' in its first year of operation they were 
resisted by the workers. Although it was reported 
that the number of togt workers registered in terms 
of the regulations had risen to 550 by July 1874, by 
the end of the year the Natal Chamber of Commerce was 
complaining that many of the togt workers had left the 
town and had caused a shortage of labour. The resistance 
to the new measures had forced wages up to 'a comparatively 
high figure', and employers had asked the Resident Magistrate 
to fix a maximum wage for togt labour. This was not 
possible in terms of the togt regulations which provided 
only for the prescribing of minimum wage rates to make 
possible the compulsion to labour. Theoretically it would 
otherwise have been possible for employers to force togt 
workers to work for wages which were well below the average 
wages paid. This could have caused the state to have 
become over-extended in exerting a direct compulsion to 
labour, and the ID1nlmUm wage rates allowed some conception 
of 'fairness' in daily wage contracts to remain, while 
at the same time drastically increasing police powers. 
The magistrate informed the Chamber that only minimum wage 
rates could be fixed and these were set at Is 6d a day or 
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3d an hour. Despite the employers' offensive and the 
concentrated use of the state powers against the togt 
workers, wages had not been significantly reduced below 
those of labourers in the United Kingdom. Through their 
resistance the togt workers had secured a wage which was at 
least equal to that for casual dock labour in London in the 
same period (wages of London dock workers were only 4 or 5d 
per hour in 1889) and a persistent complaint of the employers 
29 
was that African workers' wages were al.ast equal to that 
in the .. tropolitan centre. 2) 
)0 
The .ini.u. wage laid down by the Resident Magistrate 
was opposed by the togt worker. who de .. nded an (unspecified) 
increase in March 1875. The Town Council turned down their 
de .. nd and increasingly used the togt regulations as a .. ans 
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of general control over the .ove .. nt of all African workers. 
The upward trend in prosecutions provides a superficial 
indication of the deep underlying resistance of the African workers 
as a whole to the DOre intensive exploitation aade poa.ible by 
an increasingly larger and more oppressive state. -In response 
to the eri.i. within world capital is. and to the resistance 
of the indigenous people in Southern Africa, the British .tate 
beca .. increasingly involved in politically do.inating the 
region and quickening the transformation of relations ot 
do.ination into productive relations. In what beca.e later 
described as the war. of conquest, British and colonial troops 
beea .. involved in attacks on the independent African people. 
and Afrikaner republic.. Imperialist domination over all 
indigenous Southern African people. prepared the way for the 
forcible integration of the region on a capitalist ba.is, a 
co~n infra.tructure, and a widened .. rket. The.e war. were 
not conducted simply for the purpose of un:iform political 
do.ination alone under a rapacious British policy. 
As Bukharin has arguedt 
War serves to reproduce definite relations of 
prpduction. War of conquest serves to reproduce 
those relations on a wider scale. Simply to 
define war, however, as conquest i. entirely 
insufficient. for the simple reason that in 
doing so we fail to indicate the .. in thing. 
namely. what production relations are 
strengthen;d or extended by the war. what 26 
basis is widened by a given 'policy of conquest'. 
The attacks against the Zulu in 1879 were, for example, in 
the words of the British High Commissioner, frankly conducted 
to turn the Zulu 'man-slaying hu.an .ilitary .. chine' into 
a 'useful class of native labourers'. An aggressive 
imperialist policy was thus closely linked to the perennial 
shortage of labour and the challenge posed to the relations 
of exploitation and domination by the resistance of African 
workers in the towns. 
There vere distinct connections between resistance in the 
countryside and in the towns. One of the reasons for the sudden 
labour shortage and the upward pressure on wages after the 
promulgation ot the togt regulations was the attack on the 
Hlubi by colonial troops in 187). The warriors who put up a 
spirited resistance to Briti.h troops were no strangers to wage 
labour and had been the largest single group of workers in 
28 the colonial capital, Pieter .. ritzbur~. 
Siailarly, even after the Zulu army. had been decisively 
beaten at Ulundi on 4 July there i. evidence that the 'useful 
class of Dative labourers' vas prepared to adopt new .. thods 
of struggle in the towns. With congested port facilities, rising 
var inflation, and i..anaa transport proble .. , the .-ployers 
)1 
and the state were vulnerable to mass walkouts from Durban. 
African workers co-ordinated their efforts to force wages up 
and resist state action. During the early days of October 1819 
the Superintendent of Police in Durban reported that about 100 
workers had lett the borough tor their kraals in protest 
against retaliation for making wage demands. 'They are becoming 
very dissatisfied and independent I in some cases where one 
has been tired for refusing to work at the price laid down in 
the togt laws, numbers have at once thrown up their badges. ,29 
Although the workers' resi8tance did not take the form of an 
all out strike, the ma8S walkouts and confrontations with 
employers formed part of a prolonged struggle which created 
turbulence in the labour MArket. The proble .. faced by 
employers were worsened by the unsettled conditions in 
Zululand which resulted in the migration route trom Mozambique 
to the south being shut off. The Police Superintendent 
reported that no batches of Amatonga had entered the 
colony since September the previous year and that there 
seemed to be no tree pas.age through Zululand. Only 50 to 
60 Zulu labourers had entered the borough and every tirm 
was short handed, some paying ,S and providing rations to 
togt workers.'O The resistance waged by the togt workers 
over the period, even with the devastating defeats in the 
countryside, had enabled wages to be doubled in tive years. 
The persistent antagonism of African workers to the 
machinery of control only increased the determination of 
the ruling class to strengthen the police and subject the 
workers to the discipline of barrack life. Five additional 
African policemen and a white constable taken on early in 
1877 brought the total police force overseeing togt workers 
to 17, providing a policeman for every 47 togt workers. 
Further additions to the togt police force would be made 1n 
the future. But the primary emphasis of state policy was to 
squeeze the togt workers into barracks. A large building 
was completed in 1878 with funds from the swelling togt 
account with accommodation for 'a large number of men' and 
light, cooking utensils, and a storeroom. In addition to 
these inducements no rent was charged. The Resident Magistrate 
called a meeting of togt workers in the town to explain the 
purpose of the barracks and the Mayor appealed to the white 
householders to prohibit togt workers from sleeping on their 
premises at night. Despite this strategy the 800 togt workers 
h · hI' . . h b k 30 were 19 y res1stant to mov1ng 1nto t e arrac s. 
The process of municipal controls over African workers 
continued relentlessly. In 1881 an attempt was made to bring 
monthly servants under a similar code of rules as the togt 
workers by establiShing the identity of all African workers: 
their names, tribes and kraals. The pass system was tightened 
in the following years to give effect to the Vagrant Law, and 
a,,,l,, 
the mayoriappeale4 to property owners not to give African 
33 
34 
workers imprecise passes which would make the law ineffective. 3l 
When the Resident Magistrate gave a judgement which weakened 
the arbitrary powers of the police in terms of the Vagrant 
Law, the Superintendent confessed that the passes were an 
invention of the police, but argued they were essential. 
'As the pass, however, is the only means the police have of 
testing the truthfulness of a native's assertion that he is on 
lawful business, the Vagrant Law without such a pass becomes 
d d 1 d h 1 b . 1 . . d' 32 a ea etter, an t e resu t can e eaSL y Lmaglne • 
The strategy of the ruling class was centred on rooting 
out the togt workers from the backyards of the householders and 
destroying all independent shecks in the dock area in the drive 
to force all togt workers into the barracks. This strategy 
was closely related to that of forcing the wages of togt 
workers downwards. The municipal records abound with 
complaints about the high wages and shorter hours of the 
togt workers in comparison to the monthly workers. Togt 
labour was considered 'demoralising' by the Superintendent 
of Police in 1890 because he considered the workers needed 
little more than food, a few old clothes, and about 2s to pay for 
hut tax. He argued that the consumption of workers should be 
limited and wages reduced to increase their labour time. 'What 
the "jobber" receives is about 2s 6d per diem and food for 
8 hours work, and having no legitimate use for all these wages, 
spends half of his time in idleness, and very naturally other 
Kafirs wish to do the same, and refuse to enter into monthly 
service.' He suggested that the wages for African labourers 
should be reduced to Is a day with food. 33 His proposal 
was 'out of season' during the boom in imports 1886 to 
1893 which strengthened the position of the togt workers. 
At this time the mayor considered that the togt workers 
had become 'almost uncontrolled' and able to command high 
wages. Councillor Nicol, who was connected with the 
stevedoring trade, was asked to produce a report in 1891 
on counter measures to the togt workers indA.pendence. 
The aim of the local property owners was to force the workers 
into barracks. As the mayor argued in 1891, the 'concentration 
of a part of the floating population will not only bring them 
under more complete and salutaty police and sanitary control', 
but would also prevent 'sponging' upon domestic servants. 34 
The attack on togt workers drawing on the rations of monthly 
servants was not simply a determination to defend the 
colonial domestic economy from parasites, but also to reduce 
the togt workers' capacity to resist the downward pressure on 
wages exerted by employers. When the flood of imports began 
to recede in 1893 the employers were able to reduce the 
wages of African and Indian workers as the concentrated power 
of the state was brought to bear against the workers. 35 
The pressure on workers outside the compounds and 
backyards was also increased by municipal policy towards shacks 
occupied by workers in the dock area. In 1891, the same year 
in which attacks were made on togt workers in the backyards of 
householders, the Water Police reported the old shanties in the 
Point area had been demolished and that new buildings were 
35 
being erected. There had been an increase 1n population 
in the Bamboo Square locality 1n the Point but the residents 
had been brought under better control, the police reported. 
The population of the area had a multi-racial and even 
cosmopolitan character being made up of Malays, Indians, 
Chinese, Whites, and Africans, but family life on any scale 
seems only to have been possible for Whites and Indians. 
There was a sharp decline in the number of African workers 
living in Bamboo Square in 1885, possibly as a result of 
compulsion to live in the compounds built 1n 1878 and only 
partially occupied for many years. The steady drop from 
431 Africans in 1889 living in the area to 186 in 1893 
was certainly the result of police pressure as the togt 
population as a whole had expanded during this period. But 
despite the ruling class resistance to a permanent African 
working class the growth of families had not been completely 
suppressed. On the last date for which figures are 
available (1893) there were 18 women and 5 children among the 
African resid·ents a sign that to a limited extent family 
life was possible for African people in the waterfront area. 
Even this small development posed a threat to the collective 
discipline exercised through the barracks over African 
workers. 36 
The reluctance of African workers to move into the 
barracks was met by a major policy of compulsion with a minor 
one of inducement. While backyard accommodation and the 
workers' shanties were being attacked, the Chairman of the 
36 
Sani tary Connni t tee argued that residence in the barracks 
should be made compulsory for togt workers. 'If judiciously 
managed', he wrote 'These places may be made so attractive 
to the native as to induce him to give them his preference 
and this should be steadily kept in view, as COmpulsion 
37 
would convey the idea of imprisonment to the untutored'. 
The exercise of force was more to the alternatives to the 
barracks rather than direct compUlsion to live in them. Yet 
even these policies were unsuccessful in driving African 
workers to approved accommodation. By 1892 only about 140 
37 
workers occupied the barracks which were capable of accommodating 
400-500. By this time the 'free' accommodation policy of 
1878 had been modified as the workers were charged a rent of 
2s 6d per month, and this was one of the workers' arguments against 
38 the system. As the goal of control through inducements and 
suppression of alternatives proved inadequate, the Superintendent 
adopted an increasingly shrill tone and demanded the militari-
zation of African labour. 
If it is necessary (which it is) to keep an army of 
our own race in a compound after 9 p.m., it is surely 
more imperative that we should keep our l~ 000 
uneducated savages under similar control, for I see 
plainly that unless some steps are taken no amount of 
Police will be able to keep this Borough in the 
perfect order and safety I do so much desire. 
This demand for placing African workers under direct police 
control in their non-working hours was modified only by a 
reactionary and false utopianism in his view of what was 
possible behind the enclosed walls of the compound. 
Think agaIn, the Natives could have in their 
own compound all that was necessary, such as 
eating-houses, schools, churches, playground, 
etc., and not as they are now, between 5 and 
9 p.m. subjected to all the temptations for 
liquor and other vices and after that hour 
penned up in hovels (for a few pence) a vagabond 
to give them a pass to wander about after hours, 
or get one from some of their employer's family 
on the pretence of going to school. J9 
The peculiar juxtaposition of ideas of reform and 
bureaucratic control, the protest against the imprisonment of 
workers in hovels and the demand for tighter enforcement of 
the pass system, revealed the contradictions within the ruling 
class strategy towards the African working class. The police, 
who were in charge of enforcing the cheap labour system on a 
daily basis were possibly more aware than other sections of the 
municipal bureaucracy of the need to eliminate the shabby and 
inefficiently controlled private accommodation of African 
workers in favour of a solution more on the lines of monopoly 
capital In the mining industry. With the upswing in imports 
in the late l890s and intense activity in the docks, a decisive 
settlement of the questions of accommodation and control 
of African workers on a municipal basis became an 
urgent priority. 
Labour intensity and national oppression 
The concern of the political representatives of Durban's 
property owners 'to 'deal with' the problem of the togt workers 
varied considerably from year to year. At certain times the 
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control over these workers became a central issue for 
both municipal and colonial government (as in 1874), at 
other times these issues were considered mundane and 
routine. On occasion the political action taken by 
employers and the state against the workers was directly 
related to crises within the colonial economy, to the 
upswings and downturns of trade. More usefully, the 
general policies adopted by the municipal representatives 
can be related to the deeper transformations within the 
world economy, the increasing tendency towards monopoly 
capital and the sudden expansion of production in South 
Africa during the 'mining revolution.' 
The growth in nationally oppressive legislation and 
policies was linked to the rising demand for labour over the 
whole period of the late 19th century and the intensity of 
that labour. The demand of property owners in Durban for 
segregationary measures was,for instance, related to the 
intensity of labour during the upswing in trade from 1887 
to 1892. Electric lights were gradually introduced to 
enable work to carryon late into the night (until 2200 and 
2300) as well as introducing Sunday work. 40 The lengthening 
of the working day and intensity of labour caused an 
increase in demand for African labour (employment rose from 
403 employed on the wharves in 1887 to 1,067 in 1889), but 
also resulted in demands for African workers to be 
segregated in togt barracks. The white householders at the 
Point objected to the African labourers who worked late into 
39 
the night hanging around the Point area with friends. 4l 
The greater propulsion of municipal policies was, however, 
the need for capital to have a disciplined labour force on tap 
day and night. Barrack accommodation would be the cheapest 
way of housing the workers and ensuring that discipline. 
The passes, raids on backyards and on shanties, and expansion 
of the police by taxing the workers, followed on logically. 
The togt workers were compelled to pay for their own 
policing through the registration system and high level of 
fines for contravening regulations; the amount spent on 
police salaries and rations alone more than doubling between 
1877 and 1879. 42 
The togt regulations at a glance seem to be a 
self-perpetuating and effortless system of domination over the 
African working class, but contained their own contradictions. 
The large number of workseekers required to supply the urban 
labour market on a daily basis 'compelled the employment of 
a police force far larger than would otherwise be necessary', 
but the 'benefits' of the system (the barracks) could only 
be provided by a high level of repression which agaln required 
1 I , f 43 a arger po lce orce. The whole edifice of labour 
taxes, police, passes, and barracks, was intended to cheapen 
African labour power in the towns, but met a strong 
oppositional force in the resistance of the workers. During 
periods of economic upswing when African labour was in 
40 
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strong demand wage increases could not be resisted and 
tended to undermine not only the low wages the system 
was intended to enforce but also the basis for the 
political rule over the African working class. 
The whole direction of the bourgeoisie in colonial 
Natal was towards the expansion of commodity relations and 
new means of production at the fastest pace possible in the 
face of rising inter-imperialist competition. Far from 
~ the bourgeoisie bring~in political reforms 'from above' 
in correspondence with its greater material achievements, 
1n the towns which were the centre of its political rule 
and wealth, any movement by African workers towards 
expanding their area of unrestrained activity was met with 
the growing weight of the state fed by the appropriation 
of their unpaid labour. Far from the growing national 
oppression of the African people being determined by 
relics of the 'feudal' past, it has been argued that the 
elemental features of the modern apartheid system (barracks, 
passes, police control) developed from the rising 
contradictions within the growth of capitalism in an 
underdeveloped region. Each crisis of capital, world-
wide and within the region, tended inexorably towards 
the development and routinization of class and national 
oppression. But the very extremity to which the 
bourgeoisie was driven in defining and redefining the 
relations of domination was also an acknowledgement of the 
growing powers of an increasingly self-confident African 
working class. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TOGT WORKERS AND THE FORMATION OF THE 'DURBAN SYSTEM' 
Capital is command over labour. 
Adam Smith 
The regulation and limitation of togt labour ••. is unquestionally 
a subject of more importance than would appear at first sight. 
It is a class of labour which is under very little or loose 
control, a circumstance which is detrimental to morality and 
social order among a people, to whom restraint in a form more 
powerful than public opinion or conscientious scruples is still 
necessary. 
Report of Native Affairs Commission, 1906-07, para 93. 
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The tremendous expansion of the world economy and inter-
imperialist rivalries in the late 19th century secured 
effectively the subordination of almost all the population of 
Africa and Asia to formal imperialist control. The destruction 
of tribal kingdoms, principalities, and small republics (as 
1n the case of the Boer republic's) was both an economic and 
political process; the free circulation of commodities under-
mining handicraft production, and the military arm of 
imperialist countries breaking up the political unity of 
agrarian societies. The intrusion of one common factor 
(imperialist domination) over a variety of subjugated peoples 
gave rise to national movements in the colonies, and the 
growth of capitalist production to the formation of a working 
class. In South Africa which became the arena for imperialist 
wars involving the direct intervention of British troops against 
the Xhosa in the Eastern Cape, the Zulu in the area north of 
Natal, and finally against the Boer Republics, the growth of 
nationalism and class consciousness arose in response to the 
specific forms of capitalist domination. 
War is a power accelerator of social tendencies, and modern 
imperialist wars have required an increase in the ideological 
content of the struggle against opposing military forces. 
Military struggles between peoples have a political purpose, or 
as Lenin argued: 'war is a continuation of the politics of 
01 0 h O 0 fl 1,1 partlcu ar classes 1n t elr pursu1t 0 c ass goa s • 
The South African war which was fought by thousands of British 
troops against the Boer Republics involved the mobilisation 
of all forms of transport and production in the struggle to 
assert the hegemony of British imperialism over the form of 
state developing in South Africa. The war involved a tremendous 
expansion in wage labour for African people: as labourers for 
the British army, transport riders, agricultural workers, and 
dock workers. The British army paid higher wages to indigenous 
workers and provided better diet in an attempt to secure a 
plentiful labour supply. The expansion in demand for labour 
marked by the South African war disturbed the pattern of stable 
low wages and exposed African workers to the contradictions 
within the ruling class in Southern Africa. As an extension of 
politics by other means, the South African war introduced 
African workers to the politics of imperialism in the guise of 
liberalism: opposition to Boer 'slavery', arguments for 
equality within the British Empire, etc. The conclusion of the 
war was, however, marked by a capitalist crisis caused by the 
overexpansion of unproductive military expenditure and its sudden 
collapse, resulting in the growth in the exploitation of workers 
and national oppression. In Durban as elsewhere in South Africa, 
increased racism and demands for segregation were a response to 
this crisis and working class resistance. The contradictions 
within this crisis were brought out clearly by the struggle of 
the togt workers and the intense debates within the local state 
on the appropriate form of accommodation and control of these 
workers. 
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Accelerated proletarianization, a rapidly expanding 
industrial reserve army, and the rapid growth of political 
consciousness of the African massess (initially in the form 
of Ethiopianism) disturbed the relations of domination between 
the local ruling class and the growing African petty bourgeoisie 
and working class. The moral panics expressed in the cry of 
'black peril' were centred in the urban centres and were a means 
of mobilizing ruling class ideology against African workers 
and disciplining aberrant whites. The relations of dominance 
in the countryside were being challenged by increasingly 
assertive black agricultural producers (particularly share-
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croppers on white farms), and a desperate African peasantry. The 
hysteria of the black peril crises was evidence of the disintegration 
of bourgeois ideology as a means of subordinating African 
(particularly African workers) resistance. The crisis was 
ultimately resolved only with the slaughter which followed the 
Bambata rebellion and the formulation of more sophisticated 
ideology of segregation and racism. The Bambata uprising marked 
some of the most determined resistance to state intervention to 
secure effective subordination and accelerated proletarianization. 
Despite this important aspect of resistance (fought in many cases 
by African workers who returned from the cities) the crisis in 
relations of domination in the urban centres is crucial for 
understanding of the development of systematic subordination 
(particularly in the municipal departments of 'Native Administration') 
. , 
and the ideological formulation of 'satisfactory race relations. 
It is in the urban centres that there is the most concrete 
evidence of the resistance of the black proletariat and 
indications of its consciousness. The struggle of the black 
proletariat against the system created by capital and the state 
to reproduce cheap labour power (the master and servants legisla-
tion, labour tax, pass laws, curfews, and compounds) brought the 
1ssue of 'detribalization' and class consciousness into the 
debates on the appropriate forms of control, particularly into 
demands for segregation. 
The togt workers in Durban who serviced the most important 
port in Southern Africa were an important element in the black 
proletariat and engaged 1n resistance to the increasingly 
developed forms of control and post-war levels of exploitation. 
The growing resistance of African workers to the penal labour 
contracts of the Master and Servants Act and the rising demand 
for dock labour stimulated the expansion of togt labour during the 
period of the South African war. In response there was a vigorous 
debate within the ruling class about the form of contract which 
should be the basis of wage labour in the urban centres within the 
context of the overall social and political controls over the 
African population. As African workers came to understand the 
points of vulnerability of the ruling class so there was an increase 
in confidence and action. The local bourgeoisie reacted with 
meetings on the 'proper' relations which should exist between black 
servants and white masters, and arguments for stricter discipline 
over Africans in town generally. In particular the issue focused 
on arguments whether blacks should be allowed to walk on the 
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pavements in Durban (a point which was vigorously debated in 
most urban centres during the post-war crisis). From these 
discussions a reform movement was established which argued for 
segregation as a solution for racial conflict and as a means 
of securing a continued supply of cheap labour. The most 
concerted response to the growth of an increasingly assertive 
black proletariat in the cities was the development of a Native 
Administration to regularize and institutionalize the relations 
of domination, and to attack the basis for African family life in 
the cities and political action by the black working class. 
These initiatives on the part of the local bourgeoisie met 
with an ambiguous response from the African petty bourgeoisie, even 
from politically conscious elements in the formative national 
movement, which resisted aspects of racial oppression but were also 
opposed to strikes, in favour of an austere work ethic, and 
opposed to liquor brewing. By the beginning of the First World 
War there was a considerable expansion of the local state 1n 
Durban, and growing sophistication in regulating the lives of 
African workers. The justification for extensive state intervention 
1n the labour market advanced from the unsubtle direct support 
of the interests of employers to considerations of social welfare 
and a benign paternalism. Native Administration in Durban which 
grew parasitically from taxing African workers,gradually achieved 
a greater uniformity and internal routine and became known to its 
opponents and advocates as the 'Durban system'. This system of 
administration sought to maintain the subordination of African 
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workers in the cities and the cheap labour system under the new 
levels of proletarianization of the early 1900s and against the 
rising demands of African workers. The department which was 
initially based on the establishment of a beer monopoly was able 
to expand the detailed control over African employment, provide 
municipal compounds as the most effective form of mass 
accommodation, deny family life to African workers, and expand 
the bureaucracy of the local state. All these points were necessary 
elements in an integrated approach to the African proletariat in 
the post-South African war period. 
Rising employment, resistance and reaction 
The South African war following on the rindepest epidemic 
of 1896-7 marked an important phase in the formation of an African 
proletariat and the growth of differentiation in the African 
peasantry. For the mass of African workers and peasants this 
period increased dependence on wage labour as the major source of 
income. There was a marked increase in indebtedness to traders 
and farmers. 2 Though the increase in employment by the British 
army compensated in some measure for the virtual closing of the 
gold mines, many workers families were reduced to dependence on 
food relief particularly in the devastated northern areas of 
Natal. The British army employed African workers in the Cape 
at 60s a month with rations for a three month contract, and 
Basuto workers in Bloemfontain were paid 40s, but workers in Natal 
received only 30s. Where voluntary recruitment failed, African 
workers (particularly refugees) were subject to conscription or 
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maintained at labour depots as a reserve labour force. 3 This 
form of labour was resisted by the workers in the form of enormous 
desertion rates and occasional strikes. In the countryside the 
scorched earth policy followed by the British Army destroyed the 
crops of African farmers. The disruption of food supplies 
intensified pressure on the food resources of the remaining rural 
areas. The higher prices for grain stimulated production among 
the well-to-do peasantry in certain areas, especially in Natal 
and Pondoland, but for the poorer strata the war crisis terminated 
their independence from wage labour and increased their cash 
requirements. 4 The post-war regime of direct rule by British 
imperialism enabled a united policy to be adopted by the local 
bourgeoisie in the form of a savage attack on the wage levels of 
labourers, increased taxation, and reorganized labour supplies. 
African workers who jubilantly burned their passes when British 
5 . d troops entered Johannesburg in June 1900 were soon subJecte to 
an even more rigorous labour regime. African workers responded 
with a series of strikes and resistance on the Witwatersrand in 
lgOl-02, and their actions were matched by workers in Pietermaritz-
burg and Durban where demands for increased wages, backed by strike 
action, continued up to 1904. 
The overwhelming number of African workers in employment were 
migrants from rural areas, particularly the reserves, and 6,967 
were 'foreign' migrants from Lesotho and Mozambique.* A persistent 
policy followed by all municipalities from the l870s had severely 
* For employment figures see Table 1. 
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restricted the settlement of African workers with their families 
in the urban areas, and the age/sex composition of the African 
population in the towns shows very few women and children. African 
migration flowed from underdeveloped areas to coastal plantations 
and commercial agriculture, mining areas and to the urban centres. 
Figure I presents the data on the movement of African workers from 
rural areas especially to Durban (18,100 workers), Pietermaritzburg 
(7,586), and centres of agricultural capitalist production. The 
outflow of workers came not only from the reserves but to a lesser 
extent from white farming areas, a cause for continual complaint 
and agitation by white farmers who demanded controls over migration, 
in particular legislation to strengthen the control of the African 
patriach in families on farms. Controls were also demanded 
particularly by white farmers over the movement of African workers 
out of Natal, a delicate issue to be raised in the negotiations 
between sections of the bourgeoisie investigating unification of 
South Africa. 
The statistics on numbers of African male migrant workers from 
rural areas show 29 counties exporting and 11 importing labour. 
The spread of workers from neighbouring counties to the urban 
centres to those most distant, provides some indication of the extent 
of impoverishment in the countryside: Vryheid in the northern area 
of Natal providing most migrants followed by Mapumulo which is 1n 
the 'catchment' area for labour supplies to the sugar plantations 
and Durban. The extent of labour supplies from Zululand (particularly 
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Eshowe, Nkandhla, Nqutu, Ingwavuma, and Mahlabatini) 
shows the extent to which capitalist relations had penetrated 
into 'traditional' areas of patriarchal society. By adopting 
the concept of rates of migration in relation to rural 
concentrations of African population, a more qualitative 
approach can be used to assess the primary areas of export 
of labour.* The statistics (Figure 1) demonstrate the lack of 
correlation between the areas exporting the greatest volume 
of labour to those with the highest rates of male labour 
migration. The general pattern which emerges is that of the 
greatest proletarianization in the reserves adjacent to the 
urban centres, followed by reserves further distant, and then 
by white agricultural areas. 
There was a considerable expansion 1n employment in 
Natal during the war years 1899-1902 particularly in transport 
and the docks, but also in mining and industrial production. 
Coal mining was disrupted to some extent between 1899-1900 
when production declined from 329 to 241 000 tons, but 
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the mines continued to employ just over 2000 African workers • 
African employment in industry expanded considerably in the 
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period between 1900-04 from 6337 to 10,378 workers, an increase 
* This approach owes much to the work of Jill Nattrass (September 1975) 
who skillfully employs population analysis to calculate the movement 
of migrant workers. The migration rate = adult African male 
migrants - African adult males in rural areas + migrants, c.f. 
Nattrass (September 1975): 8. The migration rate from rural 
districts on this calculation does not take account of the 
permanent urban working class population, which at this point 
is not very large. 
of 64 per cent. In 1900 African workers constituted 29 per cent 
of an industrial labour force of 22,047 and were mainly concentrated 
in food and drink (1,881), building materials (1,981), metal works 
(1,373), and brick yards (1,128). By far the largest single concen-
tration of African workers ln one occupation were the Durban dock 
workers who numbered about 2800 in 1900 and expanded to about 5100 ln 
1904.7 By 1904 some 76,700 African male workers were in wage employ-
ment in Natal and it was estimated that 23,500 were employed in other 
1 . 8 co onles. If employment in Natal and elsewhere is totalled, then 
41 per cent of an estimated 244,500 adult African males were in wage 
employment. Labour supplies at this level indicate a high level of 
proletarianization and labour migration from even the most remote 
reserves. No calculation is made here of the growing industrial 
reserve army of labour; the unemployed migrants 'resting' after 
employment, and the increasing number of African women workers. 
TABLE 2.1 AFRICANS ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE IN NATAL, 1904 
Male Female 
A. Professional 1,700 
B. Domestic 30,100 10,200 
c. Commercial 2,200 
D. Transport and 
communication: 
Docks 5,100 1 
Other 2,700 
E. Industrial 10,400 
F. Mining 3,0002 
G. Agricu1 ture 23,3003 
H. Peasants 185,2004 292,500 
263,700 302,700 
Source: Natal Census, 1904: p.678 
Table continued •••••.••• 
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TABLE Continued •••••• 
1. Dock workers calculated from Mayor's Minute, 1904 and 
'other' the difference between all transport and 
communication workers and dock workers. 
2. Mining workers an estimate allowing for increased 
employment for increased production 1900-04. 
3. Agricultural workers calculated by subtracting the sum of 
B+C+D+E (non-agricultural wage employment) from the total of 
76,713 African male workers in employment (Natal Census, 
1904: 64). 
4. Calculated from category "primary producers of material" 
less agricultural and mining workers. 
Without undertaking a comprehensive analysis of each area of 
export of labour power from the table below, it can be shown that 
the most impoverished areas are those which are reserves and which 
9 have very little local employment. 
TABLE 2. 2 MOST IMPOVERISHED LABOUR EXPORTING AREAS 
Migration rate* 
Mapumulo 46 
Kranskop 44 
Lower Tugela 41 
Umlalazi 39 
Ndwedwe 39 
Umsinga 38 
Eshowe 38 
Nkandh1a 38 
Mahlabatini 37 
Nqutu 37 
*Proportion of total adult males absent. 
Source: Appendix and Natal Census, 1904. 
Local Employment 
85 
477 
935 
309 
61 
309 
1,062 
267 
145 
291 
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The rate of migration of African males from these areas 
indicates the high level of proletarianization and the creation 
of an industrial reserve army for capital in areas quite 
distant from major urban centres. A migration rate of more 
than 30 per cent would present a high level of participation 
in wage labour; those present in the rural areas including workers 
returning from employment to maintain their families, others 
possibly not being able to get employment. 
There were two main streams of migration for workers ln 
Natal and Zululand; towards the Witwatersrand from the 
northern areas of Vryheid and Umsinga, and towards the urban 
areas of Pietermaritzburg and Durban from the midlands and 
Zululand. Durban attracted migrant workers from throughout 
the colony, from the south (Pondoland) and the north (Mozambique), 
as well as immigrant workers from Mauritius, St. Helena, and 
India. 
TABLE 2.3 AFRICAN POPULATION IN DURBAN, ORIGINS 
Male Female 
Natal 12,010 622 
Zululand 5,259 41 
Mozambique 424 3 
Swaziland 142 2 
Pondoland 113 
Natal Census, 1904: 376 
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The extent of proletarianization of the workforce can 
be seen by the ages of workers. A heavier dependence on wage 
labour would be demonstrated by workers starting wage employment 
at an earlier age and leaving off well into their mature years. 
The population data on Durban indicates employment of young boys 
below the age of 15 and men over 40; within the labour force 
there was a core of workers forced into wage labour at an early 
age and unable to retire until shortly before their death. 
TABLE 2.4 
1 -5 
5 -15 
15 -40 
40+ 
AGE, SEX, AND EMPLOYMENT OF AFRICAN POPULATION, 
DURBAN 
Male 
53 
1,702 
15,421 
1,060 
Female 
S5 
84 
522 
32 
Employment 
1,618* 
15,943 
1,092 
18,236 693 18,653 
*African male youth employment is calculated here on the difference 
between male and female youths 5-15, assuming that no girls were 
1n wage employment. 
Natal Census, 1904: 267-268 
Despite the policy of denying African families residence in 
the urban areas the children enumerated in the census show that 
there was a demographic basis for arguing that the African workers 
in the town were becoming fully proletarianized and permanent 
urban workers. From the census data there could have been up to 
200 African families living in DurbanlO 
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By the turn of the century African workers in Durban 
were channelled into four major 'labour markets' which related 
to the level of accumulation of capital and were closely 
regulated by the local state: togt workers, washermen, ricksha 
pullers, and monthly contract workers. Each 'market' had its 
own regulations, was characterised by a rapid turnover of 
workers, and was taxed to pay for policing, sanitation, and a 
general subsidy to the local state. The taxes (in the form 
of registration fees) also served the function of forcing 
workers into employment contracts on the least favourable terms 
and acted as a pressure to reduce wages: what the employers 
lost in terms of the demands for higher wages they gained in 
terms of lower municipal rates subsidised by revenue from 
African workers. Despite persistent attempts to control the 
expansion of togt labour and to channel African workers into 
monthly employment under the penal discipline of the Master 
and Servants Act, the employers acknowledged that as a seaport 
Durban would always have a large proportion of togt workers 
to keep the wage costs of shipping companies low. The issue 
was rather the control of togt labour (both the wages demanded 
and the form of accommodation provided) and to maintain 
sufficient labour supply in each sector: washermen, ricksha, 
togt, and monthly labour. The most tightly regulated sections 
of the labour market were the rickshaw, togt, and washermen 
workers because of their exposure to policy scrutiny and 
concentration in compounds. The monthly contracts registered 
were only a fraction of the workers employed in commerce, 
domestic service, industry, and municipal service. 
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The togt system and working class resistance 
The war in the interior increased tremendously the amount 
of cargo handled in the Durban docks; war material, food, and 
equipment for the reorganization of production on the Rand. 
The strategic situation of the Durban docks apart, important 
improvement had been taking place in mechanical handling of 
cargo and in deepening the mouth of the Bay to admit the largest 
ships. By 1904 the Chairman of the Natal Chamber of Commerce 
could boast: 
Our harbour is now, undoubtedly, the best in South 
Africa. We offer facilities in every department 
second to those of no other port. Steamers of 
practically any size can enter or leave this port 
at any state of the tide, and any hour of the day or 
night. Such a thing as lighterage at the outer 
anchorage is absolutely unknown, and the great 
saving this means to shipowners is too obvious to 
need comment. 11 
These improved conditions which could guarantee lower costs 
and higher profits for shipowners were based on a proficient group 
of dock workers and collective action by employers to suppress the 
upward movement of wages. Despite the cheapness of labour, new 
developments such as the increased export and bunkering of 
coal tended to become mechanized and the overall demand for dock 
labour reduced. One of the most labour-intensive operations in the 
docks, loading coal on to ships, became mechanized fairly rapidly 
after Natal coal was demonstrated to be suitable for export. The 
new system of a £60,000 loading plant with a daily capacity of 
4,000 tons was in striking contrast to the old system by which 
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coal was carried on board from railway trucks i~ baskets by 
12 
African on narrow planks. Despite some advance in 
mechanization, the docks proved to be an area of transport 
which demanded virtually unlimited supplies of labour during 
the war period. 
The increased activity in the docks lead both to an 
increase in the absolute numbers of workers in the docks and 
the intensity of their labour (in the case of daily paid 
workers the possibility of work every day of the week). 
TABLE 2.5. LABOUR SUPPLY AND PRODUCTIVITY, 1898-1905 
Tonnage landed Togt workers Tonnage landed per 
000 tons (average/month) worker 
1898 441 2,326 190 
1899 521 2,509 207 
1900 795 2,832 281 
1901 944 3,790 249 
1902 1,103 4,753 232 
1903 1,288 5,125 251 
1904 797 5,116 156 
1905 748 1,934 387 
(Compiled from Reports of the Port Captain of tonnage of 
imported cargo, and Mayor's Minutes of each year). 
Although the concept of tonnage landed per togt worker is 
necessarily imprecise because of the tendency of togt labour to 
spread into other sectors than the docks during times of 
labour shortage and the fact that by the very nature of the work 
the workers are not fully employed, this figure does give some 
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indication of the intensity of labour in the docks. The 
figures indicate an increased intensity of work with gradual 
increase in labour supply up to 1900, followed by a period in 
which labour supplies increase in greater proportion to the 
increase in tonnage landed. The situation in 1905 
reflected both the collapse of trade in that year and the 
resistance of workers to the new conditions of togt labour; 
the crisis leading to increased levels, of exploitation of 
workers in terms of tonnage landed per worker. 
The increased demand for togt labour in the late 1890s had 
two important effects: firstly, it enabled the workers to 
increase their resistance to exploitation and subordination 1n 
the cities and,secondly, it caused a shift in the labour market 
away from monthly labour under the Master and Servants Act. 
Despite the attempts by employers and the state to squeeze 
togt workers into monthly labour, the relative relationship 
between monthly and togt registrations remained stable despite 
the increase in employment. In 1901 there were 2.28 monthly 
workers for every togt worker, in 1904 there were 2.10, only 
a small minority of monthly workers being registered. It was 
only with the post-war economic crisis that a decisive 
movement towards monthly employment took place and by 1907 there 
13 
were 11.26 monthly workers for every togt worker. This 
transformation was brought about through the controls introduced 
through the revised Togt Law but also accentuated by the crisis 
of accumulation in Southern Africa which lead to a decline in 
tonnage landed in Durban docks in 1907 to about half of that in 
1904. 
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As the major concentration of the African proletariat 
in Natal, the dock workers became the focus of antagonism for 
employers concerned about the ability of these workers to 
force wages up and resist controls of both employers and the 
local state. In 1895 about 200 dock workers 'led by one SIX feet 
high' marched to the residence of the Durban agent of the Union 
Company. These workers had demanded 6s per day instead of the 
existing wage of 4s. It appears they were diverted back to the 
docks when the agent told them to report their troubles to his 
representative at the docks. The press was quick in its response: 
'It is evident that the Natives are fully alive to the scarcity of 
labour and want to take advantage of it', complained the Natal 
W. 14 Itness. The local state responded to the increased demands 
of workers with more prosecutions for not complying with togt 
'regulations which made it compulsory for African workers to work 
for the wage laid down in the regulations if offered employment. 
The rapid expansion of togt labour during the war years was 
followed by a series of disputes, riots and general insubordina-
tion in the docks. In 1901 the local magistrate complained 
that togt workers 'do not abide by the rate fixed 
under the Togt Regulations', and were demanding and receiving 
4s a day at the Point. By the following year he reported that 
the problem of wages and labour supply had reached 'a more 
acute stage' exacerbated by the outbreak of bubonic plague In 
the dock area in November 1902 and the implementation of the 
Identification Act which served to reinforce the pass 
system. 15 The bubonic plague which initially caused the death 
of at least 13 African workers gave the authorities the opportunity 
of demolishing working class housing in the Point area and evacuation 
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of residents. The Medical Officer of Health reported that the 
'lowest grade of such buildings have disappeared' when hundreds 
of huts were demolished. Indians and Africans who were suspected of 
being diseased were forcibly segregated in a camp and guarded 
by Special Plague Police. An immediate improvement was made in 
the sanitary conditions of Indian houses and African compounds 
at Bamboo Square and elsewhere, the demolition of houses being 
the 'readiest and surest method of disinfection'. Emergency 
regulations gave the authorities even more power than the by-laws 
for demolishing huts, and large scavenging gangs were employed 
in cleaning up rubbish and demolishing huts and shanties. As the 
campaign against the plague became more organised the source of 
infection was seen to be Indian and African communities at the 
Point, in the Eastern Vlei and at the foot of Sydenham Road, rather 
16 
than the plague rats. The Medical Officer of Durban reported 
ironically that overcrowding among Indians and Africans had 
been abruptly halted by wholesale evacuation and demolition 
had gone ahead without much concern for working class housing whose 
value 'was not very much.' There was a tremendously high death 
rate particularly among Indian and African people; out of a total 
f . 17 of 124 deaths from the plague 75 were Indians and 38 were A r1cans. 
The attacx on black working class housing in the dock area 
reversed the tendency throughout seaports in capitalist countries 
for the workers to be housed in family accommodation in densely 
populated areas 1n and around the wharves and warehouses. 
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In the conditions of labour shortage created by the 
rapid increase in trade through Durban the togt workers demanded 
increased wage and fewer controls. The strike action undertaken 
by dock workers provides evidence of a grow1ng job consciousness, 
the refusal to do work not specified in their contractual 
engagement, and a wage appropriate to the skilled nature of 
stevedoring work. While job consciousness is not conducive 
to the overall unity of the working class (stressing of necessity 
the differentiation between different forms of work and of 
workers) in the migratory labour system which acts to submerge any 
form of working class consciousness, the job consciousness of the 
stevedoring togt workers strengthened the resistance to capital. 
Togt workers resisted the general relations of subordination in the 
city; worked outside the discipline of a master and servant relationshiJ 
attacked the African police force, and disputed their wages and 
contracts of work. Shortly before the outbreak of the plague 
there was a clash between some 227 togt workers at Renaud's compound 
and the municipal African police. This clash was indicative of the 
hatred of African workers for the police control over their lives, 
a feeling which was accentuated during the improved conditions of 
class struggle during the South African war in the Natal urban 
centres. This tendency was noted by the magistrate in Durban who 
reported there was general resistance to the police: 'Occasionally 
when arrests have to be made at ricksha sheds, frequented by large 
number of boys there arises active resistance (to) the Police, even 
18 
though accompanied by European Officers.' . The togt workers were 
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arrested and the case glven priority by the authorities; 
those considered to be the ringleaders were punished and the 
others cautioned and discharged. Unspecified steps were taken 
to guard against further attacks on African police, and bring 
workers housed in barracks under more effective control. 
Occurring before the outbreak of the plague, this attack on the 
police strengthened the arguments of those in the local 
state who felt the alarming 'spirit of lawlessness' could only 
be brought under control through determined implementation 
of evacuating African workers from the town to a peripheral 
area on the boundary. 
A series of strikes took place 1n the following 
years, 1903-04,in support of demands for higher wages and 
against changes in job demarcation (generally by stevedoring 
workers refusing to do the work of dock labourers or coal 
bunkering). Despite the penal provisions of the togt 
regulations which effectively made strikes illegal and 
punishable by a maximum of three months hard labour with 
d · 19 . . h h spare let workers came out on strlke Wlt out t e support 
of the growing nationalist movement or the organised labour 
movement, which in Durban consisted of trade unions in the 
railways and other industries and the Clarion Fellowship which 
was basically oriented to the British labour activities. 
The radical African petty bourgeoisie was committed 
to such issues as abstinance and a Protestant work ethic 
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as well as land rights and the franchise. It failed to provide 
any leadership on the central issues in the towns and absolutely 
opposed the strike movement among African workers, blaming white 
workers for setting a bad example. Despite the support of the 
white labour movement's representatives for colonial rule over 
Africans, there was at least one instance in which white workers 
who objected to their conditions of work agitated for African 
workers to strike against these oppressive conditions and 
meagre wages. The whole direction of white labour leadership and 
the local bourgeoisie was towards incorporation of white workers 
in the political domination of the ruling class over the African 
masses and develop~t~racial ideology to eliminate any points 
of solidarity between white and black workers. White labour 
representatives in Natal argued that class struggle between white 
workers and employers set a bad example to Africans. Instead 
they proposed forms of industrial conciliation to resolve disputes 
before they reached the stage of strike action. W. McLarty, the 
Labour Member for Durban, who was also a member of the Durban Stock 
Exchange and closely connected with many coal mining and commercial 
companies argued that strikes such as that of white bricklayers 
were being followed by strikes of African workers, such as the 
African trarnwaymen. 'We have the Native population growing up 
around us, and being educated, and they are learning to strike', he 
20 
told the Natal Legislative Assembly. As a 'champion of the 
(white) working classes' described by Twentieth Century he had the 
distinction of getting Indian porters removed from the Natal 
Government Railways and replaced by whites. 
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The radical African petty bourgeoisie which similarly 
argued that the African masses were imitative of white workers also 
deplored the strike movement. Although John Dube,editor of 
Ilanga lase Natal,complained that African strikers were arrested 
while whites were not punished, he accused white workers of setting 
a bad example to African workers by refusing to work and demanding 
what he regarded as 'unheard of wages'. These comments were 
republished approvingly by the Natal Mercury on 20 May 1903. 
Mark Radebe ,21 edi tor of 1pepo 10 Hlanga and a founde r member of 
the Natal Native Congress was more forthright: 
As we pointed out in these columns the evil of strikes so 
far as the natives are concerned, a little while ago, it 
was only to be expected that our people would be seized 
by the disease and allow themselves to be misled. We 
first heard of a strike amongst natives at the Point. 
Fortunately, this was promptly dealt with, and a stop 
was effected. 22 
Without falling into the conception of African workers as 
simple-minded imitators of white workers, the strike movement among 
white printers, railwaymen, and bricklayers did undoubtedly stimulate 
African workers to study the tactics of organization. The togt 
workers had put forward their demands in an organized way as early as 
1874, in this sense refuting both the chauvinis t labour movement and 
the staid views of the mission educated nationalists. 
At the turn of the century African workers who were employed in all 
the types of work in the harbour were increasingly confident of their 
collective strength and ability to resist their employers and the 
state. A contemporary report gives some of the atmosphere of the 
sheer muscular expenditure of labour power and the collective skills 
of the workers: 
Scores and hundreds of Zulus - lithe, active, muscular 
men lined the wharf, actively engaged in loading and 
unloading the ships. They lifted and trundled into 
the sheds and warehouses huge boxes of merchandise, 
doing their heavy work in the broiling sun with 
apparent ease and playfulness. Never had I seen 
workers play with hard work and enjoy it as did these 
Zulus. 23 
African workers were dominant in harbour employment, 
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white labourers were said to be unable to compete. The strength 
of African workers in production was reinforced during the 
outbreak of plague. 
The fear of the plague drove many African workers out of 
Durban in early 1903 and lead to a real shortage of labour. In 
May 1903 a gang of dock workers who took advantage of this 
situation were arrested at St. Paul's wharf for refusing to work, 
24 presumably in support of demands for higher wages. Another 
strike took place as a direct result of the agitation of white 
workers who were disgusted with the low level of wages paid In 
the docks. The Superintendent of Durban Police, Alexander, was 
careful to exonerate the African press from any blame for the 
strike; instead he bla~ed 'the low European' who agitated for 
African workers to resist their oppreSSIve work conditions: 
(The Afr1can workers) saw we were pushed for labour; 
they saw the white men would not work for less than 
lOs. I sent down 150 unemployed Europeans to the 
wharf for five shillings a day, where they would get 
shelter and everything else, and they flung up the 
job. Then they turned to the Ka2~rs and said: 
'Why do you work for so and so?' 
This revolt against the cheap labour system in the docks was 
led by the stevedoring togt workers, according to Alexander whom 
he described as seasoned workers who were very valuable men 
'because they knew exactly what they had to do.' It was these 
men who joined the white workers immediately afterwards in 
26 
support of the lOs wage demand. On another occasion (the 
date of the strike was not mentioned in evidence) when African 
dock workers demanded 4s a day instead of the existing rate of 
3s 6d, the municipal police took vigorous counteraction: 'That 
all ended in smoke, as they were cleared out, and soon came 
27 
back'. Other strikes demonstrated the advance in job 
consciousness by the stevedoring togt workers who became more 
distinct from 'jobbers' ,or from dock labourers and bunkering 
workers employed on long contracts. They realized how dependent 
their employers were on their skills as the volume of trade 
expanded enormously, and demanded the employers take on labourers 
to carry heavy timber or bunker ships. They struck when required 
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to carry heavy timber on one occasion and refused to carry coal on 
28 
another. The large number of workers who argued they had been 
engaged to load cargo and not carry coal in June 1903 were 
arrested, brought before the magistrate and fined 45 each. The 
growing independence of this core group of togt workers was shown 
when the new togt regulations were introduced in May 1904 
increasing the registration fee from 25 6d to 55, adding a booking 
fee; making a total increase of 55 per month in tax, tripling 
the tax burden on togt workers. 'This extra 55 suddenly clapped 
upon them', Alexander remarked in evidence 'has caused 811 last 
,29 k 
week to throw down their badges and return home. The wor ers 
who stayed on hired a lawyer to take up their case against the 
municipality. 30 The increased industrial action by togt workers 
improved the wages paid in the dock area considerably; 
according to the figures produced by a major employer wages 
increased from 2s a day in 1894 to 2s 6d in 1899 and finally to 
3s in 1902. These figures seem to apply more to the dock 
labourer than the stevedoring worker, many of whom were already 
earning 4s a day in 1895, but they do indicate how far workers 
31 
were able to improve their wages through demands and strikes. 
The upward pressure on wages did not pass unnoticed by employers 
in the docks or more importantly by the bourgeoisie 1n Natal as 
a whole. The reaction to r1s1ng wage rates and the greater 
confidence of African workers went further than the reduction of 
wages (although that was a central focus in the immediate post-war 
period) but extended to demands for segregation, the growth of 
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racism, and more effective controls over African workers. 
The post-war reg1me and origins of Native Administration 
The immediate post-war situation was one 1n which for the 
first time there was a co-ordinated strategy in relation to African 
t.Ite 
workers under~aegis of direct rule by British imperialism. In the 
mining industry the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association acted 
as the recruiting agency of the Chamber of Mines and a maximum 
average wage system was instituted reducing wages to a maximum of 
32 2s 3d a day. Throughout the country the cry was for cheaper 
labour and a co-ordinated reduction of African wages. An extensive 
debate was initiated on the cheapest form of labour including the 
mass importation of labour from throughout Africa or more particularly 
from China. 
In Natal as elsewhere employers acted with a dual tactic; 
the forcible reduction of wage levels,~an increase in the 
overall supply of labour. As these counter strategies developed 
so some of the contradictions were explored; the growing 
differentiation between African workers (which involved a 
72 
grudging acceptance of the concept of a 'skilled African worker'), 
the question of whether workers segregated in locations would 
challenge the cheap labour system, and the appropriate policy 
towards African women in the cities. Although the wage 
relationship was the first issue to be dealt with by the state 
and employers, the non-wage aspects of the capital relation soon 
came to the fore; the reproduction of the cheap labour system 
as a whole. It is these issues in particular which give the 
debates within the bourgeoisie a modern ring; housing for African 
workers, stablized labour against the possibility of permanent 
migrant labour, and questions of the conflict between different 
capitals and the overall capitalist strategy expressed through the 
colonial and local state. The severe capitalist crisis which 
followed the South African war could only be resolved, it will be 
argued, by increased repression of the black working class and 
peasantry culminating in the massacres which followed the Bambata 
uprising. It was this brutal intervention which cleared the 
ground for the more routine adjustments of the relations of 
subordination in the development of Native Administration and 
municipal by-laws which secured the cheap labour system in the urban 
areas and covered the minutae of appropriate behaviour of Africans 
in their relationship with white masters and Indian workers. 
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As the city having the largest increase in African 
workers during the war period (Johannesburg's labour supplies 
were disrupted, the Cape Town could rely more on the use of 
Coloured workers), Durban became the cockpit for contending 
theories and policies of social and political control over Black 
workers. The resolution of these ideological and political 
struggles had an important effect on the course of policies of 
exploitation and control and in particular on the development 
of the local state which influenced municipal policies throughout 
South Africa. In two important articles Swanson has surveyed 
the origins of the 'Durban system' as an early form of urban 
apartheid in which the key concepts and basic components of urban 
33 
segregation developed. These articles cover quite adequately 
a description of the controversies and problems faced by 
employers and the municipality in the late 19th and early 20th 
century and focus attention on the progressive development of 
forms of racial oppression rather than their installation with 
the advent of the National Party government in 1948. As a 
continuation of the tendency within modern liberal historiography 
which rejects the superficial analysis of the rise of apartheid 
and attempts a more rigorous study of the history of race 
relations in South Africa, this work advances considerably our 
understanding of a crucial period in the growth of segregation. 
, . I Despite the meticulous research employed, Swanson s art~c es 
fail to advance a convincing theory for the implementation of 
segregation and social controls beyond the 'particular combinations 
of event and circumstance' and an analysis of the 'moving forces' 
In the ideological and policy battles being 'bureaucratic and 
34 
individualistic' • Although the social class data on the 
individuals involved in these debates is presented,there is 
no thorough exposition of the class forces behind the give 
and take which occurred between the merchants, manufacturers, 
shipping agents and contractors, lawyers, building contractors 
and other property owners who made up the local state in Durban. 
In the absence of a theory of the local state as a form of 
class rule, the discussion o~ different strategies 1n maintaining 
the relations of domination tend to become reduced to a 
conception of ideological bureaucrats struggling against vested 
interests (a key concept in Swanson's writings) reluctant to do 
anything which would jeopardize their control over labour or 
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increase the costs of municipal government. In discussion of these 
issues I will be argu1ng that the solution to the problems of 
political and social subordination of black workers can only be 
understood in terms of the rising resistance of African workers 
and peasants during a moment of capitalist crisis. The intervention 
of the state in legislation segregating African workers, the 
policing of dock workers, and the military action taken against 
insurgents in the countryside, cannot be understood in terms of 
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particular interest groups or vested interests (or more 
sophisticatedly fractions of capital) or in terms of an obsessive 
bureaucracy, but rather from an understanding of the state as 
an instrument of class rule which secures the interests of capital 
in general. It is only from this perspective that the events 
of a particular city and the actions of English speaking town 
councillors can be understood to produce an important element in the 
highly regulated system of capitalist oppression which is apartheid. 
Swanson does carry the debate about the origin of apartheid 
further than the contradiction between econom1C integration and the 
contrary forces impelling political separation. While the movement 
of African people to the urban areas should tend to cause the 
separation of black and white to decline, Swanson argues that 
urbanization brought about an increased demand for separation • 
•••• one may wonder how it is that origins of apartheid are 
found in the same phenomenon that seems to be making it 
harder and harder to apply that policy, namely, the urban 
and industrial economy with its insatiable demand for 
labour and its tendency to draw all kinds of people into 
ever greater interdependence and closer association. The 
answer is that this process of concentrating population 
also generated increasing concern for its consequences 
among officials and citizens alike, a concern which tended 
to follow established patterns of thought in facing new~d 
very great problems of social organization and control. 
(My underlining). 
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While this is a valid generalization and carries our understanding 
of the conflict which produces demands for separation forward to some 
extent, this characterization of the process of urbanization itself 
producing social antagonism mystifies the prior question of capital 
accumulation. It is the grow1ng accumulation of capital 1n specific 
I be"flj 
areas (e.g. mining) which brings intofinew forms of social relations 
and a workirig class. Capital does not only bring about general 
shifts in population but draws upon the most able and intelligent 
sections of that popUlation for the growing urban areas, and a highly 
selective population in terms of age and sex as wage workers alone, 
is found in the centres of capital accumulation. The social 
relations which then develop in the cities are determined by the 
results of the struggle between the growing concentration of workers 
with the bourgeoisie; a struggle in which ideologies are formed and 
policies framed. The ideology and policy of segregation then is not 
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the result sin~ly of 'magnifying symptoms of disorder' and a 
manipulation of public feeling as implied, but a policy 
composed of essential class concepts and practices; the 
discipline of workers, the maintenance of plentiful and cheap 
labour supplies, and a response to the specific demands of 
workers. 
An attempt to separate the legitimate and necessary 
development of municipal government from its bureaucratic and 
racialist outgrowth which is implied in Swanson's analysis: 
'the abatement of health dangers, slum clearance and housing, 
the rational spatial and functional development of the community, 
taxing and licensing for revenue, and the maintenance of the 
public peace', tends to obscure their inseparable connection with 
the form of class rule embodied in the state. It is this 
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attempted separation which leads to his implicit acceptance of 
the complexity of colonial society and a view of the African 
working class as foreign to the towns, a central theme of the 
ideologists of segregation: 
In South Africa, it must be admitted that municipalities 
were confronted with an especially acute situation where 
practically the entire mass of the urban proletariat 
were not only materially deprived but culturally and 
ethnically alien. 39 
This view which accepts the settler bourgeoisie's claim that 
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the towns were theirs, detracts substantially from his acknowledge-
ment of the African workers' centrality to the labour process 
and their resistance to exploitation and racial oppression. 
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Counter~attackon wages and labour supply 
The questions of urban segregation and the form of labour 
controls exacted over African workers have to be understood 
in the ~ontext of class struggles of the immediate post Anglo-Boer 
war. As the British army secured the mining districts in the 
Transvaal, production was restarted on the basis of average 
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wages of between 30-35s per month for African workers. These 
wages constituted a substantial reduction from pre-war rates and 
compared unfavourably with almost every other category of work in 
South Africa except farm labour. With the establishment of WNLA 
in 1900 and a maximum average system of wages in the mining industry, 
a determined effort was made throughout the colonies to reduce 
African wages. The assault on Africnn workers living standards became 
formally organized in Natal early in 1902 when a conference was 
called at Newcastle by the Governor attended by the military, the 
Secretary of Native Affairs, mining representatives, agricultural 
and household representatives, and J. Currie representing the 
d . 41 steve orlng trade of Durban. There was a simple theme: reduce 
wages and cut rations. The Gnvernor explained that the aim of the 
meeting was to discuss the 'abnormal rate of wages at present given 
to Natal natives both by the Civil and Military Authorities', and how 
'we best cut them down' with a suggestion that 'a proper wage be fixed 
to take effect from a given date'. He had already made a start in 
reducing the full wage of African workers by withdrawing the 
'European rations' supplied by the military where possible, since 
the men were becoming 'thoroughly demoralised'. He urged the 
military to return to the staple mealie meal and withdraw the 
meat ration. 
The discussion which followed provided evidence of 
increased wages in the mlnes and Durban harbour; underground 
mine workers wages had rlsen from 43s 6d to 50s a month and the 
monthly earnings of togt labour had risen from 30s-35s to 30s-40s 
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a month. While Marks' account of this conference and the 
whole question of labour supplies at this time tends to a view 
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that it was the agricultural employers who most vigorously demanded 
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wage reductions the level of mine wages in Natal were 
considerably higher than the 30s-35s average wages/month paid to 
African mlners on the gold mines at this period. Despite the 
overall agreement on the urgent necessity of reducing wages and 
rations of workers there were some differences between the 
approach of different employers; those in 'strategic' sectors such 
as the docks who tended to act to hoard their labour supplies and 
argue for a difference between skilled and 'ordinary Kaffir 
labour', and other employers who were determined to reduce wages 
to the agreed level of 30s per month. 
While Currie, who represented the stevedoring trade at the 
conference, was less enthusiastic than other employers about a 
vigorous offensive on African wages and rations which could affect 
the supply of labour to the docks, he also agreed that the dock 
employers' strategy should be to reduce wages to the pre-war level 
of 2s a day. Rather defensively he told the conference that 
togt workers had never been provided with meat, although they were 
fed and housed. Their wages had to be compared to the hours 
worked 'at all hours and whenever required night and day'. 
When challenged by Colonel Lawson with the fact that many 
workers earned as much as 60s and African foremen ('head boys') 
as much as 90s a month, Currie responded by arguing these 
workers paid extra tax, were skilled, and were in short supply: 
••••• these Natives are trained boys. They are the class 
known as 'Togt Labourers'; they pay a license to the 
Corporation (license is five shillings per month), come 
and do their day's work and get what they can from us ••• 
They do good work and are really more economical than 
ordinary raw Kaffirs on monthly wages. We could do with 
seven thousand boys at the Point but have only got between 
four and five thousand, and a4~ very shorthanded owing to 
the present excessive demand. 
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The defence of the togt system was taken up by the Secretary of 
Native Affairs, Moor, who praised the labour market in the docks 
in terms of classical laissez-faire economics. The casual 
labour system was a 'very useful institution', which benefitted 
the workers and employers. He even defended workers inducing 
competition among employers, a notion which relied on skill 
among a strata of the workers: 
These labourers are absolutely free to come and go as they 
please and so are quite independent. Togt labour is purely 
a case of supply and demand. If we have one boy in advance 
of the demand wages will go down, but if we have on hoy 
too little, they will go up. Competition among the owners 
will tend to put prices up.45 
This Vlew certainly exaggerates the freedom and ability of the 
workers to move in and out of the cities and the flexibility of the 
labour market; wages did tend to remaln at a 'conventional' level 
until a strike or forcible reduction of wages, rather than 
fluctuating from month to month. The relative 'freedom' of the workers 
to move from employer to employer was also the freedom of the 
employer not to employ any workers (an issue which would only 
become sharply apparent during the recessions and depression of 
the economy). Moor's eulogy did not also bring out the 
employers' and state opposition to a totally flexible labour market: 
by this time there had already been some tightening up of the 
workers access to togt badges. Workers were expected first to 
serve a contract of monthly employment before qualifying for 
buying a license as a togt worker. 
The arguments made about the relative skill of dock workers 
did force the conference on reducing wages to distinguish between 
'ordinary Kaffir labour' and other 'skilled or trained labour' 
such as mule, ox leaders, or togt workers: these were regarded 
as necessarily being paid higher rates which were 'not 
unnecessarily excessive'. This recognition of the relative 
skills of workers in particular sectors of the economy (an 
evaluation also applied to the mining industry) did not affect the 
final outcome of the meeting which determined the norm of wages to 
be reduced to 30s per month and decided on a strategy of increasing 
labour supplies. The two responses of employers: repression of 
wage levels and increasing overall labour supplies were closely 
linked in the discussion. As Moor argued: 
I think any agreement for a general reduction in the 
rate of native labour is contingent on our obtaining 
a supply of Protugqese labour. If the natives strike 
we can then fill in the gaps by the Portuguese, and 
the natives will see that they are done, and will give 
in. Otherwise it would mean the importation of 
enough supplies of Portuguese labour to fi 11 every 
demand. 
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This casual rejection of the laissez faire philosophy of 
a free labour market in favour of repression of strikers backed 
by the reorganization and mobilization of the industrial reserve army 
j "f provided the class context of both the advocates free market forces 
and those of the virtual militarization of labour. Workers did 
resist these attempts at lower wages. Before the conference was held 
workers at the remound depot at Pietermaritzburg who were paid 30s 
a month (the lowest wage level paid by the military) had refused to 
work In the areas where military operations were taking place unless 
they were paid 40s. When these workers had returned to the depot 
46 those there also struck successfully for a wage rate of 40s. 
It was resistance like this and in the dock area which was 'the only 
matter for some time to come to cause any disturbance sufficiently 
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serious to call for the presence of troops'. 
While the counterattack on wages was the most forward policy 
of capital once the military victory of British imperialism seemed 
assured, the successful reconstitution of the capital relation on 
the basis of higher levels of exploitation both on the Rand mines 
and in Natal involved other elements; reorganization of labour 
supplies, higher rates of taxation, and ideological struggle 
to reduce African workers to more effective subordination. 
Togt workers: accommodation and control 
The drastic increase in the amount of cargo passing through 
Durban docks during the war period caused a sharp increase in demand 
for togt workers. Between 1900-01 the average number of workers 
registered per month increased by 1,000 (from 2,832 to 3,700) and 
still did not meet the virtually unlimited and ~.eavy demands for labour 
being made by the stevedoring trade. During these boom years 
of the togt system,wages were edged upwards and the docks 
attracted what other employers considered a disproportionate 
number of workers. The rapid concentration of workers in the 
dock area, their growing resistance to employer and state 
controls, and their class consciousness, posed fundamental 
problems for the local bourgeoisie. The crisis in the relations 
of dominance brought about a response in the demand for urban 
segregation, specific measures for increasing taxation and social 
controls, and an increase in racist ideology. Increasing working 
class resistance to the apparatus of social controls was met with 
the response by the bourgeoisie of 'demoralization'; strong 
hostility to the institution of a new and specifically urban culture 
(most notably in the leita gangs which expressed the confidence of 
younger workers in the towns) and a yearning for the absolute 
discipline of the patriarchal 'racial' past. The African petty 
bourgeoisie responded to the crisis in the relations of domination 
by disavowing working class action such as strikes and insisting on 
the need for discipline, but also by protesting against those 
aspects of state policy which limited property ownership among 
Africans and requesting the franchise. There is evidence that the 
African petty bourgeoisie encouraged chauvinism in response to the 
growing racism of the bourgeoisie, and in this sense were unable 
to provide leadership to the growing movement of resistance of the 
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workers and peasants of Natal. 
The labour shortage in the docks brought out a dual response 
from the employers and the local state; a determination to increase 
labour supplies, and a 'welfare' response of accommodation and 
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social control. These responses were co-ordinated within 
the overall necessity of reducing wages and disciplining the 
working class in areas which affected employment, crucially in 
the supply of liquor to workers. The disciplining of the workers 
formed part of the overall strategy of the bourgeoisie in Natal 
to assert Durban as the principal port of South Africa, an issue 
which was fought for at length at the political conferences of 
the time. The most immediate problem for the employers and the 
state was both the level of wages in the docks and the labour 
shortage. By 1901 the Durban magistrate reported that the togt 
workers were totally disregarding the minimum wages laid down in togt 
regulations and demanding more. 'They, at the present time, 
demand 2s 6d a day as a rule, whilst at the Point they get as much 
as 4s.' He blamed the employers for a lack of co-ordinated 
strategy against the workers, for paying these 'excessive charges', Q~d 
for permitting African workers to take advantage of the employers 
disorganization. The togt wage issue was the key to the general 
question of rising African wages: 'I have no doubt but that the 
high amounts paid to togt boys largely influence new-comers, who, 
. . d' b . bb ,49 Th Instead of enterIng omestlc serVIce, ecome mere JO ers. e 
problem was according to him not only a question of disproportions 
in labour supply between monthly and casual labour but also one of 
state control of non-wage questions. The central problem was that 
of accommodation. This 'welfare' response to the problem of a too 
independent group of workers was seen as the only method of securing 
round the clock control over togt workers, a 'do-as-you-like class' 
which slept 'anywhere and everywhere.' His solution was for the 
local state to provide accommodation as the collective expression 
of the interests of all employers, meeting a welfare need and 
securing detailed control over workers. 
Many difficulties would be overcome by meeting this need, 
but it would be no use building separate quarters unless 
effective measures are taken to control the occupants. 
General police supervision is not sufficient where large 
bodies of men are huddled together~O 
An almost obsessive concern for control carried through the 
whole discussion of accommodation for African workers in response to 
the problems of insufficient labour supply. 
The question of accommodation for togt workers was seen as 
urgent because of the difficulties of maintaining the harbour as the 
central seaport of South Africa, in competition with the varying 
claims of Cape Town and Lourenco Marques. A special committee 
appointed by the Town Council in 1901 which submitted a scheme for 
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the construction of three compounds to accommodate 5,000 togt workers 
considered the existing regulations inadequate to the problems of 
carrying out the scheme and providing the detailed controls. A 
request sent to the Governor to amend the 1874 regulations to 
increase the Town Council's powers was rejected. The Governor replied 
he had no powers to grant additions to the law and that it would be 
necessary to legislate to increase the powers of Town Councils in 
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this area. 
A more immediate response to the increasing demands of togt 
workers was to extend labour recruiting to secure a supply of cheaper 
labour. The strategy of long range recruiting of labour has to be 
related to the general campaign of reducing wages and developing 
labour supplies as determined at the Newcastle conference. In 
Durban recruiting of workers was seen as a measure of maintaining 
the unity of all employers through the local state; a unity which 
was threatened of being split asunder by the pressure of increased 
demand for labour by both merchants and stevedoring companies. 
Natal stevedoring companies scoured the East Coast as far as Suez 
to get labour at cheaper wages and longer contracts than the togt 
workers. Soon after the conference which decided to reduce wages 
stevedoring companies applied for permission to recruit workers 
. 52 D from Madagascar and Zanzlbar. urinj the period between 
1 August 1902 and 31 December 1903 altogether 5 licenses were 
granted by the Secretary of Native Affairs for the recruiting of 
5,050 workers. There was a tremendous range in the areas from 
which labour was to be recruited; from Inhambane in Mozambique, 
Comoro Islands, Zanzibar, Dar-es-Sa1am, Mombasa, Egypt, to British 
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Central Africa. The conditions of recruitment were a contract 
of service for two years at a wage of Is per working day or in some 
cases 20s per month, a wage about a third of those earned by togt 
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workers. 
The enthusiasm with which the employers applied for recruiting 
licenses and the alacrity with which the Secretary of Native Affairs 
granted these permits was not matched by the response of workers in 
the recruiting areas. By 31 December 1903 only 1,000 workers had 
actually arrived in Durban from Inhambane and Zanzibar. ~lile the 
original contract at the point of departure was for two years, the 
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Natal license apparently provided for the return of the worker 
at the end of the first year unless the worker agreed to extend 
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his service. 
TABLE 2.6 LONG DISTANCE RECRUITMENT TO NATAL 
1st August 1902 to 31st December, 1903 
Licenses 
R. Beningfield & Co. 
A. Corigliano 
Maoy Bros. 
Renaud & Ebsworth 
F. Staniland 
" 
R. Renaud 
African Boating 
Company 
W. Watson & Co. 
F. Stani land 
" 
African Boating 
Company 
" 
Source of 
Supply 
Inhambane 
Zanzibar 
" 
Comoro 
Is lands 
Zanzibar 
Mozambique 
Comoro 
Islands 
Zanzibar 
Zanzibar 
Dar-es-Salam 
Mombasa 
Zanzibar 
" 
Number 
Authorized 
300 
150 
sao 
400 
500 
500 
200 
100 
100 
500 
500 
100 
100 
F. L. Kruger British Central 300 
Africa 
Chiazzari & Co. Zanzibar 
R. Beninjfie Id & Co. Inhambane 
" " 
F. Stani land Egypt 
Source: NBBNA, 1903:84. 
300 
100 
200 
200 
5,050 
Number 
Arrived to 31st 
December, 1903 
290 
III 
294 
54 
30 
52 
100 
69 
1,000 
86 
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Contract labour in the docks was not as satisfactory 
to employers as would have been imagined by the lower wages 
and extended contracts. While the Suez workers had given 
'moderate satisfaction' there were problems with Zanzibar 
workers. The Suez workers were described as 'adepts at the work 
in which they were engaged, viz: coaling, but of somewhat 
independent turn of mind, touchy, exacting and exclusive'. They 
apparently refused to work with men of other nationality and 
were quick to enter into disputes with the employers. The Durban 
magistrate complained they were frequently in court on charges of 
refusal of duty and assault on the police, and some had been 
returned. The employers of Zanzibar labour were reportedly 
'keenly disappointed' and were not interested in further 
recruiting by 1904. Despite this lack of interest in recruiting 
with its added expenees, the stevedoring companies tried to 
extend the contract of their service for as long as possible. 
Zanzibar workers employed by Maby Brothers were transferred to a 
contract of service for two years with African Boating Company 
starting on 1 October 1903. Despite the Durban magistrate 
describing their bteatment and terms as 'of the best' the workers 
obviously resisted a forcible extension of their contract, and 
demanded their repatriation. The workers 'adopted an attitude 
of skulking and malingering, resulting in serious loss and 
inconvenience to their employers' eventually leading to a strike 
which forced the company to agree to their being sent home. 
The workers were all arrested and imprisoned for refusal of duty 
and the final arrange~ents for their repatriation were made in 
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prison. 57 The workers most amenable to employment on long 
contracts appeared to be those from Portuguese territories, 
many re-engaging with their employers and building up long 
. . h' 58 serV1ce W1t certa1n employers. During 1904 the number 
of workers arriving on long-term contracts dropped rapidly, 
not only because of the problems employers experienced with 
imported labour but also because of increased labour supplies 
in Natal following a disastrous harvest early in 1903~9 
Between January and December 1904 only 223 more contract 
workers were imported from Egypt and Inhambane which partially 
compensated for those whose contracts had expired, died or 
deserted. Many employers cancelled their licenses to 
recruit. The importation of labour to serve long contracts 1n 
the' docks did not solve the question of labour supplies for the 
employers; but this strategy was not meant to provide a 
complete solution. Rather than aiming for substitution for 
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togt labour the mobilization of a reserve army of labour throughout 
the East Coast of Africa was (as in the case of Chinese labour 
on the mines) intended to weaken the resi'stance of African 
workers to their oppressive conditions of work and to effect a 
permanent wage reduction. While employers were organizing labour 
supplies from outside Natal, a complementary policy was being 
adopted of providing accommodation for and discipline over 
tog t worke rs • 
The determined assault against the position of relative 
t.a.k 
independence of the togt workers was not thej solely of 
stevedoring employers but rather of the state and 
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employers as a whole. The demand for concerted and co-ordinated 
action against togt workers came from an analysis of disproportions 
in the overall labour market in Durban; too many workers 
concentrated in the docks and insufficient supply in commerce and 
households. The collective strategy which was agreed upon against 
the workers, which involved administrative, legislative, and 
co-ordinated employer action, served to reconcile the differing 
interests of capitalists under the strain of shortage of labour 
through a further extension of the state. The demand for tighter 
control over the rapidly increasing numbers of togt workers 
initially came from commercial companies and merchants soon after 
the Newcastle agreement to reduce African wages. A petition 
addressed to the City Council in April 1902 complained bitterly 
b b " .. 60 that togt adges were elng lssued without llmlt. The peti tioners 
maintained the present togt system was causing the 'greatest 
hardship' and was 'entirely changing the character of the labour 
market in Durban to the prejudice of the inhabitants whether 
householders or business firms'. They claimed that monthly 
servants were becoming increasingly difficult to hire and that 
the monthly contract could soon become a thing of the past. The 
Corporation was squarely blamed for the labour problems of the 
merchants and householders as it allowed an unrestricted 
issue of togt badges. The large number of togt workers caused 
the cost of labour to rise 'enormously and quite unnecessarily' 
and the workers had become most unreliable. 'Our contention 
is supported by the fact of the daily and ever increasing 
applications for togt badges and the number of monthly boys who 
who leave monthly service and immediately take on togt 
badges.' The petitioners begged the Councillors to stop the 
issue of togt badges, 'the numbers being now greatly in excess 
of ordinary togt requirements', to ra1se the cost of togt badges 
by a large amount to induce monthly service ' which is so much 
more satisfactory 1n its character to the burgesses', and to 
limit the number of togt workers in the future to those for 
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whom night accommodation could be provided. At one level 
the demands in the petition posed a real clash of interests 
between merchants and stevedoring companies who had complained 
at the Newcastle conference that despite the higher wages they 
were paying there still existed a shortage of labour in the 
docks. Every worker attracted to work in the docks was a loss 
to the more rigorously determined monthly employment, and the 
demands of the togt workers were putting general pressure on 
the cheap labour system. At another level there still 
existed a community of interests in maintaining the Durban 
docks as the prime seaport of South Africa (which implied a 
joint commitment to keeping wages down) and in opposition to 
any challenges to oppressive conditions of work. Both 
stevedoring and commerce formed an interlocking part of the 
distribution of commodities at the lowest cost and maximum 
profit both within Natal and to the crucial hinterland. Their 
differences 1n relation to labour supplies were real but not 
insurmountable given their common concerns, and could be 
resolved at two levels: new strategies as employers to expand 
labour supplies, and by increasing state intervention on a 
commonly agreed basis in the area of accommodation and control 
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over the movement of workers. The debate on exactly what basis 
state intervention should take place and the cheapest and 
most effective forms of organization of labour supplies ranged 
widely over the political issues of the subordination of 
African workers (including their differentiation from white and 
Indian workers, and the question of urban segregation) to the 
issues of the most productive form of regimentation of African 
workers. 
The importation of contract workers from outside Natal 
by the stevedoring companies can be Seen as the initial response 
to these demands for an end to the competition between stevedoring 
on one hand and commerce and households on the other. A far more 
fundamental response to the antagonism between sections of capital 
was political; taking the form of legislation to strengthen the 
position of employers, increase taxation particularly of togt 
workers, and provide controlled welfare in the form of compound 
accommodation. The legislation required a closer development of qle 
coloni~l state and the municipality as regular negotiations were 
initiated by the municipality to frame regulations for the control and 
accommodation of togt workers. At the request of the Prime Minister 
the Special Committee consisting of Poynton and Taylor formulated 
draft by-laws particular to Durban. In March 1902 the Prime 
Minister forwarded a draft bill for the Council's information which 
enabled the Town Councils of Pietermaritzburg and Durban to frame 
regulations for togt labour. The bill met with 'hearty approval' 
from the Durban Town Council and was passed on to the Legislative 
. 62 Counc~l. 
The material questions of labour supply and wages became 
transformed in the political arena of the Natal Legislative 
Assembly into the broader issues of segregation in urban areas and 
reformed relations of domination. The Secretary of Native Affairs 
introduced the Bill and stressed its urgency in terms of a v1s10n 
of a settled urban African population in the large towns of South 
Africa on the basis of residential segregation. He strongly 
attacked racially mixed residential areas (a common theme of the 
bourgeoisie at the turn of the century) which he considered would be 
a drawback to a constant and steady supply of labour; his 
insistence on urban family housing on a segregated basis was his 
response to the germ of a modern non-racial proletariat in the 
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backstreets of the centres of accumulation. His views were not 
actually embodied in the togt law, apart from his insistence on 
separating African workers from other urban workers, as the 
legislation basically provided the Town Councils with the power to 
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compel togt workers to live 1n barracks within the town area. 
The amendment introduced by Taylor, who was also a member of the 
Legislative Council as well as a member of the Special Committee 
of togt labour,effectively watered down the municipalization of togt 
labour (the municipal control and accommodation of these workers) 
by a clause which provided for the licensing of private compounds 
by the municipality. Taylor argued this amendment was in the 
interests of Africans and large employers of African labour such as 
the stevedoring companies, who wanted their labour under direct 
command of management rather than the indirect control of employers 
exercised through the local state. Licensing of private compounds 
would serve the interests of African workers who often worked late 
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into the night and who often did not finish until three or four o'clock 
1n the morning. He was concerned for their convenience 1n 
then having to walk to the municipal compounds which could be 
a mile away from the docks. Their accommodation in private 
compounds would be short: only a week or two at a time. If the 
large employer was licensed to house an African worker 'for a week 
while he is in his emplor'the Town Council could still exerC1se 
direct supervision and keep a check on where the workers slept. 
This rather tentative support for the licensing clause demonstrated 
Taylor's anxiety for this concession to stevedoring companies who 
65 
had built private compounds to house their workers. He was 
acknowledging their power by providing for permissive legislation 
which would amount to opening a gap through which the uncontrolled 
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masses could flood. In an attempt to stem this tide Taylor 
proposed a further amendment, which would make it illegal to 'house 
or harbour' a togt worker outside a compound once the municipal 
compounds have been constructed. This proposal to provide some 
form of control over employers did not meet with the approval of 
other representatives. Taylor defended the clause against those 
who argued it would make any master open to arrest by arguing it 
was required to deal with a specific class of people from whom he 
wanted to protect the togt workers. These persons, 'mainly low 
class Indians', were 'enticing' the togt workers to sleep on their 
premises, charging 2s 6d a month and 'demoralising' the workers 
by supplying them with liquor. 'It is the desire of the Town 
Council that we should be in a position to relieve these Natives, 
, 67 
to get them out of the hands of what I might call landsharks. 
The humanitarian gesture was passed into the legislation and formed 
a part of the general counter-attack of the employers against petty 
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traders and rentiers 1n favour of large capitals. Seen in 
this light, the togt regulations were an important aspect of the 
bourgeois strategy of intensifying the racial differentiation 
of the urban working class, petty traders, and small householders. 
The growing community of interests of Indian petty rentiers and 
labourers, African labourers escaping from the direct control 
of employers, and sections of White labour who refused to be 
reduced to cheap labour but did not turn against African workers, 
was seen as evidence of 'racial demoralization' in all these 
groups by the bourgeoisie. The outbreak of plague in November 1902 
gave the local state the opportunity of destroying the racially 
mixed areas of the urban poor, but the determination to root out 
these areas preceded the bubonic plague epidemic. 
While the Town Council and employers waited on the promulgation 
of the togt laJ8 and worked on the detail of the municipal by-
laws, action was taken to limit the supply of togt labour. At 
a meeting of the Town Council in June 1902 it was decided that 
a committee be appointed to investigate the supply of labour 
(probably a way of reconciling different interests) and that in 
the meantime the Superintendent of Police be instructed to see that 
the Togt Sergeant not issue badges to any workers who were either 
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too young, slightly built, or unhealthy. This curious decision 
reflects the differing demands for labour; dock employers were 
not denied strong and healthy workers, while younger and weaker 
were channeled into monthly employment. 
The togt law was more comprehensive than specialized 
legislation for casual labour; it prescribed strict controls 
over all African access to town and gave African workers five 
70 
days to register for employment. All togt workers were 
required to live in compounds and to work if 
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offered employment at the wages laid down by regulation. 
The law basically enabled the Town Councils to bring the togt 
system under direct municipal control, and the municipalities 
were released from having to make detailed reports on 
expenditure under the togt law to the colonial government. 
The togt regulations ceased to be part of the Code of Native 
Law, and became a section of municipal law, clearinj up some 
potential legal anomalies in a dual legal system of 
72 
'absolutist' decrees and acts of Parliament. More important 
95 
than the Act itself were the regulations made by the Council which 
were passed at a Special Meeting on 26 October 1903. The most 
important sections of these by-laws were those increasing the 
taxation of togt workers, differentiating between various kinds 
of work, and providing an armoury of controls over accommodation 
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The first aim of the legislation and behaviour of workers. 
was to squeeze togt workers, to recover part of the wage 
increases achieved by the workers for the municipal coffers, and 
simultaneously to pressurize workers into monthly employment. 
The monthly registration fee was increased from 2s 6d to 5s, 
and togt workers who were forced by the regulations to live in 
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compounds could be charged up to 55 per month rental. A 
clause was inserted giving officials more power to deny workers 
the right to a togt badge76 for those considered 'physically or 
mentally unequal to the work of a labourer', diseased, or of 
96 
'dissolute habits', which would tend to make togt labour 
the prime labour market and give officials wide discretion 
in adjusting labour supplies to the demand for monthly or 
togt work. Provision was also made for full particulars of 
workers to be recorded during registration to identify 
77 
workers. The wage rates laid down in the regulations confirmed 
the division between labourers and stevedores, dock labour being 
classified as common store or dock labourer (2s), stevedore 
inside the Bay (39, and stevedore outside the Bay (4s). Washermen 
were also classified as togt workers and paid 3s a day. Work 
at these wages was made compulsory for togt workers, which 
meant an attempt to reduce wages which were in many cases higher 
than the minimum prescribed, and which made bargaining or disputes 
. 78 
over wages ~llegal. 
Togt workers were compelled to sleep in either the municipal 
or licensed private compounds and detailed regulations were laid 
down for 'orderly behaviour' and 'proper discipline. 79 The 
workers were required to return to the compound not later than 
9 p.m. unless legitimately employed for night work. A penal 
disciplinary code was provided against disorderliness, the 
creation of disturbances, interference with other people, 
provocative language, 'obscene or indecent acts', and wilful 
80 
damage of premises. Workers were required to keep themselves 
and their clothes clean and to 'carry out all directions of the 
81 
Caretaker.' 
Agreed upon in the wake of the outbreak of bubonic plague 
in 1902-03 which brought many deaths, the municipal by-laws lai~ 
. f the~r ma~ntenance and cleanliness. down detailed regulat~ons or L L 
The pr1ce of direct control over togt workers by the large 
employers was tight municipal control, at least on paper. The 
Town Council was to regulate the erection, structure, maintenance, 
and inspection of private compounds and compel the owners to obey 
82 
the health regulations. Plans were to be submitted before 
83 
licenses were granted and a maximum number of lodgers set. 
The compounds were to be kept clean and in good repair, swept 
every day and thoroughly washed twice a week, provide water, 
lavatories and even baths, be properly ventilated and lighted, and 
be open to inspection by municipal officials whose orders were to 
84 
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be obeyed. Special mention was made of the problem of infectious 
diseases: any cases were to be notified to the Medical Officer 
of Health, and any cleaning and disinfection required by officials 
b 1 · d . A5 was to e comp 1e w1th. The rigourof the regulations may be seen 
as a concession on the part of large-scale employers who were well 
represented on the local council to those who demanded greater 
supply of monthly workers, but a more useful interpretation would set 
these regulations in the context of the general offensive against 
African workers in particular and the drive to 'clean up' housing 
for the urban poor. The regulations would be accepted by stevedoring 
companies as their contribution to the general disciplining of the 
working class required by the potentially uncontrollable concentra-
tions of workers in the town centres. Accommodation problems would 
be solved on the basis of social welfare policies, e.g. better and 
healthier sleeping quarters, with the advantage of direct control 
over the work and leisure activities of the togt workers. 
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For the workers the togt law was an unambiguously coerCIve 
instrument increasing their taxation and particularly the indirect 
controls of the local state over their lives. A whole new range 
of criminal offences was created, particularly in the municipal 
by-laws applying to behaviour in the compounds. The penalt~s for 
contravening the togt laws were stepped up considerably from the 
1874 regulations. The new law provided for imprisonment with or 
without hard labour and spare diet for up to three months as 
against one month with hard labour for first offenders in 1874. 
Fines were raised to a maximum of £10, about 100 days wages for 
workers in 1903, as against a maximum of 62 days for first offenders. 
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in the previous regulations. The reform in legislation and 
demands of employers for cheaper and more disciplined labour 
caused the local state to step up penal sanctions against togt 
workers. While in 1900 some 88 togt workers were prosecuted 
in terms of the togt regulations, by 1903, the year of wage 
reductions in Natal,. this figure had increased almost seven times to 
594, a figure which was 12 per cent of the average monthly number 
. d . 87 
of togt workers reg~stere ~n that year. The rising pace of 
prosecutions was a means by which the local state could intervene 
in evening out the distribution of labour between togt and 
monthly employment and si~ultaneously wear away the resistance of 
the togt workers to their more oppressive conditions of work and 
intensified exploitation. The use of the local state against the 
rising resistance of the togt workers further amplified the 
circular process of revenue and repression which characterized 
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the 1874 law. The growing independence of togt workers brought 
out a response among the bourgeoisie for higher taxation of workers 
which provided the revenue to expand the police and permit a more 
vigorous implementation of repressive legislation. In 1903 the 
income from fines from the offensive mounted under the new togt 
law equalled the amount paid in for the registration of monthly 
88 
workers, togt workers, and ricksha pullers. The revenue from the 
togt system supported a police force of 70 white officers and 400 
African policemen, the costs of the repressive force of the state 
89 
being met completely from the togt account. The police made a 
tremendously high rate of arrests. Alexander, the Superintendent 
of the Durban Police, calculated he arrested 6,000 more people in 
a year than a major industrial city such as Leeds; out of 20,000 
Africans, 8,000 were arrested each year. 'That is proportionately 
more than in any other part of the world that I am aware of' .90 
Most of the crimes were committed against the laws controlling 
African mobility in the city and those ensuring discipline over 
workers. In 1903 there were 1,471 arrests in terms of the Vagrant 
Law for being out after 9 o'clock without a pass or 'being idle 
and suspicious, or without any visible means', 1,339 arrests for 
breaches of the peace particularly of members of 'leita' gangs, and 
91 
1,234 arrests for drunkenness. Alexander was worried about being 
able to maintain public order despite the high level of arrests, he 
protested against Africans being fined rather than imprisoned, and 
felt there could be serious rioting if the property owners tried to 
92 
attack leita gangs. The growing resistance of African workers to 
control during their working hours by employers and leisure activities 
100 
and mobility by the police was met by a forceful assertion 
of the state authority in all areas of life. The crisis in the 
towns spurred on an urgent discussion of the most effective 
means of maintaining social control, and produced some of the 
most vigorous demands for segregation made in the urban situation. 
Locations or compounds: the most effective means of social c\Jntrol? 
The immediate post-war period in Durban was one of prickly 
insecurity for the local bourgeoisie. Despite the enactment of the 
new togt law which gave the municipality added powers to bring 
this most volatile element in the African working class under 
control, employers and the local state were very unsure of 
themselves and at times tended towards panIc. Alexander was 
deeply worried: 'The complaints I receive are so numerous that 
I dread what will be the result should the Natives at any time 
93 
defy the authority of the police.' Swanson argues that 
statements such as these were clearly exaggerated and that 
94 
Africans never did challenge state authority ,but fails to 
mention the clashes between workers and the police, the strikes, 
and shrugging off of their subordination in the towns. The 
local bourgeoisie clearly was worried otherwise there would not 
have been the formation of vigilante groups and the furious 
ideological struggle over differing paths to social reform and 
improved discipline over workers. The arguments which raged 
between the colonial government and the municipality, between 
merchants and manufacturers, and between white petty bourgeois 
movements and state officials encompassed a wide range of 
political and economic issues. Fundamentally the debate was over 
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strategies of direct or indirect control over workers, over 
questions of family or single accommodation (the provision of 
more compound accommodation as against segregated urban African 
settlement), continuous and experienced labour from a settled 
proletariat or the continued dependence on migrant labour subsidized 
from the reserves, and ideological differences over 'the nature 
of man' in relation to African workers as sociable and reasonable 
human beings or instruments of production. In none of these 
debates did the voice of the African worker intrude, although 
the African petty bourgeoisie presented its views in newspapers 
and evidence to commissions of enquiry. 
At the centre of ideological debates lay the problem of 
enforcing control over togt workers. Despite the urgency of the 
new togt law and the determination to stop togt workers 'sponging' 
on white households or being 'corrupted' by Indian petty rentiers, 
the progress in compound construction was not very rapid. In 
November 1901 the Governor had authorized the expenditure of 
£9,000 from the Togt Fund to build suitable compounds and the 
Town Counci 1 had decided to erect bri ck compounds in Bamboo 
Square to accommodate 2,000 men. The Indian residents of Bamboo 
Square were to be moved to make way for these barracks and in 
a state of alarm they petitioned the Council not to force them 
to move and gave details of their compliance with the various 
95 
health regulations. The plans were eventually dropped not 
through respect for this petition but because a wood and iron 
barracks would accommodate more workers. Finally other plans 
96 
were considered. Even after the new togt law had been 
promulgated there were delays in formulating the municipal 
by-laws, and the whole question of togt accommodation became 
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involved in the general question of segregation and social 
control over all African workers. 
The controversy over togt accommodation and the pressing 
need to increase the supply of monthly labour gave Jameson, the 
Chairman of the Sanitary Committee and manufacturer of preserves 
and condiments, the opportunity of proposing a location 
rather than 'scattered barracks' as a comprehensive solution to 
the problems of labour supply. Jameson was alarmed by the clash 
between dock workers and the African municipal police at Renaud's 
premises which indicated a 'spirit of lawlessness', and wrote a 
memorandum to the Town Council suggesting segregated housing. The 
togt worker, he wrote, had become 'master of the situation': 
'he gets pay, under our pressing needs, entirely out of proportion 
to the value of his services, he picks and chooses his work, or 
will not some days work at all,,97 Unfortunately the 'radical 
cure' of abolishing togt labour altogether was impossible. The 
municipal barracks being constructed were essential, but he was 
opposed to spreading private barracks throughout the town as they 
were not under police supervision. Scattered barracks which were 
expensive took up valuable land and with the spread of the business 
area would have to be removed. The alternative would be to remove 
the togt workers 'entirely out of the town' by purchasing a 
site for a village to accommodate the present and future togt 
workers while leaving some 1,500 men for the more urgent needs 
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of the stevedorlng companles. He suggested this drastic 
action would help to secure for the householder and the merchant 
continuous monthly labour. The segregation of African workers by 
their removal to the outlying areas of the town was seen as 
a solution to the problem of social control and profitable land 
use in the central business district. Africans would be moved 
from an area 'where land is so valuable' to a place where it 
was cheap, securing the most advanta.geo~ posi tion for prope rty 
owners with room for expansion in the central areas with the 
promise of higher prices and rents complemented by a steady and 
99 
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cheap labour supply Radical segregation, that is the complete 
removal of African workers from the centre of town rather than their 
isolation in scattered areas within the town, was proposed by 
Jameson as a solution for the problems of the householder and 
merchant as their workers would be insulated from the subversive 
influence of togt workers, and for the stevedoring companies as 
the workers would come under more effective measures of social 
control. All property owners would benefit from the 
'municipalization' of labour and the setting free of urban land 
for more profitable use. 
Jameson's intervention, coming at a time of insecurity within 
the local bourgeoisie, started off serious discussions about the 
possibility of segregating African workers in Durban. Coupled, as 
the discussion was, with the specific question of control over 
togt workers, it leq to legislation empowering town councils to 
establish locations for African workers who were not provided with 
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accommodation by their employers. Despite this level of success, 
those arguing for urban segregation on the basis laid down by 
Jameson, failed decisively in implementing the removal of African 
workers to the periphery of the townlOI Opposed to the 
'segregationists' (basically the manufacturer Jameson, the 
104 
Superintendent of Police,Alexander, and the Secretary of 
Native Affairs,Moor) were the 'repressionists' a less articulate 
group of merchants and professionals who argued that urban 
locations were expensive, allowed workers' dependents into towns, 
and would encourage a breakdown in tribal life. The argument 
centred on a number of related issues around the question of 
direct employer control over workers against the alternative 
of more social and indirect controls; both sides were, however, 
unanimous in their determination to lower wages and increase 
the discipline over African workers in town. The formation of 
the Natal Native Reform League, a semi-vigilante association, 
during this debate strengthened the hand of the repressionists 
opposed to the restructuring of class relations implied by the 
segregationists considering creating a permanent African working 
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class in the towns. 
The maln thrust of the segregationists' argument was that 
the 'floating Native population' (the togt workers) should be 
brought under more effective social control and transformed 
into workers dependent on continuous wage labour. Moor, the 
Secretary of Native Affairs, argued: 
a floating popUlation such as the togt labourers 
scattered about the town, difficult of supervision, 
sponging on the citizens, and more or less a nuisance 
to the whole community, would be better segregated, 
under control and police supervision, in a place where 
there would be all the conveniences of sanitation, easy 
communication with the working centres, and comfortable 
accommodation. 103 . 
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The provision of urban locations in Cape ports, he had 
been assured, had brought about a settled African working 
population continuous service and dependent on wages to support 
their families. The segregationists argued a settled workforce 
would provide more labour, and the urban locations would enable 
all forms of the industrial reserve army of labour to be 
brought under control, including the 'rascal element'. The 
segregationists went so far as to attack the compound system 
as one 'unnatural' to African w0rkers and to present idyllic 
images of life in segregated locations. Alexander, who had 
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resolutely demanded compounds to control workers 1n 1898 
presented a humanitarian concern for the African workers in 
the backyards of stores: 
Between n1ne p.m. and six a.m. they are shut up 
like rats in a hole, and cannot get out. This is 
what I complain of. Some of these back yards are 
not fit for dogs, let alone human beings. 105 
Moor similarly argued that barracks were foreign to the nature 
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of Afr1can war ers. 
In their natural condition they abhorred huddling 
together. To be huddled together in barracks was 
contrary to their nature, their feelings, and their 
habits. They wished to have a little freedom and 
fresh air, and to be more or less in touch with 
nature. He thought it a mistake to try to 
coerce the natives into a manner of living opposed 
to their own methods and ideas. 107 
This humane concern for the welfare of African workers 
was used to justify the most remarkable formulation of 'scientific' 
segregation which has the ring of modern apartheid in its concern 
for the rational deployment of labour power. Jameson 
made the most advanced statement of utilitarian segregation: 
The fact of the man living there (in the location) 
would entitle him to a ticket to go in for work, 
and he would not get in on the railway for any other 
purpose; he would not go into town unless there 
was a summons by telephone for so many employees, 
by an employer w~o said 'I want so wany men to-day, 
send them in.' lO 
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Jameson,as did the other segregationists, supported removing 
African workers from town to improve control over liquor trade 
Ito 
andAsever the links between African workers and working class 
Indian people. He also considered a segregated location as a 
more effective means of controlling workers' resistance, such as 
the attack on the police by dock workers: 
If there was a riot and there were one or two liquor 
stores in the immediate vicinity, they would be raided, 
and that would form a focus for any mischief; whereas 
out there any incipient rebellion, any incipient riot, 
or any incipient trouble, would not have fuel added to 
it in the shape of liquor handy, and therefore could 
soon come under control. The difference between a riot 
out there and a riot in town would be very great 
indeed. 109 
Jameson here articulates the strategic insight of the local 
bourgeoisie, by arguing for the siting of the working class away 
from the point of production and political co-ordination. A 
housing scheme which was effectively isolated from these 
centres and could be policed by a smaller and specialized police 
force and if necessary surrounded to localize the resistance of 
African workers was a real advantage to the continued rule of 
the local bourgeoisie. Despite their perception of the physical 
controls needed over the African working class, the segregationists 
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put forward a reformer's zeal in attempting to meet some 
of the social needs of the workers and the long-sighted needs 
of capital. The location was presented as the most efficient 
means of organizing labour supply; even more than the 
repressionists they argued that African workers should only be 
allowed in the town to provide labour power. Rather than permitting 
the massive inflows and outflows of African labour with a huge 
turn-about to secure a definite amount of labour time, the 
segregationists argued for a settled African proletariat to 
"d db" no prOVl e a measure amount of la our tlme. Ins tead 0 f the 
vagaries of periodic under- and over-supply of labour dependent 
on the haphazard co-ordination of harvests with the demand for 
labour, the locations could provide an efficient labour reservoir 
totally dependent on wage labour serviced by a specialized 
labour bureaux. 
The repressionists answered these persuasive arguments for 
segregation by arguing against the growth of African families in 
, by"" h d"" b d I " "h h the towns, pOlntlng out t e contra lctlon etween ea lng WIt t e 
togt workers and solving all labour problems,8nd basically ,y 
repeating arguments for cheap government and cheap labour. 
The major argument of the repressionists put forward by 
the mayor, Ellis Brown, a coffee merchant, was that sufficient 
discipline could not be maintained over African workers unless 
they were under the direct control of their employers. The 
irregular demand for labour and hours of work of the stevedoring 
" s was the l"llustratl"on used If the workers were situated companle • 
at considerable distances from the harbour there would be 
dislocation of the work carried on at the Point: 
Vessels needed to discharge or coal rapidly; the 
work was in many cases carried on to 10 p.m. and 
midnight, and sometimes all through the night. The 
Corporation would never consider the making of a 
location unless on the outskirts of the borough, and 
in no system of barracks or other accommodation which 
necessitated travelling by rail or tram would it be 
possible to have communication that could be called 
upon at all hours. Regular traffic could of course 
be provided for, but not heavy intermittent traffic 
at midnight or very early in the mornings - the boys 
sometimes started work at 2 or 3 o'clock in the 
morning. These considerations tended to show the 
Co~ncillfhat barrack~ must be provided near the 
POlnt. 
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As an alternative to the location Ellis Brown argued for the 
provision of barracks in the three main centres of work in Durban. 
All the repressionists were alarmed at the suggestion that 
African workers be allowed to bring their wives and families to the 
towns, and some raised the spectre of 'allowing all the kraal 
natives to bring all their wives into any town'. Henwood, a 
military officer involved in transport riding and land 
speculation, was concerned that there 'would be natives who would never 
go back to their chiefs'. As many of the other repressionists he did 
not totally oppose the idea of a location which could be advantageous 
in the future, but effectively obstructed the segregation policy 
by raising fundamental problems from the point of view of the local 
bourgeoisie particularly that of cost. Others, like Charopion, 
a chemist, argued Africans in Natal were 'not yet ripe for the 
change'. Rather than engage in direct confrontation with the 
segregationists the general arguments of the repressionists centred 
on two major weaknesses in the segregationists arguments: 
the necessity of keeping an immediate supply of 
workers available for work in the docks at any 
time of the day 
the high cost of the location, not only for 
the property owners but also for the workers. 
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When questioned by Ellis who argued the location accommodation 
could cost the worker up to £2 a month, Jameson 'frankly admitted 
that his scheme was based on a considerable advance in the 
present togt fee'. The counter-argument of the repressionists was 
that the barracks built by the municipality provided a solution 
to the immediate problem of housing the workers and that a consi-
derable reform and expenditure had taken place in the accommoda-
tion of the workers by employers. The merchants simply demanded 
112 
more police to control African workers. Employers, they 
argued were responsive to the health and needs of African workers 
particularly after the eruption of the plague. The short-term 
solution to the problem of workers' housing was seen as barracks 
controlled by employers supplemented by municipal barracks; the 
question of a location was posed as a question for the distant 
future. 
As the post-war political and economic crisis deepened, so 
the demands of the repressionists became more frantic and a 
semi-vigilante group of politicians and local property owners took 
form with the endorsement of the local magistrate, J. Stuart. 
This period is marked by a pronounced increase in racism in the 
local bourgeoisie, and a decisive attack on the non-wage 
aspects of the capital relation; liquor supplies, petty trading, 
and African women. The counter-revolution set in motion during 
110 
these years eventually resulted in the repression of the Bambata 
rebellion which left thousands dead and finally the Native Affairs 
Department in Durban as a specialized form of control over African 
workers. The language of the bourgeoisie became more formally 
racist: Stuart, for examp Ie, demande<A that the status of Africans 
should be 'unequivocably subordinate to that of the ruling race, 
113 
a race immeasurably ahead both in achievement and in refinement'. 
The articulation of racism was closely immeshed in the class 
consciousness of the local bourgeoisie, aware of the stratification 
within each racial group but determined to submerge class antagonism 
within a cultural and racial order. 'The question is not one of 
class against class, but of civilization against barbarianism, 
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enlightenment against ignorance.' In this context, state policy 
concentrated on increasing racial differentiation between white, 
Indian, and African people. In an onslaught against growing social 
interaction between the urban poor of many races which in some 
cases had resulted in cohabitation between black and white, the Natal 
Legislative Assembly outlawed extra-marital intercourse for gain or 
love between white women and African, Asian, or Coloured men. Harsh 
penalties were laid down: two years imprisonment for women and 
. , llS . I . I' f h' k' d twenty-f1ve years for men. Raclal egls atlon 0 t 1S 1n was 
essential to curb any tendencies towards the 'Latin Americanization' 
of social relations, the formation of mixed residential areas with a 
cultural tradition subversive of the protestant ethic of the 
bourgeoisie. Measures of this kind were also crucial to the 
reproduction of a white working class as a definite stratum within 
the working class; dependent 
. 116 d 
white petty bourgeois1e an 
solidari ty. 
politically on the radically racist 
contemptuous of working class 
The response of employers and the state to the grow1ng 
confidence of African workers in the towns in the form of wage 
reduction and higher taxation was considerably strengthened and 
widened by the protests of the white petty bourgeoisie. The 
Natal Native Reform League which was formed in October 1904 
campaigned on a whole range of issues, most dramatically for the 
removal of Africans from the footpaths, but also for tougher 
state measures such as passports and character references 
for African workers. Members of the League such as the 
Chairman, Dr. Campbell, excited racist feelings as the basis for 
'reforms'. African men were being allowed into the bedrooms by 
white women, girls were being nursed by African male domestics, 
and the master/servant relationship generally was becoming lax. 
H. Stuart favoured segregation as a solution to the growing 
indiscipline of African workers, in his language 'they would have 
to drive the natives from the towns'. He advocated that all 
Africans should be required to carry a passport with a character 
reference, and that locations should be laid out miles out of the 
town. Other members of the League favoured even more drastic 
measures 'even to the extent of military discipline', to exclude 
Africans from pavements, and to demand 'certificates of 
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efficiency' from African work-seekers. For many the question 
of docile and fluid supply of African labour was 'the root of the 
III 
whole matter'. Dr. Campbell, for instance, made a forthright 
attack on the 'extreme diffidence' with which the local authorities 
had dealt with the togt workers defiance of the new togt law. 
For him this symbolized the way in which the authority of 
employers and the state was being undermined by an insubordinate 
African working class. The problem lay in the governing 
authorities who were opposed to any interference with the 
'leisured loafing' of African workers and who feared African 
resistance to increased repression and taxation: 
Togt barracks had been built for the natives. for 
sanitary and other reasons. The law said he must 
inhabit these dwelling places, the native said he 
would rather not, and he defied the law - and there the 
matter ended. 
Unless there was a concerted drive against African people in 
the towns he saw there was the danger of the state regulations 
becoming irrelevant and the local state unable to carry out the 
112 
collective measures decided on by the bourgeoisie. In an alarmist 
fashion, Campbell prophesized the period of neutrality would be 
followed by one 'when the native would attempt to impose his 
118 
will upon us.' The whole tenor of the Natal Native Reform 
League was towards stricter enforcement of the social mores 
making up capitalist relationships, in the household, the streets, 
in master/servant contracts, and demands for more definite state 
intervention to strengthen property owners and employers. 
In response to the clamour of the white petty bourgeoisie, 
the ideologists of the colonial bureaucracy developed even further 
racism as a bridge between all sections of the ruling class and 
provided a far more comprehensive view of the uneasy social 
relationships in the countryside and towns. In an extraordinarily 
sweeping survey of the crisis of capital in all its aspects. urban 
and rural, social and political, J. Stuart the First Assistant 
Magistrate of Durban, made a report on 'the growth of lawlessness' 
113 
ln Durban. In this report he stressed the urgend need for 
a special department of state and anthropological research to 
make a precise investigation into the 'affairs' of African 
119 
people. Fundamental to the crisis in social relations was 
the 'constant, uninterrupted contact' between all classes of 
whites and the African population as a result of 'multifarious 
commercial tendencies' which were acting to transform African 
'ancient habits and customs, their beliefs and modes of living. ,120 
Stuart projected the most radical pessimism: a direct relationship 
between insubordination in the towns and disruption in traditional 
social life in the countryside, African women 'subject to 
little or no control', and the rapid spread of venereal disease: 21 
The growth of commodity relations in the countryside was 
threatening to dissolve traditional life and Africans 'should 
not be accorded a liberty, a cruel liberty, which ••• is slowly but 
1 b " b h ' 'h'l ' ;1.22 sure y rlnglng a out t elr own annl 1 atlon. Instead of 
advocating liberalization which would hasten the disintegration 
of ancient modes of life, Stuart favoured the reform of 
harsher punishment: 
The most effective way of ruling Native youth is 
undoubtedly by means of moderate corporal punishment. 
In former days the most usual penalty for boys was 
flogging. So it should be with us, for only in that 
way can savages be taught to respect and to obey.123 
Lashes and imprisonment should be the means of punishing 'the 
more serious cases of open defiance'. Africans using footpaths 
should be brought under the discipline of the borough police, but 
not removed by racial proclamation, while Africans should not be 
allowed to ride on trams. The justification for these racist 
measures was to reinforce the temporary nature of African presence 
1n towns, encouraging the migratory nature of African labour 
and the repelling force of the state as against the views of 
those favouring steady and continuous labour from a location. 
In a statement which welds the concept of African workers as 
units of labour-power with their national oppression Stuart 
argued: 
They should, for many years to come, be regarded 
as mere visitors to the town; as such, though 
they do not contribute to the municipal rates, 
and therefore have no right to share the same 
privileges that regular citizens do ••• Permanent 
residence in town should, as far as the great 124 
majority are concerned, be distinctly discouraged. 
Stuart spoke for those who sought to limit the effects of 
proletarianization, to maintain a high turnover of labour to 
limit the growth of class consciousness, and to attack the 
petty trading which sprung-up to provide the African workers 
with liquor and food. The ideological assault launched against 
the permanence of African workers in the city and attempted to 
conceptualize the 'endless and enormous power of discipline' 
of tribal life l25 in the employment of the capitalist state. 
The whole thrust of collective action by white property owners 
carried out by the state was towards the reduction of the price 
of labour power. The two goals of state policy were then to 
develop a more intelligent and repressive state apparatus, and to 
reproduce a highly fluid reserve army of labour to sweep aside 
the growing class consciousness of workers in crucial sectors. 
These two aspects of the state were integral to each other; the 
only means of controlling the massive flux of workers in Durban 
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was through the full development of the means of repression. 
The segregationists lost the battle to form a permanent Black 
working class under control of the municipality in segregated 
urban areas. The alternative of acculturation of the mass of African 
workers to an acceptance of a passive role as proletarians living 
and working under more social than direct state control. the 
question raised by the segregationists in an apparently 'advanced' 
position of capital, was rejected as the cris~deepened and the 
flexibility of capitalist strategy was reduced by t~f! 
limits of state expenditure and urban land policy. 
The emerging nationalist movement among the intelligensia and 
well-to-do peasantry was not responsive to the struggles of 
African workers in the towns against the new levels of exploitation 
and racial oppression planned by the local bourgeoisie. The Natal 
Native Congress brought into being through the co-operation of 
the advocate G. H. Hulett and educated Christian Africans operated 
in Hulett's words as a 'safety valve of public feeling' during 
the war.126. Martin Luthuli. a farmer and Vice-Chairman of the 
NNC presented its policy as the 'welfare of the Native population 
under the Government', concerned with the franchise, buying land. 
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trading in the towns, and education. The NNC was limited to 
128 
Christian Africans and had no relationship with the chiefs. 
Composed basically of well-to-do African peasants closely connected 
to the mission stations, the NNC was unable to escape from a 
puritanical concern for honest labour and public morality. 
The politically conscious African petty bourgeoisie had aspirations 
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to speak for 'the masses', 'the nation ••• for the black 
people'; but from its predominantly rural base had no conception of 
the popular demands of African workers and African women 
in the towns. It repudiated absolutely the strike weapon 
as a means of securing higher wages and combatting an 
increasingly oppressive state and was unable to reflect 
the increasingly restive mood of the African masses. While 
they protested against jsibalo as a form of conscripted 
labour and opposed the chiefs as oppressive and 'greedy', 
Luthuli used the language of the bourgeoisie in talking 
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of 'raw Natives', and Radebe supported compulsion 
to labour: 'It should be a crime to see a man lounging 
about and going about the hills playing a concertina as 
131 
many are doing now'! As a Christian petty bourgeois 
loyal to the established Churches Radebe violently opposed 
the Ethopian movement which campaigned to break the links 
with these churches because of the growth of white racism. 
Possibly fearing its growing influence as a component of the 
ideology of resistance Radebe underplayed its significance 
but demanded measures to stamp it out as a 'seditious' 
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movement: 'I would simply get them out of the country'. 
Unable to disintangle themselves from the religious 
orthodoxy of the missionaries or a close relationship with 
sympathetic white professionals, the African political 
leadership compromised themselves by adopting many of the 
positions of the local bourgeoisie and rejecting any concept 
of mass resistance to state policies outside of their 
leadership. By supporting prohibition, arguing for the 
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universal obligation to labour, and basically concerned 
about land and trading rights, the African petty bourgeoisie far 
from seeking to advance resistance to an increasingly oppressive 
state rather sought out a niche within the social and racial 
structuring of colonial society. They contributed to the 
liberating of the African people from oppressive conditions only 
to the extent of arguing for qualified franchise (tentative 
although this suggestion was), and attacking the chiefs for 
commanding isibalo, arbitrarily and nepotisticallY distributing 
land, and for being determined to maintain the petty despotism 
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enshrined in colonial law. None of these attitudes were 
revolutionary, nor necessarily an advance on the ideology of the 
missionaries on whom many of the petty bourgeoisie were closely 
dependent. Their search for reforms and amelioration of 
oppressive conditions from the local bourgeoisie was out of 
temper with the growing resistance of African workers and peasants 
in the post-war depression. 
Capitalist crisis and the Bambata uprising 
Following the South African war the coastal areas 
experienced a short burst of prosperity. Capital flowed 1n 
resulting in a large expansion of bank credit, and the stream 
of white immigrants led to widespread land speculation. The 
whole period was marked by the rapid growth of capitalist 
agriculture (particularly wattle and dairy farming which 
supplemented the sugar plantations), and after some interruption, 
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the quick growth of coal mining. The increased income from 
peasant production and wage labour brought about by military 
expenditure soon fell off from 1902.135 After having been 
brought into the cash nexus at an accelerated rate, the 
African peasantry both in the reserves and on private land 
carried the burden of capitalist expansion. The expansion of 
the railway system, the largest item of expenditure on public 
services in Natal, which secured the widest expansion of 
commodity relations, also brought about the decline in peasant 
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agriculture by lowering the price of grain in remote areas. The 
continued expenditure on extension of the railways and on 
capitalist agriculture and mining was maintained at a high level 
during the post-war depression which was described as 'one of 
the severest, and undoubtedly the most prolonged depression South 
136 
Africa had experienced during the past one hundred years. I 
Despite this crisis,the nascent state in Natal was determined to 
maintain the growth of the railways, and between 1900/1 and 
1909/10 over four hundred miles of new lines were built and the 
. . 137 public debt rose to £23 mllllon. As state revenue from 
consumption taxes and licenses and business taxes declined rapidly 
from 1904/5 while revenue from import duties remained static, the 
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state searched for new sources of revenue. After dismissing 
the alternatives of income or land tax, the local bourgeosie decided 
upon a head or poll tax of £1 upon all adult males in August 1905. 
This measure was specifically designed to place the burden of the 
crisis on the shoulders of the African masses, in particular the 
139 
young, unmarried men. Given the imperative of the expansion 
of capital and the political constitution of the state, it was the 
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only measure which would avoid property owners from having 
to sacrifice some of their gains during the war. 
the imposition of the poll tax came at a time when the 
working population had suffered a considerable decline in living 
standards. Awakened to a heightened political life during the 
war through migration and work in the towns, the African workers 
led the resistance to the new tax, although the decisive battles 
against the state took place in the countryside. The togt workers 
who had fought against the local state siphoning off their wages 
through registration fees and had resisted theirforced accommodation 
in compounds were hardened to attempts by the state to indirectly 
reduce their wages through taxation. James Stuart who convened 
meetings of African workers towards the end of 1905 to announce the 
new tax, met with strong resistance. He reported that a refusal 
to pay the tax could be expected and the state would have to exert 
force to squeeze the cash from Africans who regarded the tax as 
oppressive. 140 These workers had no encouragement from Dube, the 
editor of Ilanga lase Natal and later the President of the South 
African Native National Congress. After these turbulent meetings 
addressed by Stuart he wrote: 
' ••• If the Ilanga does find fault with this (poll) 
Tax, it has to find more fault with the remarks made 
by those natives in Durban,who said they would not 
pay the money. Such contemptuous speech to the 
Government is not right. ••• It is well that the natives 
should learn to be more respectful. t 141 
As the resistance grew in the countryside as the magistrates 
attempted to collect the tax from the end of January and the 
beginning of February 1906, Duhe became more equivocal, attempting 
• 
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to build on the desperate resistance of the people to argue 
for a deputation to intercede with the Imperial government. 
The argument of the black petty bourgeoisie during the uprising 
was to reject violent resistance and armed warfare as futile and 
to pose instead the alternatives of education and political 
organization. While it was formally correct to argue that the 
'primary' stage of resistance to imperialism was coming to an 
end throughout Africa and that new methods of struggle were 
needed, the black petty bourgeoisie deeply imbued with Christian 
and constitutionalist views posed a reformist conception of 
political action to the insurgents' consciousness of the need to 
attack state power. Even the 'interceding' strategy proposed 
by Ilanga which brought Dube a reprimand from the Governor did not 
mention the poll tax as one of the grievances to be put before 
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the British government. Faced by the alternative of identifying 
himself completely with the mass resistance to the poll tax, Dube 
became apologetic, retracted his words and in the months during 
which the brutal extermination of the resistance was taking place 
in the countryside was commended by the Governor 1n a communication 
to the Secretary of State for aiding the government in preventing 
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the spread of rebellion. By holding aloof from the mass 
resistance to the poll tax and arguing against the armed uprising 
as a method of struggle, the black petty bourgeoisie acted to 
neutralize the ideological currents of resistance and provided 
partial justification for state action. Mass armed resistance, 
it could have been argued, would only worsen the situation of the 
people as a whole. 
Interpretations of the Bambata uprising have tended to 
describe the influence of Ethiopianism and the ideology of 'Africa 
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for the Africans' within the mass resistance as part of the 
'agitator theory' of the ruling class. The contrary position is 
argued by Marks who concludes that the 'disturbances were 
basically tribal in origin and organization.' 144 From our analysis 
of the growing class consciousness of African workers and the 
pauperization of the African peasantry, the Bambata uprising should 
be linked much more closely to the rising political conSClousness 
of the black masses. Bambata,who became the leader of the 
resistance which began as a series of incidents and demonstrations 
• 
and ended with a frontal attack on the army, although a hereditary 
chief,represented new elements of political leadership. Before 
taking the field of action against the state he had been involved 
in numerous court actions mainly over his failure to pay rent to 
local white farmers, and he was heavily in debt. Despite his 
chiefly position, Bambatawas distinguished from other petty despots 
by his lack of discipline on his followers and his controversial 
marriage. These attributes showed his lack of concern in 
maintaining a traditional order in his area and his responsiveness 
to militant action from the younger men. A man of considerable 
courage, even audacity, he represented the deep sentiments of 
resistance to racial oppression and the imposition of the 
capitalist state. 
Although there was vocal criticism of the poll tax by 
African workers in the towns, th~ first confrontations with the 
state over the issue took place in the countryside. After a series 
of incidents in which assemblies of people with their chiefs refused 
to pay the tax, martial law was declared, and all forms of 
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. resistance brutally suppressed. When two white policemen were 
killed in a fray near Byrnetown which involved two artisan 
Ethiopians, summary trials were held and the accused shot before 
bl d f · . 145 assem e A rlcans and chlefs. The Natal Field Forces under 
the command of the viciously racist Colonel Duncan McKenzie 
swept through the Midlands and then the coastal areas demanding 
the chiefs hand over defiant men and pledge loyalty to the state. 
In the Mapumulo division, an area which had one of the highest 
proportion of men in wage labour (see diagram) and where there 
was widespread resistance to the poll tax a 'scorched earth' 
policy was adopted with the troops marching through locations, 
burning crops and kraals, confiscating cattle, deposing and 
imprisoning chiefs. The resistance which followed became associated 
with Bambatha's leadership, developing from a first phase of 
guerilla warfare to a disastrous frontal attack on the Natal 
troops armed with Maxim guns. As the main body of resistance 
gathered in June 1906 large numbers of workers deserted from employ-
ment in Durban to supplement the 3-4,000 men gathered in the 
Mapumulo area. More than 1,000 dockers, about 500 domestic workers, 
a number of rickshaw-pullers, and most importantly about 40 per 
cent of the African Borough Police joined this group in armed 
146 
warfare with the Natal Field Forces. Attracted by the prospect 
of dealing a blow to the state which oppressed them, the men were 
decimated by the advanced tactics and weaponry of the Natal troops. 
By the time the uprising had been completely suppressed between 
3-4,000 Africans had been killed, 7,000 imprisoned, and many thousands 
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severely lashed. 147 The pacification of the countryside was 
carried out by a policy of terror; 1n some areas for months no 
one could be found to bury the dead, and in Mapumulo, Ndwedwe, 
and Lower Tugela (important areas of labour supply to Durban) 
well over 30,000 people were without shelter after their huts 
had been destroyed. 
The uprising which took the form of demonstrations, 
guerilla attacks and finally culminated in unco-ordinated mass1ng 
of insurgents in the heart of the reserves of Zululand cannot simply 
be described as a form of resistance to conquest (the overall political 
control of Zululand under the Natal state was achieved by its 
incorporation in 1897 after ten years of direct Imperial rule) butqg 
a series of armed actions by the industrial reserve army of labour: 
the peasants, unemployed and workers of Natal. The strongest 
support for an armed uprising certainly came from the pauperized pea-
santry (the well-to-do Christian peasantry remained neutral or 
supported the suppression) and the workers in the towns fighting the 
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struggle 1n the countrys1 e. The terrain of reslstance move 
from the towns where the ruling class felt most vulnerable, faced 
with large concentrations of workers restive under the new levels 
of exploitation, to the countryside where the growing political 
consciousness of the workers and their adoption of new techniques 
of struggles (strikes, attacks on the police, legal action by 
workers) was subordinated to the traditional methods of massed 
attack. The black petty bourgeoisie, which condemned the use of 
force by workers in the towns, was reduced to wringing its hands 
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and making calls for the uprising to come to an end. The 
most advanced ideology of resistance, the Africanism espoused 
by the Ethipian movement was certainly not xenophobic and was 
able to draw together Africans from disparate classes, clans, and 
tribes, against a state enforcing national oppression. Its 
definite limits were its 'reactive' nature, a response to 
white racism, which led to a conception of defence of 'hearth 
and home' rather than the forward movement of the workers in the 
mining, commercial, industrial, and political centres. Despite the 
devastating eradication of all resistance in the countryside, 
the uprisings of 1906 marked a definite advance in political 
consciousness by traditionalists, Ethiopians, pauperized peasants, 
and the workers that their aspirations could only be accomplished 
by an armed uprising. The contrary conclusion of the black petty 
bourgeoisie was that armed struggle was obsolete and led to de-
vastating losses and that the modern forms of political 
organization were constitutionalist and reformist. These two 
strands of thought were held in uneasy alliance in resistance 
to the racial state, the latter conclusion being embodied 
until 1960 in African nationalism led by the black intelligensia, 
religious leaders, and well-to-do peasantry. 
The origins of the Durban system 
The overwhelming victory of the local bourgeoisie over the 
African masses in the rural areas cleared the way for new forms 
of class rule the towns. The final form of government in 
Durban over African workers was, however, not a planned 
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extension of the local state but rather a series of responses 
to the post-war crisis which enabled the form of subordination 
over African workers to be reformed to become a systematic 
set of social relationships reproduced by a specialized state 
bureaucracy. While the primary thrust of the local bourgeoisie 
was against the black working class (isolating black workers 
from organized and militant white workers, collectively acting to 
reduce wages, and forcing black workers into barracks under the 
direct control of employers and the local state), another crucial 
aspect of the post-war counter-offensive was action against women 
and petty trading. The growth of petty trading by Africans ln 
the towns tended to consolidate working class communities outside 
the barracks and as importantly provided African workers with a 
plentiful liquor and cannQbis supply, thus loosening the general 
control over workers after work. The influx of African women, 
although posed in terms of prostitution, venereal disease, and 
public morality, threatened the drive to force all African workers 
into barracks by posing the alternative of working class households 
in the towns. Since the two issues of petty trading and African 
women in town were closely linked as the women were traditionally 
the brewers in African society, the attacks on both were aimed 
at averting the formation of a permanent African working class, 
'd' d h' b ' h "1 " not 1n a 1stant segregate towns lPS, ut ln t e ow 
central business areas not desired by the commercial 
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bourgeoisie. 
While the state was involved in tentative measures to bring 
the 'informal sector' under control or eliminate it entirely before 
" 
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the decisive suppression of working class and peasant 
resistance represented by the aftermath of the Bambatha 
rebellion, the strong measures adopted by the Durban 
municipality were part of a 'sanitation' drive resulting 1n 
the eventual achievement of a beer monopoly. In his evidence to SANAe, 
Alexander, the Superintendent of the Durban Police, said there 
were about seventy beer sellers in Durban in 1904 earning 
about £1 a day, considerably more than the highest wages paid 
to African workers. African workers were spending their wages 
on clothes, food, and beer rather than taking it back to their 
families. More than that, the beer brewing was rapidly becoming 
more alcoholic and getting up to the strength of 'isitshimeyana', 
a form of home-brewed spirits. Already the police were taking 
action against the beer sellers on the basis that the liquor 
exceeded two per cent, the level at which excise tax was exacted. 
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In one day Alexander had fifteen men convicted. Apparently 
action taken by the municipal police had pushed some of the brewing 
outside the borough boundaries and the Natal Police were called 
in to suppress this development. The attack on liquor outlets 
was accompanied by sets of regulations which strengthened the hand 
of white commerce. The workers accommodated in the new Point 
barracks were not allowed to cook their own food; catering 
arrangements for the 2,000 togt workers were handed out to tender. 
In justification Alexander argued: 'Do you think that 2,000 men 
are going to have 2,000 kettles, and each cook for himself, and 
each have a frying pan?' The municipality had converted an old 
barrack into an 'eating house' and granted a contract to a white 
caterer for £600 a year. With the decrease in employment at the 
Point during the post-war crisis, this caterer was finding it 
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difficult to pay his way. It was doubtless with the interests 
of large-scale commerce and defence of their centralization of 
services under municipal control that the police acted so severely 
against petty traders. 
An article appearing in the Natal Advertiser towards the end 
of 1904 signalled an offensive against African petty traders and 
Indian landowners in violently racist language. The article headed 
'The Kafir Market, filth and food' wrote of the stench in the Grey 
Street area of Durban. 'As one passes along many of the streets one's 
nostrils are assailed by stale, pungent odours, which cause one to 
catch the breath until the reeking area is passed.' The attack on 
petty trading was couched in the language of racism and segregation, 
defining the town and its industries built by black and white 
labour as 'European' in a formulation very similar to that made 
by Stallard in 1921 in his attack on the permanency and urban rights 
of the black working class, and on the black petty bourgeoisie: 
Durban is a European, not a native or an Indian town. 
Indians and natives are allowed in it by reason of their 
usefulness as labourers, scavengers and workers at any 
work at which the white man does not care to soil his 
fingers. 
From this view which includes an important role for the white 
working class there was no position at all for Indian or African 
petty traders. The proper solution to the problem suggested by the 
anonymous contributor , was a segregated location for African 
people, and a determined campaign to rid the town of the 'nuisance' 
of an African market. The African traders were influenced by 
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Indian landowners to become 'extremely filthy' and their 
activities were 'a menace to the health of all the neighbourhood'. 
The market area which was used both by Indian and African traders, 
numbering sixty, was condemned out of hand. During the day about 
40 beer barrels and 25 eating stalls were in operation making, 
according to the correspondent, the ground saturated with the 
leavings of thousands of meals: 
Open fires, of which more than 75 pots and cooking 
utensils simmer daily, and burning regularly while 
day lasts, and in the meantime there is the perpetual 
and indiscriminate sprawling of native smokers of 
msangwa who have nothing better to do. 
The Council was apparently determined to take action against 
the Indian landowner who allowed this market on his la n d wi thout 
providing drainage, and at a Council meeting it was even suggested 
that an interdict should be sought to 'put the beer and food 
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sellers out of the way of trade.' The report presaged the tenta-
tive manoeuvrings of the local bourgeoisie, wary of committing the 
municipality to planned urban segregation and meeting the expenses 
of a location away from the city centre, but also determined to 
eliminate the bases for non-racial urban communities which 
undermined the 'barracks strategy'. 
Any expansion of petty trading obviously threatened the 
municipal 'eating house' and competed with commercial interests. 
Before engaging in a determined struggle to eliminate African 
trading, the Natal state acted to increase pressure on the petty 
traders. The Stamps and Licenses Act of 1905 imposed a £5 licence 
fee on all African eating houses and the municipality expanded its 
154 
own catering establishments. These measures increased revenue 
,I 
for the municipality as that from the taxation of togt workers 
declined, siphoning off from the wages of African workers as a 
whole the means for their repression and administrative 
control. Once the food stalls had been brought under municipal 
control, the major issue of liquor supply could be broached, not 
simply as a means of increasing municipal revenue (although this 
was the dominant concern during the post-war depression) but also 
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as a means of bringing the whole series of subordinate relationships 
into alignment. The problem of African workers refusing to be 
squeezed into the barracks, attracted by a specifically urban life 
of new social relationships with people of other classes and races, 
could be partly solved by a forthright attack on areas where an 
alternative life was possible. The fact that African women could also 
only make an independent existence in the towns on the basis of liquor 
brewing was also a component of official thought and strongly 
resisted. 
The proposal that the municipality should monopolize beer 
brewing and distribution was not as much a sudden departure from a 
previously laissez faire policy, as the liquor outlets had always 
been subjected to police harassment, but a necessary aspect of 
keeping the value of labour power at its lowest by reproducing a 
system of migrant labour. In contrast to urban workers having a 
constantly expanding range of needs and complete dependence on wage 
labour, the value of labour power of migrant workers could be reduced 
by maintaining their subsidy to wage labour from homestead 
production. Between 1906 and 1908 a struggle took place between 
the municipality and the colonial state, and the liquor brewers. The 
130 
lssue of control over liquor became a matter of some contention, 
not only at the obvious level of the municipality and brewers, 
but also stimulated a considerable controversy within the 
ruling class. The missionaries, teetotal groups, and sections 
of the black petty bourgeoisie argued for complete prohibition 
(a view identical to that of the Chamber of Mines), while the 
municipality and those who claimed insight into African customs 
argued for a beer monopoly. All were united, however, on one 
theme; that Africans should not be allowed free access to 
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liquor of any kind. The divisions within the ruling class over 
the precise form of control over liquor supply delayed the 
implementation of a formal municipal beer monopoly for some time, 
as the brewers struggled for existence. When the police took 
action to close all liquor outlets selling to Africans, the 
vendors 0rfealed to the Supreme Court in Natal and won judgment 
against the authorities. This decision apparently caused a frantic 
mood in which legislation establishing a municipal beer monopoly 
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was enacted. The by-laws applying to Durban in terms of the 
Native Beer Act of 1908 were only promulgated late in the year, but 
did mark an important victory for the municipality. African 
women would not be allowed to sell or supply beer which was only 
to be manufactured and sold at municipal premises 1n Victoria and 
157 Bell Street. Any contravention of the regulations would result 
1n a fine of up to £20 or imprisonment with or without hard labour 
for up to six months, harsh penalties which showed the determina-
tion of the bourgeoisie to build a powerful local state in the 
wake of defeats of the African people in the countryside. 
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The provision of eating houses and installation of a 
beer monopoly by the municipality was not so much a sudden 
extension of the local state into new areas,as a similar 
enterprise to the provision of electricity, tramways, and 
telephones in the late nineteenth century. This development 
of 'municipal socialism' parallel to the growth of Fabianism 
and municipal public services in Britain, was not a service 
for the African labourers, who resisted further control and 
exploitation, but a public service for property owners in terms 
of cheap labour. By the local state appropriating production 
and distribution of food and drink, the necessities of the 
reproduction of labour power, it became integrally involve'd in 
productive as well as coercive relations with the mass of black 
workers. The togt fees which were such a naked display of the 
state drawing revenue from the wages of African workers to provide 
the means of repression became displaced by the more indirect and 
masked forms of collecting revenue. The explicit nature of class 
rule characteristic of the togt regulation period became supplanted 
by the more developed strains of paternalism which made a real 
contribution to the maintenance of migrant labour at a time when 
many important areas of labour supply had been devastated 
during the repression.* The food and beer industries which were 
so important in the early phases of capital accumulation in Britain, 
the distribution of which also became a major source of livelihood 
for the petty bourgeoisie, became under municipal control the source 
*This point will be expanded on in discussion of municipal policy 1n 
the post world war I period. 
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f 158 a revenue for a vastly expanded state bureaucracy. From 
the total wages of African workers employed in the town, the 
local state secured an increasing proportion for professional 
managers, clerks, police, and large stata of petty officialdom. 
Increasingly the functions of the local state in relation to the 
black working class became removed from the direct rule of the 
openly coercive state, the police, to the more sophisticated 
rule of fluent linguists and specialists who stressed the welfare 
aspects of segregation. 
Municipal control over food and beer eliminated almost 
completely the material basis for a fairly independent urban black 
petty bourgeoisie. The growth of beer brewing within the town 
did undoubtedly provide such a basis before the introduction of 
the beer monopoly. Shortly before this was introduced the police 
reported there were 112 'beer dens' employing 200 people and 
producing 4,000 gallons a weekend. The extent to which the beer 
trade offered a precarious but profitable livelihood is illustrated 
by the following example. One of the breweries closed down by the 
police was a five-room house employing twenty women and thirteen 
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men using fifty-seven casks, drums, and paraff1n t1ns. 
Enterprise on this scale obviously provided income for a fairly 
wealthy independent life by African traders possibly rivalling 
the income of the white petty bourgeoisie. Since commercial 
capital did not want to dirty its hands 1n plying the messy trade 
of food and drink for the black working class, it was quite satis-
fied to lose this section of the market to the municipality in 
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exchange for state efforts to cheapen labour power. While 
the beer monopoly was introduced with the fervour of municipal 
reform, a sharp struggle took place between the brewers and the 
municipality before the monopoly was achieved. When the police 
began to take systematic action against beer outlets In a 
campaign to suppress drunkenness, the vendors appealed to the 
Native High Court in 1907. This Court decided on appeal that 
utshwala was not an intoxicating liquor within the meaning of the 
Liquor Act and that the sale could not be restricted. 'From 
1907 until the beginning of 1909 utshwala was brewed by everybody 
and anybody who wanted it in Durban without control or 
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restrIctIon. The NatIve Beer Act of 1908 was designed to 
bring an abrupt end to the legality of beer brewing by Africans 
in the towns of Natal, and was a piece of racial legislation 
which particularly accentuated the oppression of African women. 
While it cannot be argued that the local bourgeoisie followed 
a carefully formulated plan in introducing the beer monopoly as 
a means of providing the revenue for a municipal department of 
control over African workers, the latter developed surprisingly rapidly 
once the competition from petty brewers had been eliminated. 
Originally the manufacture and sale of beer was placed in the hands 
.,Ao tool< 
of the Chief Constablp/ the anomalous position of 
suppressor of the now illegal beer trade, arrestor of the drunken, 
and municipal brewer. As this contradiction became more evident 
with public criticism, the municipal bureaucracy became more refined. 
A new department was established in 1910 to control the 
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manufacture and sale of beer headed by an official with the 
clumsy title of 'Superintendent of Native Eating Houses and 
Native Brewery'. As the welfare aspects of this new system of 
taxation became developed with an African Women's Hostel in 1911, 
the foundations of the bureaucracy in the beer trade were obscured 
with the more benevolent title of the 'Municipal Native Administra-
tion Department'. Experts in brewery machinery were consulted, a 
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new brewery was built, and the eating houses extended. This 
lucrative source of revenue depended on constant police suppression 
of independent brewing (the brewing of utshwala was only brought 
under control by an 'unusual amount of work' on the part of the 
police in July 1909) which in turn required further expenditure 
on the police force completing the cycle of taxation-police suppression 
- increased revenue for police so characteristic of the togt 
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regulations. The money flowing in from beer sales compensated 
for the decline in income to the togt fund which resulted from the 
post-war depression. Both these sources of income were further 
augmented by the municipality charging for passes issued to 
Africans in 1910. The beer monopoly brought in considerable 
revenue for the municipality and provided the material base for the 
system of control adopted by the municipality over African workers. 
After an initial investment in brewing plant had been made the 
income was quite substantial. 
TABLE 2.7. 
1909 
1910 
1911 
1912 
INCOME TO THE BEER ACCOUNT (£) 
4,502 
14,116 
20,370 
24,201 
Compiled from the Mayor's Minutes of these years. 
The beer monopoly had the advantage of obscuring the form of 
class oppression by drawing revenue from the expenditure of 
African workers on the necessities of life rather than the more 
open extraction of tax from the registration of togt workers. 
Politically it was posedas a voluntary system as workers were not 
compelled to drink beer. It also gave off the useful by products 
of paternalistic benefits such as the municipal eating houses, the 
hostel for African women, and the wage remittance agency for 
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African workers. By funding a state apparatus more from monopoly 
profits rather than direct taxation of African workers or from the 
general revenue gathered from property owners, the Durban municipality 
made a definite advance in the material and ideological development 
of class rule in South Africa. African workers maintained the 
specialised bureaucracy which fed off their wages, and the 'benefits' 
of the Native Administration Department eliminated independent 
economic activity by the African petty bourgeoisie (the eating houses 
and beer monopoly) or severely limited family life and brought African 
women under close supervision (the hostel). 
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The institution of a remittance agency provides 
a good example of the way in which the Native Administration 
Department reinforced migrant labour and made it more efficient, 
thus limiting the workers' opportunity to settle in the town. 
The agency which remitted wages to relatives in the countryside 
was instituted in 1907 allowing the Magistrates to payout cash 
to the workers' families. No charges were made for this service 
which gradually grew in importance until in 1910 £1,110 l6s 7d 
was remitted. The remittance enabled kraal taxes to be paid and 
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'the Government benefits accordingly.' The African workers 
were encouraged by the agency to send their money home rather than 
to 'squander' it in the towns. Other reforms made as part of 
the developing system of 'Native Administration' could be shown 
to serve similar objectives in one way or another maintaining 
migrant and thus cheapened labour power in the towns. 
The rapidity at which reserves were accumulated by the Native 
Administration Department increased conflicts about how the money 
should be spent, on more effective policing of the African popula-
tion or on forms of social welfare. As before, this conflict 
first became evident in a difference of oplnlon between the 
central government and the municipality. Percy Binns, the 
magistrate of Durban, argued in July 1914 that more money should 
be spent on providing facilities for African workers, and that a 
sports ground should be built. He criticised the department for 
experimenting with new and costly machinery instead of planning 
to providing facilities for Africans in the municipal area. 
backed his advice with the threat of action by the central 
He 
authorities, demonstrating strong differences with the 
priorities of the municipality: 
Seriously now, don't continue to admire the 'bloated 
balances' but spend some of them. I don't want to have 
the advise the Government that they must alter the Law, 
to remedy the fatal mistake originally made, viz. 
leaving the control of the spending in the hands of the 
Municipality - but I shall hayt4to do it unless the 
matter is seriously taken up. 
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The whole experience of the togt labour system was, however, 
reflected in the beer monopoly; increased expenditure on repression 
and control rather than on the welfare aspects of the legislation. 
The very nature of the beer monopoly dictated close police control 
and perpetual battle with the petty brewers quite apart from 
disciplining togt workers, checking the passes of all African 
workers, and overseeing labour contracts. Far from the welfare 
aspects becoming the dominant feature of the beer monopoly, the 
police raised persistent demands for increased expenditure on 
repression. On 11 June 1917 the Chief Constable complained that 
the grant for the police from the Native Administration Fund 
was inadequate compensation for duties performed in maintaining 
the monopoly system. 'I would like to state', he affirmed, ' that 
without the existence, vigilance, and the active support of an 
organized Police Force, the "monopoly sys tern" would utterly fail 
in its object'. The plain clothes staff, he argued, were 
employed for two-thirds of their time in the detection and 
suppression of the illegal liquor trade. Ignoring the multitude 
of pass fees, registration fees, fines, taxes, and the monopoly 
beer system itself, the Chief Constable argued that Africans in the 
town received free police protection, and that the force should 
receive increased income from the beer monopoly system: 
The duties of the Native police are practically 
entirely devoted towards the policing of the Native 
Conununity, being required to deal with cases arising 
under the criminal law, general Borough Bye-Laws 
as well as dealing with the illicit manufacture and 
possession of Native beer and other forms of intoxi-
cants ••• lt can hardly therefore be argued that a 
contribution towards the police who are necessary in 
maintaining a monopoly which provides the Natives of 
this Borough with a luxury, towards which they are 
not compelled to contribute, is in any sense 
unreasonable. 165 
From the logic of this argument, African workers should 
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pay for the privilege of falling under the control of the police 4~ 
being able to buy monopoly beer. The demands for increased 
income from the Native Revenue Account was evidence of a permanent 
tendency to close 'Native Administration' in upon itself (in short-
hand, taxation-revenue-repression-taxation) rather than the 
expansion of expenditure into new 'welfare' areas. 
Welfare Police ~ Taxation ---------------7~Beer monopoly 
Revenue 
Expendi ture 
Specialized 'Native'~ 
_ Munidpality bureaucracy ~----------------
As the Chief Constable argued, the police were central to the 
revenue base created by the tax and monopoly system; without 
constant suppression of petty brewing the municipal breweries 
would be undermined. The police were just as important in 
enforcing local and state taxes; during 1909, for instance, the 
municipal police and water police devoted their whole 
attention to rounding up tax defaulters failing only by £770 
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to equal the previous years total. The diagram attempts 
to map out the flow of money and authority to demonstrate 
the constant tendency for welfare expenditure to fall outside 
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the cycle of revenue accumulation unless it was integral to that 
cycle as were, for example, the eating houses which sold the 
municipal beer. 
Specialized bureaucracy 
The major achievement of the Durban system was not the 
incidental by-product of welfare, but the growth of a specialized 
bureaucracy within the municipality to control African workers. 
The openly coercive force of the police used in the administration 
of the togt regulations was 'modernized' by an increasingly 
sophisticated programme of paternalistic social control, 
professionally independent but strongly backed by the police. 
As Swanson describes it: 'The apparatus of registration and 
passes associated with the togt system was perpetuated and 
extended in pursuit of its long-established though elusive objective 
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of influx control, surveillance and labour exchange.' While 
the transition was certainly not without immense problems (the 
regular amendments to legislation governing these areas shows how 
difficult control is to achieve in practice) the developing Native 
Administration Department marked a leap ahead in detailed control 
over African workers. Armed with the ideology of segregation and 
racial superiority, trays of record cards and improved identity 
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documents, and rows of clerks, the Department rapidly increased 
its scope and effectiveness. Other municipalities later came to 
regard the beer monopoly, professionalism, and detailed control 
of the Durban department as a model to follow. 
The charter of the NAD, headed by its first professional 
manager, J. S. Marwick, who was appointed in 1916, was the Native 
Aff . d 168. alrs By-Laws promulgate on 8 November 1916. Marwlck later 
argued that these bye-laws had become necessary because of a sudden 
increase in crime by Africans in 1916. In justification he argued 
the strongest action against criminals had the support of the 
African petty bourgeoisie: 'even the Native press drew attention 
to the matter, and suggested remedies such as the permanent expul-
sion from the borough of Natives caught in the acts of violence or 
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hooliganism'. The penalties in the bye-laws were, however, 
criminally punitive rather than embodying the crucial penalty 
of deportation from the cities. 
The regulations were founded on a racial defini don ('barbarous 
races') and laid down precise procedures for registration, passes, 
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and contracts of service. All work seekers were required to 
report for a medical examination and to submit themselves to 
vaccination. A curfew was established between 9 p.m. and 5 a.m. and 
most importantly African workers were bound to produce evidence 
of registration 'on demand'; failure could lead to arrest without 
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a warrant. The registration office was empowered to keep a 
black list of all Africans who were convicted of 
172 
crlme. 
A long list of offences were laid down applying both to 
workers and employers, although the penalties for African 
173 
workers were considerably harsher. The togt workers were 
provided with the toughest penalties: a maXlmum of three 
174 
months imprisonment with hard labour and fine of £10 for 
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the familiar schedule of crimes. After having been successfully 
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resisted in 1904 the lodging fee of 5s per month was again 
levied on togt workers who were also required to live ln 
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compounds. In short, the regulations established a rigid 
set of coercive practices which subjected African workers to 
detailed bureaucratic controls and made them more vulnerable to 
the social power of the employers. They increased the weight of 
racial oppression on the shoulders of African workers and 
strengthened the ability of employers to exact higher levels of 
exploitation. Even though they were not consciously advocated 
as such, the togt regulations and other measures formed part of 
the ruling class strategy after the South African War to establish 
the country as a profit centre within British imperialism. The 
struggle for a high rate of return on capital in South Africa 
necessitated a cheap labour system reinforced with new measures to 
meet the increasing resistance of the African workers and the 
tendency for wages to rise in the heat of the war boom. 
The political representatives of the Durban property 
owners divided under the strain of pressure from below into two 
broad groupings; the repressionists who demanded increased direct 
municipal control over African workers at the lowest cost, and 
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the segregationists who were prepared to devote more municipal 
expenditure on 'solving' the problem of resistance by allowing 
African family life in segregated urban locations. The contest 
between the two factions which at its height gathered the 
merchants and householders into the first group and the small 
industrial bourgeoisie and 'far-sighted' bureaucrats into the 
second, faded with the collapse of the war boom and the higher 
wages the workers were able to demand. The unity of the property 
owners as a whole was made possible under the reconstruction 
of South Africa under British imperialism in which an efficient 
cheap labour system was a priority. 
In Durban this took the form of a highly developed machine 
of regulation which was se If-financing through the togt taxes and 
beer monopoly, provided barrack accommodation, a specialized 
bureaucracy, and a police force. The 'Durban system' marked a 
considerable advance in the development of the capitalist state In its 
municipal and national forms, lowering the cost of domination and 
control of the mass of the workers to the property owners. The 
togt regulations were transparently an attempt by the bourgeoisie 
to place the burden of the cost of barracks and social control 
directly on the shoulders of the workers, simultaneously lessening 
their independence and lowering their wages. The beer monopoly, 
which tapped a wider social base, was a revenue-generating 
goldmine and paid for a politically skilled bureaucracy in addition 
to other services for the bourgeoisie. This widening of the tax 
. ... I land secured for base, along with a POlICY of leaSIng munlclpa , 
. bl duced municipal rates. the property owners of Durban consldera y re 
By the turn of the century there was in Durban a grow1ng 
African working class which was increasingly resistant to low 
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wages and the municipality which reinforced the social power of 
the employers. In Natal as a whole a high proportion of the 
African male population was in wage employment in the towns, farms, 
and mines. Increasing numbers of workers were also seeking 
employment in the Transvaal gold mining areas and elsewhere 1n 
Southern Africa. But the numbers of African workers in employment 
were only a partial indication of the level of proletarianization of 
the African population. A qualititative study of labour migration 
in Natal demonstrates a high proportion of African male migrants 
even from fairly remote rural districts, the lowest level of 
migrancy being recorded in the white agricultural districts where 
Africans were employed on the farms. Behind the active army of 
labour stood the large reserve army of labour; those migrants having 
completed a term of wage labour, those working unpaid labour tenancy 
contracts, and an increasingly impoverished peasantry. It was 
this changed character of the countryside, the movement of thousands 
of migrants into the harsh discipline of capitalist production and 
then back to the rural districts, and the acute impoverishment of 
the homesteads after the South Africa war which provided the 
foundations of the armed resistance to the poll tax. The brutal 
crushing of the Bambata uprising in the countryside paved 
thp- way for such sweeping measures as the beer monopoly in the 
towns. 
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Increasingly the African workers and peasants acted 
independently of their traditional rulers and the mlSSlon 
educated African petty bourgeoisie. The struggle against the 
poll tax was conducted against the advice of Dube, and the 
educated political leadership repudiated all forms of direct 
action by the workers. The prospect of united working class 
action, with African workers learning the techniques of strikes 
and picketing from organized white workers, was as repulsive 
to them as to the political leadership of the white workers. In 
this period African workers had to move into action against the 
express instructions of the African petty bourgeoisie which 
advised the workers and peasants to place their trust in the 
fair-mindedness of British imperialism. Given the low level of 
organization among African workers at this time, these 
differences did not become sharpened, but provide early evidence 
of different strategies in response to national and class 
oppression. 
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principles: prohobition of brewing and sale of beer (54), 
and compulsory removal from the town of all Africans not 
exempted in 53 to the urban location. 
Swanson (1976) to some extent creates the conception that 
the segreationists were victorious by not quoting 
opposition to their programme. 
The discussion which follows draws upon minutes of -a . 
meeting of the Town Council with the Secretary of Nat1ve 
Affairs on 8 April 1903 and evidence by Alexande: a~d 
Jameson to the South African Native Affairs Comm1SS10n , 
in May 1904. In order to present the ideas of the 
protagonists clearly, material from these two events 
ented concurrently. Which were separated b¥ a ¥ear are pres 
103. 
104. 
105. 
106. 
107. 
108. 
109. 
110. 
111. 
112. 
113. 
SNA 17/1903. 
Mayor's Minute 1898. The demand for segregation was 
not necessarily contradictory with support for a 
'modernized' compound system. Alexander is here 
protesting against backyard accommodation, he entirely 
approved-of the compounds built by the town council. 
Jameson also recognized the necessity of housing 
emergency dock workers in compounds at the docks while 
arguing for other workers to be placed in the location. 
SANAC, III: 28,178. 
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Alexander also agreed compounds were a form of 
imprisonment, despite his endorsement of the municipal 
compounds. During the April 1903 meeting he was reported 
as follows: 'He hated the very thought of barracks; 
they were against the nature of the native. Put the natives 
in the glorious sunshine, in the open, where they could 
wash themselves on the back beach or somewhere else. But 
take them from the back yards, from the terrible 
temptations they were now in.' (SNA 17/1903). 
SNA 17/1903. 
SANAC, III: 30,055. Alexander argued the locations would 
solve the social needs of African workers while at the 
same time provide for a form of militarization of labour. 
'They could lie under the trees or swim in the river as 
long as they liked. They would be perfectly happy ••• ' 
In contrast to this idyllic life, he favoured barracks 
and proposed marching the workers into town 'as they do 
with soldiers'. (SANAC, III: 28 351). 
SANAC, III: 30 129. 
Moor (SNA 17, 1903) in arguing for the location said 'the 
point was that the Natives so located did not work for six 
months in the year and for the other six off to their Kraals.' 
SNA 17/1903. Ellis Brown concentrated on the technical 
problem of segregation for the docks rath~r than resisting 
the location directly from the merchants viewpoint. 
Jameson did respond to this criticism by suggesting a 
division in dock labour between 'a certain number of men 
at command, only the surplus being taken away' but could 
not respond to the reservations of other Councillors that 
he was going far beyond dealing with the togt labour problem 
to reorganize completely labour supplies in Durban. 
SNA 17/1903. 
NBBNA, 1904: 70. The Natal Native Reform League's concern 
w~with the 'filth' of Africans in towns and with po~sible 
deterioration in the 'white race'. Stuart ~alks of, ra7e 
feeling', 'dominant race', and Europeans be~ng the :uI1~g 
power'. This racism was closely connected w1th ? bel1ef 1n 
the possibility of white degenerating in a trop1ca1 
society and disgust for 'low whites'. 
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114. NBBNA, 1904: 76. 
115. Natal Act 31, 1903: Section 16, originally quoted in 
Simons, 1968: 107. Simon writes that these drastic 
penalties were to 'stamp out the violation of the White 
man's prerogative' in exclusive access to white 
prostitutes. Alexander, however, in providing evidence to 
SANAC did not consider white prostitutes would 'entertain' 
Africans. There is scattered evidence of white and black 
living together. The Natal Advertiser of 2 November 1904 
reported on the action of vigilantes in 'a certain country 
town' who tarred and feathered whites who were living with 
'Arabs'. Again Alexander provided evidence of white men 
taking on African mistresses in highly unequal relationships. 
(SANAC, III: 28,375). Mark Radebe was probably representative 
of the African petty bourgeoisie in being outraged by 
interracial sexual relations and in demanding control over 
African women in town. 'A white man may take a black woman and 
stay with her in spite of the badge law, the registration law. 
There are women here who are simply uncontrollable; their 
parents cannot get at them, and the white man says "funani 
boy", and tells the father to go his way, and the woman is 
staying there inside and with a white man; she gives up all, 
and is kept.' Radebe accepted a version of the 'degeneration' 
view of African life put forward by the bourgeoisie: 'With 
all the offences of the Native community, the nation is going, 
and it is going badly.' (SANAe, III: 26, 434, 26,436). Both 
black and white men, of course, viewed their 'prerogatives' 
from the basis of patriarchal control, both wanted 'their' 
women not to have relationships with men of the opposite 
race. The national oppression of African people encouraged two 
important tendencies: social chauvinism among white workers who 
saw in the degredation of African workers the potential 
position to which they could be reduced, and reactionary 
views in the African petty bourgeoisie alarmed by new forms of 
social relations in the towns. The local bourgeoisie and the 
African petty bourgeoisie were united in demanding the strictest 
controls over the movement and lives of African women, their 
main ideological weapon being that of morality. From the 
leading organs of bourgeois opinion came most violent attacks 
on interracial marriage. See, for instance, Natal Mercury, 
15 December 1904. It was pressures such as these which widened the 
whole spectrum of racial legiSlation. 
116. Labour leaders such as W. McLarty, a stock broker, F.S. Tatham, 
an advocate, and C. H. Haggar, an academic 'state socialist', 
advocated preference to white workers in state employment and 
labour arbitration as a means of isolating white workers from 
the mass of the working class and disorganizing the struggle 
of African workers. Like other local leaders such as Dr. S.G. 
Campbell, a leading advocate of the Workers' Educational . 
Association they opposed Indian immigration. All were unlted 
in building'a solid white bloc. In the words of F. S. Tatham: 
'There is only one sound policy to go on, and it is by the 
Eternal decree which we cannot alter, the white man, and the 
white man only, is the governing factor.' }JLaqgalase Natal, 
17 February 1903, quoted in Swanson, 1976: l6Y. 
117. 
118. 
119. 
120. 
121. 
122. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
126. 
127. 
128. 
129. 
130. 
131. 
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Natal Advertiser,(20 October 1904.) These certificates were 
possibly the forerunners of the character references later 
an issue of great contention. 
Ibid. Swanson's interpretation of these types of statement 
is that they were unnecessarily alarmist since African 
workers never really effectively challenged the state. 
The whole direction of the argument here is, however, that 
African workers resistance brought about the tighter 
state measures of the post-war period in an attempt to stem 
the tide of insllbordination in the towns and countryside. 
NNBB, 1904: 74. This is the most developed view of the 
necessity of 'professionalizing' and specializing the state 
bureaucracy to provide exclusive contact and more effective 
control over a 'massified' African work force. Jameson 
(SANAe, III: 30,046) did talk of specially selected white 
bureaucrats to provide for the welfare and 'firm, even if 
an unobtrustive, control' over African residents in 
locations. 
NNBB, 1904 : 70. 
NNBB, 1904: 72, 73. 
NNBB, 1904:78. 
NNBB, 1904: 75. 
NNBB, 1904: 77. 
NNBB, 1904: 78. 
SANAe, III: 33,325. 
SANAe, III: 32 082. Luthu1i explained that the issue of 
the franchise had not been unanimously decided upon, and 
that he favoured white representatives to represent African 
interests. He said that Africans did not have any particular 
grievances in 1904. (32,085). 
SANAe, III: 32,258. 
26,055. 
32,380. 
SANAe, III: 26,343. During the discussion on the po~s~bility 
of importing foreign labour, Radebe argued that the 1~1balo 
powers s~ou1d be used to 'turn our people out to work. 
Ipepo 10 H1anga,(27 November 1903). 
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132. SANAe, III: 26,170. Radebe was speaking as a Methodist 
lay preacher, choir master, and organist. Marks (1970): 
70, describes how closely the political leadership was 
related to the Methodist and American Congregation~l churches, 
and their denunciation of the 'Ethopian movement'. At 
various moments the missionaries, however, followed 
concil iatory policies to the breakaway movements. 
133. Radebe cites as an example of petty oppression the advance 
payment of lobo1a before marriage; it is from this 
perspective that he claimed to speak for the masses. He 
was rather more radical than Luthu1i who said he was not 
opposed to chiefs and the tribal system, and argued that 
the chiefs helped the government. (SANAe, III: 26 055, 
32,307, 32,139). 
134. Konczacki (1967 )23, describes how capitalist agriculture 
was developed through the rapid expansion of the railways. 
135. Warwick (1977:111) quotes figures of imports of goods 
bought by Africans in Natal rising from £159,910 in 1899 to £271,45(' 
136. Schumann (1938: 94). 
137. Konczacki (1967:97). 
138. Konczacki (1967:62). 
139. Marks (197~ 140 ff" gives a detailed discussion on the 
manoeuvring within the ruling class before deciding upon this 
specific measure. 
140. Marks,(1970) 173, mentions that Stuart was well aware of the 
potentially violent resistance the state would encounter and 
considered the tactics should be carefully calculated. During 
this time the employment of togt workers was declining sharply. 
In early November 1904 the Superintendent of Police reported 
that workers at the harbour were in demand and that the togt 
workers were refusing to occupy the Point barracks. According 
to him, 1,960 togt badges had been renewed, 780 workers occupied 
the Point barracks and 300 were living in barracks near the 
jail. By 1905, however, there was a drastic decline in 
employment: only 23,210 togt certificates were issued 
against 61,400 the previous year. This was a response both to 
the onset of the post-war depression and the evasion of the 
higher fees by the workers. The togt workers apparently 
persuaded householders to register them as monthly workers while 
others rented small rooms from Indians. (Natal Advertiser, 
8 November 1904, and Mayor's Minute, 1905, Police Department 
Report). By early 1906 Stuart was more confident that the 
poll tax would be accepted and that the 'resentful spirit' ha~ 
cooled and time had 'enabled Natives to see that the measure ln 
question does not press as much on them as at first they thought 
it would.' 
141. Ilanga lase Natal, 10 November 1905 quoted in Marks 
(1970: 333 fn). 
142. Dube mentions the high rents imposed on Mission Reserves, 
the compulsory labour system, the pass laws, and other 
oppressive laws in the summary of the article presented in 
Marks (1970) :332, the burning question of the day was not 
mentioned. 
143. Marks (1970) 333 • 
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144. This is argued in pages 308-309 and is a necessary 
corrective to the ruling class' interpretation that black 
preacher agitators rather than the poll tax were the spark 
to the uprising. 
145. Marks (1970:190) Makanda and Mjongo were sawyers and 
leading members of the Presbyterian Church of Africa. Mjongo 
was hanged in 1906 after being badly injured. (See also 
Stuart, 1913:129). 
146. Marks (1970) 230. Employers made strong efforts to keep 
their workers in town. Thomas Raynes,(a labour age9t) for 
instance, was favourably mentioned in Natal Who's Who as 
having kept a gang of 650 Africans together at the Point 
with only tl-lO deserting. 
147. Marks (1970) 237-240. 
148. A possible explanation of the 'turn to the reserves' was the 
fact that the poll tax was exacted in the rural magis tries 
rather than the towns. 
149. While in 1906 Dube reprimanded the Edenda1e property owning 
peasantry for becoming 'loyal levies' at the same time he 
argued against the folly of taking up arms. Marks (1970):335. 
150. The whole development of 'segregation' in the urban areas is 
closely linked to the growth of large-scale commercial 
capi tal, to land prices, and building societies. Al though totally 
neglected by liberal and nationalist critiques of the 
development of 'group areas' (which tend to concentrate on the 
revenue reaped by the state through its intervention in racial 
zoning of the cities) a Marxist analysis is essential to an 
evaluation of the deprivation of land ownership by Indian and 
Coloured people in the cities and the vicious attacks on the 
Indian trading classes particularly in the 1960s. My 
impression is that the group area demarcations are preceded 
by careful negotiations between all sections of capital and the 
state. Obviously the 'political' and 'financial' factors are 
closely related, not only in the dominant but also in the 
subordinated classes. Representativeson the Indian Council . 
are obviously not unaware of new areas for Indian land ownershlp 
before they are officially proclaimed. 
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151. SANAC, III, para 224-237. The whole question of liquor 
has a long history in relation to the development of 
the black working class, throughout Southern Africa. 
In Natal before the turn of the century, the price of 
rum (in modern parlance 'cane spirits') was included as 
part of the necessary diet of labourers. During the 
British reconstruction of the Transvaal total prohibition 
was enforced with wage reductions as a means of squeezing 
more labour time out of the workers and securing discipline 
over work and leisure. (van Onselen, 1976:78). As in Natal, 
liquor might have served as an inducement for workers to 
offer their labour power, but also speeded up the 
development of a permanent working class severing links 
with the countryside. The ideological control of tribalism 
and the rural subsidy to wages would be lost to bourgeoisie; 
a theme into which the Durban Department of Native Affairs hadJ-~~ 
deep insight). The precise relationship between brewers and 
sellers (a major theme in van Onselen) is difficult to 
work out from SANAC and other contemporary reports; it 
could be that the men acted as the public distributors of 
beer brewed by the women. Early reports mentioned women 
bringing beer into the towns for relatives; by the late 
1920s it is definitely women who are both brewers and sellers. 
152. SANAC, 381. 
153. Natal Advertiser, 8 December 1904. The article draws on the 
question of sanitation and public health, a key issue in the 
armoury of bourgeois ideology against the labouring poor and 
an important component of virulent racism. Msangwa 
is the Zulu term for cannabis. 
1St. Marks, (1970) 140. 
155. From what evidence is available it seems as though none of 
the black petty bourgeoisie defended the African women's 
right to brew beer or saw the beer monopoly as a factor of 
racial oppression. Before the South African war, Saul Msane, 
a founder member of the Natal Native Congress and compound 
manager of Jubilee Mine, campaigned for 'total prohibition' 
on the mines and strict enforcement of the liquor laws. 
(van Onselen, 1976:73). Presumably he held the same views 
in relation to state control over liquor in Durban. 
l5a. Evidence of A. J. Cook (Select Committee 3, 1923:2l)·Cook 
was a major propogandist against the municipal beer monopoly 
as a leading member of the South African Temperance Alliance 
and supported total prohibition. 
l5~. Native Beer Bye-Laws. 
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158. E.J. Hobsbawn, 1969. Industry and Empire, Penguin, p.46. 
16'1. 
1&.'2.. 
1£3. 
164-. 
16!)". 
16". 
167. 
110. 
l7{. 
Swanson, (1976): 74. Swanson argues that the municipality 
exaggerated the 'runaway illicit liquor trade' to create 
a favourable social climate for introducing the beer 
monopoly. This may well be true, but it still remains to 
explain why the municipality struck on beer rather than 
8".')ther ' social evi l' as a central issue in the onslaught 
on the black community. 
Evidence of Dr. J. McCord to the Select Committee on 
Native Affairs (S.C.3, 1923), page 58-59. Reverand A. J. Cook 
who gave evidence on behalf of the Temperance Alliance 
situated the liquor restrictions in terms of the social reform 
movement following the Bambata uprising. He vigorously 
opposed the sale of any liquor to Africans. It is not clear 
whether this Alliance had any connection with 'The South 
African Alliance for the Reform of the Liquor Traffic' 
which secured prohobition on the Rand in the immediate 
post-South African war period, an aim closely associated 
with those of mining capitalists. (van Onselen, 1976:79-81). 
Report on Native Affairs Department made to Durban Town 
Council Meeting on 30 July 1915. 
Mayor's Minute, 1909. 
Report of the Native Affairs Department for 1910 (UI7, 1911), 
p.235. 
Durban Municipal Records, Natal Archives, File 55/117. 
Durban Municipal Records, Natal Archive, File 55/117. 
NBBNA, 1909:XXXV. During this year Durban was the leading 
centre of income from poll tax contributing £4,818. Despite 
this record there was a substantial decline from the £6,690 
collected in poll tax in Durban during the repression of the 
Bambatha Rebellion 1n 1906. 
Swanson, (1976)174. 
Native Affairs By-Laws, Borough of Durban, Natal 
Provincial Gazette No.372, 9 November 1916. 
Natal Mercury,S June 1918. If this statement is true, it 
is certainly remarkable, as the African petty bourgeoisie 
would have been calling for the enforcement of one of the 
most oppressive aspects of national oppression in South 
Africa. 
Sl-8. 
S9 and 10. 
17.2. S13. 
173. S14-17. 
174-. S28. 
175. Swanson, (1976)173. 
17b. S22 and 23. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The ICU, beer and bureaucracy 
Bolshevism means the rule of the working class. And when the 
workers rule, the capitalists cannot carryon their robber system 
any more. Bolshevism means the victory of the wage-earners. 
Get ready for the World-wide Republic of Labour. The way to 
get ready is to combine in the workshops. Combine as workers, 
no matter what colour. Before Labour can emancipate itself 
black workers as well as white must combine in one organisation 
of Labour, irrespective of craft, colour, or creed. Workers of 
the world, unite~ 
(Pamphlet distributed in Natal in Zulu translation, The International, 
25 April 1919.) 
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The leadership of the working class in the struggle for democracy 
and in the resistance to the capitalist state is essential to a Marxist pers-
pective on political and social movements. As in other countries 
where the majority has suffered under extreme forms of national oppression, 
this leadership (both in the demands made by the working class and the 
mass action which provides the dynamism to resistance) is obscured by the 
support which the workers often provide to petty bourgeois leaders who add 
some of the workers' demands to their national ist rhetoric and the un iversal 
opposition of all oppressed to the measures of oppression. The extra-
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ordinary importance of the Durban dock workers in resistance to the employers 
and the state in the period between the wars assumed national significance 
and provides a graphic illustration of the class character of mass resistance. 
In the course of the struggles against the municipalization of beer, the tax 
system, and wage reductions, the social movement of the workers brought 
out the differentiation between oppressed classes to these forms of national 
oppression and is germane to a discussion of leaders and followers in the 
resistance. Durban generally, and the dock workers specifically, became 
characterized as a stormy field of social action threatening at a number of 
conjunctures to force a breach through the wall of state and employer control. 
The resistance to the poll tax spilled over into the countryside, underground 
cells of workers were formed in the city, and abrupt confrontations with the 
state demonstrated the fragil ity of the plethora of regulations and laws in the 
face of united working class action. In the face of such opposition the 
local and national state sought to modify the legal system of control and 
replace the dictates of formal regulation with the more elastic forms of 
domination. Yet these modifications, essentially minor and with the aim 
of dividing resistance to the local state, could only be introduced after 
sweeping repression and specifically the national raids mounted on the Point 
compounds from where the workers were leading the struggle against the 
state. The coordinated counter measures to the advance of the workers 
took the most vigorous repression at the beginning of the depression, but with 
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the onset of rising unemployment and wage reductions, social and economic 
factors as well as political and administrative factors took their toll. With 
the revival of economic growth in the mid-1930s the stevedoring workers, as 
other workers in industry, fought to regain the position they had lost before 
the world-wide destruction of capital. 
Those sections of the ruling class directly concerned with the racial 
forms of domination :lver the African working class, the 'Native administration' 
bureaucracy and the missionaries, were particularly concerned about the 
changes in the African working people brought about during the war. Both 
recognized that a permanent 'detribalization I was taking place, that African 
workers, impelled by the dual pressures of rural impoverishment and increasing 
urban employment ,were shifting to the towns with their families and that this 
process was irreversible. These changes posed the demand for the repro-
duction of a specifically African working class, separated from the 'low types' 
in the Indian and white working class and under specifically racial forms of 
domination. Officials and missionaries alike were concerned to blunt the 
effects of the proletarianization of African workers and to suppress the develop-
ment of class consciousness. The war, accompanied by an expansion of 
industrial production throughout South Africa, attracted an increasing number 
of African workers, the African population of Durban rising from 17,925 in 
1918 to 29,011 in 1921. 1 The increase in the moss of African workers was 
accompanied by a growing number of African families struggling to survive in 
the towns, African women were being increasingly employed as domestic ser-
vants. Marwick, writing at the conclusion of the war, was disturbed that 
the patriarchal order of tribal life which secured dependence and allegiance 
to authority was disintegrating. 2 An African proletariat was emerging 
which was permanently attached to the urban areas and engaged in continuous 
work, which was accompanied by the 'demoral ization I of the people. Homo-
sexuality was becoming common in the compaunds (described in Zulu as 
Izitabane) and secret, hierarchical, criminal organizations were also to be 
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3 found. As the proletarianization of the African workers advanced so 
the ideological subordination of the workers ('restraints of custom ') were 
reinforced through legislation; a curfew was enforced, Africans' use of 
the sidewalks, streets and open places was regulated, and a wide range of 
controls exercised through the Native Affairs bylaws. With the 
reorganization of registration of African workers,after the registration under 
Law 21 of 1888 had apparently fallen into disuse, 'the town Natives 
are now under better contro I' . The Native Affairs Department acted in 
loco parentis over African workers through police discipline, but its tasks 
were not solely repressive; the officials helped find minors in the cities, 
sorted out petty disputes, recovered industrial compensation for injuries, and 
encouraged thrift and a system of deferred pay. These 'welfare' functions 
of the department reinforced the paternalism of control and the patriarchal 
system in the reserves and white farms. Marwick was keenly aware of the 
conflict between the goal of the Native Affairs Department and those of 
other sections of soc iety; he was one of the first to draw attention to the 
propaganda of socialists among African workers and the threat this posed to 
4 ' 
the state. The 'preaching of Social ism and syndical ism amongst the 
Natives in their present backward state is wholly undesirable'. He was 
somewhat cautious in discussing the source of revenue for the apparatus of 
racial domination: the monopoly of beer brewing. The Missionary Con-
ference in Natal had criticized the system for leading to demoral ization and 
imp~verishment and had requested restricted hours. 5 He nevertheless 
defended this 'experiment' as a means of keeping the African workers from 
stronger liquors. The source of his sa lary and the repression of African 
women necessary to enforce the monopoly of beer, which he described as the 
'food' of the African people, was not mentioned. His article demonstrated 
the fear arising in the ruling class in the face of the growth of a permanent 
working class and its power in the centres of its control: the cities. The 
response of the ruling class was expressed in the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 
1923 which provided for uniform regulation of African workers in the towns, 
with curfews, regulation of service contracts, and control over liquor, as some 
f . • f 6 o Its most Important eatures. 
The 'humanitarian I section of the ruling class, the missionories, 
were equally concerned with the possibility of a, class conscious proletariot 
and proposed policies which, if anything, were more racist and concerned 
to achieve the subordination of African families in the towns to the control 
of the bourgeoisie. At the Fifth General Missionary Conference held in 
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Durban in July 1921 a special report was presented on the position of African 
workers in the towns. The authors acknowledged that 'detribal ization I 
was taking place and that 'respectable Native families' were living perma-
nently in the towns. Couched in moralistic language the missionaries 
described the 'degeneration' of African people in the cities. The report 
was most hostile to Indian and Jewish traders, looking forward to the time 
when African traders could 'regain the trade that the White man has thrown 
away to his own loss I, a direct encouragement of an African petty trading 
class hostile to other minorities. 7 It also raised the spectre of African 
servants contaminating white children in their care with venereal disease and 
urged tighter control over African women in the towns. The problem of 
'morality' was that African women were becoming reduced to prostitutes after 
being seduced by white masters to the extent that there were Ivery few respec-
table and pure Native girls in town ' . 8 The authors give support to the 
patriarchs in the countryside who were said to be demanding that the women 
be returned; while providing some protest against the exploitation of 
African 'women these views reinforce the view that African women should not 
be allowed into the towns and that the African population should be subject 
to strict segregation. 
residential areas: 
This is most explicit in their condemnation of mixed 
In this particular neighbourhood the worst forms and the beast-
liest immorality prevails, the lowest types of European, Indian 
and Native mixing up together, with results that may very well 
be left to the imagination; enough to say that there is no 
wonder that Natives lose all respect for the White man and the 
White woman, when in the open daylight and in the darkness of 
the night vice stalks unreproved in their very midst. 9 
What was most frightening to the sombre missionaries was that the relations 
of domination were being disturbed through 'degrading sexual intercourse' 
between black and white. 10 Their concern for 'morality' in this and 
other issues provided much of the rationale for the most vicious race and 
class measures imposed on the African working people; in defence of 
bourgeois morality the 'friends of the Native' we.re laying the ideological 
foundations for attacks on African women and the African working class. 
The missionaries expressed no doubts about the controls exacted over the 
African working class housed in compounds under the controls of employers 
and the municipal ity. 
Regulations .•• based on common-sense and a due regard to the 
moral welfare of the men I iving in the barracks, are in force 
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and have to be observed, and rightly so too, or the barracks, 
instead of being healthy and respectable, would speedily degene-
rate into cess-pools of immorality. 11 
Although some doubts are expressed about municipal brewing of beer, the 
new scheme is seen as a definite improvement on unrestricted brewing and 
selling by African women and a step towards the 'ultimate goal of Prohibition'. 
As the eyes and ears of the ruling class, the missionaries reported that 
there was a growing demand for equality between black and white and a sense 
of unrest and injustice. In particular, price increases were bitterly resented 
as 'deliberate swindling and oppression'. 12 The solution b the rising demand 
of the African workers for political and economic rights was presented as 
involving'the enlightened Natives' in consultation. The missionary report 
was fairly representative of the bourgeois view of the African working class 
in the towns which sought to enforce further restriction on the permanent work-
ing class{while making some reforms to separate them from other sections of the 
working class) and to cement the migrant worker to the homesteads in the 
countryside after completing labour in the towns. 
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These considered opinions of bureaucrats and bourgeois ideologists 
in the field (the missionaries) provided no evidence that evolutionary change 
and amelioration of the impoverishment of the African working people was 
on the agenda; the war served internationally and internally to exacerbate 
national and racial antagonism. It also led, however, to the expansion of 
the African working class and the acceleration of resistance to imperial ism 
with the October 1917 Revolution in Russia. 
Working class resistance and African nationalism 
Towards the end of the war and in the immediate aftermath, the 
African working class asserted its strength in a number of strikes and demon-
strations against the pass system. In this period before the growth of the 
mass Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) the workers looked parti-
cularly towards the African petty bourgeoisie for leadership in the struggle for 
higher wnges and political rights, and the International Socialist League (ISL) 
which carried out agitation among African workers although basically orientated 
towards the white labour movement. The South African Native National 
Congress establ ished in 1912 to represent the political aspirations of the African 
people took up the leadership of the African workers' resistance to the pass 
system and poverty wages particularly in Johannesburg. The workers' 
relationship to both the SANNC leaders and the white socialists was ambiguous; 
the radicals among the SANNC were deeply influenced by the ISL propaganda 
and led public meetings, but withdrew when the workers moved on to the 
offensive as in the 1920 miners' strike. The ISL propaganda was warmly 
received by the African workers, but in turn the organization was split by 
differences on the approach to the African working class and did not provide 
the crucial leadership during strike action {although members were charged 
with provoking African workers into taking action}. 13 The relationship 
between the ISL and the SANNC, cooperative in the immediate post-war 
period in the Transvaal, became uneasy thereafter as the socialists turned 
towards the white labour movement and the African leaders to reforms within 
imperial ism. 
Working class action in Durban in this period reflected these 
ambiguities and tensions to a lesser extent than in the Transvaal. The 
most prominent local African leader, J. L. Dube, had been elected Presi-
dent of the SANNe in 1912 deliberately because of the devastation wh ich 
167 
had been dealt to Africans in Natal after the Bambata Rebellion. 14 Dube 
had, however, kept a considerable distance from the uprising and his views 
did not become more radical over time. In accepting the Presidency he 
wrote of a 'hopeful reliance in the sense of common justice and love of free-
dom so innate in the British character' and in the same year spoke of Africans 
coming before the Government not with assegais but respectfully as loyal sub-
jects. 15 He also expressed his belief in the principle of segregation at a 
later date. Yet by the end of the war Dube was to champion the position 
of African workers in Durban and to lead a campaign for higher wages. 
Wickens in describing the early growth of the ICU writes that Durban 
was the onl).' major seaport that did not produce an African trade union in the 
post-war period or any major working class action. While it is undoubtedly 
true that Durban did not experience the combativity of the dock strike in 
Cape Town in 1919 which provided the impetus for the growth of the leu as 
a mass organization, or the street fighting of Port Elizabeth in 1920, it was 
not innocent of strike action. There were a number of strikes, more than 
detailed by Wickens, but it is true to say there was no decisive struggle as in 
the two ports mentioned or in the Transvaal with the tremendous strike of 
African miners in 1920. Rather there was a series of strikes to which Dube 
responded by starting a campaign of petitions by workers for voluntary wage 
increases as an alternative to strike action. The lack of formation of a 
trade union in Durban during this period has been ascribed by Wickens to 
several reasons 'none very convincing': that the Zulu people were cowed 
by the suppression of the Bambata rebellion, that there was no Zulu leader 
capable of organizing the workers, that the Indian community tended to keep 
to itself, that the workers were 'less committed' to urban life, and finally that 
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h "1' , I I ' 16 Th h h' h t e munlclpa Ity was partlcu ar y repressive. e uge growt In t e 
ICU which took place in the mid-1920s demonstrates effectively that the 
African working people had not accepted the brutal repression of the struggle 
in the countryside as a defeat in the cities and the lack of a foundation of 
working class organization has to be explained in terms of the limited objec-
tive and equivocal leadership of the struggle for higher wages and against 
national oppression. There was very little propaganda for African workers 
and nothing like the scale of work done by the ISL in Johannesburg and Dube 
did not see any necessity for working class organization; his role was limited 
to that of interceding with the authorities. His interests were primarily 
educational, on the I ines of moral and self-improvement, based on the ideas 
of Booker T. Washington, and he was not one of those leaders of the SAN NC 
influenced by syndical or socialist ideas, The campaign for higher wages 
did not lead to permanent organization of the working class or even mass 
membership in the Natal Native Congress, but it did demonstrate that the 
African workers were capable of breaking new ground in struggle in advance 
of the leadership. And in doing so the workers showed they had absorbed 
lessons on working class tactics from organized white workers. 
While employment expanded during the war, the working class in 
South Africa suffered particularly from the sharp rise in prices, especially of 
food. As in other areas, African workers came out on strike for increased 
wages on a number of occasions. As the missionaries noted, African workers 
were particularly affected by rising prices and were deeply conscious that they 
were being exploited. Working class action centred on the dock workers but 
also included other disparate groups such as ricksha pullers and even the 
municipal police, the lead tending to come from the dock workers who were 
employed on a dai Iy basis outside of the Master and Servants Act, Dube's 
relationship to demands for higher wages was not immediately clear; it was 
only with the initiation of strike action that his intervention began. 
169 
The first open indication of action taken by African workers in support 
of the demand for higher wages came with the strike of ricksha pullers in 
Durban in protest against a proposed increase of the charge made by ricksha 
owners for renting the vehicles from lOs to 12s per week. On 15 April 1918 
the ricksha pullers refused to take out their vehicles at the increased charge. 
Dube led a march of 1,200 ricksha pullers to the office of the Municipal 
Native Affairs Department. 17 Deeply sensitive to the possibility of strike 
action on the scale experienced on the Rand, the Mayor, J. Nicolson, 
immediately contacted the ricksha owners and persuaded them to withdraw the 
increase. He then told the workers that in an IEuropean town the assembling 
of large bodies of Natives was undesirable because it was subversive of proper 
order I. The workers were told that the proper method of representation 
would have been for a small number of chosen spokesmen to put the case on 
behalf of all the workers and they were warned not to take part in demonstra-
tions. Dube expressed the appreciation of the ricksha pullers for the settle-
ment and Ino discussion was necessary I . 
This first action taken by African workers was essentially defensive in 
character but may have stimulated further dissatisfaction with the low level of 
wages. Many large firms received demands from African workers for wage 
increases. According to Nicolson, these firms granted increases ranging 
from 10 to 15 per cent on the wages previously received. The demands of 
the workers were well in advance of whatever upward adjustment employers 
were prepared to make to wages, the togt workers demanding a virtual doubling 
of their wages. The level of wage demand was evidence of the deepening of 
the workers' consciousness of their exploitation well in advance of the Itrade 
union' demand for compensation for rising prices to their pre-war value. 
The togt workers led in taking independent action in demanding higher wages. 
On 24 June 1918, a deputation of togt workers went to the Native Affairs 
Department saying they had been guided by the advice given by the mayor in 
presenting demands for pay increases. They demanded an increase in wages 
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to 5s per day for work performed during the day, and lOs for a night shift. 
The approach to the Native Affairs Department also seems to have been dic-
tated by the municipal regulations laying down the minimum wages for togt 
18 labour. The officials then arranged a meeting between the employers 
and the deputation. 
Before the meeting took place on 26 June 1918 a preliminary meeting 
was held between the officials and employers which provides insight into the 
local state under capitalism. The Native Affairs Department under pressure 
from the workers' demands assumed the task of organizer of the local state and 
the employers, its class content determined by the tactical action taken to 
unify the employers and repel the workers' demands. 19 The employers and 
the municipal officials felt the claims of the workers were exaggerated as they 
were said t:> earn more than many other workers. Before the deputation of 
five togt workers met with employers and officials of the municipality it was 
conspiratorially agreed to listen to the workers' demands but then to turn them 
down flatly. It was decided to set up a sub-committee of the Town Council 
consisting of the mayor and employers of togt labour who would preside at the 
meeting and then tell the workers: 'You have not made out a sufficient case 
for an increase'. 20 Marwick, head of the Native Affairs Department was 
given the authority to coordinate a defence of the employers against the inc-
reasing demands for higher wages. An employer of a large number of togt 
workers and a councillor, R. B. Nicol, was put in charge of the meeting with 
the workers' del egates. As pre-arranged, the workers were I istened to but 
no concessions at all were offered. The delegates reported back to the togt 
workers and advised them to stage a strike. Their advice was rejected, 
however, and instead a collection was made to engage a lawyer to plead their 
case, an instance which tends to counter a popular conception of reformist 
leadership and a militant rank and file. 21 
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It was at this point that the mayor felt the matter of wages had become 
a political matter, as there was a widespread demand for increased wages. 
Following the bold claims of the togt workers he claimed that Dube had be-
come the agitator behind the demands for large wage claims. In a leader 
entitled 'The Money Famine' in "anga lase Natal, Dube outlined a strategy 
for securing higher wages and criticized the togt workers for acting by them-
selves. 'If certain bodies only are going to make representations, the 
weight of the Africans' voice and needs wi II not be noticed. We cordially 
welcome one of the resolutions of the Natal Native Congress wh ich met at 
Pietermaritzburg last week, and resolved to bring to the notice of General 
Botha, the fact that all N~tive Servants wish to have their wages increased 
on account of the high cost of all commodities, and that he should submit this 
22 fact to all European employers.-' The editorial itself and the subsequent 
actions of Dube did not confirm the complaint of the mayor that Dube was 
agitating for wage increases, but rather that he was proposing a strategy for 
increasing wages by pleas to the authorities rather than strike action. In 
contrast to the strategy of the advanced workers in putting forward substantial 
wage demands and suggesting strike action, Dube proposed a 'political' strategy 
of petitioning the capitalist state to urge wage increases from employers. He 
criticized the Point togt workers for 'going it alone' as all African workers 
wanted their wages increased, and so appeared justified in claiming to act on 
behalf of the interests of all African workers in making proposals for getting 
concessions from the employers. 
Dube had followed up his editorial by calling a meeting of African 
workers in the name of the President of the Natal Native Congress. All 
heads of gangs, indunas, workers, domestic servants, storemen, and stablemen 
were called upon to send their delegates to him to arrange a mass meeting to 
agree on one resolution. About 800 African workers attended a meeting on 
27 July 1918, and since it was found to be difficult to formulate a resolution 
at the gathering, Dube asked the indunas of gangs to remain behind and set 
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out a resolution demanding an increase in wages. This suggestion and the 
resolution which followed showed Dube's conservative approach which stressed 
the acceptance of the hierarchical control of the workers through the indunas 
at work and the chiefs in the reserves. The final resolution proposed action 
on two fronts: directly through demands for pay increases from employers, 
and indirectly by asking all chiefs to petition the government for a pay rise. 
The wage demands were for 2s a day for togt workers who provided their own 
food and slept in quarters for which they paid rent, and a 1s increase for all 
workers receiving food and quarters. It was decided to present these demands 
to the government through the Secretary for Native Affairs, and to the Mayor 
of Durban, the Chamber of Commerce, and to employers of gangs. 23 
Apparently referring to the stevedoring workers who were considering strike 
action, Dube repeated it 'would be the height of folly' to do so before the 
employers had received notice of the general grievances of the workers and the 
answers had been made known. The contact with the workers was evidently 
radicalizing for Dube, the question of strike action not being totally dismissed. 
A strike would, however, require much organization because unless it was pre-
pared for, disunity would result as some workers would be on strike while 
others would continue working. He suggested that the stevedoring and rail-
way workers keep in contact with him by selecting a representative each to 
discuss building up a fund. 
As the demands of the workers mounted on a coordinated basis the local 
bourgeois press blamed the International Socialist League, which was active on 
the Rand, for the growth of organized agitation. 24 In response to this 
accusation and to distance himself from any agitation on a socialist basis, Dube 
called a meeting on 10 August 1918. At this meeting he repudiated any' 
connection with the Johannesburg socialists{with whom the Transvaal Native 
Congress was working} and distributed the printed petitions calling for inc-
reases in wages as agreed to by the resolution. But at the meeting Dube 
came in for criticism as well as praise. There had been a number of small 
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strikes taking place after the meeting on 26 July at which the workers had 
demanded an increase of 30s per month, a demand identical to the resolution 
but expressed in terms of a monthly wage. 25 Dube had been called in by 
the Chief Magistrate after hearing that the Point workers were considering 
coming out on strike on Monday, 12 August, if Dube was unable to report 
satisfactory results, and warned against continuing agitation which led to 
strike action. At the 10 August meeting Dube repeated the Chief Magis-
trate's warning to the workers and appealed to them not to strike 'as their 
doing so might have serious consequences'. This caution after the some-
what more radical suggestions immediately after the earlier meeting was not 
well received by the workers. Workers who reported on some success in 
achieving higher wages also said they had stopped work to make their demands 
and in some cases this had led to wage increases. The critical attitude of 
some workers to Dube became most evident when further contributions were 
called for. One speaker objected to making any further donations and 
wanted to know when definite action would be decided upon. He asked 
whether the funds would be completely run down before anything was done. 
Dube responded by saying his purpose in life was to 'serve the Native' and he 
did not think the workers would expect him to carry the expenses of work on 
their behalf. He had consulted a lawyer before drawing up the petition, 
had had notices printed, would need to travel to Pietermaritzburg to see the 
Chief Native Commissioner, and to Pretoria to see General Botha. The 
questioner represented a group of workers who were impatient with the slow 
development of the wage campaign and suspicious that Dube was using the 
funds for his own purposes. After putting the brakes on independent action 
by advanced sections of the African working class in favour of united action, 
Dube was being seen as unable to provide a strategy which would provide a 
decisive lead to the workers. 
While the workers were increasingly expressing doubts about a policy 
of caution and petitioning, the ruling class was increasingly alarmed by action 
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by the working class, although there were differences of opinion between 
the conciliationists concerned with maintaining some substance to bourgeois 
rights, and the repressionists who followed a policy of extreme action against 
the African proletariat. The Natal Mercury sounded the alarm for the con-
ciliationists by repudiating the decision of the Johannesburg magistrate who 
sentenced striking African sanitary workers to two months harsh imprisonment. 
His attitude was a 'glaring example of how not to deal with trouble of this 
kind', the editor wrote. We simply cannot afford to live on bad terms with 
the swarming mass of Natives.' The conci liationists were concerned that 
African workers would be influenced by socialists whose aim was 'to paralyze 
the trade and industries of South Africa' • Employers should respond to the 
reasonable demands of African workers to 'render powerless' those who 'intrigue 
to unsettle the minds of the Natives'. 26 
From the evidence of the letter of the Mayor to General Botha, the 
conci! iationists were the weaker p'Jrty. According to Nicolson, a limited 
number of employers were prepared to consider a 'reasonable' request for a 
small increase in pay, but all employers were united in denying any increases 
occasioned by the resolution at the mass meeting. 'There is a strong feeling 
that any civil commotion among the Natives such as this deadlock portends 
would be most harmful at the present juncture, and that the Government should 
indicate clearly and firmly that any trifl ing with the dangerous situation which 
exists, will not be permitted. ' Being unable to understand social pheno-
mena apart from the operation of individuals, Nicolson accused Dube of having 
come to the town with the objective of setting African workers against white 
employers. Many African workers had stopped work en masse to make their 
demands to employers, and had only resumed work provisionally until the end 
of the month. 
The mayor was particularly concerned about reports of an impending 
strike at the docks. He made this the key issue in attempting to get General 
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Botha to take action against Dube. 'In view of the serious possibilities 
which would result not only to private enterprise and householders in Durban, 
and publ ic services, but to the even more important question of shipping and 
landing at the Port should a Native strike be precipitated, I have been asked 
to press upon your notice the immediate need for some action being taken 
which will put a stop to the agitation and hostility, which is being fermented 
in Durban by Dube. ,27 A fter the reported threat of the doc k workers to 
strike on Monday, 12 August 1918, the strategic implications of a disrupted 
port during a period of war were given prominence and the position was 
reported to the Chief Native Commissioner in Pietermaritzburg and the Acting 
Chief Magistrate in Durban. 
Two strikes of dock workers followed, but they did not take the form 
of a violent explosion or a protracted struggle. The strikes took place not 
among the togt workers who hod led the workers' demands in the meeting with 
employers of 26 June 1918, but among monthly employed cooling workers. 
The first strike involved workers of Associated Stevedoring and Landing Com-
pany who refused to work at 0500 on Wednesday, 14 August. The strike 
took the form of a broken series of confrontations wi th the compound man,!ger, 
Robert Stainbank; initially 27 workers refused to start work. Stainbank 
rejected the workers' demand and told them it was neither the time nor place 
to ask for an increase. He managed to persuade 24 b go to work and took 
the remaining 3 to be charged by the Water Police under the Masters and 
Servants Act. While Stainbank was at the police station a further 100 
workers struck. He managed to caiole some into returning to work after 
taking them to the police station, but eventually 21 workers were brought 
before the court. Although Stainbank argued he had not received any wage 
demands from the workers, the accused said they had handed in Dube's petition. 
They complained of rising prices, particularly of the coats and trousers they 
had to buy to work in coaling. The Acting Chief Magistrate was severe. 
'He saw the petition in frontof him, b~t it did not contain anything, for it was 
signed only by Dube who had nothing to do with the matter before Court 
and had no right to intervene between them and their employers'. The 
accused had not adopted a 'constitutional' method of presenting their 
grievances but had put forward their demands in 'an insolent and defiant 
manner'. With these harsh words he said he was dealing with them 
'leniently' but hoped the case would warn others 'not to show themselves to 
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be led away by agitators'. The workers were fined £ 1 with the alternative 
of 14 days' imprisonment with hard labour. 28 
Not being able to believe that African workers were capable of 
independent action, the bourgeois press claimed the strike was the 'result 
of .•• mischievous leadership', and called on employers not to acquiesce 
to the demands the workers had been 'incited' to make. 29 A further strike 
took place apparently on Sahxday, 17 August 1918. On this occasion 
workers employed in coaling by Associated Stevedoring and Messrs. R. Nicol 
and Co. of the Point refused to work overtime after lunch on Saturday and 
demanded overtime rates for Saturday afternoons. They were arrested and 
taken to court where they were fined £ 1. 'The Magistrate found much fault 
with them, saying that they were monthly employees and should not therefore 
break up their work in such away, particularly in these times of war at the 
Point where coal is loaded. ,30 The employers offered to pay the fines if 
the strikers would agree to return to work. Although, as Dube had warned, 
there was not complete agreement among dock workers on the form of action 
to take and the strike did not lead to a victory, it showed that the workers 
were determined to resist even if this meant some workers had to lead and 
fail in their objectives. 
These strikes were followed by a meeting of municipal officials and 
employers on 30 August 1918 which aimed at stiffening the resistance of 
employers against thewidespread wage demands after administrative action 
had been taken to silence Dube. The Chairman of the Native Affairs and 
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Pol ice Committee of the Town Council told employers not to concede to the 
demand for 1s a day increase. The communication with General Botha 
had evidently brought some strengthening of the employers' position: he 
announced that the Resident Magistrate had forbidden Dube to have further 
meetings without his consent, and that Dube had left Durban to make personal 
representations in Pretoria. Employers of African labour were jnstructed to 
listen to Marwick, the head of the Native Affairs Department, on the issue of 
wages as 'no one (was) better able to size up the Native'. Marwick 
reported that further increases had been requested by railway workers and 
employees of Randles, a commercial firm; but he appealed to employers to 
t . I' h f' 31 H 'd h D b h d ac unanimous y In t e matter 0 wage mcreases. e sal t at u e a 
protested strongly against the magistrate's ruling and hod urged the workers to 
continue their demands. Dube had collected £4 9s from railway workers and 
£2 15s from Randles' employees to set up a fund to press the wage claims. 32 
Some of the employers had already started to carry out victimization of the 
'ringleaders' of the workers, and these men had to struggle to get other employ-
ment as their passes had been endorsed by their former employers. (This is 
only one of the many ways in which the pass system is used by employers and the 
state to maintain control over Afri<7an workers, and here it served as a valuable 
auxiliary power to the social power of dismissal.) Marwick reported that 
the wage demands were being further impelled by the increase in taxation in 
the reserves; the hut tax had been increased from 14s to 19s by an addition 
of 5s dipping tax. To the fire of inflation was being added the fuel of added 
taxation. 33 Altho tgh not contradicting the proven need of African workers 
for higher wages, Marwick strongly urged employers not to allow any increases. 
The employers were, however, clearly worried and some had made elaborate 
plans to break strikes when they occurred. The Divisional Superintendent of 
Rai Iways, Carr I said that two weeks previously 500 workers had presented 
Dube's petition for an increase in 1s a day even though they had been granted 
an increase in February. He had made arrangements to completely replace 
. 34 
the workers if they struck by bringing in 2,000 workers to Durban If necessary. 
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With Dube curbed and the workers facing larger fines and imprison-
ment for striking, the momentum of the wage campaign slackened. Dube's 
relationship with the workers brought out the ambiguity of the African petty 
bourgeoisie's relationship with the workers; while Dube exercised courage 
in calling the meetings and signing the petition he also repudiated the strike 
weapon and encouraged the workers' dependence on himself. While 
undoubtedly aware of the formation of the Industrial Workers of Africa on the 
Rand, he was unwilling to assist in building the permanent organization of the 
workers or to conduct agitation. To the contrary, it seems as though he used 
the wage campaign as a base for establishing himself as the spokesman for all 
Africans in Natal to the highest authorities. When challenged by the state 
he seems to have stopped the public role he was playing in attempting to 
coordinate the wage campaign. 
Independent working class action on wages 
The withdrawal of Dube from the wage campaign after being warned 
by the magistrate to stop holding meetings,opened the field for the ISL which 
could bring out propaganda without disrupting the original wage campaign. 
The first decisive intervention by the ISL in the Natal area was not, however, 
on the issue of wages but a pamphlet explaining the October 1917 revolution 
in the Soviet Union and calling on workers to unite. The pamphlet, entitled 
'The Bolsheviks are coming', argued that the war between nations had been 
replaced by class war and that the Bolsheviks were leading the struggle for the 
rule of the working class. The capitalist press, it explained, slandered the 
Bolsheviks because 'they h~ve lost the rich mines and factories which the 
Russian working men are now working for themselves', and were frightened 
workers in South Africa would follow this example. Calling for workers I 
control, it exhorted workers to combine in workshops: 'Combine as workers, 
no matter what colour'. In essence it argued for united working class action 
by white and black within one mass organization 'irrespective of craft, colour 
or creed'. 35 Implicit to the call for organization was a syndicalist conception 
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of working class unity, breaking down the barriers between skilled and un-
skilled, black and white, as a basis for the struggle for social and political 
emanc ipation • Starting from this premise its weakness was an inability to 
develop resistance to national oppression as the basis for mobilizing the 
African working class, but this did not impair its popularity nor the alarm it 
caused the rul ing class. 
The authors, 0.1. Jones and L. H. Greene, were charged with contra-
vening war regulations in publishing and distributing a pamphlet 'calculated 
to create alarm or excite public feeling', as well as other similar offences. 36 
The main thrust of the prosecution was that the pamphlet had given rise to 
disturbances in Pietermaritzburg and Durban, that it had been printed in Zulu 
and Sesuto, and that unity between black and white was subversive of the 
co lour line. Although it was said the pamphlet 'went off I ike a damp squib' 
in Pietermaritzburg (although there had been a scuffle in this town), the situa-
tion in Durban was volatile and it had caused great excitement. 37 There 
was a wide variety of witnesses against the accused, including Marwick, the 
censor of publications, police officers, employers, and Josiah Gumede, the 
secretary of the Natal Native Congress and editor of Ilanga lase Natal. 
There were, however, divisions within the judiciary and the senior civil ser-
vants which mirrored the arguments of the conciliationists and repressionists 
in the town councils and press. The censor, for example, said hedid not 
have to see the pamphlet as Africans had the right to organize. Marwick 
was an advocate of the strong line of repression. He gave evidence that he 
had been doing 'political' work among African people since 1903 and that the 
effect of the pamphlet was to cause excitement and create alarm. Specifi-
cally, he blamed strike action at the Point on the distribution of 'a pamphlet 
containing false represent~tions'. which caused much dissatisfaction among the 
workers. 38 He argued that although the African workers had the right to 
organize, as the censor had acknowledged, 'it would be dangerous for them 
to exercise that right unless it were possible to keep them under very strict 
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control I • Because the pamphlet had been written in Zulu it was worse 
because it would be better understood. A Ithough Africans were 'strictly 
speaking I not oppressed, he felt that any explanation of the Native Land 
Act would cause 'curiosity, disquiet, and uneasiness ' • He accepted that 
African people were becoming impoverished, but argued this was because of 
the thriftlessness of the workers, although 'he is not entirely to blame for his 
impoverishment ' • For the local ruling closs the most alarming issue was 
expressed by the censor. The pamphlet encouraged the workers to seize 
the mines and 'if they did that with the mines it {sic} would do the same thing 
with the sugar and wattle plant~tions I ~ 39 
The prosecution IS strongest argument was the evidence presented by 
African witnesses. Some said the pamphlet might provoke disorder and bring 
bock the days of Tshaka. 40 Josiah Gumede thought that the African people 
would be reduced to slaves if the Bolsheviks took over the Government. He 
feared a republic and placed his faith in British military power. The magis-
trate supported the policy of repression. He held that the pamphlet was 
libellous, treasonable, and indeed diabolical; 'while the idea that a South 
African Lenin might conceivably be a Bantu suggested lunacy'. Both Greene 
and Jones were sentenced to a fine of £75 and four months ' imprisonment. On 
appeal the sentence was set aside. In their defence the accused argued their 
aim had been Ito avoid on the industrial field the territorial strife of the pioneer 
and tribal days I, and this statement constituted a partial retraction of the 
revolutionary propaganda of the pamphlet. It was possibly this moderation 
wh ich led the judge to conc lude that the pamph let did not advocate an armed 
41 
insurrection and could hdve had no effect on the prosecution of the war. 
Despite the inspired exhortation to black and white workers to unite 
and organize, the pamphlet did not provide on immediate strategy forward for 
African workers. The Industrial Workers of Africa, which had been formed 
on the Rand in 1916, was not mentioned nor the wage issue which was the 
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burning question of the moment. In the apparent absence of any further 
propaganda and organization of African workers by the ISL, the workers 
moved into strike action spontaneously some time after the pamphlet had been 
di stri buted. As with the wage campaign conducted by Dube, the ISL propa-
ganda failed to develop permanent organization among the workers although 
there was undeniably a receptive mood among African workers, particularly 
dock workers, in Durban. 
Following the incidents of August 1918 which were repressed by threat 
of dismissal,and charged of contravening master and servants legislation, the 
dock workers held back on further action while raising their wage demands. 
Early in July 1919 there had been evidence of a 'nasty spirit' when the muni-
cipality had distributed gifts of meat as part of the peace celebration to dock 
workers. The feeling of the workers had been: We don't want your meat, 
we want more moneyl . In at least one case the meat was thrown into the 
street. The local magistrate found this a difficult problem to deal with as, 
ironically, 'apparently the Natives have the right to refuse a free gift' .42 
A wage dispute soon followed with workers, again those employed by Nicol 
and Company, cooling contractors to the railways, coming out on strike on 
16 July. The workers marched to the Nati ve Labour Office of the Ra ilways 
in a group of about 500 and demanded an increase of 4s 6d per day over their 
present wages. This wage demand was a considerable increase over the 2s 
a day increase demanded in August 1918. The strikers refused to return to 
work before receiving a guarantee that there would be on increase in wages. 
It was arranged that a deputation would be received by the employers in the 
afternoon, and that none of those elected to present the grievances of the 
workers would lose their wages during the negotiations. The Divisional 
Superintendent of Railways, Carr (who had made plans for the replacement of 
strikers in 1918), and the manager of the Native Affairs Department, Marwick, 
met the deputation of 13 workers. 
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The delegates complained that the cost of boots and clothing had 
risen tremendously and they needed a wage increase to compensate; the 
added burden of the 5s dipping tax per kraal pushing them to desperation. 
In response, the employers tried to create the impression that the inflation 
was simply caused by the war, with the coming of peace prices would auto-
matically return to pre-war levels. Carr argued that the price increases 
caused by four years of war were temporary, 'the soldiers were returning, 
which would mean that scarcity of clothes, etc, would gradually disappear, 
and prices would decrease in the course of time' .43 The workers had been 
given an increase of 5s per month since the war had begun as well as extra 
rations. Since the rations were paid for by the railways, the workers housed 
free, he considered that the African workers 'had been very well treated' in 
comparison with white workers. He found the workers' demand 'preposterous' i 
they had entered into contracts with the railways and would be in breach of 
their contracts if they persisted in strike action. He instructed the dele-
gates to resume work on the following morning and to advise the others to do 
the same. The talks continued until 1700, but the delegates then asked 
that the discussion be continued with the workers as a whole, as each indi-
vidual worker had a grievance to discuss. This would have been to them 
the best means of countering the bourgeois arguments of the employers with 
the militant demands of all the workers without exposing themselves immediately 
to victimization. 
The two spokesmen of authority, Carr and Marwick, moved in to the 
compound and put their viewpoint to the workers directly. The strikers were 
unimpressed, and were then told that if they wanted to take the matter further 
they would have to elect a deputation to the Chief Magistrate. The strikers 
responded by saying a deputation would be arrested, but Marwick and Carr 
gave the assurance that the delegates would be granted immunity and not lose 
their wages. The workers insisted that their demcnds should be conveyed 
directly to Pretoria. With growing anxiety and impatience the spokesmen 
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conc luded the discussion by saying that if the workers continued in their 
demands 'their only course was return to work and give notice in the ordinary 
way'; the workers should resign. Obviously concerned that the dispute 
would turn into a protracted struggle, Nicol and Company rang up the Chief 
Magistrate of Durban to ask him to address the railway workers, rather than 
encourage the idea of a deputation to the Chief Magistrate. 'As I was 
anxious that nothing should mar the Peace celebration, and was aware that 
Nicol had the coaling of the Australian transport {with troops then in harbour} 
I agreed to go on condition that they brought Mr. J. S. Marwick along to go 
with me. ,44 Marwick was to prove invaluable; with his 'usual skill' he 
was able to draw information from the workers and prepare the ground for the 
address given by Binns. 
By the time Binns arrived at the railway yards they had been occupied 
by a strong force of white and black police. Binns, whom the bourgeois 
press reported as having 'expressed a desire to address the men' rather than 
having responded to the urgent plea of the employer concerned, put the case 
of the employers from the legal point of view as a representative of the state. 
'Having spoken to the natives, he said that those who wished to return to work 
could move to the right, and those who sti II desired not to work could move to 
the left.' This command, backed by the large complement of police, proved 
to be a brilliant strike-breaking tactic, as it succeeded in dividing the workers 
without even making any wage concession. A small group of workers decided 
to return to work and walked towards the workshops, but these were followed 
by militants carrying sticks who tried to dissuade them from breaking rank. 
The African police were called on to arrest these pickets and there was a brief 
scene of res istance. This attack on the strikers was, however, successful. 
The workers gradually drifted back to work with the exception of about a dozen. 
These militants were arrested and taken to the Police Court. They were 
severely reprimanded by Binns in his judicial role, discharged, and sent back 
to work. A force of mounted police was sent out to parade around the rai 1-
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way premises abng Ordinance Road at lunch time, and no further resistance 
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was reported. 
Shaken by the determination of the workers and what were considered 
audacious demands, Binns ordered an investigation by the CID into the possi-
bility of the workers having 'been got ot by unscrupulous Europeans'. In 
the imagination of the ruling class African workers were thought to be incapable 
of independent thought and action, racism obscuring the understanding of ele-
mental social forces. The Reverend B. L. Sigamoney, who had organized the 
Durban Indian Workers' Union and who was a leading member of the ISL, came 
under suspicion. He had organized Indian dock workers in his union and 
had been elected Vice-Chairman of a socialist conference held in Durban in 
October 1917 to debate the rival merits of 'pure' industrial action and parlia-
mentary politics. 46 Sigamoney was, however, cleared by the CID of the 
accusation of inciting the workers; the actual relationship between the 
propaganda of the ISL and militant strike action by the dock workers remaining 
obscure. 
The strike illuminated the extraordinary intimacy of members and organs 
of the ruling class, an insight which was certainly not lost on the striking 
workers. During a time of crisis, such as during the railway workers' strike, 
the close networks between particular employers, municipal officials, and repre-
sentatives of the central government; were lit up starkly in the suppression of 
organized working class action. What was clearly evident in the actions of 
Marwick was the dependence of other state officials and employers on an 
intelligent specialist who could devise the overall strategy of the ruling class 
towards African workers and actively coordinate the employers' counter-
offensive. In this sense the local state was 'on tap' to employers under pres-
sure, and the Native Affairs Department developed as a strike-breaking 
agency possessing the practical wisdom of repression, such as providing for a 
character reference in the A frican workers' pass. In terms of the later 
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development of the capitalist state in South Africa, the magistrates took a 
very active part in using political and legal power against the working class; 
the crowning anomaly being the double role of the Chief Magistrate as 
'strike-breaker of last resort' as well as the adjudicator in the court case 
involving the strikers. This 'simple' form of the capitalist state which 
tended to allow the separation of functions to become obscured in the imme-
diate defence of particular capitalists was also its weakness; it tended to 
destroy any illusions of an impartiality in the state in the minds of the most 
oppressed section of the working class. 47 
The activity of the local state as an agency in enforcing a cheap 
labour policy was brought out most clearly in the discussions among all 
employers about the wages to be paid to municipal workers. The numerous 
meetings held between employers and officials and the constant attempt to 
get unity against the demands of the workers reinforces an idea of the capita-
list state as a perpetual conspiracy against the working class; discussing in 
private, making minuted decisions,and having the salaried staff to enforce the 
decisions, in contrast to the workers compelled to discuss and act openly to 
secure their aims. The 'conspiratorial' view of the capitalist state is most 
clear during class struggles which pose a clear alternative between the interests 
of all employers and all workers, on other occasions during which the interests 
of different capitalists do not coincide, the smooth efficiency of the apparatus 
breaks down. The possibility of united counter-action against the demands 
of the working class is also limited by the power of strategically-placed workers 
to make a breach through the wall of opposition of the employers. The 
'advanced party' in the wage struggles in Durban was to be the togt workers. 
One of the major areas of difficulty the employers faced was that the 
municipality itself was a large employer of African workers; if it conceded any 
wage in~reases it would have the effect of putting pressure on wages generally 
in Durban. At a meeting of muncipal officials and employers held on 12 Sep-
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tember 1919, the strategy of holding the line on wage increases for African 
workers was again discussed. The meeting of the Mayor, Marwick, Gilbert 
(Chairman of the Native Affairs ond Police Committee of the Town Council), 
the Railways, the stevedoring companies, and commercial firms, decided 
firmly that there should be no increase in the wages of municipal workers. 
At the same time it was reported that the togt workers were intending to use 
violence to compel other workers to join in a general strike to demand an 
increase in wages. 48 With these threats and uncertainties it seems as though 
the solid front presented by the employers was beginning to crumble. Mar-
wick, who had been given the authority to consider all wage increases before 
giving his approval, reported that the SARH had granted an increase of 2s 6d 
per month from 26 October 1919. 
Despite a general agreement that wages of municipal workers had to 
be held down, the demands of African municipal workers for wage increases 
persisted. By holding back any upward movement in wages, the municipality 
eventually laid itself open to strike action by quite diverse employees. The 
muncipal workers demanded at least parity with the wages of other labourers in 
Durban. The togt workers employed by the City Engineering Department 
came out on strike on 8 November 1919. The Department employed 560 
togt workers and many would be difficult to replace, and the Borough Engineer 
asked permission from the Native Affairs Department to increase the pay of the 
more experienced workers to 3s 6d a day. By this stage, many employers 
were paying this wage. Marwick adopted a tough stance against the strikers, 
warning them they would not be allowed to remain at the Stone Depot and 
should return to the togt barracks or be prosecuted and made to hand in their 
togt badges. Even the African police made an application for a considerable 
increase to their wages. They argued there had been a tremendous increase 
in the price of essential commodities and statutory payments; a bag of mealies 
cost £2, a blanket £1 lOs, tax 19s, and rent to farmers varied between £1 lOs 
49 Th .. I't 
and £2. The police were earning only £2 17s per month. e munlclpa I y 
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held off from promising any wage increases until the agreement of other major 
employers had been received. 
By the early 1920s the stone wall erected against wage increoses was 
beginning to crack. Associated Stevedoring and Landing Company was 
paying its workers 4s a day, which compares with the demand made for 5s a 
day made in July 1918, although this wage was certainly more than earned 
by the month Iy workers of the railways, engi neeri ng fi rms and commerce. 
At a meeting convened by the municipality on 27 January 1920 the mayor 
sought the approval of other major employers for an increase in municipal 
wages 'as the Council had no wish to increase Native wages and then find 
that other employers had to follow their example'. Again Gilbert, Chair-
men of the Native Affairs and Police Committee, appealed to employers to 
take concerted and coordinated action on African wages. 50 But the pres-
sure of the workers' demands had ultimately broken through the collective 
resistance of all employers to an increase in municipal wages, and Gilbert 
was forced to acknowledge that these wages were below those paid generally 
in town. Some firms, he said, had actually doubled their African wages 
from 1918 to 1920. Marwick, who was once again paying ,close attention 
to Dube's columns in Ilanga lase Natal, sensed the danger of being completely 
obdurate; Dube was again giving prominence to the low level of African 
wages in Durban, and strikes were becoming general. Dube had emphasized 
the low wages, famine in the countryside, and strike action. 'Never a day 
passed but some body of men went on strike for more money, and very often 
they got it. The Natives were the only men who had not received more 
money. ,51 Cautiously viewing the possibility of widespread strike action on 
the scale suggested by the rumoured general strike to be led by the togt workers, 
Marwick said that Africans felt they were entitled to an increase in their 
present wages. Increased wages for municipal workers of a small amount 
(5s a month) were eventually approved. 
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The wage issue was by no means resolved by the piecemeal increases 
in wages made by employers under pressure from an increasingly militant 
working class, black and white. The year 1920 was one of a record number 
of strikes, in January 1920 alone the white tramworkers and municipal workers 
of Durban ::ame out on stri ke, there were a number of strikes on the Rand and 
in Port Elizabeth. A strike by white municipal workers on 7 January 
brought all municipal services to a standstill for three days, and the strikers 
moved on to instal a board of control in the town hall; the workers' action 
being described as setting up a muncipal 'soviet'. On the Rand a tremen-
dous strike of African workers on the mines stopped work on twenty-two mines 
by 25 February. The 71,000 African miners who struck in support of their 
demCJ1ds for wage increases of between 55 and lOs (about a 100-400 per cent 
increase) a day displayed a high degree of organization with pickets, cohesion 
and discipline. 52 These wage demands, if secured by the workers, would 
have speJt the beginning of the end of the cheap labour system and brought 
the African miners up to the wage level of the highest paid day labourers in 
South Africa: the dockers in Cape Town. 53 
These revolutionary demands provided a powerful incentive 
for African workers concentrated in compounds throughout South Africa to 
co;ne out on strike. 54 In February 1920290 of the municipal policemen 
who had carefully prepared their arguments in support of a substantial wage 
increase came out on strike. 55 The most determined battle against the 
cheap labour system came from the dock workers who had held back until this 
moment, although continually posing a challenge to the minimumizing wage 
policy adopted by the employers and the municipality. Early in March the 
dockers took disciplined action to enforce their demand of lOs a day for togt 
workers and £5 for monthly workers with increased rations and other benefits. 
Early on Friday, 5 March 1920, the dock workers came out on strike with 
tactics which clearly demonstrated a pre-arranged strategy. While some 
workers had already started work on the ships an organized mass picket armed 
with sticks and stones moved into the docks from the Bell Street compound. 
Starting at A Shed and moving on to I Shed the pickets demanded all work 
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stop until their demands of higher wages and more food were met. During 
the first rush half a dozen whites were involved in a confrontation but were 
not injured by the pickets. The strike was apparently centred around 
workers employed by the SARH and workers employed by a contractor to the 
railways. 56 The 193 workers employed by Union Castle line were untouched, 
and a large number of other togt workers had offered themselves for employment 
that morning. 'At the same time they went about their work silently in con-
trast to their usual joviality, until police protection arrived.' Those who 
continued working on the ships were supplied with food at work rather than 
leaving the docks for a midday meal. Despite some workers continuing to 
stay on the ships it was reported that 'practically all shipping was disorganized' 
by the action of an estimated 1,000 strikers. The workers then proceeded to 
picket the sheds and entrance to the docks but did not interfere with Indion 
dock workers, some of whom carried on work on a few of the ships to keep some 
of the cranemen busy. Until midday it appeared that the strikers had the 
docks more or less under their control with hardly any work being done and the 
tally clerks being told to sign off for the day. But the workers' occupation 
of the docks was not to last out the day. At noon a strong posse of Water 
Police armed with revolvers accompanied by Borough African police changed 
the posi tion. 
The police worked with military precision to counter the daring offen-
sive of the strikers. The force divided into three detachments, the vanguard 
advancing through each shed from A onwards, the other two flanking each side 
of the building until the strikers 'realized that control had passed out of their 
hands'. As the police advanced down Point Road from where they had started, 
many of the strikers filed out of the gate near H Shed, flinging down their 
sticks and stones without comment on the command of an African constable 'but 
looking very sullen'. The reason for the surrender was a recognition of 
superior force in the form of the armed Water Police. Once the unity of 
the strikers had been broken the police and military grew in confidence. 
The South African Mounted Rifles soon followed, patrolling at a trot past 
the various entrances which had been strengthened by additional guards. 
Extra police had been drafted in from the district to guarantee that the 
strikers did not regroup and that there was no possibility of pickets being 
formed. With the strikers repressed, a thorough search of the Point com-
pounds was made for weapons, but only a few sticks were found. When 
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the strikers could be brought together they were addressed by McConachie, 
the Port Manager, and by Harris, a labour agent, near the offices, but 'with 
no definite result' . Although it was estimated that 20 workers were com-
pel led by the breaking of the strike to resume work, the majority stayed in 
and around the compounds, rather dejected and not talking among themselves. 
Many of the workers applied for work on the following day (Saturday) and the 
remainder wer~ expected to start work on Monday. There was no violence 
reported between the strikers and the police after the demobilization of the 
pickets and no arrests were made. 57 The strike had 'fizzled out', accord-
ing to the Natal Mercury, because of the 'prompt action taken by the autho-
rities'. 
Although it is true that the dock workers' strike did not develop into 
a fighting strike on anything I ike the scale of the dock workers' strike in 
Cape Town in 1919 or the massive mine strike of 1920, the forward movement 
of the workers in attempting to occupy the docks and thei r bo I:J demands 
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counter Wickens' assessment that the workers' action was 'nothing of moment'. 
What was specifically different from the struggle of African workers in Johannes-
burg and Cape Town was the absence of a stable propaganda group which would 
advocate the permanent organization of the workers; Dube's hostility to 
socialism was undoubt3dly an important factor in the isolation of the Durban 
workers from the Industrial Workers of Africa (lWA). Formed jointly by 
radical elements within the South African Native National Congress and the 
ISL, the IWA had an important influence on the later devebpment of mass 
organization among African workers. 
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The dock workers proved themselves to be the vanguard of the African 
working class during the war period and immediately after, by being pre-
pared to take strike action despite strikes being described as 'sectional' and 
against the interests of the workers as a whole by African nationalist leaders 
such as Dube. In the existing circumstances of organized repression by 
employers and the state, advanced sections of the African working class had 
to decide to await the utopian conditions of free association or take up active 
resistance. Without strike funds, organized trade unions, or the support of 
the African petty bourgeoisie, the dock workers struggled intelligently to 
secure demands which were completely unacceptable to the capitalist class. 
In persisting in social resistance with these demands the dock workers were not 
demonstrating their utopianism but their practicality; their strikes were the 
only way the African working class could move into action in the absence of 
trade unions and political parties representing their interests. 
Beer, tax and organization 
The fairly rapid increase in the African population in the cities as a 
result of expanded production during the war posed a number of challenges to 
the bourgeoisie's control over the working class and urban property. The 
increasingly scientific approach to the problem of control over the African 
working class which was evident both in Marwick's discussion of the approp-
riate forms of control in the towns and in the 'race relations' school of thought, 
was an attempt to develop a unified pol icy in the towns. Quite different 
forms of social and political control had developed in Cape Town, Bloem-
fontein Johannesburg and Durban, which were evidence of genuine differences , . 
in approach within the ruling class, differences which could only be resolved 
by the demonstrable superiority of a particular form of class rule. The 
'Durban system', itself a product not of imagination but of responses to particular 
192 
struggles by the African working class (the demand for higher wages, family 
housing, for women to brew beer) was largely absorbed into national legis-
lation, but then put to a most exhaustive test by the workers. 
While the Native Affairs Act of 1920, which established a native 
affairs commission and strengthened the position of chiefs, was the most imme-
diate response to the challenge of the block proletariat, the most weighty 
measure which has burdened the African workers with exacting bureaucratic 
control came somewhat later in the form of the Native Urban Areas Bill of 
1923. While the African working people had resisted the municipal beer 
monopoly as it was an act of national and class oppression; both invoking 
racial regulations and serving to cheapen the labour power of the African 
workers; the Durban deputation to the Select Committee investigating the 
bi II spoke strongly in favour. The bill itself was seen by bureaucrats who 
were paid with 'beer-money' as embodying large sections of the Durban system 
of beer monopo Ii zat ion. With some pride the bourgeois press reported: 
'It was due to those fine men they had in the Native Affairs Department in 
Natal that the Natal system" was largely followed in drafting the bill. ,59 
layman, manager of the municipal Native Affairs Department,wrote in January 
1923 that the 'proposed measure provides for the administration of Native 
Affairs in urban areas under powers closely resembling those at present exer-
cised by the Durban Town Council, and constitutes a basis upon which all 
Town Councils may model their Native Affairs bye-laws. ,60 He felt that 
the beer monopoly was a logical extension of the original principle of the togt 
system; that African workers should pay for whatever measures their rulers 
devised for their control and welfare. The principle that working people 
(the working class and peasantry) should be expected to contribute directly to 
the state is not unusual, although often fiercely resisted. What was pecul iar 
to the 'Durban system' was the raising of revenue both from a labour tax (the 
togt labour registration fee) and more importantly by retrieving from the wage 
bill a large proportion of municipal revenue. By siphoning off revenue 
through establishing a beer monopoly, the municipality was exacting a tax 
on the workers' means of subsistence. The beer monopoly had the added 
advantage to the bourgeoisie of cheapening labour power by slowing down 
the formation of African households in the towns, any income to African 
women being denied by the police in support of the monopoly in beer. 
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For the Durban rate-payers and property-owners the system was particularly 
advantageous since municipal taxation in capitalist countries is usually based 
on property taxes. For the African workers the Durban system establ ished 
a 'simple relationship' between their exploitation as wage workers and the 
superstructure of their oppression: they were contributing directly to the 
salaries of the bureaucrats and the wages of the police. The most powerful 
resistance to the national oppression of African people and the agents of that 
oppression, the Native Affairs Department and the police, would be based on 
an understanding of this process. 
The inauguration of the beer monopoly was not without its contra-
dictions for some employers and the missionaries, and required a decisive 
attack on African women in town. The rapid multiplication of beer outlets 
at the turn of the century had threatened some of the elements of the cheap 
labour; the growth of women as petty traders marked the possibility of an 
assertive black proletariat in the cities I iving in households outside of the 
rigorous contro Is of compound life. While beer brewing offered to women 
the possibi lity of material emancipation (the subordination of African women 
in tribal society being not as comprehensively developed as in feudal society), 
it also affected the sobriety of the African male workers, and the intensity of 
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wage labour. The opposition of African women to the beer monopoly 
would be based on the new relations of subordination to the domination of 
large-scale capitalist brewing and to the police who enforced the monopoly. 
This was their primary opposition to the monopoly. The secondary opposition 
of the women was to the reduction of their income from male workers, their 
wages being siphoned off to feed the oppressive 'Native' bureaucracy. 
Although the African working class's opinion on the beer brewing was not 
sought, the togt workers and ricksha pullers in particular were mentioned 
as being regular patrons of the municipal beerhalls. Their views were 
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not likely to be identical to the African· petty bourgeoisie deeply influenced 
by the Protestant ethic of the missionaries who advocated a teetotal society 
and strict discipline over African Christian converts. While the political 
spokesmen for the African petty bourgeoisie wavered between arguing for the 
'national rights' of the African people to brew utshwala, or demanding com-
plete abstemiousness from all people and a teetotal society, the overwhelming 
weight of opinion was in favour of prohibition. In arguing for prohibition 
many African political leaders were uncritically supportive of the demands 
for prohibition made particularly by the mining companies in the interests of 
squeezing out the maximum amount of labour time from the workers. All 
these factors were to have to surface in the resistance to beer monopoly and 
to make a difference between the African proletariat and petty bourgeoisie 
in the general opposition to the system. 
From its inception the beer monopoly, as has been described in 
previous chapters, was accompanied by an attack on African women living in 
the town who became characterized as prostitutes, spongers, and illicit 
brewers by the ruling class. Maintaining the beer monopoly required the 
constant exercise of force against the workers and women, leading to the 
growth in the forces of repression in a 'self-perpetuating' cycle of repression 
and resistance. The beer monopoly itself achieved by a political decision 
by the ruling class did not automatically el iminate competition from the petty 
traders who were prepared to accept lower profit rates and to introduce a 
more intoxicating product: home-made spirits, like itishimiyane. Faced 
by the beer monopoly, the petty traders could compete by cheapening the 
means of subsistence. Spirits as a concentrated form of alcohol have been 
important in the proletarianization of the working class in Europe by cheapen-
ing the wants of the workers, and in South Africa beer and spirits brewing was 
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to be a decisive issue in the creation of the working class. ThE! ability of 
the petty traders to compete with the beer monopoly depended both on the 
power of the state and the size of the market ot the ever increasing employ-
ment of African workers in Durban. Even with incessant raids on petty 
traders and the provision of beer with official sanction, the petty trading 
sector was not completely eliminated. Out of these political and economic 
struggles the state grew relentlessly in coercive power feeding directly off 
the means of subsistence of the workers. 
With the rapid growth of a market for liquor sales during the war 
period, the use of the police against the petty traders became increasingly 
urgent to maintain the monopoly. The demand for control evoked equal 
demands from the pol ice for an expansion of the force to secure its, and the 
'Native Affairs' bureaucracy's, income. It also brought about arguments 
about the relative share of the police and the bureaucracy in the spoils of 
the system. In response to the increasing resistance of the workers and 
petty traders to the discipline of employers and the state, the Native Affairs 
By-Laws were promulgated in 1916. The increasing use of the pol ice against 
petty traders was concentrated on African women. It was simultaneously 
an attack on urban family life for the African working class. In evidence 
to the select committee inquiring into urban Africans prior to the Native Urban 
Affairs Act of 1923, the municipal officials gave details of action against 
African women in all its brutal ity. I n support of the compounds as a means 
of accommodating and controll ing workers and the beer monopo Iy, the mun i-
cipal officials and the Borough Police had drawn up a I ist of all African women 
and men living together in poor areas of Durban. They warned the women 
to come to the Native Affairs office and took a statement from each one of 
them, forcing them to acknowledge they were living 'out of wedlock' with a 
man. The women were told to get out of town. 'In the majority of cases 
they were content to abide by instructions, and went home. ' In the other 
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cases where there was resistance the women were deported under escort. 
In oarrying out these and other exacting tasks the pol ice demanded larger grants. 
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While the political representatives of the property owners of Durban, 
benefiting from the beer monopoly, were united in support of the specialized 
bureaucracy of the 'Native Affairs Department ' financed by 'beer money', 
fines and fees, they had to overcome two contradictions. The first, rela-
tively minor, was the problem of some employers complaining of drunken-
ness among their workers and demanding strict control over the hours of sell-
ing utshwala. The second, more importantly, was the resistance of the 
workers to the whole apparatus of control transparently financed from taxes 
on their wages and monopoly profits on the means of subsistence. 
For some employers the beerhalls posed the problem of keeping the ir 
workers sober and hard-working. 63 They were concerned that the ava iI-
ability of beer should not interfere with the workers' capacity to labour. 
In comparisJn IV,'Chthose missionaries who expressed public opposition to the 
beerhalls, the employers who were adversely affected limited themselves to 
working privately to modify beer drinking in their interests. The stevedoring 
companies who ordered a night shift to be worked were most affected by the 
expansion of the beerhalls, and in 1915 a manager of one of the companies 
complained that the stevedoring workers were coming to work drunk because 
the beerhalls were easily accessible. The response of the municipal ity to 
this complaint brought out clearly the question of whose interests were to be 
served by the state. As in the case of the Chamber of Mines which cam-
paigned for total prohibition for African workers and succeeded in 1902 in the 
Transvaal, the stevedoring companies exercised similar powers even over a 
municipal enterprise. 64 The difference was that the stevedoring companies 
were more concerned about limiting rather than prohibiting liquor sales. 
A compound manager of one of the leading companies, Associated 
Stevedoring and Landing Company, wrote to the Mayor early in 1915 asking 
for the beerhalls to be closed from 1600 to 1800. lit is with our night boys 
that we get the most trouble', wrote R. H. Stainbank, 'and to have at least 
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twenty per cent off duty besides those who turn up considerably after time 
and completely unable to work through drink is a little too bad' , The 
workers left the barracks at 1700, he wrote, with the intention of getting to 
work, but called in at the beerhall and stayed talking and drinking longer 
than they intended. We may state that we have in our employment about 
500 Natives and the manner and hours in which these people are supplied 
with beer is of great importance to the Company and to the Natives, as 
accidents in working occur through the Natives of the night sh ift being able 
to obtain beer just before going to work, ,65 Apparently the whole question 
of the opening hours of the beerhalls had been discussed with the stevedoring 
companies some three years previously when there had been complaints, 
The employers had argued that workers who had been on night shift waited 
until 0800 when the beerhalls opened and spent the morning drinking when 
their employers considered they should be sleeping, The municipality then 
changed the opening time to 1000. Aga in the employers complained there 
was too much drinking at the eating houses before the 1700 shift and the halls 
were closed at 1400 instead of 1600. The overseers of the eating houses 
w'3re given instructions not to allow Africans to drink too long, and to 'give 
every assistance to employers in sending off their native servants who may be 
I ,· bo h 'h ,66 I h f I' h ' olterrng a ut t e eatrng ouses. n eac case 0 comp alnt t e mUnI-
cipality had met the wishes of the employers, but in the complaint of Associated 
Stevedoring the officials were faced with a dilemma: they would suffer a 
great loss of income as between 1715 and 1930 was the busiest time of the day. 
In defence of the fundamental source of their salaries and the interests of the 
property owners as a whole, the municipal offici:Jls refused to make any further 
adjustments to the hours. Instead they offered to a 1I0w the stevedoring 
indunas into the beer section of the eating house to tell the men to leave on 
time. They blamed any drunkenness not on the open beerhalls but on the 
i1pcit liquor sellers, particularly declasse whites ,67 Unsatisfied, Stainbank 
had to accept the over-riding interests of capital as a whole, 
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The primary contradiction between the racist authority of the ruling 
class and the workers took place in the arena of the struggle against the 
beer monopoly. The bitter conflict which this form of direct rule over the 
African working c lass took cannot, however, be understood outside of a dis-
cussion of the mass movement of the workers and peasantry: the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers' Union of Africa. 
Dock workers and the ICU 
Established in Cape Town in 1919, the leu had a tumultuous growth 
as a national organization of the black oppressed claiming a membership of 
almost 200,000 in 1928.68 Championing the resistance of the African work-
ing class to the multitude of laws and regulations burdening workers in the 
urban areas, and expressing the aspiration of the workers on the land for land 
rights and security of tenure, the ICU grew rapidly into a mass organization. 
The very pace of its development, however, makes it clear that the workers 
drawn into the organizcition in response to the populist leadership were very 
loosely 'organized' and that the speed of its motion was likely to shake the 
structure of its internal organization. Founded on a simple formula of mass 
organization equalling inspired leadership plus an undifferentiated following, 
the forward movement of the workers into the ICU did not lay the basis for 
permanent organization in the future. The attitude of the African working 
class was, however, not critically evaluative towards the ICU until its disinte-
gration in the late 1920s; the initial response was one of enthusiasm and hope. 
The ICU in Natal had a peculiar history. While Durban was one of 
the last major industrial centres to respond to the impetus of the organization, 
the workers joined with great determination and made the local branch one of 
the major contributors to the income of the ICU. The workers in Durban 
advanced from being characterized as 'backward' to being one of the advanced 
detachments of the ICU - all in a remarkably short time. When the ICU 
itself foundered, the workers in Durban, unlike in the early centres of ICU 
activity, moved into political resistance. As South Africa entered the 
world-wide depression, Durban became described as the 'storm-centre' of 
the country, the workers continuing the struggles taken up by the ICU in 
the Communist Party or autonomously. In the centre of these unusual 
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developments, the dock workers were absorbing the lessons of mass mobiliza-
tion and of underground organization, at certain points having a decisive 
?art in leading the resistance of all oppressed to the national and municipal 
laws and regulations. In coming out as the leading force against the beer 
monopoly, the workers adopted their own strategies and slogans wh ich drew 
off the popular opposition to municipal rule, but added new content to this 
resistance and provided its vanguard. 
In contrast to the other major industrial centres, the ICU was rela-
tively slow to develop in Durban. Kadalie, the ICU leader, visited Durban 
in July 1925 on the invitation of the President of the Natal African Congress, 
J. T. Gumede, who assisted him as far as he was able. The editor of Ilanga 
lase Natal, the Reverend John Dube, who had retreated from the wage cam-
paign of 1918 and the task of extending the Industrial Workers of Africa to 
Durban, was more cautious but not unfriendly. 69 Despite encouragement 
from Gumede, Kadalie was not optimistic about the possibility of mass organiza-
tion. 'I must admit', he wrote, 'that my first impressions of Durban and the 
Zulu people were very disappointing. A II seemed to be so tame and ready 
to submit to anything the official European suggested to them'. 70 When the 
municipal authorities refused him permission for holding a public meeting (a 
restriction which did not apply in the Cape or Johannesburg), Kadalie turned 
towards local liberals such as Mabel Palmer to get the ban temporarily removed. 
legal obstacles such as these continued to dog the Durban branch of the ICU 
and possibly accentuated a tendency towards adopting a strategy of legal action 
to secure the rights of African workers. Despite the unoptimistic assessment 
of the mood of the workers in Durban by Kadalie, the ICU branch grew extra-
ordinari Iy rapidly under the leadership of Champion, a former pol ice spy 
and mine clerk. 
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The strategy which Champion and the union leaders adopted, bring-
ing such success to the Natal branch of the ICU, is difficult to disentangle 
from the we Iter of personality, pol itical and regional disputes which en-
gulfed the organization towards the end of the 1920s. Kadalie's style of 
leadersh ip was based on oratory and mass meetings, tub-thumping speeches 
with rhetorical challenges to the state, a form of mobilization which was 
dependent on its tolerance by the state. Organization of workers within 
the factories, mines, and plantations; a political and industrial strategy, 
which set as its goals the socialist aims of its constitution to 'take from the 
capitalist the means of production, to be owned and controlled by the workers 
for the benefit of all', 71 was not seriously considered. Champion adopted 
a similar style of leadership to Kadalie: denunciations of racial oppression 
combined with repudiation of strike action, but added a keen ability to employ 
legal action in defence of ~frican workers. These tactics have been dis-
cussed in the histories of the ICU only in the context of the costs involved 
and the frivolous litigation and counter litigation among the leaders in Natal, 
but Champion's enthusiasm for lawyers was embedded in the reformist str'Jtegy 
of the leu as a whole. He possessed considerable insight into the poten-
tial contradictions in the ruling class between bourgeois rights and national 
oppression and exploited these contradictions adroitly. Whi Ie he used his 
legal successes to fortify his image as a great leader of the .African people 
and to hide the simple corruption of his administration (all ICU funds went 
into his persona I bank account), legal defence was an important method of 
breaking through the plethora of laws and regulations weighing down the 
.African workers. 72 Ironically the Durban municipality, which had pioneered 
the exact controls over the urban African population which were embodied in 
the Native Urban Areas .Act of 1923, proved to be surprisingly vulnerable to 
legal attack. Legal action secured the lifting of the curfew, the end of 
the dipping of .Africans in disinfectant tanks, abolishing of character references 
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in pass books, and deprived the police of the power of arbitrary arrest of 
African people. 73 The strategy of legal action secured these important, 
though short-term advances, without compelling Champion to initiate any 
thorough industrial organization. Ultimately, virtually all these allevia-
tions in the operation of national oppression were re-establ ished in a re-
written set of by-laws promulgated in terms of the 1923 Act, but the ICU's 
success in forcing back the relentless progress of state control over the lives 
and movement of the African working class secured its tremendous popularity. 
The legal offensive which was combined with mass meetings at Cart-
wright Flats and the provision of entertainment facilities (apparently in Cham-
pion's own name) ensured a certain momentum to the ICU in Durban. These 
activities never quite coincided with the movement of the workers against the 
pol ice and employers until the dramatic events of the beer boycott in 1929. 
The ICU in Natal, as elsewhere, did not pursue consistently the wage and 
political demands of the workers, or even the policy decisions decided upon 
at nat iona I conferences. When the workers, often members of the ICU, 
came out on strike they were either ignored or to Id to return to work, and the 
leadership prided itself on its responsibil ity. Early in 1927, after having 
communists expelled from the ICU, Kadalie declared that 'strikes were wicked, 
useless and obsolete'. 74 Unlike Europe, in which decisive class battles 
were being fought in the 19205, the growth of the ICU into a mass workers' 
organization did not lead to a strike wave. 75 While raising the aspirations 
of the workers for a transformed society, the ICU leaders insisted on reformist 
tactics. Were it not for the success of the legal offensive, the split bet-
ween the workers' actions and the tactics of the leadership would have become 
pronounced much earl ier in Natal where there was undoubtedly militancy among 
the workers. The workers on white farms, in the docks, mines and f:lctories 
in Natal were groping for a determined strategy against their employers and 
the oppressive state. 
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Soon after the establ ishment of a branch of the leu in Durban there 
was evidence of a rising mood of resistance by African workers against grossly 
exploitative conditions of work, taxation, and the police. The most con-
centrated group of African workers, the dock workers, took the lead in these 
struggles which were to cause anxious moments for the ruling class and a turn 
towards armed resistance by the workers. One of the first signs of these new 
conditions were the cases of 'insubordination' at the Point. With manage-
ment less able to control the workers through conventional methods, increasingly 
workers were being brought to court for resisting orders. In December 1925, 
a number of cases of insubordination among dock workers were brought to court 
and the workers sternly disciplined by the magistrate. I n one of the cases 
the workers who refused to work under a white foreman who they complained 
tormented and assaulted them were fined £ 1 or fourteen daysl imprisonment 
with hard labour. In another case seven dock workers on night shift refused 
to obey orders after they considered their work complete and had walked away 
towards the compound. One of the police witnesses argued the men were 
incapable of concluding they could go home once their work was done, lit 
emanated from some superior person, probably from a member of the Union l• 76 
The argument was both racist, implying that African workers were incapable 
of reasoning, and possibly incorrect, as there is no evidence that the leu was 
taking up the industrial demands of the workers. The magistrate was clearly 
alarmed with the frequency of cases of small-scale resistance in the docks and 
lashed out at the workers. Who gave you the right to work when you like 
and go home when you I ike? I have had three or four of these cases within 
recent time from the Point and I look upon this as the climax. I He sentenced 
the workers to a fine of £2 or a month's imprisanment with hard labour, double 
the initial punishment. 
There was further evidence of resistance early in 1926 when an African 
gang employed in rood construction came out on strike in support of their 
demand to be po id. There was a heated argument between the workers and 
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employers and the police arrested 22 of the strikers. The strikers were 
brought before a magistrate and fined £ 1 or 14 days' imprisonment with hard 
77 labour. These severe punishments did not blunt the opposition of the 
workers to their employers and the police in particular. Later in January 
it appears as though there was a pitched battle between the black workers, 
many of whom were ICU supporters, and the police. In a further court 
case three blacks were charged with interfering with the police. They 
were charged with ridiculing the police by removing a bicycle of one of 
the Borough Police and eventually found not guilty through insufficient evi-
dence. The incident had shown that there was no love lost between the 
police and the black people. When the magistrJte asked why no 'Iaw-
abiding' people had come to the aid of the police a police sergeant admitted 
the police were not popular in Grey Street (a racially mixed residential area) 
with black or white people. After the argument between the policeman 
and the accused had started,it had taken police reinforcements to restore 
order. 78 The police blamed the ICU which held mass rallies on Sunday at 
Cartwright Flats for the fight, they 'tell a lot of people that they are as good 
as a wh i te man' • The newly-establ ished branch was clearly making an 
impact both on the workers and the forces of order. The magistrate, Lava-
piere, released the accused but denounced the 'preachers of rebellion' among 
African people; they would have to be dealt with. 
The resistance in the docks continued with more workers being brought 
before the courts for discipline. In one notable case the workers employed 
at Cato Creek received national publicity for striking against their appalling 
conditions. These dock workers were employed from 0700 to 2230 to load 
the ships with 100 pound bags of sugar. They had come out on strike 
demanding wheelbarrows to carry the bags as their necks were sore. On 
being hauled before the magistrate, the prosecutor attacked agitators who 
told African workers to join the ICU and stand up for their rights. He 
demanded the court should take a 'strong attitude' against the strikers who 
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were told by the magistrate not to 'dictate to their masters I and were fined 
£ 1 or 14 days for refusing to work. After the case had been pub I ished by 
The Star, which represents the interests of monopoly capital, Kadalie voiced 
the protest of the ICU. The strikers were overworked and underpaid, but 
were not members of the ICU, he sai d. 
I know of no greater impetus for the Natives organising indus-
trially than that which has been provided by the publicity 
given this system under which human beings are treated worse 
than animals, for, be it remembered, the white man in his 
civilisation has deemed it but human to treat with kindness to 
animals which are, as a matter of fact, protected by law from 
ill usage. But not so the unfortunate Native. The task of 
hulking 100 Ibs bags of sugar for a period of 15! hours dai Iy is, 
in terms of European civilisation,designated euphemistically 
employment, but in those of the true civilisation, which should 
know no barrier and be sacrosanct to none4 it is persecution relentlessly waged upon a helpless race. 7 
This rather flowery denunciation of the conditions of the dock workers pub-
lished in the workers ' newspaper promised no immediate organizational support 
for the workers nor mentioned the policy on dock work decided on by the 
previous year's annual conference. The question had been fully debated at 
the Fifth Annual Conference in 1925. Delegates had resolved to extend 
the rate of pay of the Cape Town workers throughout other docks; 8s a day. 
Although this wage was 'altogether inadequate to provide the workers with 
the necessary {sic} of I ife ' , this wage demand was a preliminary to securing 
better conditions in Cape Town. The delegates also demanded special rates 
for handling heavy cargo such as sulphates and guano. 80 This important 
industrial strategy was not mentioned by Kadalie nor adopted by the local 
branch. While Kadalie denounced 'European devilry' he also described the 
workers as 'helpless ' , an attitude which tended to smooth over the contra-
dictions between an increasingly active African working class and a leader-
ship which was incapable of deciding on a strategy of agitation and national 
industrial organ ization. Instead of raising the question of support and 
organization Kadalie wrote poetic praise of spontaneity: 'The worm that 
is trodden on does not react to the influence of the agitator but to natural 
impulse, and so in the case of the Cato Creek men ••• ,81 
The ICU failed not only to develop systematic agitation around the 
industrial demands of the workers but also in the pol itical resistance of the 
African working class. When the various tax laws affecting Africans 
were consolidated in the Native Taxation and Development Act No 41 of 
1925 a general tax of £ 1 was levied on every male African. 
there was a local tax of lOs a hut up to a maximum of £2. 82 
In addition 
These new 
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regulations meant an increase in tax for Africans in Natal and in the Cape, 
but the administrators considered the extra burden had not added much to 
the resistance of African workers. 83 For the impoverished majority in the 
cities, reserves and white farms, the poll tax was not Qnly an added burden 
which reduced their abi! ity to demand higher wages, but also an oppressive 
measure of inferiority. The dock workers in Durban were to prove most 
resistant to this attempt to squeeze further revenue from their earnings and 
encouraged other workers to boycott the po II tax. As the pol ice stepped 
up arrests in a drive to increase revenue the workers responded by threaten-
ing to strike. The dock workers finally took strike action on 16 June 1927 
to secure the release 'of their comrades who had been arrested for tax offences. 
On th is day the workers st.arted work as usua I but soon began to I eave the 
ships, first in two's and three's, and eventually in large batches unti I only 
White workers were left. This action had been prearranged and was the 
result of a meeting which was held the previous day after about twenty 
workers had been arrested. 'We protest against the arrest of thirty of us 
for not paying the Poll Tax', the workers said, 'And we shall not return to 
work until they are released. ' This decisive action by the workers posed 
a dilemma for the authorities as it challenged the police powers of arrest by 
stopping production. 'The situation looked indeed ugly when Colonel 
Herschell, the Harbour Manager, came on the scene and pushed his way 
through the throng', reported the Nata I Mercury. Herschell responded by 
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offering the workers no compromise; he told them bluntly that if they con-
tinued to strike they would be paid off and locked out of the compounds. 
He offered them no remedy for their demand: 'I always pay my tax, why 
should you not do the same?' If the workers did not pay the Poll Tax they 
would all be prosecuted, he promised. 84 With the full power of the 
employers and the police arrayed against them, the workers chose to return 
to the sh ips. The lesson drawn by the bourgeo is press was that a tough 
response to the workers' demands was the best way of maintain ing control. 
The dockers' action, which led the resistance of the African people 
to the Poll Tax, was followed by strikes of African workers on the Natal coal 
fields, many of whom were ICU members. To both these strikes the ICU 
officials denied responsibility and even declared that the coal strikes were 
illegal. 85 With this questionable leadership it is surprising that the ICU 
continued to expand; the Natal membership rose to 45,487 in 1927, reach-
ing at its highest point an estimated 52,800. 86 But the ICU in Natal had 
approached its zenith and was soon to show a marked decline. By the end 
of 1927, Durban, described by Wickens as the 'mi Ich cow of 1926-27', started 
to dry up. Subscriptions fell continuously after reaching a peak as early as 
April/May 1927. The sudden decline in the ICU branch was due not only to 
the complete repudiation of the workers' actions, but also to two great financial 
scandals which came to a head in November 1927. These precipitated a 
crisis between the Natal branch and head office and spectacularly between 
the overweening personalities of Kadalie and Champion. The result was 
that Champion seceded from the national organization to set up a regional 
ICU yase Natal, an organization he could securely control. Faced with 
the possibility of the ICU declining to a shadow of its former strength, Cham-
pion adapted himself to new strategies of survival, apparently looking more 
towards the settled African proletariat. 
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Champion, togt workers, and the beerhalls 
Once proved successful, the beer monopoly was extended throughout 
the urban centres of Natal. The further it advanced, the greater became 
the resistance it engendered, as it pressed heavily on the African women's 
insecure position in the towns and threatened the workers with a stronger 
state. When the Sydenham Local Administration and Health Board, a local 
authority within the municipal area of Durban, decided to impose the beer 
monopoly in its area, Champion took up the leadership of the African opposi-
tion. When the togt workers entered the fray this opposition took a decidedly 
different form which threatened this basis of municipal control over African 
workers. 
Before entering into the dispute in Sydenham, Champion had been 
active in complaining that there was no location provided in Durban despite 
the large profits from the beer monopoly. He had organized a petition to 
the Prime Minister protesting against the 'Durban system' and compound accom-
modation, which had been signed by 500 men and women. These protests 
had drawn out the connection between the beer monopoly and the apparatus of 
the Native Affairs bureaucracy. 87 Protests against the extension of the beer 
monopoly followed logically; meetings were held in Sydenham and the resi-
dents complained they had not been consul ted. On 4 May 1929 Champion 
wrote to the Sydenham authorities protesting against the proposed extension of 
the monopoly. 
We protest against any Local Health Board making attempts to 
obtain monies from the low paid natives for the purpose of financ-
ing their funds for their own advancement, at the expense of the 
voiceless members of our Community who have suffered untold 
pains at the hands of certain people who are out to make them a 
football {sic}. We object to have our growing people to be 
taught by Europeans to drink Kafir beer. We feel that this is 
the step destined to deteriorate our race if all the surrounding 
suburbs of Durban will have their Kafir Beer Halls to obtain money 
from the natives who will not resist such a temptation. 88 
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This letter, with its use of racial ideology, and presentation of Africans as 
helpless victims of their appetites, was cleverly constructed for the burgesses 
of Sydenham. There was apparently no response to this letter and protest 
marches were held in the area. 
Parallel to these developments and not organizationally linked to 
them, the togt workers were drawing their own conclusions about the beer 
monopoly. The agitation against the 'Durban system' of beer monopoly and 
Native Affairs bureaucracy begged the question of the relation of the togt 
workers to the ICU; obviously large numbers had joined the leu as indi-
viduals, the struggles against the Durban system were to bring out the capacity 
of the togt workers to act as a collective unit and to engage in alliances with 
the ICU. At certain points in the struggle quite definite differences of 
ideology and strategy were clear between Champion and the togt workers. 
Independently of ICU organization or intervention by Champion until at an 
advanced stage, a number of incidents built up at the docks which eventually 
culminated in the boycott of the beerhalls and bitter clashes between the 
workers and the police. The precise origins of the workers' struggle against 
the beerhalls are obscure, a series of events gathering force in an atmosphere 
of increasing hostility to the oppression of the property owners' state: the 
enforced residence in compounds, beerhalls, Borough Police, taxes, and 
miserable wages. The attack on the beerhalls was an attempt to strike at 
the roots of the cheap labour system and the state which enforced the exploita-
tion of the workers. 
The resistance developed in fits and starts. The windows of the Point 
beerhall were smashed and the overseers' office raided on 6 May 1929, but 
there was no further action until quite late in May. Some of the hostility of 
the workers to the beerhalls came fram those workers who were brewing and 
selling mahewu;90 this activity does not seem to have grown to any size, 
but the subsequent events were precipitated by the compound manager at the 
209 
Point ordering the workers to stop brewing mahewu except in smoll quantities. 
Any sale of the drink wos prohibited. One of the workers, Mcijelwa 
Mnomezulu, complained that an Indian storekeeper who sold the ingredients 
was behind the prohibition. 91 The induna, Makati, who had announced 
the new regulation (he was also a sergeant in the Borough Police) later 
alleged that Mnomezulu had attempted to stop the togt workers making pur-
chases at the Indian store and also at the Point beerhall. Mnomezulu was 
brought by Makati before Chester, the Chief Clerk in the municipal Native 
Affairs Department, on 30 May 1929. After consulting the manager of the 
department, Layman, Mnomezulu's togt badge was withdrawn. 92 But he 
was not told of the decision immediately. Chester had heard rumours of 
the beerhall boycott and wanted a marked man who could be watched to see 
who was leading the agitation against the beerhalls. Mnomezulu was only 
warned against continuing to call for a boycott. The department had a more 
subtle way of getting rid of him: his togt licence would not be renewed. 
Later the compound manager refused to re-register Mnomezulu 'in accordance 
with instructions' and he was told to find employment elsewhere. 
The boycott of the beerhalls built up over a period of a few days. 
A number of accidental issues accelerated the workers' hostility; on 5 June 
the lights failed and there was a general stampede out of the beerhall. 
Workers were subsequently arrested for creating a disturbance, as beer cans 
had been thrown about and tables overturned; they were fined by a magis-
strate on 6 June. 93 The boycott against the Indian trader had become 
effective at about this time, in an attempt to win back his customers he had 
asked Champion to intervene. It was through the trader apparently that 
Champion became aware of the boycott and the demands of the workers. 
When he visited the Indian storekeeper on 11 June 1929 the togt workers had 
surrounded his car and called for his support. There is no reason to doubt 
Champion's later statement that he had not mobil ized the workers to protest 
against the beer monopoly but had been drawn in by the togt workers. 'The 
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idea of the boycott commenced at the Point', he stated later in evidence to 
the Commission of Enquiry, land it was only located at the Point'. His 
advice to the workers and statements made at the time confirmed his view 
that 'the thing had got too far when I came to the Point', and he was unable 
to fill out an intermediary role between the workers and the authorities. 94 
. What Champion added to the growing action of the workers was a greater 
politicization of the issues, but also an insistance on 'constitutionalism' and 
opposition to the strike movement. Wavering between open support for the 
workers I demands and the possibi lity of a general strike and the alternative of 
being recognized by the municipality as the moderate leader of the African 
people, Champion attempted to hold the centre. 
words and moderate in action. 
He became radical in 
When the workers approached Champion on 11 June they had in mind 
taking strike action to demand the reinstatement of Mnomezulu, but he opposed 
this strategy. He was, however, converted to the beerhall boycott and 
addressed a meeting of workers near the Point on 12 June, calling on the 
workers to support the boycott but not to strike. His speech made in the 
evening was in effect a repudiation of limited strike action by the togt workers 
in the morning. 95 The industrial demands of the workers and solidarity with 
Mnomezulu were subordinated to the anti-beer monopoly struggle. In the 
evening of 12 June pickets were formed and systematic discipline exercised 
over the working class as a whole. The togt workers and the ICU set about 
constructing a definite campaign of io int action, to agitate against the beer 
monopoly and to organize pickets. F or more than three days the togt workers 
and the ICU lase Natal discussed cooperation at a series of committee meetings 
which establ ished the Anti-Kaffir Beer Manufacturing League committed to a 
96 general boycott of beerhalls. The system of day labour possessed some 
advantages for the dock workers in developing their organization; they could 
sacrifice some days' labour in having full discussion about strategy. It was 
97 
possibly at this time that the togt workers joined the ICU lase Natal en bloc. 
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As agreement deepened on the necessity for an all out struggle against the 
beer monopoly the sales at the beerhalls plummeted as pickets stood outside. 
This was noticeable from 13 June even though a strict boycott was not being 
enforced. 
The Anti-Kaffir Beer Manufacturing League issued a pamphlet wh ich 
denounced both the beer monopoly and the compounds and barracks which 
were its complement. It exposed the roots of the oppressive municipality in 
the parasitical beer monopoly: 'it has enriched the Corporation at Durban 
and it has built barracks for Natives where they are iI/treated'. The League 
protested against the compounds 'which are full of bad laws and disagreeable 
control; because a Native who lives in these barracks is like a prisoner on 
account of the regulations governing them'. A II the grievances of the 
workers were absolutely ignored by those in authority. I t cone luded with a 
warning that anyone breaching the boycott would be punished by the promoters 
of the resolution 'according to their law'. The leaflet combined many of 
Champion's moral arguments against beer drinking (it encouraged a waste of 
money I drunkenness) with the analysis of the source of revenue for the muni-
cipal apparatus of control. It also included a five point resolution which 
was adopted by a meeting of workers employed in gangs at the Point and togt 
workers held at the hall of the leu. 98 
When a more rigorous boycott of the beerhalls came into operation on 
Friday I 14 June 1929 the togt workers took advantage of the general resistance 
to press their demands for the reinstatement of Mnomezulu and other grievances. 
A deputation consisting of Mnomezulu, Mtehelwa Ndhlovu, Dazu likali, and 
J. H. London, the Assistant Secretary of the ICU of Natal was received by 
Chester. The workers complained that conditions had worsened steadi Iy after 
the previous togt inspector had retired. A /though Chester said he did not 
consider the deputation representative of togt workers in the barracks, during 
the meeting he received reports of mass picketing to enforce the boycott of the 
beerhalls.
99 
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According to the beerhall overseer, trouble had broken out when armed 
pickets had surrounded the entrance of the Point beerhall. At 1130 an 
induna, Folweni, had come to the beerhall to call the railway workers out to 
work, apparently carrying out the agreement of the municipality in 1914 to 
allow more control to employers over the drinking hours of the workers. 
Before he could enter the building he was stopped and told to explain his 
position to the ICU office. It was claimed that he was suddenly attacked 
by the pickets but given support by the municipal police who came out to 
relieve him. In the melee which followed the beerhall was stoned, the 
fence broken down, and the compounds stormed with the windows in each 
building being smashed. Clashes between the pickets and the municipal 
police continued. 100 Thousands of the Anti-Kaffir Beer League pamphlets 
were distributed on the following day. 
The League moved decisively on to the offensive at a mass meeting on 
Sunday, 16 June 1929, which was attended by 5,000 Africans and addressed 
by Champion and J. T. Gumede, the former president of the African National 
Congress who had not been re-elected because of his left wing views. 
Champion's speech at this meeting, which was recorded by members of the CID, 
may be judged as a fair reflection of what was said; it was not contested at 
the Commission of Enquiry. In it he acknowledged the leading port taken 
by the togt workers in boycotting the beerhalls, developed the nature of the 
alliance between the ICU and these workers, promised the support of his 
militia for the boycott, and expressed his personal support. But he also com-
pletely avoided mentioning the demands of the workers for the reinstatement of 
Mnomezulu and was complacent about the workers' earnings. The tog't 
workers were the leaders of the boycott: 'The Natives who have decided 
that there should be no beer made in Durban are the Natives at the Point' . 
He felt they were under very bad supervision but argued (in complete contrast 
to the decisions of the ICU to demand 8s a day and the woge demands of the 
workers) thot the workers were earning '0 very good solary'. The problem 
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was fundamentally that of the beerhalls, many of the workers 'are so broke 
that they do not want to see their relatives " having wasted their money on 
beer. His speech acknowledged a certain distance between the togt workers 
and the ICU; the workers had been told Champion would rob them of their 
wages, but now they had changed. 'They stood together one day and 
treated the Corporation the same as the Corporation told them to treat Cham-
pion. ' The ICU now committed itself to the complete support of the togt 
workers; 'from today the ICU is taking up the burden of the togt labourers 
and are in sympathy with them and are willing to die with them'. He 
promised the support of his militia ('my boys') who acted as marshals during 
ICU demonstrations and were under the command of a Swazi, Mjaji Dhlamini. 
They, together with the League volunteers, would discipline any African 
going into the beerhalls. 10 1 
H is speech reflected his egotistical temperament; he was to take 
personal command of the boycott and he had been personally misused by the 
Corporation. But Champion had also provided an organizational ability 
the workers lacked, and it was through the ICU that the boycott spread from 
the Point throughout Durban, and even further into the countryside. On 
Monday, 17 June 1929, a general boycott of the beerhalls came into operation 
and a larger deputation than previously {now of twelve workers} met Chester 
and presented him with a list of their demands and grievances. The funda-
mental demand was for the reinstatement of Mnomezulu, for an end to togt 
registration and the regimentation of the barracks. The key demand was 
that 'the Native who was deprived of his registration, record as a togt labourer 
should be reinstated because we consider that he is not personally responsible 
for the boycott of Kafir Beer which is the resolution of all Natives employed 
at the Point' • A long list of demands and grievances followed, some crucial 
{such as the demand that the togt badges should be el iminated}, some incidental 
{that the barracks were not clean}. All in all, the list gives considerable 
insight into the way in which the togt regulations were being applied, with 
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inmates forced to do the upkeep of the barracks, and the totality of control 
over the workers. The workers put forward these demands and grievances: 
the yards and paths in the compound at Bell Street were in poor repa ir, the 
workers should not have to carry refuse from their rooms to rubbish bins, the 
workers should not have to clean the windows as this should be the responsi-
bility of employees of the Corporation, the bathroom floors were never 
scrubbed and were slippery and a source of danger, that wives were not 
allowed to stay as long as the workers would wish - up to two weeks, the 
stores in the eating house should be kept open until 2100, the tables in the 
eating houses should be kept open on Sundays, the period in which rents may 
be paid should be extended - seven days being inadequate in the case of a 
man out of work who should be allowed fourteen days, the police interfered 
when togt workers were waiting to be engaged near the Point clock, the togt 
badges should be eliminated, there was inadequate lighting in the lavatories, 
bathrooms and pathways, the compound officials refused to admit visitors, 
and wood for cooking was not provided. 102 
These demands and grievances indicate a considerably greater resent-
ment against the whole 'Native Affairs' and employer system of regulation 
and exploitation, a /though on balance the emphasis was primari Iy against 
police and municipal control. Significantly, these were not the issues raised 
by Champion or acknowledged by subsequent enquiries. 103 But although the 
workers added demands which would have abolished the togt system of control 
and barrack regimentation to the burning question of the time, they continued 
to attack the commercial interests which they felt had precipitated the conflict. 
From the workers' argument it was the Indian trader opposite the gate of the 
barracks operating through the induna Makati who had increased the burden of 
restrictions on the workers. In resisting the trader, the workers implicitly 
supported the four petty traders inside the barracks. 'The Indian trader in 
furthering his business, succeeded in getting the management to close the 
Native trader's shop at 1700 sharp while the Indian sold his goods up to the 
215 
hour the togt labourers went to bed. The Indian, not satisfied with this, he 
actually went inside the compound with the Native induna to throw out the 
mahewu belonging to the Natives, complaining that the Natives were no 
more buying sugar from his store and only used mahewu instead of his drinks.' 
The workers protested that two workers had been arrested for opposing this 
action, and one had lost his badge. 'The man was then deprived of his 
badge, the fact which he reported to his fellow labourers who decided to con-
tinue the boycott of the Indian trader, strike work, and also include Kaffir 
B h · h . d b h N . . d h . h' . ,104 eer w IC was supervise y t e atlve In una, w 0 gave t e instructions. 
According to Luhlongwana, a togt worker, there had been four barrels of 
mahewu and when Makoti made an inspection of the barracks on 27 May he 
had instructed the men to make mahewu only in paraffin tins. This had 
prompted Mnomezulu to decide that since the men were not allowed to make 
mahewu they should stop drinking beer. 105 
The hostil ity of the African workers to the Indian trader was not a 
simple issue of racial animosity with workers of one race supporting their 'own' 
traders. They were demanding free availability to the workers of all stores 
(as made clear in the list of demands), and resisting the imposition of controls 
over their lives exercised directly by capital (in this instance in the form of 
the Indian trader). The fact that the boycott started initially both against 
the trader and the beerhalls showed the workers were aiming to destroy all the 
bases of control over their I ives and labour. 106 
Chester contested many of the arguments of the workers. He objected 
to petty trading in the compound; 'they are supposed to be out working', and 
thereby confirmed that the national oppression of African people was to secure 
'cheapened' working class. The workers should not be allowed to sell mahewu; 
sanitation demanded food should not be kept in the compounds. The Indian 
trader, he said, had a tea room licence and so could stay open later than the 
African traders. Makoti had denied overturning the drums of mahewu and 
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had not stopped the workers from brewing in limited quantities. Visitors 
to the compound were restricted because there had been claims of thefts, 
anyway 'it is not desirable that we should have unknown visitors coming into 
the barracks indiscriminately', demonstrating that the issue of control was 
the real priority. The rooms at the barracks had been cleaned by the 
workers themselves for 15~ years, why should it now become a matter of 
dispute? 
While these and other issues were being discussed with Chester, armed 
pickets were enforcing the beer boycott agreed to on Sunday. Inevitably, 
the municipal police intervened to protect their source of income and violent 
clashes between police and pickets took place again. As the clashes spread 
Champion was invited to participate in negotiations with Town Council mem-
bers. At last he secured the recognition from the bourgeoisie he had sought, 
his mediating powers were being acknowledged, and he agreed to call off the 
boycott without consulting the togt leaders. Baston, the District Comman-
dant of the SAP, called on Champion with the Chief Constable, paying him 
the supreme compliment. The three headed to the Point where the police 
had heard a group of pickets were moving into town. Ndhlovu, an ICU 
leader at the Point and an induna of rai Iway workers, later joined Champion 
and the police. 107 Together they visited the Bell Street barracks and found 
no gathering, although the workers started to congregate around them. Cham-
pion instructed the workers to stop picketing. He said he intended to go into 
town to bring the workers ' grievances before the Town Counc it in 'a proper 
constitutional manner'. The man who had dec lared himself prepared to die 
for the boycott on Sunday, when acknowledged as 'African leader' called off 
the struggle on Monday. The workers obeyed Champion IS instructi.ons and 
messengers were sent out to other beerhalls to call off the pickets. As 
Baston said afterwards with evident approval: 'Champion IS conduct throughout 
was perfectly correct I • 108 Within the space of less than twenty-four hours 
Champion IS position hod become authoritative, a place was secured in the 
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hierarchy of social and political control through the popular resistance to the 
beer monopoly. This place was, however, tenuous and dependent on his 
ability to open the floodgates of resistance and then command them to be 
closed according to the tactics of the moment. 
Neither the police nor Champion had apparently calculated on the 
possibility of a white vigilante mob being incited by sensational press accounts 
of the clashes between the pickets and the police. Despite the police issu-
ing a bulletin announcing the trouble was over, a white mob gathered at the 
ICU hall in the 'bazaar' area of Durban. The hall was besieged by the mob 
and Africans attacked in the streets. Despite the efforts of both the Mayor 
and the Chief Magistrate the blood of the vigi lantes was up and they refused 
to disperse. Violent clashes took place between the vigilantes and the 
besieged Africans and a number of people on both sides were killed or seriously' 
injured. Hearing of the attacks on the ICU hall, the dock workers of the 
Point formed a relieving column and counter-attacked the besiegers. The 
reaction of the police was entirely different to their parleying with the vigi-
lantes. Although the municipal police were barred by low from carrying 
firearms, they and the white vigilantes fired at the column, and when it 
retreated, pursued the workers in cars as they fled back to the Point. The 
forces of order and reaction secured a victory by force of arms; altogether 
six Africans and two whites were killed, and 108 persons injured. 109 
This bloody violence, the moss resistance to the beer monopoly, and 
the unchecked formation of mobs and mil itias, was of concern to the rul ing 
class. In South Africa, unlike the experience of the Southern States of 
America, the state has always abrogated to itself the full use of violence 
against the working class and the black majority. 110 By granting the state 
full powers to maintain the public order of the capitalist system (staatsrecht), 
mobs and vigilante groups, even when attacking the oppressed majority, have 
been deprecated. 111 A thorough investigation into the background and 
218 
circumstances of the riot was ordered to be made by Justice de Waal, the 
state-appointed commissioner. Ironically, the supposedly liberal-minded 
English section of the ruling class was to be judged by an Afrikaner trained 
in the school of Roman-Dutch law. While de Waal argued that the Africans 
were 'by no means solely to blame or even primarily to blame' and concluded 
his investigation with a plea for clemency, he provided a complete vindica-
tion of the beer monopoly and considered the demands of the togt workers 
were 'almost pathetic' and 'utterly devoid of any substance'. 112 He placed 
the blame for the deaths and injuries squarely on the shoulders of the white 
mob which had precipitated violence in a tense situation. In opposition to 
the 'lawlessness' of either black or white he proposed that the police should be 
provided with firearms 'not for use so much as for open display'. This con-
clusion had the effect of further s·trengthening the state against the workers, 
but as a supposed 'impartial' armed body. 
The report of the commissioner was full of praise for the Durban system 
the African workers had given their lives to resist; an end of the beer mono-
poly would mean an immediate increase in drunkenness and crime. De Waal 
considered that 'one undoubted benefit' of the beer monopoly was that 'the 
net revenue accruing from the sale of kafir beer is spent in various ways upon 
the Native himself and for his benefit'. It would be impossible to allow the 
African people to brew their own beer as this would allow the cheap spirits 
brewers of shimiyane, skokiaan, and kekeviki 113 to flourish. But de Waal 
also discovered that the mUf'icipality which had pioneered rigorous control 
over the African working class and had developed a unique source of revenue 
from the workers themselves, had done the least of major industrial towns in 
providing housing or recreational facilities for the African working class. 
The beer money was flowing, as ever, into the salaries of the police and 
bureaucrats and as a subsidy to other municipal depcrtments. The hypocrisy 
of the benevolent paternalism of the Durban system was revealed in a 'free' 
po I ice force (that is, one not charged to the property owners of Durban) without 
219 
any of the benefits promised to the African workers. At this point the 
commissioner was critical. Although 'high class barracks and eating 
houses' had been built, 'it cannot be too strongly urged upon the Borough 
that the establ ishment of a native location is a pressing need' • In a mix-
ture of encouragement to the 'better class natives' and arcadian utopianism, 
de Waal proposed 'a residential native township where a native who wishes 
to do so may reside with his family; where he could keep a cow, run his 
fowls and till a small piece of land.' He strongly endorsed a policy of 
ameliorating the social conditions of the African workers as a means of re-
gaining social and political control; recreational and sporting facilities 
would relieve the worker of an 'excess of vitality' and remove him to the 
playing fields away from being exploited by 'agitators at home in his barracks'. 
He perceived the concentration of workers by capital in compounds as ambi-
guous; capable of bringing them under strict discipline but also allowing 
their speedy mobilization against the state. 
He considered that the barracks were well constructed, clean, well 
kept, and well ventilated. Each room in the barracks had sixteen bunks 
and the workers provided their own bedding. The bunks were portable and 
taken weekly outside where they were thoroughly disinfected and de-verminized 
in a hot solution of caustic soda. The workers paid two pence per day and 
night or five shi II ings per month for accommodation. They were allowed 
either to buy ready cooked food in the eating houses where African caterers 
served the workers, or to cook their own food at the large open fireplaces in 
the kitchen. 
The food supplied by the eating house licensees is wholesome, 
clean and good. I was present when food was being served, 
the native being accommodated with a seat at a trestle table. 
For a large plate of food, consisting of meat, rice and beans 
or potatoes - clean looking, wholesome and good-smelling -
he pays threepence. For a thick slice of excellent bread he 
pays a penny, and for a large cup of coffee with milk anothe~ 
penny. If he indulges in three big meals a day, and assuming 
that he took bread and coffee at each meal, he would pay 
one and threepence for his meals and twopence for his 
accommodation, that is one and fivepence a day. As 
wages are uniformly good (the dock labourers I earnings run 
from 4s 6d upwards) the native would have a substantial 
balance in hand at the end of the month. 114 
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The beer was served out in tin mugs in either a third or a sixth of a gallon 
for 6d or 3d respectively, which would make it as expensive as a large plate 
of food. 
With this strictly statistical and uncritical evaluation of the barracks 
and the beer monopoly, de Waal dissolved the comprehensive grievances and 
demands of the workers and their oppression under the well-oi led mach inery 
of the Durban system. Instead of a systematic consideration of the list of 
grievances and demands item by item, a complete endorsement of the founda-
tions of the barracks, police, and bureaucracy, is provided and the aspirations 
of the workers ridiculed. Despite concluding that the municipality hod, by 
withdrawing the togt badge of Mnomezulu, set in train a series of events which 
had led to the general picketing of the beerhalls on Friday, 14 June 1929, de 
Waal proposed no changes in the arbitrary powers of the 'Native Affairs ' 
bureaucracy. The only gesture of a concession to the workers in the entire 
report was in proposing that Mnomezulu should have his togt badge restored to 
him as Ian act of grace ' • 115 He had not deserved to keep his badge by 
his behaviour, but he needed it to live and work. With this exception, the 
demands and grievances of the workers were regarded as frivolous and imaginary. 
In the absense of an analysis of the exploitation and oppression of the 
African workers as a basis for the decisive resistance to the beer monopoly, de 
Waal magnified the issue of Champion IS personality as an alternative explana-
tion. Taking up Champion IS complaint that the municipal authorities had 
refused to recognize his right to approach them on behalf of African people 
with grievances, de Waal observed, 'taking himself seriously, and being very 
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touchy and of a suspicious nature, the alleged denial to him of the right of 
approach rankled, and has, to my mind, been one of the chief causes that 
contributed to trouble in recent years between the Borough of Durban and 
the natives led and guided by Champion. ' Subordinating the demands 
of the African working class and the pol itical questions of the resistance to 
the analysis of personality, de Waal paved the way for advocating an 
advisory board as a means of securing more effective social and pol itical con-
trol. This solution to the challenge posed by the demands of the workers 
was fully acceptable to Champion who agreed that an advisory board would 
make the ICU quite irrelevant. He gave an emphatic promise to drop the 
ICU if an advisory board was introduced: 'I would be satisfied ... my work 
would be done'. 116 Evidently attracted by this prospect the advisory board 
was proposed by de Waal because Champion 'has failed as a go-between'; 
the board would provide alternative access for grievance':'holders to the 
bureaucracy independently of the ICU. 
The commissioner's report containing a mixture of insistence on super-
structural reforms and- proposals to arm the state against demonstrators in the 
streets did not command universal respect from the enthusiasts of imperialism 
in Natal. In particular, white officials and politicians were firmly opposed 
to acts of clemency which they regarded as a sign of weakness. Marwick, 
the former head of the Native Affairs Department and now member of parlia-
ment for IIlovo, objected to any exercise of clemency, and thought that the 
commissioner had underestimated the effects of communist agitation; Oswald 
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Pirow, the Minister of Justice, insisted that the law would take its course. 
The report was more attractive to other sections of the bourgeoisie. 'He 
has frankly faced the facts; he has not slurred over those which were not 
pleasant to European opinion; he has seen that not less than justice has been 
done to the Native; he has not magnified, as he might so easily have done, 
the effect of Communist propaganda on the Native mind; and above all, he 
,118 h .. fth has not sought to make a scapegoat. These were t e opinions 0 e 
editor of the Natal Mercury who considered that the report had vindicated 
the Notive Affairs Department and proved that agitation against the beer 
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monopoly was 'altogether bogus'. This section of the ruling class was more 
concerned about the volatility of some white workers and the lumpenproletariat, 
and argued that white racism expressed in the cry of 'black peril' could be 
counter-productive to social control over black workers. 
These differences of emphasis within the ruling class aside, the problem 
of re-establishing rigorous control over the African workers remained. Far 
from Champion's orders having been accepted by the workers, the boycott of 
the beerhalls continued unabated, although pickets were no longer mentioned. 
Quite apart from challenging a central aspect of the Native Urban Areas Act 
for which the Durban system served as a model, the bureaucracy was losing 
considerable revenue. The Native Affairs Department's authority was being 
flouted by African workers who, far from considering themselves defeated by 
the killings, were in an increasingly defiant mood. Although the leu and 
togt workers had joined forces in the Anti-Kaffir Beer League to enforce a 
general boycott of the beerhalls, the boycott had been initiated by the workers, 
and with the diversion of Champion into the manoeuvrings of the municipal ity 
following the report, the boycott continued under the direct leadership of the 
workers. It even seems to have gained new social support in a proliferation 
of illegal brewing of beer and shimiyane as an al ternative to the beerhalls and 
income for African women. 
As the municipal police were increasingly deployed in destroying petty 
brewing and driving the workers back to the beerhalls, the workers' resistance 
intensified. Many of the African workers were eager to turn the Point area 
into a 'no go' area for the police and to attack police patrols. A few inci-
dents in September 1929 provide some insight into the atmosphere. When 
the police raided a deep sea fishing boat on which shimiyane was brewed and 
sold wholesale to compounds at Maydon Wharf, a group of armed Africans 
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attacked the raiding party. After a sharp fight, twenty-three of the African 
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combatants were arrested. On another occasion African workers refused 
to pay fares on a ferry and challenged the pol ice to fight. In the battle 
which followed stones were thrown at the police and a large crowd of hostile 
workers came out of the compounds at Bamboo Square to confront the police.120 
With the police increasingly unable to bring the workers' resistance under con-
trol, the bourgeoisie became restive. The same editor who approved de 
Waal's report for its balance in August was panicky by November. 
African workers concentrated in barracks at the Point and,commanding 
a dominant position in the strategic dock work, were coming to pose a chal-
lenge not only to the system of local government but also to the national 
government. The Natal Mercury, previously concerned with inflammatory 
white racism, gave its fullest support to measures proposed by Pirow to deal 
with 'agi tators who are inflaming the Native mine by dangerous subversive 
doctrines', meaning the Communist Party. The editor was alarmed at the 
growing number of incidents against the authorities led by African workers in 
the past three to four months. He was most concerned not with the violence 
of the resistance, but with its cohesion. 'The manner in which the ICU boy-
cott of the Municipal Kafir canteens and eating houses has been enforced by 
the rigid obedience of many thousands of Natives to the orders of a group of 
profoundly mistaken leaders clearly indicates the existence of a state of most 
unusual discipline among the workers who follow the banner of the ICU.' 
While possibly over-estimating the direction of the ICU leadership over the 
continuation of the boycott, the statement does acknowledge the self-discipline 
of the workers who led the struggle. The organized resistance to the Durban 
4tspih 
system, though 'passive at the moment', had been strengthened whenfa magis-
terial prohibition a meeting was allowed to continue its proceedings without 
pol ice intervention. The state's authority was made the butt for the wit and 
ridicule of every African worker by what the newspaper considered an 'unhappy 
faux pas'. Finally the editor came down heavily on the side of the party of 
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repression, castigating those who might object. 'The time has come when 
the authority of the law must be restored, and any citizen who today delays 
that restoration will stamp himself as an enemy of society. ,121 Without 
advocating a 'conspiracy theory' of the state, it would be surprising if the 
editor was not aware of the preparations being made for a decisive attack on 
the j frican workers at the Po int by the pol ice. 
Uncontrolled resistance and the national police raid 
Far from having reduced the workers' movement to impotence by 
unleashing violence against the pickets and relieving column, or by proposing 
mild reforms, Durban became a focus for some of the most unrelenting anta-
gonism to the state and to the particular forms of national oppression administered 
locally. As this development is somewhat tangential to the disorganization 
and decay of working class struggle in other major industrial centres towards 
the end of the 1920s and during the depression, this calls for some comment 
even if a final explanation of why Durban should be the focus may not be 
possible. 122 What is certain is that the divisions within the African working 
class which were evident elsewhere: the division between migrants and the 
urban working class and between advanced and retarded sections of the work-
ing class, were not reproduced in Durban. Possibly a decisive factor was 
the exemplary development of the machinery of control over the African work-
ing class fuelled by the transparent revenue-generating engine of the beer 
monopoly. As a centre in which the national oppression and exploitation of 
the African working class was most advanced, a corresponding intensity of 
resistance could be expected. This fierce resistance more than elsewhere 
carried the stamp of the African working class as there was a leftward shift 
both politically and industrially. As anticipated in Marxist theory, the 
forward movement of the workers brought out sharp differences with the petty 
bourgeoisie sections of society which decidedly opposed the actions of the 
workers and their organizations. In a phenomenon which was not found 
elsewhere, the African workers moved decisively to the left leaving the leaders 
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of the national movement high ond dry, a situation which created an unusually 
propitious moment for the Communist Party to establish a firm base in the area. 
Reflecting the 'ultra-left' turn within the Comintern, the Communist Party 
reaped the benefits of a process which was already in motion before real 
organizational work was started in Durban. 
The contrast between the African petty bourgeoisie and organized 
workers was marked, the divisions being widened by the Communist Party's 
slogan of a Black Republic. Dube, the President of the Natal Native Con-
gress, was so concerned about the activity of workers and the ICU that he 
even demanded measures against both. A I though the di fferences between 
Champion and Dube can be ascribed to the personal pursuit of power, these 
differences brought out the opposing class forces supporting each faction. 123 
When Dube, for instance, organized a meeting of 'respectable Natives' and 
chiefs in the urban location after denouncing 'rotten social conditions' caused 
not by the municipality but by 'Town Natives' who organized all night dances, 
the ICU militia of young men and women broke up the meeting, rushed the 
platform and defied the police. 124 Responding to this attack, Dube made 
statements which put the racist ruling class to shame. 
T own Natives are out of control, and the criminal element is 
increasing in large numbers. Law-abiding Natives cannot 
tolerate this state of things. It seems that the lives of those 
people who work to stop undesirable conditions among Town 
Natives are not safe. It is up to those in authority to break 
up these amalayita mobs. The leaders of these gangs must be 
found out and dealt with. The heterogeneous mixture of de-
tribalized Natives in our large Towns is a problem within a 
problem. 
In his fury he was providing the Native Affairs bureaucracy and the police 
with the justification to attack an organization of African workers which had 
made tremendous advances in lifting the weight of national oppression from 
the shoulders of all Africans in the towns. Similar statements made in 1916 
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had led to the municipality imposing an even more rigorous set of by-laws 
to control every aspect of the African workers' lives in the towns. 125 
Shortly after this incident he warned the leu that the agitation against the 
beerhalls was 'a matter which is entirely outside the scope of the leu whom 
we understand are (sic) a purely trade unionist organization'. If the ICU 
continued in its 'militaristic and defiant attitude' there would be 'days of 
great trouble and suffering ahead'. 126 And when these days inevitably 
came, he wrote: We entirely dissociate ourselves from the recent violent 
measures taken by certain members of our race in Durban'. After repudiat-
ing the picketing and self-defence of the African workers, Dube made a mild 
protest against urban controls and made similar proposals to the de Waal report. 
.•• we cannot help feeling that if more provision were made in 
the towns for our entertainment and recreation, by the provision 
of, say, Swimming Baths, Lecture Halls, Picture Palaces, Schools, 
and so forth - by the provision of social centres - in short, by 
provision for the gradual elevation of our people to a higher status, 
contentment would be secured. 127 
With this Booker T. Washington outlook of social reform, Dube stood a con-
siderable distance away from the African workers who had found in the leU, 
with all its faults, an organization to struggle against oppression and even an 
entertainment place in the ICU hall. 
During the time in which the Natal Native Congress was edging away 
from the mass organization of the workers and its leadership repudiating the 
leU, the most important section of the African working class at the time, the 
togt workers, were slowly growing in number. Although 'casual' labour 
evokes a mental image of continuous ebb and flux, the togt workers as a self-
conscious group were surprisingly stable, with a fairly low proportion of new 
workers registered each year. In 1925 which was a year of fairly high regis-
trations at the Point only 517 new togt licences were issued, some 2 per cent 
of the total. The remainder were togt workers who either were re-registering, 
after having been back to the reserves, or renewing their I icence on a monthly 
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basis. The togt workers, who referred to themselves as inyati (in Zulu, 
buffalo, i.e. strong men) hod a relatively advanced consciousness not only 
through their concentration in the dock area compounds but also because 
they sow themselves as 'instrumental' (the chief instruments of production) 
in the labour process in the docks; their labour was central to all work 
t · • I d· d h· . 128 T I bo did· opera Ions In on Ing an Sipping cargo. ogt a ur eve ope In 
response to the development of capital. Wi th the open ing up of the Con-
gella dock area the number of togt workers increased proportionally in 1928 
d · . .• I 5 129 D . h on an Increase In new registrations to a most per cent. espl te t ese 
shifts, the impression is created of a relatively stable and experienced group 
of workers at the Point, who were to constitute the main force in the resistance 
to employers and the state. They would provide the most effective challenge 
to the urban areas legislation in any industrial centre. 
A Ithough the central focus of resistance to the Durban system was on 
the beer monopoly, the repression when it come attacked on equally important 
issue of non-cooperation and resistance: the poll tax. Pirow, the Minister 
of Justice, took the tax payment as the main thrust of repression against the 
fluid area of the beer boycott. The imposition of the increased poll tax 
had led to direct resistance by the togt workers to police action taken to 
enforce the new low in 1927. The municipality undertook a campaign to 
increase payment of the tax by African workers with little success. At a 
meeting held on 2 December 1928, the municipal officials hod addressed 
African workers on the necessity of paying the additional £ 1 a year imposed 
in 1925. The workers were told they would be arrested after three months 
if they had not paid; an admission that evasion of the new tax was wide-
spread. The workers were incensed by this threat, stood up in ,their thou-
sands and shouted down the officials. One of them was reduced to appealing 
to Champion to restore order, which he did .130 The impotence of the 
bureaucracy was demonstrated by the fact that Durban, the largest centre of 
employment in Notal, was the lowest revenue producing area of the general 
tax. The statistics provide evidence of massive evasion. While the 
remote rural district of Msinga had brought in £ 15,950 in general tax in 
1928, Durban had only paid in £459. Even the adjacent urban area of 
Pinetown had managed to bring in £ 13,645. 131 Even with an enormous 
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increase in the number of arrests and convictions between 1926 and 1929 in 
Natal, with convictions increasing from 4,338 to 15,961 in the respective 
years, the revenue generated in Durban did not rise proportionately. 132 
The tax law was being openly flouted by the African workers in Durban and 
it was on this issue that the state counter-attacked against the general con-
tempt for the law and the police. While it might not be possible to force 
the workers into the beerhalls, the same result could be obtained by tackling 
the parallel question of revenue for the national state. 
Durban was proclaimed the 'storm centre' of South Africa, by the 
Nata I Mercury on the morn ing of 14 No vember 1929. The newspaper, 
which had established a special liaison with the police, justified the national 
police raid on the Point which took place that morning by arguing that 'law 
and order' had been challenged to an unprecedented extent since the riots of 
June. Strong police patrols had been attacked by large numbers of workers 
at the Point, prisoners had been released, and 'impudent' messages had been 
sent to the police. The police had been particularly alarmed by Communist 
Party plans for Dingaan's Day (16 December). A call had been made for 
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demonstrations and strikes under the slogan of 'Long live the Native Republ ie' . 
Only a small number of African workers had paid their poll tax, and many 
groups of African workers were defiant of the pol ice and counter-attacked when 
the police attempted to arrest them. Not even the Mobile Squadron, which 
terrorized the rural areas could have a 'restraining effect'; it had been 
recently attacked by several thousand Africans at the Point. A 'conspiracy 
of a revolutionary nature' existed which would climax on Dingaan's Day with 
the aim of undermining the South African Pol ice to prepare for an eventual 
Black Republic. 
Hundreds of specially equipped police made a carefully planned 
attock on the Point on the morning of 14 November in a great display of 
force. The Minister of Justice, Oswald Pirow, flew into Durban from 
Pretoria to toke personal command of the 700 pol ice armed with machine-
guns, rifles with fixed bayonets and tear gas. The police drew a cordon 
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around the barracks in the early hours of the morn ing and sent in strong 
detachments in search of assegais, battle axes and other weapons, and to 
demand tax receipts. The detectives entered the barracks at 0430, which 
was the usual time of getting up in the quarters, and sent the workers out to 
line up in single file to present their posses and poll tax receipts for examina-
tion. The raid did not have the element of surprise that had been counted 
upon, strong rumours of a notionally coordinated police raid had been reported 
in the Johannesburg press. Some of the workers were defiant, but most 
accepted the police raid philosophically, or were even amused with the colossal 
efforts of the authorities to stomp out their resistance. Even as workers under 
the direct control of employers and the municipality and without arms, they 
had earned a notional reputation for their fighting abilities. Many of the 
workers hod been forewarned and hod slipped away to the Bluff (just over the 
mouth of the boy) and hod taken refuge in the bush. Despite these counter 
measures the massive presence of the pol ice hod, in the words of the Notal 
Mercury, 'a profound moral effect on the Native mind'. On the first day 
of the raid more than 6,000 Africans were 'dealt with' and 500 alleged tax 
defaulters were charged in six special courts. The attock on the barracks 
was completed by 0630 and by 0700 the police hod disappeared from the Point 
area. The police worked methodically through the barracks and the papers 
of the workers were examined by a special stoff; those whose papers were in 
order were sent immediately to work. By 0600 over 350 African tax defaul-
ters hod been mustered and marched to jail. The objective was to strike 
terror into the hearts of the workers at the Point, to restore the prestige of the 
police, and to convince Africans 'that they could not resist the authorities 
with impunity'. 
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In a display of the new techniques of repression the police, who 
were equipped with tear gas bombs and respirators, tossed tear gas bombs 
into the crowds of Africans who gathered to witness the drama of repression. 
A tear gas canister waS thrown into a crowd in Bell Street,where there was 
a large compound, from a passing pol ice car with 'devastating results', 
causing amusement from the police and the bourgeois press reporting the raid 
from the vantage point of the police. The local press was pleased that the 
sober lessons of police discipline had been impressed on the workers as pre-
viously there had been the 'greatest difficulty in maintaining discipl ine 
among togt workers' • The police raid on the Point barracks was, however, 
only the beginning of a big campaign to enforce the poll tax payments and 
to control the illicit brewing of liquor throughout Durban and the surrounding 
area. Similar raids later took place on the barracks at the Bluff and Con-
gella. 134 
As the police spread throughout the city the earlier light-hearted 
response to the raid turned to terror. Faced with the prospect of a month's 
imprisonment with hard labour, African workers flooded the tax offices. 
Altogether £800 was collected at the tax office in one day, with £200 raised 
from prosecutions in the special courts. These courts operated in the old 
Indian Repatriation Camp at the Point and from 0700 six magistrates and ten 
tax collectors worked through the cases of the defaulters. A newspaper 
reporter wrote that the atmosphere was 'more like barracks rather than courts 
of justice'. The workers were given the option of either paying the tax or 
receiving 30 days hard labour; if they paid the tax immediately the case 
was withdrawn. In bringing the judiciary and the civil service into 'one 
administrative unit, 'the work of the magistrates was I ightened considerably'. 
Whether from poverty or defiance of the law, more than 200 workers were sen-
d •• 135 tence to Imprisonment. 
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With the popular resistance to the police and Native Affairs Depart-
ment under control, the local press carried an editorial claiming that an 
answer had been found to anti-government agitation. With some self-
satisfaction it was reported that the authority of the pol ice had been restored 
in an area where there had been a steady erosion of that authority. The 
Department of Justice had achieved its primary purpose. 'Its combing out 
of several nests of lawlessness in the Native barracks of the Borough had had 
an immediate moral effect, plainly visible in the changed demeanour of thou-
sands of labourers and house "boys" yesterday'. Without the police having 
to use violence, it was claimed, those who had defied the pol ice had been 
taught a lesson. It was revealed that one of the most compelling reasons 
for the overwhelming use of force was the slogan of the Black Republic and 
the plan for mass demonstrations on Dingaan's Day. Attempting to main-
tain the unity of all sections of the ruling class in the face of liberal criticism 
of the national raid it was argued that whites were united in opposing the 
Black Republic. 'in this matter the White civilisation stands solid. There 
is no distinct Natal, transvaal, Free State or Cape point of view in regard to 
the security of the fabric of the State as a whole. There is merely one 
South African standpoint. I Military logistics were introduced: the police 
exerc ise had demonstrated the effectiveness of national mobil ization and that 
no part of the Union was isolated for more than twenty-four hours. The 
greatest triumph reported was that Champion had been one of the many to pay 
h• 136 IS tax. 
Some time later, further evidence was produced to justify the massive 
repression taken by the South African Police. It was said that a strike of 
dock workers had been threatened, and this had required decisive measures. 
'Had this materialised, there can be little doubt that a disastrous blow would 
have been struck at shipping activities in Port Natal, which would have had 
repercussions in the commercial, industrial, and pastoral interests throughout 
the country. In order, however, to meet such an eventuality, at least in 
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part, the Government drew up a scheme for the drafting of Native convicts 
to Durban in order that the work of the Point might be more or less main-
tained. ,137 It was also alleged that plans had been made for the firing 
of the petrol tanks at the Bluff. According to the bourgeois press, this 
information had come from indunas and police informers from among the 
workers. These involved arguments used to justify the national police raid 
tended to imply that the workers were attempting to organise an insurrection; 
these fanciful interpretations hiding the mundane and unreported fact that the 
workers were maintaining the beer boycott without interruption. Whether 
a strike was planned to supplement this tactic of resistance it is difficult to 
establish; certainly the Communist Party had called for strikes and demon-
strations but this could hardly justify the national mobilization to suppress 
tlll resistance at the Point. 
The ostentatious and highly publicized raid aroused the opposition 
both of I iberal opinion and the 1':Jbour movement. The Johannesburg press 
described the raid as 'barbarous', while the trade unions and Communist Party 
protested and tried to draw out the strategic impl ications for working class 
struggles. The National Executive of the Trade Union Congress and the 
executive committee of the laundry union protested against the raid and the 
proposed amendments to the Riotous Assemblies Act. Bill Andrews, spokes-
men for the TUC, argued that the tax could have been collected by normal 
means and that African workers were heavily taxed without representation. 
The Communist Party described the raid as 'bloody baboonery' and instructed 
the workers as follows: 'Keep cool; keep your heads; do not be rushed 
or bluffed into false moves even by your own leaders'. 138 Ball inger, who 
had been closely associated with the final developments within the ICU as a 
national organization, complained that the de Waal Commission which had 
stressed clemency had been completely ignored. 139 
Even after the massive display of force by the police, the cordons 
and searches, and large numbers of workers imprisoned, an unusually pre-
carious situation for the ruling class existed in Durban. Despite the 
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optimism of the local bourgeois press, which felt a decisive change of mood 
was evident among African workers, nothing essentially had changed. 
A I though more tax may have been squeezed from the workers and they were sub-
jected to the humiliation of searches, arrests and summary trials, the beer 
boycott continued and the ICU remained extraordinarily popular. Margery 
Perham, who visited Durban at this time, reported that thousands of African 
people were attending the ICU hall in search of entertainment and a focus 
for resistance. The relationship between Champion and the municipal 
officials was prickly and unstable, and the workers' resistance undiminished. 140 
A crisis in political control remained, with the African workers undefeated. 
In the search for a more stable solution, yet another investigation was ordered, 
this time by the Native Affairs Commission, a body selected by the government 
to give advice on methods of rule over African people. This Commission 
visited Durban on 26 November 1929 accompanied by the Secretary for Native 
Affairs. 
The Commission had discussions with the Borough Council, representa-
tives of areas adjoining the Borough area, the Chamber of Commerce, African 
organizations, and a representative of the European and African Joint Council. 
Its report raised a series of new issues, such as the law wages of the African 
workers, the humiliating treatment of African people by the African police, 
a lack of sympathy towards Africans by municipal officials, and delays at the 
tax office, and well as the perennial questions of the lack of urban housing 
and the beer monopoly. On none of these questions, new or old, did the 
Commission have anything remarkably original to say - general improvements 
needed to be made much on the I ines of the de Waal Commission. Urban 
housing should be provided, for instance, as an alternative to the recreation 
and agitation provided by the ICU and other political organizations. The 
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existing forms of recreation from Saturday afternoon to Sunday evening were 
roundly condemned: 
This may, and does, take undesirable forms - illicit drinking, 
I istening to the ill-informed and unbalanced agitator of com-
munistic or anti-European tendencies, the attendance at 
dance-halls where the votaries of the national Zulu dances 
rub shoulders with others indulging in European dances in some 
cases with loose women, etc. The atmosphere at these forms 
of amusement is unhealthy in the extreme and can but lead to 
deterioration. 141 
Such intense hosti lity to the organizations of the workers could on ly provide 
justification for further repression; the Commission could not even provide 
the municipality with a definite direction in urban housing. 
On the really urgent question of the time, the Commission, not 
unexpectedly, felt that the existing system of beer monopoly should not be 
altered. The conflicting opinions of various witnesses were detailed: some 
were in favour of the abolition of the beerhalls, others said the boycott was 
only maintained by 'the terrorising and threatening attitude' of a section of 
the ICU loyal to Champion. African women were somewhat divided between 
those arguing for total prohibition because the men wasted their earnings on 
beer, and those asking for 'domestic brewing', or that the Council should be 
a wholesale brewer with African retailers. The most important fact estab-
lished was that the boycott of the beerhalls had not been broken by the massive 
police raid at the Point. The remark made by Champion during the de Waol 
Commission of Enquiry was substantiated: 'I knew that every black man in 
Durban was going to abide by the resolution wherever he was, in sympathy 
with the Point people. ,142 It was most probably the continued success of 
the beer boycott which brought the Commission to make one positive recom-
mendation: that the Governor-General consider the possibil ity of deporting 
Champion from Durban by using his powers as Supreme Chief. Champion 
had established a tremendous influence with the younger men 'filled with Zulu 
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energy, lacking an outlet for their spirit, and irresponsible while away from 
the steadying influences of their wives, and chi Idren and elder relatives'. 
This influence, the Commission considered, was full of dangerous conse-
143 quences. 
Whi Ie these views were hardly exceptional and were an acknowledge-
ment that for the ruling class the failure of repression could only be met with 
more repression, there were some shifts in an understanding of the level of 
proletarianization of the African workers. The Commission reported that 
the municipality had failed to notice the changes which had been brought 
about affecting Africans during and after the First World War. 'His taxes 
have increased, his needs have been extended by education and his neces-
sities cost more. I Only a few months after de Waal had concluded that 
the chief desire of the African worker was to be left alone t:> earn as much as 
he could in the shortest possible time 'and then to go back to his kraal I , the 
Native Affairs Commission reported a completely different situation. 
Economic pressure forces the Native to go out more into industrial 
centres and to work for longer periods - the activities in the 
industrial and commercial world of Durban demanded more and 
more labour evei-y year - and insensibly and unrecognised the 
Native has changed from the person who, in the past, came from 
his reserve for a short period every year to earn the cash to pay 
his taxes and buy the barest necessities. So instead of having a 
population which normally worked in the past for only a portion of 
the year and returned to their kraals there is noW both a permanent 
and a uasi- ermanent ulation within or within eas reach of 
the Borough IS industrial works. 
From recognizing this significant change in the level and form of proletarianiza-
tion in Durban, the Commission traced many of the grievances and dissatisfac-
tion of the African workers to this new set of circumstances. Following on 
the de Waal Commission it had to provide some explanation of the extraordinary 
resilience of the African workers to the most crushing pressure of state power. 
Following logically on the unpalatable recognition of a mil itant permanent 
African working class, the Commission examined the wage issue. 
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The main grievance of the Africans interviewed by the Commission 
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was the low level of wages. The importance given by the Commission 
to wages is significant as it was not the primary demand of the ICU; possibly 
the Commission saw it as an area in which concessions could be made which 
would undermine the base in the African working class commanded by Cham-
pion. This was an issue on which the ICU was weakest and during the anti-
beer monopoly agitation wage demands had actually been pushed into the 
background; Champion explicitly said the wages of togt workers were good 
but it was the beerhalls which drained the wages away. 146 From a view of 
the growing urbanization of African workers the liberal Joint Council of 
Europeans and Natives thought that low wages were a legitimate grievance 
and submitted domestic budgets of single and married Africans in support of 
their views. But employers generally denied that African workers were being 
underpaid. The Commission found that the wages paid by Durban firms to 
African labourers varied considerably. The general rule was that the large 
employers paid adequate wages and provided rations and quarters, while the 
smaller employers did not provide faci lities and paid lower wages. 
Having identified an area of manoeuvre the Commission could not con-
cI ude a strategy to make economic concessions to African workers. No 
definite conclusions were arrived at and the Commission split into two opinions. 
The fi rst, taken by Dr. Loram, was that there should be an enquiry into African 
wages through the Wage Board. He felt that the workers in Durban would 
feel that any other method would give them less than the law allowed and that 
the wage determination at Bloemfontein had satisfied both employers and 
workers. The other view, taken by Dr. Roberts and Senator van Niekerk, 
was that there should be a survey by an official who would then try to persuade 
emp loyers payi ng inadequate wages to ra ise their standards. IAn officer with 
the confidence of the Natives and with sufficient standing to ensure the res-
pect and goodwill of employers would be in a position to effect substantial 
amelioration and avoid action, in advance of public opinion, being taken 
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under the Wage Act.' 147 A compulsory minimum level of wages for unskilled 
workers in Durban, it was argued, would take many more years to accomplish, 
and unti I then increases in African wages would be on an ad hoc basis. 
These differences in approach possibly reflected disagreements among large 
and small employers, or more probably varying degrees of emphasis on the 
importance of wage concessions in dampening the resistance of the workers. 
The concessions to the workers were not to come in the economic but 
in the'political'sphere as the Town Council moved fairly rapidly after the 
Native Affairs Commission report to establish a Native Advisory Board of 10 
Africans and 4 town councillors. In contrast to the advisory boards elected 
in cities where there were established locations and ward organization, the 
board in Durban represented differing political organizations ond workers 
elected directly in the compounds. 148 The Natal Native Congress, the 
ICU, four representatives from the various municipal barracks nominated by 
the Town Council, and two representatives from Government barracks, made 
up the African side of the Advisory Board. Johannes Sibiya represented 
the rai Iway compound at the Point, Magcekeni Matsonsi the togt barracks in 
Bell Street, and Jeremiah Mkwanazi the togt barracks in Dalton Road. 149 
Concessions on wages seemed also possible when the town councillors reported 
that the Council had considered the two suggestions on African wages made by 
the Native Affairs Commission. Eventually it had been decided to make 
representations to the Union Native Affairs Department to ask for an investi-
gation to be made into the wages of unski lied workers in Durban in terms of 
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the Wage Act. With the onset of the depression and the changing con-
ditions of class struggle in Durban during this period, these rather ambiguous 
resolutions came to nothing. 
With the continuing boycott of the beerhalls undermining the 
wide-ranging subsidies to the police, bureaucracy, and other municipal depart-
ments, it was not unlikely that the first major issue to be debated by the 
Advisory Board was the possibil ity of bringing it to an end. The Town 
Councillors suggested there should be an attempt to come to some kind of 
solution of the boycott, but the reaction from the African representatives 
was wary and hesitant: Champion, who possessed some insight into the 
machinations of the bureaucracy, shrewdly demanded to see a copy of the 
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Native Administration Account first. At a meeting on 19 February 1930, 
J.R. Msimang of the Natal Native Congress said that the boycott would con-
tinue indefinitely. The demands made at the start of the boycott had not 
been met and the togt worker who had had his badge removed still had not 
had it returned. The flow of subsidies was soon to bring out divisions bet-
ween the settled urban workers and the migrants housed in compounds. A 
few weeks later the unrelenting posture of the Natal Native Congress changed 
when on 16 April 1930 the same speaker proposed the boycott should be 
brought to an end. Because of the boycott, income to the Native Admini-
stration Account was being stopped and pressure was being brought to bear on 
the married quarters built by the municipality which had very low rents and 
electricity supplied. If the boycott did not come to an end, the rates would 
have to be increased, he complained, I n response Champion argued he 
was much more in favour of the Bloemfontein system which permitted home 
brewing. 151 The motion to end the beer boycott was not carried, but the 
tensions between different sections of the African working population were 
evident. 
As the beer boycott continued and the resistance of the workers to 
the Native Affairs bureaucracy continued unabated, the Advisory Board was 
reorganized with the Natal Native Congress and the ICU having proportionately 
less representation. The Natal Native Congress,which was in the process of 
splitting, was granted one representative as was the ICU, while the railway 
barracks were apparently granted two extra representatives. The precise 
significance of these changes is not immediately clear, but the 'reorganization' 
was accompanied by the deportation of Champion from Durban by the Minister 
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of Justice. His deportation order followed his protests against the ICU 
representation being reduced to one, although the administrative decision 
was probably not solely precipitated by this factor. At a meeting on 8 
September 1930 the Advisory Board extended its sympathy to Champ ian in 
connection with his banishment, but did not take its protests any further. 152 
The heroicism of his position was somewhat blunted by the mayor writing to 
the Minister asking him to release Champion from his banishment since he 
had promised to behave and should not be made into a martyr. By the 
time Champion eventually returned he found his position on the Advisory 
Board as ICU representative taken by Ngcobo who claimed to be the Chair-
man of the ICU yase Natal. 
Up to the point of the 'reorganization' of the Advisory Board no con-
crete gains had been made by the African representatives and with the changes 
being introduced the suspicion of the workers became even more clearly mani-
fest. Having achieved nothing definite through the Board,the representa-
tives were apparently loath to make public reports on what was being dis-
cussed to the workers who had elected them. The crisis in representation 
was most clearly evident among the togt workers who both possessed a keen Iy 
democratic tradition and were taking an increasingly radical political direc-
tion. On 26 November 1930 two delegates of the togt workers, Gumede 
and Ngcobo, petitioned the Advisory Board to replace Magcekeni Matsonsi 
as the representative of togt workers at the barracks in Bell Street. These 
workers had asked Matsonsi to come to a meeting, but he had refused. A 
deputation of four was sent to interview him, but he decl ined to give them a 
hearing. Another deputation was sent and he had refused to interview them. 
'He does not wish to see us and give us an account of his activity in the 
Board. I Yet he had been reappointed to the recognized Advisory Board by 
Chester. The delegates wanted to know who had elected him, where he 
had come from, and what matters and grievances he had presented to the Board. 
'We do not wish to be led by a man we do not know. We were only told by 
240 
the authorities that he is our leader, and we know nothing of him. We 
declare that the entire natives of the Point barracks do not want him as their 
representative •• 153 The minutes of the Advisory Board do not provide 
any information on responses to this petition, but the demands for consulta-
tion and report-back meetings by the workers demonstrated an increasingly 
impatient mood with the Advisory Board and representatives who did not put 
put forward the demands of the workers. 
Towards the end of 1930 the attempt to stabil ize relationships between 
the exploited and the government of property owners through the Advisory 
Board was being shown to have failed. The state action against Champion 
was possibly aimed to disrupt the ICU and increase the splits in the organiza-
tion, but it was also an acknowledgement of the failure of conciliation. 
The representatives on the Board were coming under increasing pressure from 
an African working class searching for new tactics to throw off the weight of 
municipal and state control and to free their hands in confrontation with the 
employers. 
The movement of African workers in Durban was unparalleled and 
requires a full discussion in its own right, and this follows in the next chap-
ter. But the development of the municipality in Durban as the coordinat-
ing centre for counter-measures against the African working class does allow 
some conclusions to be drawn about the nature of the local state and its 
bureaucracy. 
Conclusion 
Until comparatively recently the bourgeoisie in command of local 
authoriti es in the major industrial centres in South Africa followed paths of 
domination over the most advanced section of the working class which were 
not identical. The forms of class and racial domination have not been fixed 
and immutable from the point of formation of the South African state, the 
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rul ing class strategy for continued domination is itself a response to working 
class struggle - the privileged position of the white working class, for 
example. Resistance from the oppressed classes has produced a continual 
striving for stable class rule as evidenced by numerous commissions of enquiry, 
the growth of a specialized 'Native Affairs ' bureaucracy, and revised legis-
lation. The expansion of the local and national state as an instrument ,for 
repressing and stabilizing class struggles certainly guaranteed the continued 
development of South Africa as a capitalist social formation. The expan-
sion and specialization of the bureaucracy which was integral to the evolving 
state, in particular the distinctive local 'Native Affairs ' bureaucracy, far 
from being favourable to welfare and social levelling as postulated by Weber, 
was precisely the instrument of the ruling class, gathering information on 
resistance, planning responses, and clearing the way for repression. 154 
It possessed a political character which was hostile to the working class and 
siphoned its income from taxes on the African workers ' means of subsistence. 
Although Weber argues that the 'spirit' of bureaucracy is formalism, he also 
writes there is a tendency towards 'a utilitarian point of view in the interest 
of the welfare of those under their (officials) authority I • But this is obscured 
by the formalistic spirit of the enactment of corresponding regulatory measures~55 
This conception, which also argues that capitalism allows the bureaucracy to 
develop lin the most rational form I , is contradicted by the importance of 
welfare as a means of dampening class resistance and providing an opening for 
social reformism. It is not so much the suffocating overdevelopment of 
officialdom in itself wh ich provided the basis for racial oppression in its exact 
form, but rather its class character. Bound not only to the attainment of 
the objective of the bourgeois state, but also expressing in its actions and 
deliberations the markings and spirit of the class, its antagonism to the interests 
of the African working people was unquestioned. 
The extraordinary resistance of African workers in Durban to the 
central features of their oppression in the beer monopoly, tax system, and 
242 
passes, established Durban as a leading area in the struggle against the urban 
forms of domination. A Ithough faced by one of the most 'organized ' groups 
of property owners in South African towns, the resistance of the workers pre-
cipitated, unexpectedly, one of the most severe crises in authority in any 
urban centre. Despite a particularly advanced 'Native Affairs' bureaucracy, 
class rule in the period 1925-30 was chronically unstable and required increas-
ing use of nationally coordinated pol itical and police oct ion to maintain 
stabi I ity. Not having an urban location and compel! ing African workers 
to live in barracks, the ruling class found that this concentration of workers 
could be turned against employers and the state. Towards the late 1920s 
the African workers succeeded in turning the barracks into fortresses, requir-
ing repeated attacks and nationa I raids to return to the normalQcy of centres of 
bourgeois control elsewhere. The barracks, which were centrally located 
and ensured the continuation of the cheap labour system, posed a contradiction 
for the ruling class: any mass mobilization of African workers immediately 
threatened the administration centres. While the forceful segregation of 
African workers in the Transvaal and Orange Free State permitted the develop-
ment of political demonstrations in the locations (which met with the same 
repression as in Durban), in Durban simi lar actions had the immediate support 
of large numbers of militant workers in the town centre. Faced with instability 
of this order, the bourgeoisie was compelled to resort to the direct rule of 
repression. 
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attempt to describe the relationship of workers in Durban to the 
activity of the working class as a whole is possibly suggestive of 
trends within class formation and class consciousness over a long 
period. 
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p.340. 
155. Ibid. 
CHAPTER 4 
Pass burning and the Communist Party 
Never, under the sun has a nation been so shackled with the chains 
of slavery. We are not even allowed to voice our opinion on the 
state of affairs in our Motherland. Why not awake and stand on 
our feet? Men, women, and young women, we must support 
organisations that fight for our freedom. 
Final message from Johannes Nkosi, Communist Party and dock leader, 
December 1930 
We are made to work as if we were a people without souls - as if we 
were a machine. 
Dock workers, Umsebenzi, 5 November 1932 
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As South Africa entered the world-wide depression, the tendencies 
which were evident in Durban during the late 1920s became even more 
pronounced. The social movement of the African working class in Durban 
was definitely in a different phase to the other major industrial centres, as 
the ruling class sought solution after solution in attempts to regain decisive 
control. Despite a number of measures mixing tactical reforms with 
further repression, the beer boycott continued and even gained strength in 
some ways. The contradictions which were so obvious within the ICUi 
Champion IS domineering and self-seeking leadership and its inability to pro-
vide ideological and tactical leadership after the national police raid, came 
to a head in a number of complex spl its. After commanding mass support 
in the post-June 1929 period, Champion dithered between carrying forward 
the struggle for higher wages and against the passes, and securing himself a 
career as a shopkeeper. Early in 1930 he declared that the Communists 
were opposed to African interests and Ithat the capitalist class must be created 
among all non-European races in South Africa l • Without such a class there 
would be Ino hope of liberation I , for history revealed that Ithe capitalist is 
. 1 
and always will be the backbone of every country'. Armed with these 
views and an increasingly commercial view d the ICU as a source of entertain-
ment for African workers, the divergences between his leadership and the left-
wards trend within the African working class were clearly j'l eoJlaellCe. But 
while the formal organizat.ion was rent with disputes and splits, the work ers 
were united in strengthening their opposition to the policies of national and 
class oppression and responsive to the Communist Party during the phase in 
which it attempted to take over the reins of leadership in the struggle for 
natIonal liberation. 2 The foundations of cell organization within produc-
tion laid during this period also served the dock workers in the times of 
repression which followed. 
The Communist Party, wh ich had been racked by dissension over the 
Black Republic resolution, was instructed by the Comitern to step up its 
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activity towards 'the complete carrying through of the national ist revolutionary 
struggle, and, as the subsequent stage, the socialist revolution'. Its 
strategy, as outlined by the Executive Committee of the Communist Inter-
national, was to act as the vanguard in the revolutionary nationalist movement. 
Permeated with a view that the capitalist world was entering a period of 
degeneration in which the Communist Parties should seize on the revolutionary 
possibilities completely independently of other organizations of the exploited 
and oppressed, the Comintern executive accused the South African party of 
'lagging behind the growing mass discontent' in the country. In the struggle 
for national liberation the Communist Party was to repudiate the 'petty 
bourgeois nationalist parties' and act alone. I ts duty was to develop a core 
of full-time professional revolutionaries, form cells in factories and streets, 
organize revolutionary trade unions, and to launch 'l peasants' movement for 
the seizure of land. 3 It is from this perspective that the Communist Party 
launched an organizational drive and prepared for massive pass-burning demon-
strations on Dingaan's Day, 16 December 1930. 
In Durban the communists took the opportunity afforded by the deter-
mined resistance of the workers to the tax system, beer monopoly, and oppres-
sive municipal regime to establish a branch. Wolton, the secretary of the 
Communist Party, who campaigned as Native Representative candidate in 1929 
along with S. P. Bunting, helped to establ ish a branch of the Communist Party 
during a stormy visit. Many of the workers who joined were members of the 
ICU yase Natal and had loyalty to both organizations.
4 
With the removal 
of Champion from the arena of the struggle, the state had ironically opened 
the road to the communists who were determined to seize the opportunity of 
leading mass struggles against national oppression. Champion encouraged 
a relationship with the Communist Party on occasion, but before the de Waal 
Commission he renounced Marxism and said that the aim of communists was to 
dispossess landowners such as himself. 5 Not being capable or willing to 
develop propaganda to any level, Champion tolerated some influence of the 
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Communist Party in the ICU yase Natal (in contrast to Kadalie) and did not 
oppose speakers who argued for workers to be members of both organizations. 
The growth of the Communist Party in Durban was closely associated 
with one of the new generation of African communists, Johannes Nkosi, 
previously a farm labourer, kitchen 'boy', and an ICU official who had joined 
the Communist Party in 1926. The Communist Party had developed steadily 
after he had arrived in Durban to organize a branch shortly before the beer 
hall violence in June 1929. Organizing with enthusiasm, Nkosi built up 
Communist Party membership among African workers with help from the white 
Communists (one of whom was on the Town Council) selling Umsebenzi (the 
party newspaper) and starting to organize a dockers, railway, and transport 
union. 6 A rather ambiguous relationship developed between Nkosi, leader 
of an 'Africanised' Communist Party branch and eager to enter into confronta-
tion with an oppressive state, and Champion, who headed a mass organization, 
was unwilling to develop a decisive strategy of resistance, and was well aware 
that the Native Affairs Commission had recommended that he should be 
banished from Durban. Nkosi would attend ICU meetings and ask Champion 
for permission to sell Umsebenzi. 'Sometimes permission would be given, 
sometimes refused, according to whether Champion was at that particular 
7 
moment in a rebellious mood or feeling the wisdom of placating the authorities'. 
When Champion was finally removed from Durban in October, Nkosi 
and the African members of the Communist Party were in effective command 
of the resistance to the Durban system, and in particular the pass laws. 
Faced with criticism for 'tailing' behind the popular resistance of the masses, 
the Communist Party drew up plans for nation-wide burning of passes and a 
general strike on Dingaan's Day 1930. The militancy of the Communist 
Party in leading the resistance to national oppression matched the conscious-
ness of the African workers in Durban who had sustained the boycott of the 
beerhalls for eighteen months. 8 As the workers looked for leadership to 
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provide them with a way forward from the somewhat deadlocked beer boycott, 
the spirit of conservatism and conciliation mixed with defiance of Champion 
became displaced by.the unrelenting hostility of radical togt members of the 
ICU at the Point and of Communist Party members to the capitalist state. In 
the build-up to the Dingaan Day demonstrations, Johannes Nkosi addressed 
himself particularly to the togt workers who had proved themselves to be the 
leading force in the resistance. At a meeting held on the sand dunes near 
the Bell Street compound, the togt workers were addressed by Mtolo of the 
ICU and Johannes Nkosi on 9 November 1930. Nkosi was reported to ro ve 
made a fiery speech, adding the tactical questions to a denunciation of the 
racially oppressive state. ITo hell with Pirow and the Riotous Assemblies 
Act. I pray that the ship conveying Hertzog who has been overseas to 
obtain more power to penalize the Natives may sink at sea, and Hertzog's 
soul go to hell. I A leaflet had been distributed carrying the following 
slogans: Down with Pirow, Slave Laws, Away with Passes on Dingaan's 
Day, Burn the Passes~ Alarmed with the response of the workers to Nkosi, 
the compound manager, Gray, instructed his indunas to report on Communist 
Party meetings held with togt workers. These informers said {although their 
statements cannot be acapted uncritically} that Nkosi had told the workers 
to carry their sticks on 16 December, and that any police in the streets, or 
anyone working for the Corporation, should be killed. Another induna 
reported that Nkosi had said that anyone entering the beerhalls would be 
killed. 9 Whether these reports by collaborators in the compounds and at 
work were true is difficult to establish; later it was argued that the 
demonstration on 16 December was peaceful and that the police made an 
unprovoked attack. It was also unl ikely that the authorities would have 
tolerated this level of agitation for any time. 
10 
An increasingly alarmed bourgeois authority searched for more infor-
mation about the agitation and for a strategy to defeat the worker,1 resistance. 
The Native Welfare Officer, a descendant of Shepstone, was requested to 
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make regular reports on the Communist movement among Africans in Durban 
to the Native Affairs Committee. The welfare provided by the town council 
in the wake of the Native Affairs Commission report was material izing as both 
a spying agency and the 'soft' option in the municipality's counter-attack. 
While the CID specialized in infiltrating the workers' movement, the 
bourgeoisie still required more detached observations, possibly as a balance 
against hysterical over-estimation of the resistance. The initial observa-
tions of the welfare officer tended in the opposite direction: there were few 
African members of the Communist Party and these were concentrated at the 
Point, he reported. He did not expect anything dramatic as forecast by 
Nkosi for Dingaan's Day, and apparently this was also the view of the Chief 
Constable and the Additional Native Commissioner. 11 If this assessment had 
validity late in October, it was certainly challenged by the entrance of new 
forces in the resistance as African women entered formidably on the pol itical 
arena. Suffering under a nationally oppressive regime wh ich removed their 
basis for material emancipation in the towns, and limited their income in the 
'take-home' pay of the men, the women acted (as history would confirm) with 
great vigor and determination. Dispensing with the shackles of patriarchal 
domination which were mo,st acutely forged in the colonial period, the women 
charged the men with having failed to defeat the beer monopoly. On 20 
November 1930 the Native Affairs Department received a report that the 
African women were saying 'the men have failed and we women will show them 
what we can do'. The women planned to take, as yet unspecified, action 
on Dingaan's Day. A considerable movement among African women was 
later reported around the strategy of holding a conference in Durban on the 
beer question, and publishing findings which would include an extensively 
signed petition to request the Minister of Native Affairs to remove the exist-
12 
ing restrictions on brewing utshwala in town or country at homes or kraals. 
Although the women's movement appears from this report to have been some-
what sidetracked into constitutional proceedings, their entry into the struggle 
against the Durban system at a political level showed there could be no turn-
ing back from the inexorable confrontation. 
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Faced with the uncompromising hostility to the passes, beer monopoly, 
a,.J. fJ..r i"t('r~t"/JI\ of 
and taxes imposed on the African peoplel the Communist Party, a 
~.';'st the ... ~ /lt4t1eN,..r 
coalition of oppositional force~ibegan ta emerge. Champion's replacement 
on the Advisory Board, James M. Ngcobo, made a statement before this 
Board of the ICU yase Natal's attitude to the planned demonstrations and 
burning of passes. Although complaining of the pass system which 'had the 
effect of branding the Native as a slave ' , he entirely opposed the initiative 
of the Communist Party and did not want to be identified with the demonstra-
tion. Africans were leaving town, he said, because they real ized there 
would be a dist'Jrbance on Dingaan's Day. 'These alleged disturbances 
were of communistic origin and whether any good or bad results were achieved 
by this demonstration, the lelJ would claim no responsibility'. 13 Coming 
four days after Kadalie denounced the pass burning campai~n, this statement 
made a further contribution to the gathering counter-offensive to the first 
nationa Ily coordinated anti-pass campaign. The ICU yase Natal washed 
its hands of the protest against the passes, and the path was opened for Nkosi 
to take over the leadership at a crucial moment. 
Worse than the renunciation of any connection with the pass burning 
was the actively supportive part played by the ICU yase Natal to the muni-
cipal authorities. In keeping with the counter-offensive mounted by the 
Native Affairs bureaucracy, the ICU struggled for political domination over 
the restive workers and provided a platform for the welfare officer. When 
the communists held a series of meetings at Cartwright Flats in the centre of 
town during the weekend before Dingaan's Day, which fell on Tuesday, the 
Native Welfare Officer came to act as an essential link of communication 
between the ICU,. the Native Affairs bureaucracy, and the police who were 
preparing the 'hard' option of the bourgeoisie to continued resistance. He 
attended the meetings of the ICU at Cartwright Flats, which were directly 
competitive and called on the 3,000 who attended to be calm and act in a 
'constitutional way' • Elated with the apparent success he had in dampen-
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ing the flames of resistance, he reported: 'I was given an excellent 
hearing and reception. The ICU prolonged their meeting until late that 
evening in order to keep away their members from going across the Railway 
line where the Communists were holding their meeting.' 14 With such 
compliance from the social reformists in the opposition to united action, it 
seemed as though the question of resistance could be solved through the 
political intervention of the liberal wing of the Native Affairs bureaucracy. 
The day before the demonstration the welfare officer had long inter-
views with the Chief Constable, the Native Commissioner, the Chairman of 
the Native Affairs Committee, Chester of the Native Affairs Department, 
ICU leaders and many wh ite and black persons who had been 'alarmed by the 
speeches heard at the Communist meetings'. The ICU became even more 
deeply involved in the preparation of repression when J. London, the ICU 
leader who ha:l accompanied the togt workers' deputation to Chester in June 
1929, went with the welfare officer to interview the Native Commissioner. 
A further meeting with Chester and London, at which the 'whole situation' 
was discussed, was held in the afternoon. The flurry of activity between 
the municipal and central government departments and the close interaction 
with leading members of the ICU gave the authorities the opportunity of 
planning a common response to the pass burning. The municipal police, 
advised by Detective Sergeant Arnold (nicknamed T,,!,aka) of the CID, were 
also able to make their plans although these are not publicly available. 15 
Pass burning and suppression 
The results of the agitation by the communists and the counter-
offensive by the municipal ity were not predetermined; what developed may 
not have been anticipated by either party. But the African workers of 
Durban, tempered in the struggle against the municipality in an organized 
manner since 1925, were extraordinarily responsive to the first opportunity 
to deal a powerf",' blow against national and class oppression. In emphatic 
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contrast to the cautious response of African workers in the other major indus-
trial centres, the resistance turned into a bitter struggle against control by 
municipal and central state authorities. 
Africans began to assemble at Cartwrightls Flats at la very early houri 
and as the day progressed a steady stream of people were attracted by two 
speakers. A bearded man wearing a fez and a flowing red robe gathered 
in the passes and gave a red card denoting membership of the Communist Party 
in return. In possible competition with the meeting, the Native Women IS 
Congress was held at the ICU hall to consider the beerhall issue. Despite 
frequent rainfall the crowd increased until there were about 1,000 present at 
midday. One of the speakers said: IThis is the end of the pass. It is 
this that has made it impossible to look after our ch ildren and has caused us 
to eat dirt. No more shall we carry our passes and put money in Pirowls 
16 bottomless bay. I Other speakers were reportedly messianic; promising 
fire from heaven to burn the Native Affairs Commissionls office and warships 
to come to their aid. 17 But Nkosi was loudly applauded when he produced 
his pass documents and gave a reasoned but spirited speech: ILet us give 
the Government a big Christmas box. There is going to be no trouble. 
The people who say there is going to be are telling I ies. We ore going to 
burn our passes, and when we have clone that we will finish. I Dampened 
by the rain the passes needed match after match but eventually they blazed 
among cheers from the crowd. Many more African workers assembled, and 
the hats were sent around again. The gathering remained peaceful but 
enthusiastic, by 1630 more than 2,000 passes and tax receipts had been burnt 
and a procession began to form. The Chief Constable, Whitsitt, ordered 
the workers to stop and a large force of the borough police attacked the meet-
ing, making directly towards the table where the speakers were standing. 
Nkosi was shot and struck down while still on the platform appealing to the 
crowd not to offer violence. The African demonstrators fought back with 
sticks and stones. In the attack on the enormous gathering Johannes Nkosi 
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and three others were killed and twenty others seriously wounded, mainly 
by African constables armed with assegais. 18 The dead had been hacked 
with assegais, their skulls severely fractured, and none had less than seven 
serious wounds. 
After the meeting had been routed the CID and South African Police 
arrived in lorries from where they had been waiting in reserve. Armed 
with rifles, tear gas, and gas masks, they pursued the demonstrators who 
regrouped in the streets. OJ tor of this bloody suppression, arrests were 
made, and twenty-six demonstrators convicted of public violence, four being 
sentenced to six months' hard labour. 19 The Native Welfare Officer who 
had waited in his office the whole day ready for any call was not summonsed 
for advice. 
In this way, the mass resistance to the passes and beer monopoly was 
beaten to death. Oespite the suppression, however, the communists gained 
enormously in prestige as political combatants against the racially oppressive 
state in comparison to the equivocation or outright hostility of the African 
petty bourgeois leadership to a decisive confrontation with the state. Dube, 
writing in Ilanga lase Natal only three days after the savage attack at Cart-
wright Flats and while those arrested were waiting trial, dismissed the leader-
ship provided by communists like Nkosi and rejected the tactics of confronta-
tion. These views were not even balanced with criticism of the police 
action. He philosophised about the question of leadership: 'it is true that 
the nation is guarded by the leaders' who are 'the chiefs or respected people' 
whose work it was to 'look after the people'. But during the Dingaan's Day 
meeting there were no known leaders present, only 'new faces'. The chiefs 
and leaders of the people had no say on the issue of passes, although the 
speeches made were 'surprising'. Arguing in favour of the stability of the 
countryside, he blamed the bloodshed on those he had previously described as 
'detribalised' • 'It is these new people who have left home to come and work 
here who created this riot. ' Dube presented an alternative of constitu-
tional intercession to the struggle in the towns. 
The laws of this country are passed at Cape Town. That is 
where passes can be abolished or amended. The cities and 
police have no power on passes. When a law is being passed 
in Parliament it is made by those elected by voters. It is the 
only place where they can change the law. To insult those 
who make laws can not solve the issue. 20 
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He wamed those who bumt their passes the law had not disappeared and passes 
would have to be produced when demanded by the pol ice. Views like these 
were representative of an important section of the African petty bourgeoisie 
who stressed petitions, deputations, and constitutionalism, but were out of 
temper wi th the mass of workers who eagerly gave their passes to be burnt. 
By refusing to condemn the action of the pol ice, Dube implicitly supported 
the vicious repression which continued unabated. 
Reeling under the force of two antagonistic movements: the eager-
ness of the workers to continue the struggle, and the ruthless determination of 
police experts such as Arnold to eliminate the Communist Party; the leader-
ship attempted to defend the members and go underground. The otmosphere 
of the moment is captured by Roux; African workers wanting to defy the 
police and not caring for secret meetings, treachery in the ranks, continued 
21 
pass burnings, and the relentless pressure of the state. The Communist 
Party branch turned towards training cadres, setting up cells, and organizing 
seamen and dock workers. 'The old idea of the formation of groups composed 
of loose and unrelated elements is giving place to the Bolshevik form of 
organization - concentration groups, factory cells, nuclei, I wrote Albert 
Nzula, a Communist Party leader responsible for trade union work. Night 
classes were being held and soon these students would be taking up leadership:2 
As early as January 1931 a great influx of members was reported into the 
Dockers, Railwaymens, and Transport Union branch in Durban. 23 But even 
with determined attempts to organize underground (the first in political history 
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in South Africa), the sweeping raids and intell igent penetration of party ranks 
by spies disorganized the movement as a force in mass political action. 
Members of the party were particularly vulnerable to pol ice raids because 
they were conspicuous by their lack of passes and tax receipts; workers being 
sentenced to a week's imprisonment for every year's tax receipt not in their 
possession back to 1926. 24 In the wake of the Dingaan's Day police attack 
more than 200 of the most active communists had been deported, and blows of 
this order could not be sustained for long. 25 Contrary to the Comintern's 
conception of imminent revolutionary upsurge, the growing economic crisis of 
the depression forced the African working class on the defensive, and further 
political advance would only be made by movement in the economic arena. 
Yet an emphasis on trade union organization was not the only question raised 
by the terror exercised by the state, important though this was, and there was 
also the demand for arms by African workers in Durban. 26 The urgency of 
resistance had raised the necessary issue of workers I self-defence in the towns 
as well as trade unions to defend the economic interests of the workers during 
the depression. 
Trade unions and the economic crisis 
Although the South African economy did not decline as drastically as 
others during the world depression of the early 1930s, the working class, and 
in particular African workers, suffered an abrupt increase in impoverishment. 
In bourgeois social studies for the first time there appeared a recognition of a 
large relative surplus population, if not actual unemployment, and of the 
dissolution of the reserve economy. From this it followed that African 
workers earning wages based on the convention of a rural subsidy were being 
paid below the value of their labour power. Mabel Palmer, who wrote as 
the depression was taking hold of the South African economy, argued that 
African workers were not receiving 'true' wages which would provide for the 
needs of an adult man and the cost of raising his family. With the increas-
ing impoverishment of the reserves the wage relationship was dominant: 
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'His livelihood in the reserves is becoming the supplement; his wages are 
his real support. ' The cheap labour system, she argued, was maintained 
by the remorseless increase in the reserve army of labour by capital 'pressing 
constantly Into the areas where subsistence economy will still provide a sub-
stantial subsidy in aid of wages' .27 The cash nexus had its own dynamic 
and was breaking down the duality between 'the machine-, money-, and 
capital-using civilization of Europe, and the primitive subsistence economy 
of tribal communities'. From th is argument she drew the conclusion that 
political segregation in South Africa was impossible. 
Such an analysis provided a recognition of the general level of prole-
tarianization of the African working people, but not of the force of the 
depression in even further reducing living standards. In Durban there was a 
considerable reduction in the number of registered African workers from 
30,864 in 1929/30 to 24,243 in 1932/33. The workers seem to have 
extended their working period and renewed monthly contracts in the face of 
rising unemployment. In a struggle to maintain their living standards the 
workers were being forced to increase their total hours worked, making the 
28 problems of the unemployed even more acute. For the black proletariat 
in Durban and surrounding areas conditions were appall ing in terms of poverty, 
housing and disease. In evidence to the Native Economic Commission 
medical officers said that fami Iy shanty housing was unfit for habitation and 
infant mortality alarmingly high. In 1927 four out of five African infants 
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born in hospitals died, in 1930 this was lowered to two out of five. The 
infant mortal ity rate fluctuated drastically from year to year as the statistics 
included cases brought into town when ill, but the medical authorities acknow-
ledged a general increase in diseases contributing to early death. The 
wages of African workers, which had not shown any appreciable increase 
during the 1920s were forced down; the wages for the first job of African 
workers in the category under lOs increasing from 13 per cent in 1926/28 to 
30 per cent in 1932/34. 30 For the unemployed the position was desperate, 
many reportedly lying on the ground 'weakened to the point that they can 
31 
no longer move'. 
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Faced with the decline of living standards of African workers in the 
towns and rising unemployment, liberals argued against any measures to inc-
rease wages as this would cause a rush to the towns. Mabel Palmer, in 
giving evidence to the Native Economic Commission, even argued for the 
most stringent system of passes instead to protect urban African workers from 
migrants. Since in Durban the authorities were opposed to the growth of 
a permanent working class she argued that 'every effort should be made to get 
a decent well-paid permanent body of Natives'. Propagandists should be 
sent to the country districts to discourage migrants from coming to town but 
'if all other methods failed ••• she would be prepared to see further restric-
"1 d' d' 32 0 I f h f h b' tlons untl matters were reme Ie • n your mont sater t e Itter 
resistance to the pass system had been crushed by the police after 3,000 passes 
had been burned, the liberals of the town were proposing even more drastic 
controls in the interests of splitting the African working class into two dis-
tinct groups. 
While the response of the liberals to the rapid growth of unemployment 
was to demand even more repressive controls to keep out the wave of migrant 
workers from the towns, this policy reflected more an attack on the African 
working class as a whole rather than a reasoned (but perverse) response from 
measured changed in urban employment, Contradictory to the hysterical 
view of a tidal wave of unemployed sweeping through the towns, in Durban 
at least there was a surprising decline in the immediate reserve army of labour. 
Despite drought in middle and northern parts of Zululand increasing the indebted-
ness of African homesteads and causing dire impoverishment, the number of 
workseekers registered in Durban dropped from 42,300 to 26,000 between 1928/ 
29 and 1929/30 and even further in following years. 33 To some extent 
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migrants to Durban could find work on the mines where employment was inc-
reasing, or for desperately low wages on the farms, but what was taking place 
among African workers in town was a sharpening of the differences between 
experienced and employed workers and shorter-term migrant workers. 34 
Municipal officers reported an exodus from the town when the slow-down in 
production became marked, which was accompanied by a drop in the 'floating 
population' of African workseekers. Those who were employed showed 
greater determination to remain in employment the more trade and industry 
became depressed~S This tendency was strongly reinforced by steadily 
worsening conditions in the reserves; caught between the dual forces of 
declining employment and increasing rural impoverishment, African workers 
extended the length of their contract to sustain their income. These pro-
cesses were not as voluntary as presented here, the social power which the 
I r. {r:r the e"'I!/"Y~rs 
increase in proletarianization representedJbeing resisted by the workers from 
a weaker base. Rural impoverishment was increased by the vigorous enforce-
ment of both the poll tax and a special provincial tax on cattle of 1s per head 
36 
and on sheep and goats of 6d per head. In the towns Africans were dis-
missed by the municipalities and the 1930 amendment to the Native Urban 
Areas was enforced to provide powers of deportation of those declared 'idle, 
dissolute or disorderly', and to block the entry of women. 37 Through these 
draconian measures it is reported that over 1,000 African workers were ex-
pelled from Durban in 1930 and the reign of terror which fell on p0litically 
advanced African workers was a continuation of these policies of repelling 
the unemployed from the towns. State intervention of this order was a res-
ponse to both the level of "resistance of the workers and the international crisis 
of capital. In essence, the burden of the crisis was shifted on the shoulders 
of the working class and particularly the most exploited and oppressed. 
In these unpropitious times the Communist Party branch attempted to 
build a seamen and harbour workers' union to defend the living standards of 
this most advanced section of the African working class in Durban. What 
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evidence is available suggests that the communists found it difficult to make 
the transition from open agitation to the semi-secret organization of workers 
in specific industries. The branch attempted to keep up a political initiative 
which would force back the repression on the basis of the popular resistance 
to paying the poll tax. In a pamphlet produced in April 1931 the party tried 
to keep alive 'the spirit of Johannes Nkosi' and called for a strike on May 
Day 1931. 38 The poll tax was described as a law which should cause an 
African uprising. 'The monies you pay such as the Poll Tax, give the 
Government power over you so that you must not have any rights, and the 
Government out of this money pays the Police, and tne Magistrates and to 
build gaols so that you have no way of getting out of bondage. When you 
pay Poll Tax you provide the'Government with a stick to fight you.' It 
urged its readers to refuse to pay the tax, and promised that on May Day 1931 
'a great change will come about'. 'All the workers will cease work, not 
one wi II go to work on that day even if the employer does not permit. The 
streets in South Africa will be crowded - Johannesburg, Potchefstroom, Cape 
Town and other places even here in Durban. ' The tactic was to stay away 
from work and face the Police. The national day of action so convincingly 
promised is not mentioned in any of the histories of the Communist Party and 
could have been the inspired idea of the writer alone. The evident lack of 
success of the strike call exposed the danger of the undisciplined agitation and 
an und~fiMa strategy. How were the workers to continue the struggle against 
the passes as well as the pall tax? What would be the tactics if the strike 
call was not followed? From a reformist perspective Dube wrote about the 
'poor unsophisticated Natives' who were deluded by the new leadership. 
He criticized the ideas of the Communist Party from a strategic analysis. 
'One circular issued by the Communist Party advised Natives to fight for a 
Native Republic in th is country and that to a people who cannot sustain a 
siege for a single day, who have no arms, leaders and an army, under a 
G,overnment that is armed to the teeth in readiness for any rising or apparent 
rising against its authority. ,39 Even though the same article supports the 
advice to Africans to buy land instead of supporting the struggle to restore 
the land to the people, a fanciful solution to the crisis, Dube was in a 
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stronger position in this criticism; the connection between popular agita-
tion and the question of seizing state power had to be developed. The 
most pressing issue of the time was how to organize and survive under the 
fierce repression which accompanied the economic crisis and was depleting 
the advanced workers in Durban without abandoning a revolutionary perspec-
tive. 
An apparent answer to the question of how to establish deep links with 
the African working class and defend their interests came with the Seamen and 
Harbour Workers Union (SHWU), and Ikaka Labasebenzi (The Workers' Shield). 
Both were in itiated to defend the interests of the workers: at work and 
against persecution by the police. The African Federation of Trade Unions 
(AFTU), a coordinating body establ ished by the Communist Party, concentrated 
on support for a national transport union as a key sector of the economy. In 
comparison with the mass support of the leu in all its phases, the membership 
of the AFTU was ridiculously small; in April 1933 there were 821 members. 
Nzula, as the secretary of the AFTU, felt the movement was 'unable to make 
use of the full arsenal of the methods of class struggle, and plunged from one 
extreme to the other, either continuing its activities of providing legal aid to 
union members, or calling general strikes on any pretext without adequate 
preparation'. But despite its insignificant membership he claimed 'its 
40 
ideological influence is substantially greater'. But this was necessarily 
diffuse because of its emphasis on mobilizing unemployed workers, an inherently 
unstable grouping in South Africa, and its inability to make advances in the 
basic sectors of the economy. 'The Federation constantly adopted the line 
of least resistance, limiting its activities to light industry, whereas the need 
was to direct its main effort at the basic sectors of industry, particularly at the 
miners and agricultural workers . .4 1 The area of dock employment should 
have been where most organizational advance was possible; the workers in 
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Cape Town were organized in the Cape Town Stevedore and Dock Workers' 
Union, and those in Durban had proved their capacity to engage in strugg Ie 
with the employers and the state on numerous occasions. There was al so 
the added advantage of the Seamen's Revolutionary International which fought 
racism in employment and was able to smuggle literature and communicate 
ideas from country to country. 
While the Communist Party was making initial steps in the formation 
of the SHWU, the togt workers were conducting a struggle for democratic 
control over their representatives on the Native Advisory Board. The 
demands of the workers were increasingly urgent and indicated a changed 
emphasis from resistance to the beer monopoly and harsh conditions in the 
barracks to the central question of wages and taxation. With their employ-
ment determined by the changes in the trade cycle, the dock workers were 
in the front I ine of the decrease in employment, with workers being employed 
only two days a week. The total amount of cargo handled by dock workers 
dec lined from the highest post-war figure of 7,869 thousand metric tons in 
1929 to the bottoming of the depression in trade of 4,677 thousand metric tons 
in 1932. 42 With the decline in employment and income the togt representa-
tive who had been criticized for not reflecting the views of the workers on the 
Native Advisory Board became more active. Matonsi wrote to the munici-
pality on 24 July 1931 putting forward the grievances of the workers and 
claiming that the Christian Africans on the Board were not representing the 
Point community. He stated that the main grievance was the low level of 
wages; the workers had pressed him to put forward their demands to the 
authorities. 
We complain about wages. We are starving with our children. 
We are worried by taxation. We have so many taxes to pay. 
What is troubling us is to pay tax for our women, and dipping fees, 
dogs, and we are not doing anything useful with our dogs. We 
are also troubled by the Togt Badge in spite of all the taxation. 43 
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The other complaint of the workers was that women at the barracks were 
being interfered with and had been arrested. Matonsi said that the limited 
number of days that wives were permitted to stay at the barracks was a parti-
cularly bad regulation and was the cause for complaint especially among 
sick men. 
Although these were undoubtedly the grievances and demands of the 
togt workers, some of the issues being raised at the meeting with the munici-
pality in June 1929, it seems as though they had on Iy been put forward by 
Matonsi under pressure of the workers (as is implicitiy acknowledged). It 
was possibly a last minute attempt to regain credibility among the workers as 
a meeting took place shortly 'after the demands were presented to the munici-
polity which elected a new representative. The togt workers of Bell Street 
barracks substituted an open election for the appointment of a representative 
by the municipality to the Native Advis::>ry Board and demonstrated their demo-
cratic talent. 'Candidates for representing interests of workers, A. Gumede 
and D. Mate, and after they were proposed, seconded and voted upon under 
the chairmanship of Mr. Ngiba, Dick Mate had 183 votes and A. Gumede had 
168 votes. Therefore Mate is our representative in matters of the Barracks, 
Gumede is his assistant and deputy during Mate's absence, is the declaration 
of the community. ,44 This certainly was an indication of the rising mil itancy 
of the dock workers CIS Dick Mate was one of the workers who hCld addressed the 
meeting at CClrtwright FIClts on 16 June 1929, shortly before the mass picketing 
45 began. Unwilling to accept the democratic choice of the workers, the 
Native Advisory BOClrd asked for the matter to be investigated by the NCltive 
Welfare Officer who reported that the usuClI procedure was to call for nomina-
tions and then for the Department to appoint a representative decided by the 
officials, a quite undemocratic procedure. Matonsi may not have been 
removed as representative, but the principle of elected representCltives was 
later establ ished for togt workers. 0 n 30 July 1933 the secretary of a 
meeting of workers at the Bell Street barrClcks reported to the Native Advisory 
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Board that Amos Gumede had been elected to represent the barracks. He 
was subsequently re-elected at a meeting on 27 July 1934. 46 
The togt workers had established themselves as a formidable political 
and industrial group during the post-war strikes, the struggle against the beer-
halls, and the pass burning on Dingaanls Day 1930. Their concentration 
at the Point and their leadership of political and industrial resistance had 
welded them into a force which they described as a 'community'. The 
question was to what extent the SHWU cou Id come to represent these workers 
and provide a strategy to link their industrial and political demands to the 
overthrow of the racially oppressive capitalist system. The SHWU worked 
with two main categories of workers in marine transport: stevedores, quayside 
workers, crane operators and coal loaders; and sea-going and coastal sailors. 
Reading an account of the work of the SHWU one gets the impression of more 
emphasis being placed on the organization of seamen than dockers, although 
details are provided on the conditions of work of dockers. 47 Having the 
support of S.M. Pettersen, a small ship-owner in Durban, and the opportunity 
of meetings at the Durban International Seamen IS Club as well as on ocean-
going steamers, the organization of seamen had considerable advantages over 
. those of the dockers. But these advances must have a Iso been extended to 
the dock workers as it was reported that in one month there had been eight 
meetings on ocean-going steamers in which several hundred workers had taken 
48 part. This represents quite a considerable achievement for the union, 
but one which was not gained in Cape Town where the Communist Party 
encouraged workers to desert the Cape Town Stevedoring and Dock Workers 
Union to join the SHWU. 49 
The struggle against intensified exploitation 
In the struggle to raise the profitability of industry in South Africa 
during the depression, the capitalist state responded by attempting to cut 
transport costs and increase the turnover of capital. The burden of increased 
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exploitation in the interests of capital as a whole fell sharply on the dock 
and railway workers, both in the form of wage cuts and longer hours of work. 
During 1931 it was decided by the SARH to reduce black wages and over-
time pay. Whi Ie formerly overtime was paid after 'normal' hours of work 
each day, early in 1932 it was decided that it should not be paid until black 
50 
workers had completed 60 hours a week. By approaching the unilateral 
changes in conditions of ~ervice from the question of overtime, the General 
Manager blurred over the fact that the 'normal' hours of work were being 
extended from 48 to 60 and that the decline in wages per day was being 
enforced not only through direct wage cuts but also through expanding the 
working week. The wages of workers in Durban were first cut from 2s 6d 
to 2s and then again to 1s 7d a day from 1 April 1932, with an additional 
reduc t ion in the food allowance. The wage cuts and longer working hours 
marked an enormous increase in the exploitation of the workers whose interests 
were sharply attacked with the am of reducing the cost of transport to capital. 
With a greater latitude of action than employers in factories and mines, who 
were bound by legislation on hours of work, the SARH was able arbitrarily to 
intensify the exploitation ot the workers. Its response to the crisis in 
profitability was to increase the rate of surplus labour, absolutely in contrast 
to other industries where short time was being worked. The intensity of 
labour, its productivity, and duration, were all simultaneously increased. 
The workers could not remain passive under these conditions of 
rapidly deteriorating working standards. Even though the circumstances 
wen~ hardly ideal any further tolerance for these attacks on living standards 
would allow a complete rout of the workers' position. In the resistance to 
the SARH's super-exploitation one of the most important workers' struggles 
against depression-borne attacks on living standards took place with workers 
coming out simultaneously on strike. The workers in Port Elizabeth and 
""'ple bttll ted;. . 
Durban struck against the final wage reduction/on 1 April 1932. In Port 
Elizabeth the strike was crushed by the Railway Administration splitting the 
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workers on racial lines. After the African jetty workers had gone on 
strike 'a couple of years ago' they had been displaced by Coloured workers 
who had in turn gone out on strike against the depression wage cuts. This 
strike was undermined in a classical tactic: the original African workers 
were re-employed to replace the 'scabs-turned-strikers' .51 This ready 
reserve of qualified workers soon broke the thrust of the strike, although it 
was reported the authorities felt compelled to grant some overtime concessions.52 
In Durban the strike broke out spontaneously on 2 April 1932, but soon 
received the support of the AFTU. It had been threatened for days before 
the new conditions were implemented as the workers refused to accept the 60 
hour week. A t two meetings addressed by the manager the workers totally 
rejected these conditions and reportedly received the support of White dock 
workers. The demands of the workers were for a 44 hour week, time and a 
half overtime, and for 3s a day. 'The bosses I Government are determined, 
in order to reduce costs to drive the Native proletariat to an unheard of mass 
misery and starvati:>n! argued Umsebenzi, which was published the day before 
the strike. 53 More than 1,000 workers resisted the increase in the working 
week from 48 to 60 hours a week. 54 Wi th work at the port ha Ited, a con-
tingent of 10 Whites and 300 togt workers usually employed during labour 
shortages, was brought in as replacements. 'For the first time in the history 
of the Port of Durban', wrote The Star, 'white workers pushed barrows for 6s 
55 . 
a day. ' Any concrete support from white workers evaporated, although 
solidarity from black workers was equally absent. The local bourgeois press 
was complacent that the immediately available reserve army of labour could 
maintain production; cargo handling merely being slowed down and strike-
breaking protected by the police. 56 Reports from the workers' side claimed 
the strike was considerably more effective with the docks 'completely tied up 
for some days'. The togt workers who came in as strike-breakers were 
employed at 3s 6d a day as compared wi th the 1s 7d a day earned by the 
workers before the strike. 'Many dockers were deceived by this manoeuvre 
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and joined up as day-labourers, only to find their wages cut as soon as the 
strike was over. ,57 
Despite the claim of the AFTU that the strike was conducted under 
its leadership after a spontaneous start, the struggle revealed that industrial 
organization was undeveloped. Despite earlier reports of workers joining 
a transport workers' group early in 1931, during the strike there was the first 
mention of an attempt to establish a Dockers' Union affiliated to the AFTU. 
Many active workers, it was reported, had joined. (The difficulties in 
setting up a union during a strike must have been immense; although it 
could work as a strike committee if there was widespread victimization, as 
occurred, it could become predominantly an employment agency.) The 
nucleus union formulated the demands of the workers and issued a strike 
bulletin publ ished in Zulu, Sesotho and English. Despite this agitation 
and the beginnings of union organization, the strike wos lost decisively. 
Commenting on the strike, which aroused the support of large numbers of 
African workers, Dube drew morbid and reformist conclusions and attacked 
the dockers' and Communist Party leadership. The strike was truly 'pathetic', 
had resulted in hundreds losing their jobs at a time of dire impoverishment in 
the reserves, and had increased black unemployment. The problem, he felt, 
was that the African workers 'do not have an advocate in the Government 
department' . The organization of the workers was not acknowledged by the 
state and the leaders had disappeared after the strike. 'It is ridiculous that 
these leaders of the people should not have tried some easier method rather 
than allowing workers to take such a drastic step. ,58 These views ignored 
the objective necessity of strike action as the most elementary form of workers' 
defence; it may have been badly timed, but how otherwise were the workers 
to resist? At about this time Dube was entering into an all iance with the 
Ngcobo faction of the ICU yase Natal to develop its relationship with the 
Natal Native Congress. 59 Whatever the intention of these pol itical 
developments, they were certainly hostile to the Communist Party and could 
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have aimed at providing an alternative and 'responsible' dock organization. 
The attempts by the Communist Party to organize the dock workers 
had not disappeared with the strike, however, even though the workers had 
lost the battle against the new conditions of work. Within the same month 
of the strike the AFTU issued acall for the national organization of dock and 
railway workers to include in particular Cape Town and East London where 
strikes had not taken place. A National Transport Workers Union was 
needed with branches in all seaports and railway centres which should be 
based on groups in the dock compounds, railway yards, and goods sheds and 
should aim at direct action. The scabbing by the immediate reserve army 
of labour (brought out by the 'obvious weakness of strike action) could be 
stopped. 'This can only be done by organizing the unemployed under the 
leadership of the AFTU and putting forward demands on their behalf. ,60 
The emphasis on industrial demands and trade union organization marked a 
shift in the policy of the Communist Party from the general agitation in the 
form of demonstrations of the unemployed, international labour day rallies, 
and pass burning campaigns, associated with a perspective of a revolutionary 
upsurge,to the systematic development of partial demands as a basis for build-
ing the party. 61 The strikes of dock workers were seen as the starting point 
for a national dockers' and railway workers' strike as a counter-offensive 
against new attacks by the capitalist state. The strategy now was to build 
on the level of immediate resistance of the workers to the burden of the 
depression to develop a wider movement of political struggle against the racist 
state. 
The industrial strategy of the Communist Party for seamen and harbour 
workers involved an unusual combination of issues: the assertion of the 
leadership of the party, joint demands for black and white workers (although 
different wage demands were made for each group), and an attempt to build 
a national, non-racial union. 62 By May 1932 it was announced that the 
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Seamen's and Harbour Workers Union had been formed as part of a campaign 
to build up the strength of the Communist Party in basic industries and among 
the unemployed. After two weeks of existence the SHWU claimed to have 
100 members from wh i te and co loured seamen and fishermen, ra i Iway and 
harbour, and dock workers. The main purpose of the union in terms of the 
overall strategy of the Communist Party was to build vp party membership, 
and it was reported that 53 workers, mostly dockers, railway workers and 
unemployed, were recruited to the party through the union. 63 As the con-
ditions of work deteriorated rapidly for all workers, the Communist Party 
issued calls for strike action on a national basis. I n Cape Town there was 
a wage cut of 6d a day and the quarter day tickets were removed. In 
Mossel Bay stevedore wages were lowered from 5s to 4s a day for twelve hours' 
work. Later in the year the SARH ordered retirement of all black workers 
aged over 58 years, of those over 50 who were inefficient, and dismissal for 
those who refused to accept the wage cuts. These workers were to be 
replaced by white workers wherever possible as I:mg as extra costs were not 
incurred. 64 This second wave of wage cuts and redundancies appeared to 
be a decisive blow against th~ workers and the possibility f.:>r building unity 
between black and white workers. The Communist Party still remained 
optimistic that the caurse of events could be reversed through strike action. 
We lost our recent strike because we were unorganized and 
unprepared. But we are not defeated - we shall not give 
in. The next strike will be a gain for us. With renewed 
energy and determination prepare now for the coming struggle. 65 
Later in the year when even further drastic wage reductions had been made 
(to 15 for a 10 hour day in some areas) the party reported 'tremendous dis-
content' and the further development of party nuclei in the docks and ships. 
The SHWU appears to have been eclipsed by the party, which was claimed to 
have made decisive gains through taking up leadership of daily struggles of 
the workers, particularly in basic industries. 
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Putting forward the concrete demands of the workers as a 
basis for preparations for struggle, taking up the daily 
grievances and raising round them an agitation and I inking 
it up with the general conditions of imperialist exploita-
tion and slavery, the Party, through intensive work and con-
centration, succeeded in getting a fairly strong footing 
amongst the dockers and seamen and to a lesser extent amongst 
the rai Iway workers. 66 
Repression by the authorities was said to be intense and much of the organiza-
tional work was done at night. 
The gains the party made by using the SHWU primarily as a recruiting 
rrvt ., flt~ .. It* - /II;/,t""t st".t'J! .ttJ, (""',.",.,..~ 
agency and claiming exclusive leadersh ip of the workers' struggle,rere at the 
expense of unity among organized workers in the Cape Town docks. Having 
formed the SHWU to represent all dock workers: stevedores and quay rail-
way workers, government and privately employed; the union ran both into 
the problem of the sectional divisions among the workers and the opposition of 
existing trade union leadership. Two trade un ions for blac k dock workers 
were well established in Cape Town. The first, the Cape Town Stevedores 
and Dock Workers' Union had emerged as part of a break-away movement 
from the ICU in 1928. I t had managed to secure regi stration in terms of the 
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and by March 1929 had a membership of 
304. The second, the Alfred Dock Waterside Workers' Union (ADWU) was 
formed by those workers employed by the SARH who were prec luded by law 
from being members of a registered trade union. These harbour workers 
formed their own union which had a membership of 187 in the early 1930s.
67 
As part of the strategy of placing the Communist Party in the position of 
exclusive leadership of the working class during the phase of ultra-militancy 
the workers were encouraged to desert the reformist CTSDWU and to join the 
SHWU, rather than build a faction within the union. There were certainly 
political differences between the leadership of the two unions which may have 
aUracted some workers to the SHWU, but the majority preferred to remain loyal 
to the union they had built whatever its limits.
68 
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The highest point in the Communist Party's campaign to secure a 
base within possibly the most advanced section of the African working class 
in its concentration, international contact, and consciousness, came in the 
program of action published in August 1932 calling for a national strike. 69 
Despite its formal style {and the fact that it was not translated into Zulu and 
Xhosa}, its single-minded party approach and its preoccupation with the 
danger of war against the USSR, it represented a considerable achievement 
in developing the fighting demands of the harbour workers. (See Appendix 
C.) Addressed to dockers, stevedores, Iightermen, quay workers, and coal 
loaders, it presented the redundancies, short time, speeding up of work, and 
reduction in the number :>f workers in each gang, as the response of harbour 
employers to. the capitalist crisis. Employment for harbour workers was 
being reduced to one or two days a week and was being further reduced by 
cargo being transferred to the lowest wage port, Durban, where work was 
tremendously speeded up. In Durban the exploitation of the workers was 
the most intense, with workers being expected to do extra work without pay 
on Saturdays to handle the cargo diverted from Cape Town. 
The strategy and demands of the program of action reflected the pers-
pective of an imminent revolutionary upsurge among the workers: committees 
of action were to be built in every port to prepare for strike action in support 
of the comprehensive demands of the party. The demands covered a II 
aspects of harbour work, from minimum wages to manning levels. 
\ 
Against 
the earl ier ambiguity of a minimum wage and percentage increases, the 
program :>f action substituted a demand for a minimum wage of 8s a day for 
all workers 'irrespective of race or colour'. It called for a guaranteed mini-
mum wage of 32s a week, free rai Iway transport, the abol ition of overtime, 
and an end to dismissals. Three of the demands raised the question of 
workers' control in the docks: for a minimum of th irty workers per gang, 
the distribution of wor k tickets through elected committees of workers of all 
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races, and the redistribution of cargo from Durban to Cape Town, Port 
Elizabeth and East London. All these demands were made in the context 
of preparations for national strike action against the employers' offensive. 
The SHWU had considerably greater potential in Durban where ships 
were being diverted away from the higher-wage Cape Town docks and where 
work was being speeded up to unprecedented levels. The great advantage 
of the SHWU as a national 'union was that it could coordinate resistance in all 
the docks to resist the shipping lines and stevedoring companies taking advan-
tage of the 'weak link' in the line of defence of the harbour workers. But 
the Communist Party's support for the workers' struggle against the speed-up 
seems to' have been more a response to the resistance of the Durban workers 
than a planned tactic. Despite the violence of the police attack during 
the pass burning of 1930 and the defeat of the strike of April 1932, the dock 
workers were remarkably resilient. An article in Zulu appearing under the 
name of the Durban dockworkers reflected the growing pol itical awareness of 
the workers and their struggle against the rising level of exploitation. The 
workers drew the lesson from the shooting and imprisonment of the resisters 
that nq freedo:n could be possible under the existing regime. They protested 
against the laws which governed the workers, 'especially we dock workers 
during these days when we are made to work as if we were a people without 
souls - as if we were a machine'. Those who were subjected to the despotic 
regime at the docks provided evidence of the tremendous speed-up, 'people 
are made to work as if they were made of steel' . On one day a group of 
60-70 workers had set a new record in loading ships. On a normal working 
day (between 0720 and 1700) 38,000 bags of brown sugar weighing 210 Ibs a 
bag had been loaded. The workers protested against this superexploitation 
and attacked the state. 'The government of thieves is one of fools, just how 
. h ·11 .70 does it think that we could stop fighting back against suc I treatment. 
Ironically, by routing cargo increasingly through Durban, the 
harbour employers strengthened the capacity of the workers to resist the 
speeded pace of work. Despite the presence of a massive reserve army 
of labour ready to take their jobs, the workers were able to devise new 
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forms of struggle. In a significant development which ran counter to the 
call for national strike action (which could have made the strikers immediately 
vulnerable to displacement) the workers took to 'go slow' strikes against the 
tremendous speeding up of work. Early in 1933 two successful 'go slows' 
were co~rdinated through the SHWU in Durban. Two of the gangs united 
to slow down the movement of cargo through systematic delays in handl ing 
cargo in the holds and on the quays. 'As a result each gang now performs 
less than a third of the work it did previously without any reduction ~f pay. ' 
The Communist Party saw the 'go slows' as the beginning of further 'mass 
actions' against miserable wages and slave driving methods of work instituted 
by the SARH, stevedore bosses, and the indunas, which made Durban a record 
breaking port in loading and discharging cargo; 'that is', it argued, 'for 
increased profits for the steamship companies, stevedore bosses and the SARH, 
accompanied by hellish spe~d up, more accidents, lower wages, dismissals, 
etc., for the workers. ' The demands made by the party were somewhat 
moderated by the new tactics, with those for workers' control being dropped 
in favour of more defensive issues: for an eight hour day, 4s a day (instead 
of 8s), three hot meals, compensation for sickness, accidents, unemployment, 
and death, and against the forcible collection of taxes. 71 Workers were 
called upon not to pay the taxes imposed on them and mass strikes were urged 
in support of the demands. 
Despite the encouraging development of sustained resistance to the 
worsening of conditions and speed up, nothing further is reported in Umsebenzi 
on the struggles of the dock workers or the SHWU until 1935 when the strategy 
of organizing the African working class in basic industries was not the imme-
diate objective of the Communist Party. The serious decline in the industrial 
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work of the Communist Party was caused by factionalism within the African 
Federation of Trade Unions which had been reduced to the point of total 
collapse in 1932. 72 The party itself entered a period of bitter strife, as 
beset other Communist Parties, unde'r the Comintem campaign of the time 
against the 'right wing danger' .73 Considered as a whole, the Communist 
Party's intervention in agitation and organization in the docks, limited 
though it was to the least propitious time of organization (during the depres-
sion between 1930-32) showed the great possibility for national trade union 
and political organization among dock workers. After this short burst of 
activity, it seems as though the SHWU was allowed to disintegrate, and no 
attempt was made to revive it during the much easier opportunities for organiza-
tion in the late 1930s and after. The strategy of transforming the defensive 
struggles of the dock workers during the depression, as attempted in other 
sectors, into a political offensive against the capitalist state was predicated 
on the imminent revolutionary upsurge forecast by the Comintern. This 
apocalyptic strategy raised many of the essential demands of the harbour 
workers, but failed to lay the foundations for the permanent organization of 
the African working class. The primary tactic advocated by the party, 
with increasing desperation, was that of strike action. But while workers 
had spontaneously resisted lengthened hours and wage cuts on 1 April 1932 
in Durban and Port Elizabeth, the strikers had been defeated by the enormous 
reserve army of labour, black and white, available to replace them. The 
calls to strike action made subsequently by the Communist Party could have 
led to a disaster for the workers rather than a temporary defeat at a time when 
the ~RH and stevedoring companies were purging the ranks of the workers 
to rid themselves of inefficient workers and militants. Under these con-
ditions a revolutionary strategy should rather have been to have developed an 
underground trade union around mil itants deeply rooted in the til~po .... ,..,.u. 
Although some attempt was made early in 1930 to train cadres and build cells 
in production in Durban, this work does not seem to have been systematically 
developed and was not consistent with the publicity given to the strategy, 
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which could only have increased state repression. At times the Communist 
Party seemed more concerned with being seen to be carrying out an ultra-
militant strategy than carefully building the foundations of trade unions under 
Marxist working class leadership. The ringing manifestoes and calls to 
action may have attracted advanced workers to the party, but they did not 
build the trade unions as organs of workers' democracy and sustained action 
during the vicious repression. Shortly before the SHWU dissolved it 
appeared that some of these issues were being recognized but not incorporated 
into new strategies; the Igo slows' were described as a new tactic but mass 
strikes even more urgently insisted upon. The weakness of the attempt to 
organize the dock workers was a refusal to acknowledge different levels of 
class consciousness and potential class action among the workers; if the 
Communist Party was self-consciously to lead the workers into action a trade 
un ion was scarcely necessary. But a trade union is a workers' organization 
fighting for the widest unity among workers, both 'backward I and 'advanced' 
party members and non-party workers. There is evidence that these argu-
ments were being made by the workers: that strikes should be the product of 
workers' decisions to be led through the trade unions and not directly manu-
factured by the Communist Party. 74 By insisting that the trade unions 
should be dupl icates of the party, the workers' organ izations never took on 
flesh nor authenticity as the product of the workers' own activity. 
The important secondary tactic was to prepare for strikes by mobilizing 
the reserve army of labour: those casually employed, the unemployed, and 
workers in similar jobs who could substitute for the strikers. One of the 
strengths of the Communist Party was that it was able to agitate on the broad 
issues of the crisis and direct the pol itical energy of the unemployed against 
the capitalists. But this could not substitute for the most thorough trade 
union organization and tactics which would not result in mass dismissals and 
victimization. In reviewing the strike action undertaken by workers in 
this period, Nzula made the following assessmenH 
The strikes broke out spontaneously. No preparations were 
made. There were no strike committees, and the trade 
unions had no strike fund. Moreover, the strike movement 
was not I inked to the movement of the unemployed. 75 
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Even where agitation among unemployed could be undertaken in support of 
strike action this could not be sufficient to stop the starving unemployed 
taking the work of the strikers; new tactics had to be developed which did 
nat put the strikers at the mercy of employers and the police. All the 
strikes undertaken in 1932 had ended in defeat, and the one tactic which 
held out promise for sustained resistance, the 'go slow', was not advocated 
widely, possibly because of its defensive nature. 76 In the absence of 
underground trade unions based on a large element of self-organization and 
intell igent tactics, the forward movement of the workers had to wait on the 
revival of the economy. 
Rural impoverishment, capitalist growth, and strikes 
The sharp decl ine in world trade and in industrial production in the 
advanced capitalist economies associated with the depression did not lead to 
a general collapse of the capitalist system. And in some ways the South 
African economy possessed certain advantages; particularly with the gold 
mining industry which was able to increase production and act as a generator 
of demand for the engineering and food industries, for example. Neverthe-
less, the decline in wage labour and worsening natural conditions (soil erosion 
and drought) placed the burden of the crisis heavily on the labour tenants, 
poor peasants, and migrant workers depending on cultivation in white areas 
or in the reserves for a proportion .,f their means of subsistence. Although 
the process of rural impoverishment grew unevenly with some areas sustaining 
a peasantry able to subsist independently of prolonged wage labour, there 
was a marked decrease in agricultural production and rural living standards 
generally. The Native Economic Commission reported on overstocking, 
soil erosion, and even desert conditions in many reserves where once good 
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grazing existed. 77 Wolpe, who made an important advance in relating 
the changing character of pol itical domination of the African working 
people to the dissolution of pre-capitalist relations of productions in the 
reserves, tends to emphasise the sharpening and intensification of impoverish-
ment during the Second World War. 78 Whi Ie this may be valid in terms 
of a generalized statement of the decline of the necessary means of subsis-
tence in the reserves {and helps make a neat transition from segregation to 
apartheid} it fails to allow for both the particularly uneven levels of 
impoverishment by area and by ownership of the means of subsistence. The 
argument that rural impoverishment generates struggles about wages and all 
aspects of urban and rural life, as Wolpe maintains, both tends to reduce 
political changes directly to economic crises and concentrate attention on 
the reserves, whereas the specific gravity of political struggle has rested for 
decades in the towns. The 'Iag l in economic struggles to compensate for 
the losses sustained by the African working class during the depression has to 
be explained both in terms of the slow growth in the economy and the 
deficiencies of class organization and strategy. 
During the 1930s there is evidence of the advanced dissolution of 
the non-capitalist means of subsistence in the reserves as it is estimated that 
59 per cent of all grain requirements of the population in the reserves were 
imported. 79 The impoverishment of African homesteads in the reserves 
increased drastically during droughts like that of 1936 with large populations 
completely dependent on the sale of food. For many migrant workers there 
was a sharp increase in the time they spent in wage labour and dependence 
on the cash economy. The political authorities capitalized on the increased 
poverty of the reserves to draw a lesson on the disciplining of the African 
working class. The Native Commissioner of Natal, A. S. Dunlop, in 
addressing a meeting of chiefs and headmen at Dundee early in 1936 said: 
'The young men who are becoming more lazy and impudent every day, showing 
1
80 D' h t no respect to their elders, will have to work or starve. urang w a was 
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said to be the worst drought in the history of Northern Transvaal and Zululand 
about 50,000 cattl e di ed and no crops were reaped for over a year. The 
state distributed maize to poverty-stricken Africans at between 14s to 17s 6d 
while diverting maize originally consigned to stock farmers as feed at 5s 6d 
81 
a bag. 
The increased flow of workers into Durban alarmed the local bourge-
oisie who feared that slums would be created. Although the editor of the 
Natal Mercury argued against mass deportations, favoured enlarging the 
reserves, and increasing wages to widen the internal market, it also felt that 
stricter controls were needed. 'The time is rapidly approaching when 
circumstances will compel the authorities to regulate the influx of Natives to 
the towns once the reserves are enlarged and their development taken in hand, 
and to bring under control and supervision the thousands of landless, 
detribalized Natives living in and around the urban areas amid appallingly 
insanitary and demoralizing conditions. I Strict police supervision was also 
necessary over the barracks which could easily become centres of 'vice and 
82 lawlessness'. The views of the African petty bourgeoisie, expressed 
through the Combined Native Association, was that employers should poy 
their workers
' 
rents and that suitable hostels should be erected with low rents.
83 
Despite the various proposals for reform, the main thrust of the local state was 
towards control; the Native Affairs Committee proposed to employ a further 
10 additional white inspectors and 10 African constables in the interests of 
I more effective administration and general tightening up of the Native Regis-
tration Regulations'. 84 These proposals ind icated the contradictory ten-
dencies within the economic revival with a vast increase in the reserve army 
of labour, improved employment opportunities, and tighter urban control. 
Despite the constant pressure of unemployed workers on their jobs and 
a fairly sluggish rise in world trade with South Africa (the tonnage of cargo 
landed in Durban only approached that of 1929 in 1936), the African harbour 
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workers took strike action to stop the supply of food to I tal ian troops in 
Ethiopia and in demanding wage increases. The dockers were angered 
by the invasion of Ethiopia by Italian troops and were readily responsive 
to propaganda put out by the Anti-Fascist League in Durban. The issue 
came to a head when the Perla called into Durban to take on 1, 100 tons 
of frozen meat from Messrs. Federated South African Meat Industries on 27 
August 1935. The police were called in by the contractors but a gang of 
60 African stevedores who were to have loaded the beef refused and left the 
docks. Not leaving pickets behind underthe gaze of the police, the 
workers left it open for other workers to be found, and by 1000 another gang 
was loading the beef at full pace. 85 African workers interviewed in the 
compounds by a Natal Mercury reporter were eager to take up arms against 
the Italians. 'If we can do anything to stop the White man treading down 
the Native in Abyssinia as he has done in other parts of the world, we will 
do it. It is the last Native kingdom and it must survive.'86 Despite 
these views, the loading of the Perla continued the following day with frozen 
meat from Botswana and mules. 
The action which had been taken spontaneously by the workers was 
reinforced by a special Ethiopian edition of Umsebenzi which appealed to 
all dockers to refuse to handle any goods for Italian East Africa. It called 
on all workers to support the boycott. 'If we, the workers of South Africa 
allow this food to be sent to East Africa, we shall be helping Mussolini to 
conquer and enslave the people of Abyssinia. Remember that it is your 
fellow Black Africans of Abyssinia upon whom Mussolini is making war. 
The independence of Africa's only remaining Black state must be dear to 
your hearts. You have it in your power to help your fellow Africans against 
the Italian imperialists. ,87 At a meeting of the CTSDWU in Cape Town on 
31 August 1935 the workers decided to refuse to load the Italian ship Sabbia 
with meat. Mass meetings of thousands of people were held to demand the 
concellation of contracts between South African companies and Italian shipping 
lines to supply meat and provisions, and political action against Italy. 
The reformist leader of the Cape Federation of Labour Unions, R. Stuart, 
announced support of the Federation for the dockers 'by all the means in 
their power'and appealed to the public conscience of South Africa in 
defence of the dockers' action. 88 The boycott gained strength as the 
dockers refused to load any Italian ships regardless of their destination. 
General support came from the two main groupings of registered unions. 
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Although the Communist Party which led the 'Hands off Ethiopia' 
campaign had, with the decisive action of the dockers, gained a convincing 
victory in Cape Town, the Durban agents for Italian Lines, Messrs. J. T. 
Rennie, were confident the workers would not respond to the boycott call. 
The Sabbia was redirected to Durban to undergo repairs and unload cargo, 
and it seems as though suppl ies continued through this port. 89 This breach 
in the boycott movement seems to have been caused by two factors: the 
lack of persistent agitation by the Communist Party in the dock area and the 
massive reserve army of labour available to replace any activists. As one 
of the employers said: Iff the agitators try to dissuade the natives from 
working that will be no trouble, as native labour is abundant. I happen to 
know that if 1,000 natives walked off their jobs in the harbour area now we 
would have all the places filled before the evening. ,90 The strategy of 
the Communist Party in the previous period; to organize workers in basic 
industries as a means of building workers' resistance to the capitalist state, 
having been dropped in favour of broad anti-fascist alliances, the workers 
did not have the trade union organization to sustain their own boycott of 
Italian ships and gain the political and financial support of the rest of the 
labour movement. A popular Africanism was not sufficient to meet the 
organ i zat ional tasks of the mamen t. 
In the absence of sustained agitation and a strategy of organization 
by the Communist Party, the anti-fascist struggle was taken up in a sectional 
way by reformist trade union leadership. A mass meeting of 800 wh ite 
Durban citizens held on 22 October passed unanimously a resolution to 
organize support for any workers 'in the event of their withholding their 
labour by refusing to manufacture or transport goods destined for I tal ian 
91 
ports. ' Either as part of a combined strategy, or in response to this 
initiative, the Communist Party leadership of the 'Friends of Abyssinia' 
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organized a mass rally of Africans the following evening. An enthusiastic 
audience of 1,000 gave an angry response when Eddie Roux mentioned the 
African labourers who had taken over the loading of meat when the regulars 
had refused. A resolution, 'That we African people of Durban sympathize 
with Abyssinia and pledge to support her to our fullest extent, and further, 
that we will support any action that the dock workers will take in order to 
send away the Italian ships empty from South Africa' was passed with cheers. 
A dummy of Mussolini dressed in a black shirt was set on fire and beaten with 
sticks. 92 The reports mentioned no call to action by the dock workers or 
general agitation in the harbour. 
The leadership of the 'Friends of Abyssinia' were possibly aware that 
the Hertzog Government was seriously considering action against Italy. The 
need to mobilize the dock workers for industrial action fell away with the 
proclamation of sanctions against Italy to prohibit the export of arms, munitions, 
and implements of war, and forbidding the granting of financial credits to the 
Italian Government. 93 With this measure, which did not necessarily prohibit 
the export of meat, for example, it seems as though the agitation for industrial 
action was dropped in favour of general denunciations of Italian imperialism. 
With the fall of Ethiopia came despair. But the 'Hands off 
Ethio'pia' campaign had brought out the dangers of fascism and 
the links between fascism, war and colonial rule at a time when 
this was not yet apparent to all. 94 
This assessment is valid for the petty bourgeoisie (both black and white) drawn 
into political life through the campaign but does not reflect the temper of the 
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African workers who were prepared to take up arms in defence of Ethiopia. 
Unlike the campaign against rising food prices in 1919, in which the labour 
movement called on the dock workers of Cape Town to refuse to handle food 
exports, the 'Hands off Ethiopia' campaign did not seek to support the 
demands of the dock workers nor develop a national trade union so necessary 
to carrying the campaign forward. 
With the gradual increase in trade with the world economy, there 
were better conditions for political struggle and strike action after the mid-
1930s in Durban. African workers sought to make up the losses they had 
sustained during the depression and to resist the imposition of tighter police 
and administrative control. Their resistance did not meet with quite the 
same brutal suppression as during the depression because of a securer base for 
the ruling class in the government and differences among local property owners. 
The moderation of the bourgeoisie wh ich reflected the improving rate of profit 
was matched by the mild and even servi Ie character of resolutions adopted at 
a conference in an attempt to revive the ICU yase Natal. 95 The ambigui-
ties in the form of class rule over the African working people in Durban was 
well illustrated in the question of the changeover from the Borough Pol ice to 
the South African Police. The issue led to considerable controversy among 
the town councillors which stimulated the workers 'traditional' resistance to 
the police as the guardians of property relations. During 1935 there was a 
challenge to the government on the question of the South African Police by 
Councillor H. H. KeJlp, who proposed that the Durban Corporation should not 
hand over the policing of the city to government control. The argument 
centred around who should receive the revenue from police action, in 1930 
(possibly as a way of exacting a greater contribution from the municipality for 
the massive police raids) the South African Police had thrown the responsibility 
for non-serious crime on to the Borough Police and the municipality had lost 
. . . h f I 'd . .. I f d 96 revenue from bods and fines whlc were ormer y pal Into munlc IpO un s. 
After considerably controversy within the local corridors of power it was 
agreed that the South African Police should take over all serious and non-
serious crime on 1 April 1936, but it seems as though this was a difficult 
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decision for the local Native Affairs Department to accept. The deploy-
ment of the Borough Police in making searches, checking passes, and 
attacking shebeens, had always been the prerogative of the Native Affairs 
Department, whose income the police guaranteed. 
were unsettled as well as the flow of revenue. 
Institutional loyalties 
The installation of the South African Police (SAP) in Durban was part 
of the overall strategy of the ruling class to build the centralized repressive 
state apparatus particularly against the African working people. The 
central government had a general perspective on the need for uniform domina-
tion as opposed to the particular interests of local property owners and bureau-
cracies. In response to the resistance of African people in the reserves to 
tax collection, the African mobile tax squad had been reorganized and 
increased from 60 to 100 men and had 'a very wholesome effect' in gathering 
taxes despite seve're drought and food shortages. 97 Well aware of the 
potential for suppression and control in the administrative re-arrangements of 
the police force, and the violence meted out by the ~P in the national raid 
of December 1929 and during the pass burning of 16 December 1930, resis-
tance mounted among African workers in Durban along with fear. Frightened 
by rumours that the SAP pick-up vans would be used indiscriminately to take 
them to jail in a raid similar to that of December 1929, African workers flocked 
to the Native Affairs Department to pay their taxes. The Native Commis-
sioner of Durban reported a phenomenal increase in general tax collected 
98 
which exceeded the peak year of 1929 by £ 13,000. On the day before 
the SAP took over there was an atmosphere of panic among Africans in town 
as well as a determination to resist. The reserve army of labour in Durban, 
swollen by the worst drought in Zululand's history and high prices for maize, 
h d . 99 anticipated mass arrests and deportations as during t e epreSSlon. 
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On the day of the changeover a crowd of about 2,000 collected at 
Victoria Street beerhall soon after 1530 to listen to radical African workers 
denounce the SA P . The town was al ive with rumours: that frae beer 
would be available to men who came to the beerhalls armed with two sticks, 
that the dockers were ready to smash any pick up vans sent to the Point, and 
that the beerhalls were to be occupied by Africans who would refuse to pay 
and then defy the SAP. The outgoing Borough Police made an unsuccessful 
attempt to break up the meeting and huge crowds lined Grey Street expec-
tantly awaiting the arrival of the SAP. Pick up vans patrolling the area 
were stoned and the crowd booed and shouted insults at the police. Led 
by a Captain armed with a revolver, and advancing with fixed bayonets, 
the SAP eventually moved against a hostile crowd of about 20 Africans in the 
entrance of the beerhall, and in the ensuing battle two Africans were shot, 
one seriously wounded and several injured. 100 Bourgeois opinion was 
divided on the causes for mass resistance to the SA P, the Natal Advertiser 
describing the thousands of African who had prepared themselves for a trial 
of strength with the new police system as 'the definite and logical product of 
municipal mismanagement for many years past'. The 'lawless and criminal 
element' which had led the struggle were produced by inertia towards African 
housing as Durban had a night population of 10,000 above the total for which 
there was legal sleeping accommodation. 101 In this instance, the resistance 
of African workers to the oppressive po I ice system produced a response of the 
urgency of reforms. The Communist Party responded by calling a mass meet-
ing of Ikaka Labasebenzi (Workers' Shield) to protest against police terrorism 
in Durban. The speakers argued that the SAP were drawn from the most 
chauvinistic section of the white population and cJrried out the government's 
h I 'bl ' 102 wis es in a 'bruta and tern e way. 
As in the case of other demonstrations violently repressed by the police, 
those who suffered police attack were also charged with the crime of resis-
tance. What was unusual about many of those arrested and charged is that 
293 
they were employees of the Native Affairs Department, and during their 
trial there were hints of evidence being withheld. 103 Of the 20 African 
labaurers accused, 2 were found guilty of inciting to public violence and 
sentenced to two months' hard labaur, 7 cautioned and discharged, and the 
remainder acquitted. The magistrate, T. J. Conway, concluded that the 
SAP had been the first to attack, had used unnecessary violence, and that 
the accused had been used as 'catspaws' by whites opposed to the SAP. 
Conway hinted darkly that there was more in the case than appeared on the 
record and that the Africans had been led to believe if they could chase the 
SAP out of Durban they wou Id retire to Pretori.a and never return. His 
sharpest comments were directed against the Native Affairs Department 
officials, particularly Layman, the Manager, who took no action in response 
to the rumour that free beer was to be supplied at the beerhalls. H is atti-
tude amounted to 'being almost criminal' and Conway impl ied that there had 
been agitation against the SAP in the Native Affairs Department. 104 He 
called for a full enquiry into the cause of the disturbances. 
The Durban Corporation refused to give evidence, but the Commis-
sioner, Major S. M. Page, exonerated the Native Affairs Department officials 
except the overseer of the Victoria Street Municipal Beerhall and his African 
induna. The hostility of the African workers to the SAP had arisen because 
of their knowledge of SAP violence on the Rand where the pick up vans were 
used as an instrument of oppression. Although not many Africans beiieved 
the rumour about free beer they all expected there to be an affray with the 
police. 
It is improbable that this uneasiness and apprehension have been 
entirely allayed and that the stories of police brutality and abuse 
of the 'pick-up' vans are completely discredited, and it is con-
sequently of the utmost importance that if the SAP in Durban is 
to gain the confidence of the better elements of the Native popula-
tion the force must use the utmost circumspection in its dealings 
with them and see that its methods are characterised bX scrupulous 
fairness and a wise consideration for their feelings. 10 
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With this advice he sought to win over the Af rican petty bourgeoisie from 
the general hostility of the African working people by a 'reformed police 
force. The mass opposition to the SAP with the possibility that Durban 
could become a battlefield between African workers and the SAP must have 
influenced Page to urge the 'utmost tact' in dealing with African people. 
Post-depression strikes and wage demands 
The challenge issued to the SAP by the dock workers in threatening 
to smash any pick ups sent to the Point was an indication of the resilience of 
the togt and other harbour workers to the depression in trade. By 1936 
there was a considerable revival in tonnage landed which continued into 1938, 
the largest increase being in fertilizers, machinery, hardware, cars, galvanized 
iron and steel, and timber. 106 The wider spread of commodoties reflected 
a faster pace of growth in industry and construction which also helped to draw 
off some of the pressure of the reserve army of labour on the Durban docks. 
With better harvests in the reserves in 1937 the migrants entering the labour 
market were not under such compulsion to find work immediately, despite 
urban regulations, and all these factors improved the possibilities for class action 
by the employed: dockers, iron, chemical and timber workers. 
In these improved conditions of class struggle the dock workers entered 
a phase of unparalleled activity, advancing principally wage demands and 
coming out on strike. Their strikes were planned and fought entirely on 
their own initiative and showed a high level of self-organization despite the 
lack of a dock workers' union. The first initiative of the workers was to 
regain the conditions they had bst during the depression. On 24 April ~1937 
about 500 togt workers struck, demanding a full day's pay for Saturday work. 
During the depression the employers had cut wages from 4s to 3s on Saturday 
after the workers had won a battle some years before to get the full day's rate. 
Th.e bourgeois press claimed that work was not disorganized as it was a slack 
day and a number of monthly paid workers were brought in to continue work. 
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But in some cases the workers left after being warned off by pickets. The 
togt workers mounted pickets at Point Road, in the dock area, and at the 
barracks, but were prevented from stopping the monthly employed by pol ice 
patrols and a pick-up van, now an established part of police armoury. The 
workers had built up pressure for strike action by making demands for about a 
month and then staying away from work before the strike was instituted. 
Learning the lessons of survival during strike action, and hiding their leader-
ship, the workers appointed no spokesman, but the stevedoring firms were in 
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no doubt about the demand. By noon the employers were compelled to 
concede the workers I demand. The fight of the Durban dockers was an 
inspiration to all African workers, reported Umsebenzi, and proof that united 
action and militant methods could win better conditions. 'That the steve-
doring companies capitulated after a strike of only a few hours duration is 
due to the remarkable solidarity of the Native workers.' None of the togt 
workers had scabbed and the record of the dock workers 'despite their poor 
state of organization is one to be proud of'. I t drew the cone lusion that 
the strike was a spur to all workers to strengthen their trade unions and win 
improvements, but made no commitment to support their demands and help 
d I • I d . • h 108 eve op a natlona tra e union as In t e past. 
Th is strike was followed some time later in the year by that of about 
1,000 harbour workers employed by SARH who demanded that casual workers 
should be paid 4s instead of the present 3s. a day. During the depression their 
wage had been cut from 3s 6d to 3s a day and their demand was nON to raise 
their wages to the 'level of the togt workers employed by the stevedoring com-
panies. After a deputation to the Port Goods Superintendent had proved 
unsuccessful the workers, with 'admirable solidarity' came out on strike on 
the morn ing of 12 August 1937. They refused to leave the 'compounds until 
the increase of 1s was granted, and despite the utmost persuasion of the SARH 
officials remained solid in their decision. The strike provided the SARH with 
a serious challenge as the harbour was exceptionally busy. E very berth was 
296 
occupied and every possible worker needed, and the SARH System Manager 
threatened to bring in strike-breakers by drafting African employees from 
th d·• h P' 109 Th • k I o er Istncts to t e Oint. e stri e immediate y caused an unpre-
cedented congestion in the harbour and slowed down the handl ing of cargo 
as the work had to be carried on by about 1,000 Africans who were permu-
nently employed as wharf labourers., A large number of officials, led by 
T. J. Chester, manager of the Nati ve Affairs Department, addressed the workers 
on the first day of the strike. He said the strike was 'unwise' as the question 
of increased wages had been referred to the SARH headquarters in Johannes-
burg for a decision. Their intransigence would cause more irritation than 
help as the question of wages of African workers was under discussion by a 
number of bodies in Durban.' The strikers listened wi thout comment to the 
officials but remained in the compound. The coal labourers at the Bluff, 
and railway togt workers at Maydan Wharf, were not involved in the strike, 
but general cargo piled up on the quayside throughout the docks. 110 
The decisive action by the workers wh ich received the approbrium of 
employers and officials won the respect of the registered trade unions in the 
local committee of the South African Trades and Labour Counci I. Even if 
the workers won the increase they were demanding they would still be getting 
less than the minimum wage in most industries in Durban, laid down by collec-
tive agreements signed by the Minister of Labour. It was time the Govern-
111 
ment applied the same rates to its own employees, the union officials argued. 
As the cargo piled up, the SARH carried out its threat to use employees 
from other departments and districts to clear the congestion. The bourgeois 
press reported that the work at the docks would not be seriously handicapped 
by the strike as about 500 workers were being drawn from large reserves of 
labour in the maintenance section and harbour construction works. But the 
press was careful to mention this was on Iy a temporary measure and the togt 
workers would not be replaced permanently. In the early days of the strike 
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the workers were addressed by the System Manager, J.S, von Willich, who 
said that the workers had taken up a 'fighting attitude' before negotiations 
were complete. They should return to work so that their representations 
could be considered. 'The strike is premature', he said. Chester, who 
interpreted for von Willich, was implicitly attacked by the strikers who said 
they would continue to make their representations direct to the SARH. He 
replied that if they considered he was out of place he would go. 'In that 
case we agree that you go', the workers responded in an increasingly mili-
tant mood. After the meeting one of the workers told the Natal Mercury 
reporter: We have enough money to go on with and we are not going bock 
'I h'II' ,112 untl we get our extra s I '"g. 
The SARH responded to the increasing determination of the strikers 
by bringing in more strike-breakers and police. A large squad of police 
from the Rand arrived in Durban on 14 August as a 'precautionary measure' 
against the togt workers mounting pickets. By 15 August the number of 
strike-breakers from other departments was increased to 440 when 100 were 
drafted by train from the north and south coast and housed in railway barracks. 
These workers were insulated from the strike by being transported to their 
working places in trucks and protected by the police reinforcements brought in 
from the Rand. Special precautions were taken when the Warwick Castle 
was unloaded by strike-breakers with the police on hand with hoses to spray 
any pickets.113 Although the SARH was able to build up the numbers of 
strike-breakers up to 500, the problem remained of clearing the congestion 
as the replacements were not as experienced as the togt workers. Sensitive 
to the possibil ity of mass pickets and criticism from the labour movement, the 
SARH stressed that the strike-breakers were permanent railway employees and 
. , b th· ff h 114 not 'scabs' or 'labourers from outside, ut elr e ect was t e same. 
By 16 August it was reported that the situation had improved for the SARH, 
although the congestion still remained and ships were still considerably delayed. 
At a meeting on 17 August between the Systems Manager and a deputation of 
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the strikers, the determination of the strikers was undiminished. The 
Native Commissioner, Arbuthnot, berated the workers: 'You people have 
taken the law into your own hands. When men take up that attitude they 
at once come up against a stone wall. You make things harder for your-
selves. • He proposed that the workers return to work and await a reply 
to their demand, but after the deputation met the strikers their reply was: 
We have met the workers and they have discussed the suggestion. They 
expressed the opinion that it is not possible for them to go back on the 
present conditions, and that it would be better for them to seek other avenues 
of employment. Those who cannot will get home as best they can. I 115 
As the strike entered 'its eighth day a considerable police force had 
been gathered at the Point; 71 White and African railway police were 
housed under canvas. The white policemen had been drafted in from the 
Rand to supplement the African railway police{48 constables and 7 non-
commissioned officers} concentrated in the area. The pol ice paraded in the 
docks from 0500 and checked that the shifts of workers went on and came off 
duty at the correct time. There were continuous patrols in the docks and 
four parades a day, each lasting 2 to 3 hours. All in all, this amounted to 
a considerable display of force both ta subdue any pickets and to dominate 
the dock area to snuff out any development of sympathy strikes. 116 The 
extensive use of strike-breakers was not having the intended results as some 
sh ips were forced to dock in pairs, and the congestion continued. Some of 
the rai Iway togt workers got temporary employment with the stevedoring com-
panies wh ich were hard pressed at the rates of pay they were demanding from 
the SARH. 117 
With the unrelenting determination of the strikers and rising congestion, 
it was certain that the SARH would act decisively. The bui Id up of the 
large police force at the Point created the conditions in which harsh measures 
could be taken without repercussions. On 20 August 1937 the togt strikers 
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were replaced by new permanently employed labourers who were to be inc-
reased by 30 to 40 a day until the required total was reached. On the 
first day 137 were taken on and four days later this W(JS brought up to 245. 118 
But even these additional workers brought in to augment those transferred 
from other departments were unable to deal with the congestion and some 
ships were unable to work at night because there was nowhere to put the 
cargo • Despite the determination of the SARt-! to bring the strike to a close 
it was only on 25 August that it could be announced that the strike was over. 
The turning point came when several hundred togt workers applied for work 
at the original daily basis of 3s a day and 320 were engaged. They returned 
b work at the original rate on condition that the SARH would consider their 
119 demand for 4s a day. The strike had brought about a shift in the pattern 
of employment as the SARH had employed 232 permanents since the strike began 
at a wage of £2 a month, plus food and housing. Many of the togt workers 
who had been engaged by the stevedoring companies lost their work when the 
temporary rush caused by their strike was over. The end result of the strike 
on the SARH employment was to increase the number of jobs available.120 
With the defeat of the railway togt workers through strike-breakers 
and large-scale police intervention, ironically, the result was not the docility 
of repression but further str ike action by other togt harbour workers. Togt 
workers employed in unloading timber at Maydon Wharf, which was at the 
height of the timber season, struck on 28 August for higher wages. The 
strikers formed pickets armed with sticks who reportedly threatened any 
workers wanting to take their jobs. The police were rushed to Maydon 
Wharf and the pickets disarmed. Their employers told the workers that their 
demands would be considered after a conference of employers in Durban. 121 
But the workers, who were employed by W. F. Johnstone and Company, came 
out on strike again on 30 August and demanded an immediate increase in their 
wages from 2s 6d to 3s 6d a day. The discharging of the timber was hampered 
/fACk/"J e.ptrttna i,. tl..·1 .-Ie 
as the work was done by monthly employed workers/as a deputation of togt 
300 
workers met W. F. Johnstone. Their employer argued that no increases 
could be made until a collective decision could be made by all employers. 
The strikers replied they were not prepared to wait even after Johnstone 
promised to discuss their demands with other employers of African labour at 
Maydon Wharf and to present a reply in two days' time. In the face of 
this determination, the 300-400 strikers were paid off on 31 August and the 
registration fee which each worker had to pay on being employed by the firm 
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was refunded. The company decided that the permanent staff was ade-
quate and that togt workers were not necessary to unload the one timber ship 
in the harbour. The wages of all workers empbyed by timber firms were 
increased by 6d a day on 1 September. The employers decided to give the 
wage increases firstly to the permanent employees who had remained loyal 
during the strike and not to engage any casuals even at the old rate of 2s 6d. 
It was reported that some 1,000 permanent workers were employed and at busy 
times the number of casual workers could rise also to 1,000.123 
The sudden upsurge of strike action among dock workers in 1937 repre-
sented a tremendous advance for the African working class in Durban. With-
out having the advantage of contact with workers in other ports and industries, 
housed in barracks under the control of their employers and the municipal 
bureaucracy, and employed as casual migrant workers, the togt workers were 
able on their own initiative to organize strikes and raise pickets. In the 
case of the railway togt workers the strike was sustained for 14 days without 
strike funds or trade union organization against a state corporation commanding 
its own police force and able to shift monthly workers to act as strike-breakers 
from other departments. These were considerably achievements but also 
raise the possibilities if support had been coming from the Communist Party on 
the scale of its commitment during the depression. The article describing 
the railway workers' strike in Umsebenzi mentioned the difficulty of approach-
ing the workers in the municipal compounds as the reason for the dockers being 
unorgan i zed. It also stressed that because working conditions were disgrace-
ful and the workers militant, organization should be started. 
ing gain ••• is impossible until dock workers are organiz.ed. 
'Any last-
For though 
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a concession may be won here and there, these will only be temporary until 
the labourers are combined on a firm basis. ,124 These were truisms, but 
begged the question of what strategy could be adopted. If it were possible 
to make some organizational advance and develop the fighting demands of 
the workers during the worst imaginable time of the depression, surely more 
could have been expected during a time of economic growth and considerable 
self-activitiy among the workers? 
The wage demands of the workers were essentially defensive when com-
pared to the demands for over 100 per cent increases made in 1919 and 1920 
and aimed at either restoring wages to their pre-depression rates or making 
modest advances. Yet even these moderate demands provoked tremendous 
resistan~e from the employers. In the case of the rai Iway togt workers their 
wage demand, if met, would have only raised the SARH wage bill by about 
£300 a week and possibly even less but this demand was not to be met.125 
The challenge to the unifor~ly low wages for African workers by even a demand 
for 6d a day, which threatened to push wages upwards and break down ,tradi-
tional differentials (for instance between stevedores and dockers),was strongly 
resisted, all employers agreeing to hold the line against having to make any 
wage increases under pressure from the workers. No significant dent in the 
united front of the employers was possible in the battle of sections of the dock 
workers against their employers, even if the strikes could be sustained. The 
deadlock between the railway togt workers and their employers, for instance, 
could only be resolved in favour of the workers with the support of the steve-
dores and other dock workers. This level of coordinated action would only 
be possible with trade union organization to unite the workers and command 
the support of other organ i zed workers. 
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Strike movement and wage determination 
Although in the preceding section we have concentrated on the strikes 
of dock workers as the most dynamic element in the African working class in 
Durban, there were a number of strikes by workers in other industries which 
impelled wide discussion on the need for intervention by the Wage Board to 
set a minimum wage. The Department of labour drew attention to' the debate 
on African wages in employer organizations and the Native Representative 
Council which had been caused by the awakening of the black unskilled 
workers 'after a period of quiescence following the abortive Native trade union 
movement of a few years ago'. The workers were putting forward their 
demands and again organizing? particularly in Durban which was the 
. f' k .•. h 126 I h I ma In centre 0 stn e actl VI ty In t e country. n response to t e genera 
agitation and strikes for higher wages the leadership of the African petty 
bourgeoisie, which had been so bitterly disunited during the heJght of the 
strength of the ICU, took up the workers' demands in a consti tutional manner. 
This approach was made possible both by the softening of attitude towards a 
controlled increase in African wages by employers' organizations which were 
conscious of the need to expand the internal market, and by the space left 
open by the Communist Party's lack of interest in developing the fighting 
demands of the African working class during the turn to the Popular Front. 
These representations secured neither substantial wage increases nor an un-
skilled wage determination as hoped, but confirmed the centrality of the 
demands of the African working class for a political leadership uneasy with 
the. independent movement of the workers. 
While the leading force within the strike movement was the togt 
workers, there were a number of other strikes wh ich not only broadened the 
base for the economic demands of the workers, but also pointed to a possible 
merging of the organization and action of African and Indian workers. The 
strike at Falkirk iron foundry was particularly important in opening the possi-
bility for new forms of working class action cutting across existing divisions 
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among black workers. led by the unregistered Natal Iron and Steelworkers' 
Union, representing both Indian and African workers (housed in a compound) 
whose leadership was connected to the Communist Party, the strike united 
struggles previously conducted on the basis of existing racial divisions in the 
working class. 127 The bringing together of workers in production imposed 
by capital was being met by trade unionism reflecting these advances, a pros-
pect not necessarily endorsed by the African petty bourgeoisie. None of the 
other strikes which took place in the docks, railways, fishing, African Explo-
sives and Industries, textile, boxmaking, and soap industries, raised the ques-
tion of working class unity and organization to the same level. 128 
The ferment in the African working class and the possibility of African 
workers uniting with other sections of the working class in independent action 
and organization caused anxiety to those who laid historic claims to represent 
the African people as a whole. As the pace of strike action grew, parti-
cularly in Durban, the African petty bourgeois leadership, so bitterly anta-
gonistic in earlier years, united in presenting themselves as intermediaries in 
the struggle between workers and their employers. A meeting of African 
workers convened by A. W . G. Champion attracted 1,000 and agreed to send 
a deputation of Dr. J.l. Dube, of the Natal Native Congress, and his former 
enemy, A. W . G. Champion, and those they agreed to coopt, to place the 
demand for increased wages before employers and the authorities. 129 
Deputations followed to a conference of the municipal ity, Durban 
Cha;"ber of Commerce, Natal Chamber of Industries, and the Durban Rotary 
th N . C .. 130 Th Club, and in the following days to e atlve ommlSSloner. e 
deputation's request for an unspecified wage increase and the continuing 
strikes caused considerable debate among employers who differed in their 
evaluation of the seriousness of the support for the wage increases among 
African workers. 131 A number of meetings were held to build a common 
front among employers and the authorities in the face of strikes and deputations 
for higher wages. Differences emerged between those who favoured a 
national minimum wage (the Durban Chamber of Commerce), those who 
felt the main issue was evening out wage differences between African 
workers in different industries, and those who argued that each industry 
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should establish its own level of unskilled wage. 132 The Durban Chamber 
of Commerce recommended to its members to pay labourers £3 lOs a month (of 
which 5s would cover accommodation and 15s food if provided by employers) 
and daily labour 3s 6d.133 Even if this wage were paid by all employers 
of togt labour it would not necessarily have brought any wage increase to the 
harbour workers as the stevedoring workers were at that time earning 4s a day. 
The struggle of the more vulnerable section of employers to lay down a specific 
set of wages only served to sharpen the demands of the workers. A mass 
meeting of African workers in September 1937 called for a minimum wage of 
5s a day, thanked the Chamber of Commerce for accepting the principle of a 
minimum wage, rejected rations as part of the wage, and opposed servants' 
uniforms as the dress of subordination. 134 The meeting, which also appealed 
to the Minister of Labour to appoint a commission into the question of a mini-
mum wage in Durban, reflected the domination of the wage campaign by the 
African petty bourgeoisie; clear fighting demands being mixed with con-
ciliatory and even wishful gestures. 
As the tide of strike action receded, the appeals for a minimum wage 
met with less enthusiasm from the workers and less concern from employers. 
Without a strategy of fighting for the adoption of the minimum wage by all 
employers, the 5s a day wage demand did not gain currency among the workers. 
While turning towards the working class during the late 1930s, the African 
petty bourgeoisie was unable ta bring any form of persistent political or 
economic agitation to the warkers. The unity of the African petty bourge-
oisie around the wage issue masked their inability to either revive trade union 
organization among African workers or playa successful interceding role 
between workers and employers. It would only be after further independent 
initiatives were taken by African workers that the question of a general 
increase in labourers' wages would be raised again. 
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One of the most outstanding features of the whole period was the 
attempt of the Communist Party to organize a national dockers' and seamen's 
union. As part of a strategy of organizing workers in basic industries it 
marked the first attempt to organ ize the strategically placed harbour workers 
on a systematic basis, and in its conception it was sound. The reas~ns for 
its fai lure were related to the overall conception of the period, one of 
imminent revolutionary upsurge and the collapse of capitalist society. The 
SHWU was not designed to struggle and survive during the fierce repression 
and economic setbacks of the' depression; the possibility of capitalist re-
stabilization after the depression was not thought possible. The world-wide 
depression gave notice, however, that there was not a uniform relationship 
between economic crises and political action by the working class. The 
unprecedently high level of resistance of African workers in Durban during 
the late 1920s could not be sustained indefinitely; thought had also to be 
given to the need for underground working class organization. Even after 
severe reverses in the harbour it does not seem that the potential for working 
class resistance had been exhausted, as the workers searched for new tech-
niques of struggle which would make possible protracted resistance. With 
the turn towards the People's Front by the Communist Party, to unite 'rank 
and file Afrikaners and the discontented middle class as well as the Labour 
Party' and the black oppressed in an anti-imperialist alliance, the organiza-
135 
tion of African workers in basic industries received a low priority. 
These turns and changes in Communist Party policy created an anomalous 
position for both the political and industrial organization of the harbour 
workers. From making an all-out effort to organize a national union around 
fighting demands during the worst possible time, trade union organization was 
non-existent both during the Ethiopian campaign in 1935, and as importantly 
during the revival of autonomous working class action in 1937. It is pos-
306 
sible that these episodic attempts at mobil ization and organization strength-
ened the tendency for togt workers to organize on the basis of a fierce 
independence and reliance on leadership by their fellow workers. 
A Ithough trade union organization was not sustained throughout the 
period from the beerhall picketing to the 1937 strikes, there is considerable 
evidence of 'internal' leadership among the workers operating as a collective 
intelligence. Despite the casual nature of their employment, the rotation 
of workers in the migrant labour system, and the force of repression, the togt 
workers showed themselves both capable of independent thought and action 
and conscious of their exploitation. Demands were made for pre-depression 
conditions of service to be restored, and strikes were led and fought without 
the support of other organized workers. Without an external stimulus, the 
workers were able to make up their losses and prepare for a p~riod when the 
working class could move on to the offensive. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Class struggles and decasualization 
The Bantu of today regard is as normal procedure to spend the greater 
part of their working I ives outside the Reserves in European employ-
ment. They adopt this mode of existence without reservation, as 
being in the natural course of events. 
TomlinsonCommissionUG61, 1955: p.73 
Controller of Industrial Manpower to leaders of dock workers: 'If you 
do not wish to work for less than 8s a day, then, of course, you must 
go home and other people will come and do the work.' Zulu Phungula, 
spokesman for dock workers: 'The Government must show us where to go 
because our homes are here in Durban.' 
Department of Labour, File 1497, Minutes of meeting 11 March 1942 
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While there has been a comparatively large literature on African 
migrant workers engaged in wage labour but dependent on some supple-
ment to household income from the reserves, very little has been written 
on the state of consciousness of these workers, their forms of organization, 
and the struggl es they have conducted. Anthropologists have been pre-
occupied with concepts such as 'detribal ization', 'urbanization' I and 
cultural change, rather than attempting to understand the forms of working 
class action in the cities. In defence of the rights of African people to 
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live in urban areas liberal social scientists (such as Mabel Palmer) have 
conceived of migrant workers as institutionalized undercutters of wages and 
have even endorsed a tightened pass system. 1 Others who have written 
on the class struggles of workers in South Africa consider that repression and 
enforced labour migration have seriously retarded the consciousness of the 
African working class as a whole. 2 The contradictory features of migrant 
labour: the prevention of a stabilized and permanent proletariat I but also 
the widespread experience of wage labour on mines, plantations, rai Iways, 
and factories, and the spread of political ideas have been insufficiently 
developed. Migrant workers, it has been historically shown, also join 
trade unions, take part in strikes, become members of political parties, and 
take part in political demonstrations. Woddis develops this theme in part 
and concentrates on the knowledge and experience which is taken back to 
the rural areas by migrant workers. 
In the busy market-of-ideas of the urban centres they have 
become new men, with enlarged horizons and an awareness 
of class interests and class sol idarity, and a new national 
consciousness. • • The migrant worker is also a migrant 
peasant, and the African worker-peasant with knowledge of 
both worlds, is able to bring to the countryside the spirit and 
political consciousness that has grown in the towns. 3 
This argument is an advance on the pessimism of those who can only see the 
urban African working class as threatened by migrant workers, but it re-
orients attention away from the cities to the countryside, to changes in the 
peasantry rather than the development of working class struggles and con-
sciousness. As an assessment of migrant workers' consciousness it poses 
the question of the degree of their proletarianization, of the structure of 
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the African working class, and the forms of action which are taken by 
workers who are forced to maintain their families in the rural areas through 
being denied urban residence through low wages and the operation of influx 
control. The answers to these questions, and particularly the contribution 
made by migrant workers to the pace of struggle of the African working class, 
will be sought in the conditions and resistance of the togt dock workers. 
During the Second World War there were particularly favourable 
conditions for resistance to capital by the African working class. As the 
war economy accelerated the rate of production new areas of employment 
were created for African workers, during a time when there was a ded ine 
in recruitment from neighbolXing territories. The ability of capital to 
replace strikers immediately with fresh recruits was considerably diminished. 
On the political front the ruling class was compelled to make some forms of 
accommodation with the African working class in the easing of the pass laws 
and even in considering whether African soldiers should be trained in the 
use of arms. 4 Colonel Deneys Reitz, Minister of Native Affairs, declared 
that segregation had failed, that inroads should be made on the colour bar, 
and that the pass laws were iniquitous and had to be abol ished as soon as 
possible. This statement was accompanied by an announcement of an almost 
complete relaxation of the pass laws in the large urban areas which lasted for 
several months in 1942. During this period orders were given to the police 
that passes were to be demanded only if Africans were arrested in connec-
tion with offences other than pass laws. 5 The Smit Committee, which 
investigated the conditions of African people in the urban areas, paved the 
way for these concessions and recommended that Africans in urban areas 
should be recognized as permanent and that African trade unions should be 
reg istered. Before writing his report, Smit told Rotarians in Durban that 
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the tremendous expansion of industry in South Africa· had been made pos-
sible with the cheap labour of African workers. But the poverty and 
disease in urban areas had stirred the Committee with 'pity and shamel, 
and these conditions I were having a disintegrating influence on Native 
life and were undermining the health of generations upon which the country 
depended for its future ' • 6 These statements and actions were not the start 
of a rosy dawn of liberalism in South Africa, as subsequent repression would 
show, but an attempt to moderate the demands of the African working class 
for fundamental change. 
The pressing need for African workers to survive in the urban centres, 
their growing strength in production, and these signs of weakness in the ruling 
class, resulted in one of the most significant strike waves in South African 
history. 7 And yet for all the vigour of the African working class, a strong 
base was not laid for the permanent organization of the workers industrially 
and politically, and the impressive strike action of the early 1940s could not 
be sustained into the harsh conditions in the 195Os. The A fri can trade 
unions which sprang up during the war were encouraged by official bene-
volence as much as the need for thorough working class organization, and 
were astonishingly weak when the mask of benevolence was dropped. In 
many ways, the lunorgan ized ' migrant workers who played an advanced part 
in the strike wave of 1942 were better able to continue their resistance into 
the period of heavy repression. The somewhat artificial quality of trade 
unionism among African workers and the lack of decisive victories in the 
most favourable conditions yet experienced by the African working class 
call for some comment as background to the situation of the togt workers 
who were a leading element in the resistance. 
A few necessarily abbreviated points need to be made. The first 
is that African workers had real difficulties in developing a leadership wh ich 
was of the class and capable of providing enduring administrative and indus-
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trial work. The second was of the political leadership of the working 
class. Operating in the context of a broad anti-fascist popular front, 
the Communist Party did not follow a consistent policy of organizing African 
workers and opposed strikes which could damage war production. In the 
relative liberalism of the war period, the party advanced democratic 
demands such as arming the African soldiers, abolishing pass laws, and 
granting the vote to African people. Following a policy of defence of 
the Soviet Union and support for the struggle of the workers and peasants of 
Eastern Europe who were bearing the full brunt of the Nazi offensive, the 
party subordinated resistance to national oppression to the general needs of 
an anti-fascist front. This was justified by making a theoretical distinc-
tion between 'ordinary colonial oppression' to which Africans were subjected 
and f.:lsci sm. 'There is a big constitutional difference between ordinary 
colonial oppression, even when it includes murder, and legalised terrorism 
as a system of Government enforced by a fascist dictatorship. Bad as the 
situation is here, one can read in the Press where a native suing police for 
violence, rare as it is, obtains a favourable verdict. But under fascism this 
is impossible.'S Valid although this distinction might have been in theory, 
~lIj()I\S 
it was made for politicaVrather than constitutional theory , to invite support 
from African people for the war effort. During this period the party 
reversed its espousal of the national liberation of the African people as the 
main task for general democratic reforms. 9 Not unexpectedly, during the 
war there was a strong development of a vigorous African nationalism with 
influence in the African working class. 
These changes were most sharply evident in the post-war period when 
the projected plans for 'reconstruction' and reforms were shelved and the 
sacrifices made by the workers, far from being recompensed, were intensified. 
From a considerably weaker position than during the war, African workers 
particularly on the mines struggled to defend their living standards and con-
solidate their organizations. The history of the late 19405 until 1963 
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(when mass resistance to the apartheid state was decisively crushed) is one 
of constant struggle to rebuild and extend working class organization and 
resistance to the ever-increasing attacks of the apartheid state and employers. 
Black workers made up the backbone of the struggle against national oppres-
sion and for democracy in South A fri ca. 
During the Second World War and the 1950s the comparatively 'free' 
form of labour (migrant workers paid on a daily basis in the Durban docks) 
was transformed into contract labour under a strict labour regime. This 
took place at a time of intense confl ict in Durban characterized by a close 
identity of interest between stevedoring employers and the state, in which 
the issues of stabil ization of the African labour force, employer-state res-
ponses to strike action, and specifically the formation of an employers' 
organization to control labour supply in the docks, were discussed and action 
taken to limit resistance to existing structures of labour control. In this 
period of class struggles the daily paid dock workers (bath stevedoring and 
railway workers) revealed themselves as a volatile and class conscious element 
within the working class in Durban. 
The struggles of the dock workers had a significant effect on the 
development of administrative measures to deal with labour relationship, on 
the argument on how to reconcile a smooth-flowing labour supply with 
tightened influx control, and on the intra-working class relationships between 
Indian and African workers. The process of laying down minimum wages 
for unskilled labour was initiated, controls were introduced to contain and 
direct the flood of workers from the reserves, influx control was implemented 
for the first time ('endorsing out' or deportation became a permanent feature 
of urban administration), and new relationships between Indian and African 
political and industrial organizations were barn in the aftermath of the riots 
of January 1949. In Durban the base was laid for the mass organization of 
industrial workers which developed in the 1950s with the growth of SACTU 
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(the South African Congress of Trade Unions), a phenomenon which placed 
the Durban area as a leading centre of militant trade unionism, mass politica I 
action, and a high level of strike activity. 
The dock workers were a significant although proportionately small 
section of the total African labour force by the late 1930s. As has been 
described in a number of surveys, the African workers in Durban were con-
centrated in the tertiary sector (a high proportion of domestic servants, trans-
port, and commercial workers) with a growing proportion of workers in 
industry and construction. 10 The dock workers made up 43 per cent of the 
section of tr-:Jnsport workers; 22 per cent rai Iway workers (2, 168) and 21 
. 11 
per cent (2,001) stevedoring workers. The most profound characteristic 
of the African labour force in Durban was the extent of labour migration as 
evidenced by the preponderance of the working age group (15-60) >out of the 
total African population, and an extraordinarily high masculinity ratio (4. 13 
as compared to 4.32 for the mining Witwatersrand). 12 This notable feature 
of the African labour force in Durban (in strong contrast to the relatively 
stabilized African populations in Port Elizabeth, East london, Kimberley 
and Bloemfontein) was a result of the emphasis placed by the state on retard-
ing urbanization by a variety of measures controlling land occupation in 
urban and peri-urban areas and through a state policy reinforcing the role 
of the reserves in reproducing the particular form of migrant labour. Wolpe 
has argued that because the means of subsistence and the reproduction of 
labour power have been met from subsistence agriculture, the value of labour 
power of African workers has been reduced. 13 
When the migrant-labourer has access to means of subsistence, 
outside the capitalist sector, as he does in South Africa, then 
the relationship between wages and the cost of the production 
and reproduction of labour-power is changed. That is to say, 
capital is able to pay the work er below the cost of his reproduc-
tion. 14 
This argument has to be treated cautiously given the steady decline in agri-
cultural productivity of land in the reserves but does help to explain why 
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Durban, where reserves were particularly accessible and where economically 
active males were more successfully separated from the household economy, 
has historically been a low wage area even in comparison with lesser developed 
areas such as Port Eli zabeth . 
The migrant workers' limited access "to land has also been used by 
sections of the ruling class to argue against the enforcement of minimum wage 
determinations in the urban centres. In 1939/40 the Native Affairs Com-
mission made a precise calculation of material benefits obtained by migrant 
workers maintaining their rural links. It estimated that the migrant worker 
had in addition to his wages a 'reserve subsidy' of approximately £30 per 
O . 15 annum, equal to some 6 per cent of the then average black urban wage. 
Despite the struggles of African workers and their organizations such as the 
Industrial and Commercial Union, during 1920-38 the most common wage of 
African workers in Durban was 18s a week; 
16 between 15s and 20s a week. 
58 per cent of wages being 
Dock workers and wage struggles during the war 
The dock workers in Durban had a long history of resistance to the 
general level of wages in the area and their specific conditions of employ-
ment. In a broader context they had taken up issues of wider economic 
and political struggle. They had led the struggles against the poll tax, 
against passes {which culminated in the death of a number of protesters in 
1930 including the dock leader Johannes Nkosi}, and the institution of a 
municipal monopoly in beer brewing. In 1940 the dock workers were a 
group of approximately 3,000 to 4,000 workers employed by the day by four 
major stevedoring companies and the South African Rai Iways and Harbour. 
These workers were employed on average 3-4 days a week because of fluctua-
tions in shipping but also because the employers wished to maintain a supply 
of labour at a level equal to that of the maximum demand which could be 
made under peak conditions, i.e. a permanent surplus. As in all ports 
which have not undergone decasualization, it was in each company1s 
interest to maintain a reserve supply of labour over average daily require-
ments. The pressure on wage rates was maintained by this reserve which 
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encouraged competition among workers for vacancies every day. Behind 
this immediate reserve in the dock area pressed the relative surplus popula-
tion {surplus to the increasingly deficient homestead economy} of the 
'Native reserves l available to replace workers who 'struck ' for higher wages 
at the docks, i.e. refused en masse to sign on for the day. 
Accommodation for the dock workers {an issue which was resolved in 
the 1870s} was in barracks constructed by the municipality and some private 
employers. These barracks were constructed so that the greatest number of 
people possible could I ive in them, according to an African resident writing 
to a radical journal in April 1940: 
there are narrow, dark, winding stairs, that lead to the room 
occupying the floor above, and the air is foul· .•. for 3d a 
man is given what passes for a bed •.• this consists of the 
frame of a bed with a wooden board in place of the spring •.• 
the men must provide their own blankets .•• the rooms are 
terribly stuffy, the windows being situated so high that it 
would be a job to open them .•• the 'comfort ' and Irestl to be 
got from sleeping on a wooden board in a room where a harsh 
I ight burns throughout the night must be experienced to be 
appreciated. 17 
Barrack accommodation such as this was condemned by the Smit Commission 
which reported that the Bell Street compound {the primary accommodation 
for togt workers} was bver-crowded, dirty, and quite unfit for the purpose 
for which it was being used I • 18 Apart from some extension of the premises, 
no improvements were made. 
During the war and throughout the 1950s the dock workers established 
themselves as a leading section of the working class in Durban and adopted 
tactics which contrasted materially from those of the African trade unions of 
varying tendencies. Despite the recognition and institutionalization of 
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some ski II differentials among the workers (the categories by the end of the 
1950s were indunas, winchmen, gangwaymen, and stevedoring hands) there 
was a high degree of coordinated action. The position of the dock 
workers could be contrasted with that of labourers in industry who performed 
'service' roles, e.g., sweepers a~d carriers in garment, leather, footwear, 
and fumiture industries, and with the large number of domestic servants who 
were atomized among a large number of employers. Even in those indus-
tries where African workers were advancing into operative positions, such as 
in the metal industry, their position was not strategic in the labour process 
due to the relatively low level of skill involved in their work and their sub-
ordination in a tight pattern of skilled/operative/labourer relationships. 
The dock workers were probably the on Iy group of black workers in 
Durban who provided leadership from among their own ranks without relying 
on non-laboU' ing educated strata who took up the leadership of working class 
organization during the Second World War. (There was a South African 
Railways and Harbour Union organized by Philemon Tsele which operated on 
a national basis, but it appears that the dock workers employed by the rai 1-
ways in Durban owed their allegiance primarily to the togt element in the 
harbour labour force rather than to weekly employed workers employed by 
the railways.) Some time in 1939 more than 1,000 togt workers elected 
Zulu Phungula as their leader. Phungula was a migrant worker from the 
Ixopo district in Natal and became a fiery popul ist leader who would be a 
key figure in the struggles of the dock workers. 19 His style of leadership 
was clearly distinguishable from that of the urbanized intelligentsia who led 
the African trade unions during the war years based on the administrative 
recognition granted to unregistered unions during that period. 
There was a considerable increase of working class action during the 
Second World War brought about by increased organization, rising prices, 
and expanded production. In 1939 there were five strikes in Natal by 
326 
African workers in whaling, timber, excavation, and coal mining, and in 
the country as a whole there was increased strike activity. The state 
responded by providing increased controls over strike action and the mobility 
of labour and by increasing the activity of the Wage Board to provide 
remedial action. 20 The process of wage investigation and setting of mini-
mum wage I evels by the Wage Board set in motion by the wage demands of 
African workers in 1937 in Durban considerably heightened the conscious-
ness of dock workers and led to a militant upsurge in strike activity. Follow-
ing its investigation the Wage Board published a wage determination for 
unskilled labour on 27 September 1940, of a minimum wage of 20s a week 
and 4s a day which benefited 11 ,410 out of a total of 15,528 workers. 
The togt workers who were already earning 4s a day did not benefit at all 
even though their skills were acknowledged. The Wage Board said that it 
had not been possible to separate out the stevedoring togt workers for a 
higher wage despite a recognition that 'their work requires greater care and 
skill'. 
It is to be noted that the wages recommended, whilst they 
involved the maximum load which the employers concerned 
(i. e. as a whole) may reasonably be asked to carry, do not 
directly benefit what may be regarded as the most advanced 
class of the harbour workers, namely the daily paid steve-
doring employees. The reason is ••• that some of the 
employers utilize 'togt' monthly, and contract labour for the 
combined trades of stevedoring and bunkering, and the inc-
rease recommended for the two latter classes is as much as 
the employer can at this stage carry. 21 
Although their position relative to the average unskilled labourer's wage had 
deteriorated, the dock workers were experiencing a fairly high level of employ-
ment because of stimulated war production. In the year 1939/40 the 
harbour tonnage landed at Durban exceeded two mi I t ion tons for on Iy the 
third time in the history of the port and the total tonnage handled increased 
by 493,911 tons over the previous twelve-month period. 22 During May 1941, 
eight months after the wage determination came into operation, four spokesmen 
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for the dock workers submitted demands for 8s a day to the Commissioner 
of Native Affairs in Durban. A counter offer was made but not accepted 
23 by the workers. The demands were then backed up by short-term strike 
action on 27 May. There then fo I lowed a lengthy correspondence bet-
ween the employers {who argued no significant wage increases were possible} 
and the Department of Labour {who felt an increase to 5s a day was reason-
able} • 
Following two other strikes among African workers in July, the steve-
doring workers came out on strike on 17 August 1941 in support of demands 
for 8s a day and lOs for working on Sundays. The strike began initially at 
the Bell Street togt barracks, but soon spread throughout all barracks housing 
dock workers. 24 Some 1,000 railway workers on the wharves were unable 
to work and the docks came to a standstill. The dock workers gathered 
around the compounds in Bell Street quietly discussing their grievances and 
listening to speeches by their leaders. A meeting of municipal officials, 
employers, and the police was held on the same day. The stevedoring 
employers now argued that they did not object to any increase {the costs 
would be simply transferred to the shipping companies they served}, but that 
the change in wages would have to be imposed by government regulations 
because of long-term contractual obi i gat ions in the stevedoring trade. At 
this stage the Department of Labour which was acting to attempt to defuse 
strike situations for fear of general working class action felt that the employers 
were stalling on the issue. The Divisional Inspector of Labour, J. P. Martens, 
reported that: 'The employers hitherto have not been helpful and are in my 
opinion shielding behind the National Emergency. Irrevocable long-term 
contracts are a useful excuse but such contracts should not be entered into 
while operating under a Determination with the possibility always present of 
demands for improvement I • 25 During the negotiations between the authori-
ties and employers a specific wage investigation into the stevedoring trade 
was rejected as too cumbersome and time-consuming and it was decided to 
call in Ivan Walker, who had been appointed the Controller of Industrial 
Manpower in terms of war regulations, to ratify wage increases through 
I . . I' 26 proc OImlng emergency regu atlons. 
Since a strike in the harbour affected the strategic shipping situa-
tion, Walker was rushed down from Pretoria and discussed the wage issue 
with two representatives of the dock workers: Zulu Phungula and Willie 
Kumalo. He chaired a meeting of employers and authorities27 the day 
after the strike had begun and brought about agreement between employers 
and state officials on a similar basis to that originally proposed by the 
Department of Labour: 4s 6d a day, a cost of living allowance of not less 
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than 6d a day, and special rates for overtime. The workers' representatives 
did not agree to these proposals as they were 'not at the notch' which they 
wanted, but the workers agreed to go back to work. Despite this pro-
posal, which was later officially published,28 the dock workers had not 
accepted that the wage issue was closed. The stevedoring trade was 
declared a 'controlled industry' in terms of War Measure No 6 of 1941 
which gave the Controller of Industrial Manpower powers to regulate employ-
ment, wages and working conditions, and to settle any labour dispute. 29 
The arbitrary methods used and the low level of wages prescribed aroused the 
hostility of the trade unions and social movements. The Guardian con-
cluded that the Government had brought the strike to an end 'without com-
pelling the employers to make any substantial concessions to the workers', 
and that Walker's action had struck a blow against all dock workers in 
South Africa. In Cape Town dockers were already earning 8s 8d a day 
and state intervention and the use of war regulations as a strike-breaking 
d 
. . 30 
weapon could undermine tra e union action. 
The dock workers persisted in their demand for 8s a day and drew 
upon the contradictory nature of the wage regulations which had not covered 
the position of railway workers. Fearing further strike action after a 
round of strikes by other African workers towards the end of 1941 negotia-
tions started once again, and the railways system manager called together 
a meeting of railway officia Is and representatives of tegt workers on 11 
March 1942. Phungula argued that the stevedoring employers had 
offered to pay any wage laid down by the government and had agreed to 
31 pay 8s per day, but now the workers had been cheated out of their inc-
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rease. He attempted to drive a wedge between the state officials and the 
employers, 'it would seem that the government is refusing to give us 8s per 
day, because our employers have already agreed that we should get the 8s' .32 
He said the workers had concluded that the government was withholding the 
wage increases. Workers had to pay for accommodation at work, dipping 
of cattle, taxation, and were now also being asked to contribute towards 
the Paramount Chief's War Fund, he argued. In putting forward the wage 
demands of the dock workers Phungula was arguing for the dock workers to be 
accepted as full proletarians (i .e. rejecting the conception of a rural sub-
sidy) and to be paid a wage which would enable workers and their families 
to live under urban conditions, arguing for increased wages for productive 
workers as opposed to white clerical workers, and implicitly rejecting 
'scientific' notions such as the poverty datum line as a standard for wage 
increases. He argued from the perceived necessities of urban workers, 
but without adopting a trade unionist conception of a wage demand (i.e. 
existing wage + x per cent). Reflecting the revolutionary aspirations of 
the togt workers he put forward a bold wage demand (25s a day) which was 
several times the existing wages of the workers. In his arguments he 
brought out the fundamental and irreconcilable conflict between the 
revolutionary expectations and needs of the working class and the impoverish-
ment of the workers under capital ism. 
We have been taught by the Europeans what to eat and we like 
to eat the same things as the European, for instance eggs and 
tea in the mornings, we would I ike to fly in aeroplanes and 
drive round in motor cars. The shops are full of clothes and 
motor cars, but we cannot buy these things because we have no 
money .•. We do not want 8s a day, we want 25s a day 
(the wage of white clerks employed by the stevedoring com-
panies). Even if we get 8s a day we will not be satisfied. 
If we had not agreed with our masters for 8s we would not 
have asked for that today ••• the government only gives us 
an empty dish to lick. 33 
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Walker denied outright that it had ever been agreed to pay 8s and said there 
must have been some misunderstanding between the workers and the steve-
doring employers. The authorities had an interest in denying this increase 
{which was the existing wage level in the Cape Town docks} as it would have 
changed the cost structure of transport and threatened the whole structure of 
wages in Durban. Walker debated the issue for a wh ile and then issued an 
ultimatum: if the workers did not wish to work for less than 8s they could 
Igo home l and other workers would be recruited. Phungula rejected these 
alternatives and countered the threat by telling the officials, Ithe govern-
ment must show us where to go because our homes are here in Durban I. 
The argument between Phungula and Walker was not over whether the dock 
workers were migrants who were forced to maintain their links with the land 
because urban rights were denied to them but over the working class right to 
work which was being denied by the state. Phungula was in effect arguing 
that African workers were fully proletarianized and challenging the state's 
powers to crush the organization of workers and allocate labour in the 
interests of the employers. Walker's ultimatum showed a new level of 
determination by the authorities to deal decisively with the particular con-
ditions of class struggle in Durban and to maintain the overall level of labour 
circulation in the Durban labour market by restricting the workers' rights to a 
level of wages which would permit complete proletarianization. When 
necessary the authorities were prepared to make use of the reserve supply of 
dock labour (to be obtained by breaking organized action and by recruiting 
those not then employed from the urban area), and if this failed, to draw 
upon the relative surplus population in the rural areas. 
Despite the ultimatum and the steved.)ring trade having been dec-
lared a 'controlled industry', a further strike broke out on 28 July 1942 in 
support of the workers' demands. The war government was placed in a 
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quandary by this latest strike as it did not want to disrupt shipping or 
recruitment of Africans to the army even further by punitive counter action. 
At the same time there was strong pressure for the authorities to come to 
terms with the strikers because of the strategic implications of the major port 
being disrupted when the movement of war material was essential. The 
strike came under the control of Phungula and ten committee members. 
Two days after the strike had begun he was arrested, but then brought out 
of prison the following day on condition that he urge the workers to return 
to work. But when he was brought before the strikers by the police, he 
told them to carry on. The article which appeared in Inkululeko written 
by Wilson Cele (a journalist/trade unionist of the Communist Party) gives a 
vivid account of the oratory and colour of the event. 
When Phungula got out of the car with the police, he greeted 
the people in the style of Shaka: 'Bayete Zulu'. He then 
started to address the publ ic: 'The Dutch people have seen 
that General Botha had fought for them and today they say that 
the Natives are good; we better fight and die for what we 
want until we get it. I do not know what will be the outcome 
of it as they have now even taken our country. Look, we now 
dig gold for them, diamonds for them, and all they do is to sit on 
the chairs wh ich can even reach heaven. What makes them 
not to give us enough money to feed our children?' 
The Europeans said: 'Well, go to work'. The strikers said 
'We won't go', and some of the strikers started speaking to the 
public. When the white people found out that the strikers 
were not prepared to go to work, they asked Phungula to tell 
them that if they went to work he would be released. One of 
the committee members then asked the white people if they 
thought that it was Phungula's strike, and told them that all the 
strikers were after was money. After the meeting, Mr. Phun-
gula told the public that he was prepared to go to jail and that 
the strike should continue. 34 
In his speech Phungula brought out the political dimensions of the 
struggles of the black working class despite some moments of confusion 
{which could have arisen in transcription and from the official translation}. 
His uncompromising militancy, and the inability of the state to co-opt him 
despite considerable pressure, his radical style and imagery, all reflected 
the type of leadership expected by the dock workers. 
The strike which came at a time when the Communist Party of South 
Africa and other left-wing groups were mobilizing support for a Second 
Front in Europe did not initially enjoy their support. The first report of 
the strike in The Guardian described the workers as being 'engaged on vital 
work for the war effort, and their refusal to work means a serious hold-up 
for the many ships tied up at the quays ides in the Bay', and subsequently 
wrote approvingly of Walker's intervention. 35 These views reflected the 
policy of the Communist Party 'towards a peaceful settlement of disputes 
and avoiding of any strikes or any other action that wi II hinder the war 
36 
effort I • The hostility of The Guardian to the independent action taken 
by the togt workers was only overcome after the drastic action taken by the 
state to reassert control in the docks had aroused angry protests from the 
labour movement. 
The strategy of using Phungula as a hostage having failed, Walker 
finally promulgated War Measure 86 on 31 July 1942 which gave the police 
the authority to expel any togt worker from the municipal area if he refused 
to work at the prescribed wage. Any labourer refusing to work under 
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these conditions could be fined up to £25 {equivalent to about 100 day's work 
for togt labourers} or imprisonment for six months or be liable to both fine 
and imprisonment. The state used th is extreme measure to break the strike 
as the togt workers ' demands posed a challenge to the general level of 
unskilled wages in Durban. As it was, strike action gained momentum 
among African workers in industries employing migrant workers in Durban 
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and its hinterland: in brick and tile, plaster boards, quarrying, and 
sugar. A fundamental problem faced by the authorities was the loose 
form of control over employment at the docks; the togt system regulated 
only the relationship between workers and their employers during their work-
ing hours and if the labourers decided not to work on a particular day there 
was not much that could be done in terms of the law that could force A,em 
to return to work apart from deportation from the urban area. Contract 
labour would have made the workers liable to prosecution for breach of 
contract, but was not considered as appropriate to the labour process in the 
docks at this stage. 
The local press reported that by 4 August all the registered togt 
workers had returned to work after the promulgation of special war measures. 
It was reported that Major A. J. Smart, District Commandant of the Police, 
was appointed to give effect to the regulations but had found the use of force 
to be unnecessary as the workers had returned. By the next day, however, 
the Natal Mercury carried the news that 'prompt steps were taken to replace 
the togt labour and the position is now normal'. 37 Apparently the strike 
of the togt workers had been broken by African troops sent clown from Lady-
smith despite qualms about the effect of strike-breaking on the military 
recruitment drive, and it was by no means certain when full work activity 
was resumed at the docks. These official decisions aroused the anger of 
the Cape Town Stevedoring and .Dock Workers Union (CTSDWU) which 
expressed 'strong dissatisfaction' with the repression of strike action at a 
general meeting on 5 August. 38 It was decided to send a deputation from 
the CTSDWU to Durban to establish a branch of the union there. Phungula 
was committed for trial on charges of incitement to violence after being 
remanded several times. Eventually he was granted bail of £ 15 provided 
he did not address meetings of his fellow workers unless an Inspector of Labour 
was present. Advocate Harry Bloom in asking for bail pointed out that 
Phungula was recognized as I~ader by togt workers and 'could be of special 
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assistance in present negotiations to convert the dockers into a trade union 
along the lines of the Cape dock workers' • The Secretary of the CTSDWU, 
F. C. Welcome, arrived in Durban and reported that progress was being made 
in the formation of a branch of the union, with Bloom apparently the mid-
wife of the new organ ization. The local Department of Labour apparently 
accepted these conditions and encouraged Phungula to form a trade union 
which could be given official recognition. While he was still awaiting 
trial for inc itement in September, Phungula was appo inted organ izer of the 
CTSDWU in Durban, and with F.C. Welcome and J. Veldtman held several 
meetings at the Bell Street barracks. 39 
These exceptional circumstances and the semi-official character of 
intervention by the Cape trade unionists provide the basis for understanding 
the form of trade unionism wh ich was expected would emerge. The Cape 
trade unionists presented trade unionism as a conciliatory organization 
which could engage in negotiations with employers gradually to improve 
wages and conditions. Strike action by workers was discouraged in favour 
of 'constitutional' advances. Presenting themselves as experienced leaders 
of dock workers, the Cape unionists blurred over the vast differences in con-
ditions of struggle in both ports; the revolutionary struggles of the togt 
workers against the police and employers and their impressive strike record 
were ignored or denigrated. They also forgot to mention that no improve-
ments in wages had been secured by the CTSDWU from its formation up to 
1942; illusions were created that the higher wages 'traditionally' paid to 
labourers in Cape Town could be attained by the Durban labourers by nego-
tiations with employers. They also did not explain how the CTSDWU was 
able to exist as a 'constitutional' organization and gain registration in terms 
of the Industrial Conciliation Act - because of the presence of Coloured 
workers and Africans who, in the Cape, were not forced to carry passes until 
much later than workers in other provinces. Welcome told the workers 
that the present wage of 4s 'over which there had been several fruitless 
clashes with employers' was barely equal to what Cape Town dockers had 
got in 1919. He spelt out a strategy for organization and negotiated 
improvements which provided for increased wage differentiation among the 
workers, an issue which had not been raised previously as a demand of the 
, 40 
workers as a whole. 'By strictly constitutional means, using the 
mach inery of negotiation, Cape stevedores through their union had raised 
the average wage to 8s a day, with corresponding increases for winchmen, 
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gangwaymen and foremen. ' The trade union was enthusiastically accepted 
by the dockers who turned down Welcome's proposal of a weekly subscription 
of 6d which they considered too small and demanded that the subscription be 
1s. The workers also agreed to levy their members to raise a fund for the 
defence of Phungula. Abel M. S. Mhlongo was elected secretary respon-
sible to a small committee. In September he wrote to the local Divisional 
Inspector requesting recognition in respectful terms. 'It is hoped that 
from henceforth grievances will be settled on constitutional lines, also that 
power tactics will be on both sides avoided'. 41 After leaving Durban, 
Veldtman subsequently wro'te to the South African Police in Durban that 
peaceful negotiations would be used by togt workers and that there wou Id be 
no more retarding of the war effort. 42 By adopting the administrative form 
of trade unionism and open organization Phungula and the dock workers had 
by no means moderated their position or accepted collective bargaining 
through wage differentiation. A subsequent letter by Phungula and 
Mhlongo to the Controller of Industrial Manpower in Pretoria made further 
43 
demands of the order of a flat rate of 25s per day and more. Phungula 
was told that any further strike action would lead to the immediate replace-
ment of the workers, and against this background he accepted the concessions 
on the terms offered, i.e. a wage freeze binding for two years. On this 
basis the state secured industrial peace in the harbour for the war years. 
Trade unions and the suppression of working class action 
Having secured its position in the harbour, the state was able to 
deal firmly with strike action in other industries in Durban, particularly 
with those strikes involving joint action between African and Indian 
workers of which there were a number in late 1942 in the paper, laundry, 
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and textile industries. 44 As a result of inter-racial cooperation initiated 
and sustained by the Communist Party in Durban, a number of parallel and 
independent African trade unions had been formed in the early 1940s. 
Although the Communist Party provided the stimulus and resources for these 
unions, there was little central direction and control and a variety of ten-
dencies developed, particularly as a number of registered trade unions 
developed parallel unions for African workers under their control. Apart 
from those unions formed by members of the Communist Party there were a 
group of unions with a definite Africanist tendency {of whom Jacob Nyaose, 
later a leading trade unionist in the Federation of Free African Trade Unions, 
was the foremost}, and another section subordinated to the registered trade 
unions {particularly thase in the garment and furniture industries}. As the 
number of African workers in manufacturing industry increased, a united 
working class was essential for strike action to be successful. Such unity 
in the paper board making industry {where African workers were in the 
majority} and in the textile industry (where Indian workers were dominant) 
secured victories in both cases in 1942. 45 
The successful thrust of workers' organization and the growth of 
working class unity not only in Natal but more particularly in the Transvaal, 
where there were a number of serious strikes and mass unrest towards the end 
of 1942, brought a concerted counter-attack by employers and the state. 
On 19 December the Government proclaimed War Measure 145 of 1942 
which outlawed strikes by African workers, exposed strikers to a prohibitive 
maximum penalty of a £500 fine or three years' imprisonment, and imposed 
. 46 
compulsory arbitration at the discretion of the Minister of Labour. As 
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the Simons argue, the measure confirmed the subordinate position of African 
workers even though it was immediately designed to meet a particularly 
forceful upsurge of strike action. 47 
The strike wave, which included Durban dock workers, had shaken 
the confidence of the rul ing class and threatened to sweep into strategic 
sectors such as power and mining. Most of the strikes involved migrant 
workers in the towns who were determined to overturn the cheap labour 
system wi th demands for a I iving wage. The strike movement was wrongly 
by Ik SiHr8rlS 
characterized.{as 'sporadic' and 'local' and canalizing the workers' aspira-
tions 'in well-worn grooves' making no lasting impression on wage patterns 
or opportunities for employment. 48 Strikes wh ich spread throughout the 
major industrial centres and even into plantation agriculture brought about 
the most rapid and sustained increase in African wages before the 1973 
strikes. 49 The state responded by offering the false promise of eventual 
full recognition to African trade unions who were expected to discipline 
their members and by stepping up the activity of the Wage Board. Before 
the end of 1943, however, the reforms and adjustments made by the state in 
the face of working class pressure had come to an end as the counter-
revolution of the post-war period became evident. In Durban employers 
responded to militant working class action by attempting to build company 
unions and by an increasingly coordinated response to crush strikes. The 
suppression of strike action at Dunlop rubber factory marks a watershed in 
the momentum and direction of working class organization. 
The strike at Dunlop, which broke out late in Decembe4 1942 in 
response to the imposition of a company union and the dismissal of members 
of thenorrracial Rubber Workers' Union, was decisive in undermining radical 
leadership in registered trade unions and in causing distrust and hostil ity 
between Indian and African workers. During the strike for the reinstate-
ment of the victimized workers and for recognition of the union which was 
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supported by Indian and African members, the employers resorted to 
recruiting African workers from the reserves in busloads.
50 
Despite a 
prolonged and bitter struggle supported by the left-wing of the labour movement 
and particularly by Zulu Phungula, Philemon Tsele of the SARH Workers' 
Union, and Gladman Nxumalo of the Metal Workers' Union, the union 
members were replaced and no further Indian workers employed. Whi Ie 
there were 378 African workers employed in December 1942, in January 1943, 
290 of these workers were dismissed, and 581 new workers taken on, dis-
placing Indian and African union members. African employment increased 
to a peak of 1,250 workers in June and July 1945 and the company was con-
fident enough to have a survey of the African labour force made in the 
. d· 51· Th h I h Imme late post-war years. roug a se ective use of t e reserve army 
of labour, in this case as strike breakers, labour militancy was curbed for 
the rest of the war period and non-racial trade unionism blunted. Zulu 
Phungula, who was possibly the only person capable of providing inspired 
leadership to migrant workers was banished from the Durban area for five 
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years. 
Almost simultaneously with the deportation of Phungula the Railway 
and Harbour Non-European Workers' Union was formed to include African, 
Coloured and Indian workers as members. 53 As important as the repressive 
role of the state was the response of employers. Management from multi-
national companies (Dunlop's played a leading role) and from sectors of 
industry in Durban such as the textile industry and stevedoring trade, 
coalesced in the wake of the Dunlop strike to form the Natal Employers' 
Association. This Association aimed to provide specialist information on 
labour issues and 'to enable industry to present a united front to extravagant 
demands of organized labour', in particular the left trade unions. The 
Association was to prove essential in coordinating the policies of employers 
in different firms and industries towards trade unions, and the interests of 
employers and the state in regard to measures to suppress strike action, and 
implement effectively urban regulations directing the flow of African labour 
supply. 
Whi Ie the Dunlop strike had the effect of increasing the coordina-
tion of the employers I response to organized working class action it also 
had the corresponding negative effect of heightening the problems of 
working class unity_ The strike accentuated the tendency for pol itical 
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activists in the Indian community to be diverted from working class organiza-
tion {in particular from the organization of unregistered trade unions of 
Indian and African workers} towards pol itical action in defence of the Indian 
community. While Communists had taken a leading role in the establish-
ment of trade unions of Indian and African workers in the early 19405, 
towards the end of the 1940s these unions were described by Ringrose as 
being basically apolitical and having only limited links with political move-
ments such as sharing the same offices. 54 The direction of political action 
was more towards aggressive defence of the trading, investment, and residen-
tial rights of Indian people (the African National Congress in Natal, led by 
A_ W. G. Champion, at this time being virtually dormant and almost limited 
to a pressure group making the same demands for the African people) _ The 
tendency among Indian workers was towards inward-looking trade unionism 
keenly aware of the necessity of protecting selected industries and occupa-
tions for Indian employment. In the atmosphere of political independence 
for India and the excitement of the passive resistance campaign of 1946,55 
contact between Indian and African workers and trade unionists became 
superficial. More than that, at a time when Indian traders and landowners 
- d _. f h 56 I·t- I b-I-were coming un er increasing pressure rom testate, po I Ica mo I Iza-
tion in the struggle against segregation of the Indian community subordinated 
Indian trade unions and workers to the defence of the Indian petty-bourgo isie. 
In evidence to the Nata I Indian Judicial Commission, the secretary of the 
Chemical Industry Employees' Union, E. J_ Moolla, said that White agitation 
against Indians acquiring property was aimed at stopping Indians from com-
peting economically as a capitalist class. 
The Indians in hostels and as servants in houses were not 
objected to, but directly an Indian acquired property 
near a European the cry was raised of Indian penetration. 
That showed that the opposition was to the economic advance-
ment of the Indian. 
Mr. A. L. Borns (Member of Commission): Do you want the 
Indian to become a capitalist class? 
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Mr. Moolla: In the present constitution of South Africa, yes. 57 
In this situation the tendency was for African trade unions in Durban to 
develop 'on their own lines' and to avoid collective action with registered 
trade unians. Many of these unions took on a strong Africanist flavour, 
while some of the largest Indian trade unions {for example, the Garment 
Workers' Union and the Furniture Workers' Industrial Union} were actually 
opposed to close cooperation between Indian and African workers. There 
was undoubtedly an increase in hostil ity between African and Indian workers 
during this period. African workers saw the expansion of industrial employ-
ment and upward mobility in certain industries and occupations (for example, 
municipal employment and weaving) as being blocked by Indian workers. 
The rapid expansion of employment in manufacturing during the war years 
to some extent obscured this problem, but with the down turn of economic 
growth in the immediate post-war period, the lines of demarcation became 
clearer. 
In other respects, however, although the relationship between .African 
workers and the Indian petty bourgeoisie was basically exploitative, Indian 
enterprises did enable African workers and their families to break out of the 
straitjacket of municipal control. Indian traders provided the basic infra-
structure of the squatters' slums: the bus services and retail outlets - the 
services which could be provided because of the particular position of 
Indian people as a 'buffer group' in the racial hierarchy of urban segregation. 
In the Cato Manor area on land owned by Indian people, there were only a 
few shacks in 1932- by 1939 their number had grown to 500, and by 1944 
there were some 3,000 shacks housing about 17,000 African people. 58 
About half of the African population in Durban was estima ted to be living 
in shack slums on Indian-owned land at this time. Some of these people 
were dock workers who caught the early buses into the harbour area. 
Proletarianization, influx control and unemployment insurance 
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During the war years there was an undoubted increase in the number 
of Africans who were forced into wage labour through the degeneration of 
the rural economy in the reserves and the appl ication of government regula-
tions to redistribute land to locate the growing numbers of landless workers 
in the reserves and not in the urban areas. The numerous government 
commissions which investigated the conditions of rural impoverishment in the 
reserves merely recognized a process which was already well advanced: 
considerable inequal ity among the residents of the reserves, the growth of 
a landless and cattleless African rural proletariat totally dependent on wage 
labour for its reproduction, and a large proportion of African workers who 
owned some cattle and had limited rights to arable land for whom agricultural 
production met only a small amount of their material needs and who were also 
basica lIy dependent on wage -labour. One after the other the commissions 
and other contemporary reports describe the conditions of decl ine in agri-
cultural production, massive erosion, ill-health, and permanent dependence 
on food imports to feed the reserve population. While many of the reports 
describe the growing inequal ity of income, the wide ranges of ownership of 
cattle and access to land, none of them describe any significant peasant 
59 
economy for even the better endowed. The Lansdown Commission which 
acknowledged the differentiation in ownership of cattle and access to arable 
land argued that the Africans who came to work on the mines fell below the 
average in income and formed part of the 'poorer class' of worker-peasants, 
who were totally dependent on wage labour. 'For those natives who own 
no land or stock the Reserve subsistence is but a myth, and it is no doubt 
this class who find it necessary to work almost continuously on the mine with 
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only brief periods of stay in the Reserves'. 60 Despite a large group of 
workers having no agricultural subsidy to their wages, the state increased 
its efforts during the 1940s to force African workers to maintain their rural 
ties through proclamations requiring rural residents to return regularly to 
keep up their rights to land, through the establishment of 'villages' for the 
landless, ,and also through the operation of the Urban Areas Act which made 
it extremely difficult for African people not born in the urban areas to 
qualify for residence. Despite these regulations and pol icies this period 
saw an acceleration in the number of African workers who brought their 
famit ies to the urban areas and demanded the rights to urban working class 
residence and a level of wages appropriate to the cost of the reproduction of 
their labour in urban conditions. 
Material factors increased the dependence on wage labour and a 
further decline in subsistence agriculture in Natal. Drought conditions 
were widespread during the period 1944/45 (with the exception of the 
southern coastal areas), and the Msinga and Ladysmith areas were particularly 
badly hit, the latter being declared a drought area. Cattle losses were 
particularly heavy in Msinga, Ladysmith, Nongoma, and Hlabisa districts, 
and there was a severe shortage of the staple mealies. 61 The following 
year 1945/46 did not bring rei ief. There was drought again in many areas 
of the province, a severe loss of cattle, and a great reduction in harvests. 
As in the previous year, special arrangements had to be made to ensure that 
the available mealie supplies were equitably distributed. 62 The migrant 
workers of Natal and Zululand had experienced considerable impoverishment 
by the end of the 1940s. In some areas it would not be an exaggeration 
to talk of the collapse of significant agricultural production, while in the 
few districts where cereal production was increasing the total output only 
supported a fraction of the total population of the district. 63 Rapidly 
declining agricultural production meant that the amount of maize imported 
into each district increased proportionately, which resulted in heavier 
dependence on wage labour by migrant workers. Those migrant workers 
who were trying to maintain their links with the reserves and same level af 
subsistence agriculture, both of which required cattle, suffered losses 
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heavi er than those of Africans in other reserves. The maintenance of the 
cattle population despite losses of over ten per cent in anyone year must 
have required a considerable cost; at £5 each the 611,000 cattle which 
died during the four years in the table would have cost in the region of 
£3 million. 
Table 5. 1 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
Source: 
Cattle losses in Natal reserves 
Cattle owned Losses Nata I losses A II reserves 
(OOO) (000) per cent per cent 
1, 106 195 17.6 13.6 
1,048 162 15.5 11.3 
1,058 118 10.9 10.3 
1, 111 136 12.2 11. 1 
Department of ,Agricultural Economics and Marketing, 1961, 
Handbook of ,Agricultural Statistics, 1904-1950, pp. 18 and 37. 
There was a considerable rncrease in the number of African workers 
seeking employment during the 1940s and specific measures to control the 
movement of labour were proposed. In response to the fluctuations in 
employment and the increased flow of migrant labour to Durban, for the 
first time the implementation of influx control was seriously considered. 
The initial controls over the direction of the flow of labour were, however, 
controls over the movement from the reserve araas (now in the language of 
separate development, 'eflux control'). On completion of large-scale 
war contracts for the Defence Department and the Admiralty in 1944, 
large numbers of African workers were thrown out of work and suggestions 
were made to restrict the flow of labour to the ci ty. At the request of 
the City Council the Chief Native Commissioner circularized all magis-
trates in Natal and Zululand to restrict the flow of labour to Durban until 
employment expanded again. 64 By June 1944, Philemon Tsele, Chair-
man of the local Anti-Pass Committee in Durban, reported that the pass 
laws were again being rigidly enforced with police raids at night and 
deportation from Durban for two years for those considered 'idlers'. 65 
The considerable decl ine in employment between 1945-47 was probably 
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the stimulus for the formula agreed upon in 1946 to tighten controls over 
the presence of Africons in Durban and to initiate criminal proceedings 
against those workers not registered with the Native Admin istration Depart-
66 
ment. 
Arising from increased resistance to representative bodies (parti-
cularly a move to boycott the Native Representative Council and local 
elections), demonstrations in the city, and antagonism to the tightening 
of controls over the mobility of African people, a Commission was appointed 
to investigate the grievances of Africans in 1947. Th is Commission 
examined the provision of housing (which was the major complaint of the 
witnesses) and considered the various arguments over the location of the 
industrial army of labour. Justice F. N. Broome, the Commissioner, 
reported that most Whites thought the 'Native problem' of Durban could be 
solved by expelling redundant African workers from the area. Representa-
tive of this opinion was an article in a Durban newspaper which reported 
that between 3,000 and 4,000 African 'vagrants' had been deported to the 
reserves by the Native Affairs Department in 1947. 'Substantial as this 
number is, the problem of Durban's surplus Native population is as serious 
as ever •.• " the newspaper concluded. Broome disagreed with this 
analysis and defended the maintenance of a reserve supply of labour within 
the urban area to meet the requirements of seasonal industries {Durban has 
a marked holiday season} and the harbour. 
The demands of industry .•• fluctuate; all Native labourers 
cannot be employed all the time. But the requirements of 
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industry demand that there shall be readily available a reser-
voir of labour that can be drawn upon to meet seasonal demands. 
This is particularly the case in the harbour area. 67 
The arguments over the necessity of maintaining the reserve supply of 
labourers in the urban area and the contrary demands of agriculture came to 
a head over the issue of unemployment insurance for African workers. The 
implementation of the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1946 made possible a 
relatively stable urban proletariat to meet the fluctuations in the demand for 
industrially experienced African labour. The Act, insofar as it included 
African workers, existed in contradiction to the arguments of a reserve sub-
sidy to the wage labour of African workers and recognized by implication 
an urban proletariat with no links to the reserves. Since the Act did not 
expressly exclude migrant workers it received the fierce opposition of agri-
cultural employers who complained vociferously that migrant labour was 
being diverted from agriculture to industry. 68 Following an allegation by 
the Assistant Native Commissioner for Natal that large numbers of African 
workers were drawing benefits from the unemployment insurance fund, agri-
cultural employers inundated Members of Parliament with letters and tele-
grams demanding that Africans should be excluded from the Act entirely and 
that unemployed workers be placed in agricultural employment. 69 
Despite the continued increase in African employment in industry in 
the late 1940s, African workers struggl ing to maintain themselves and their 
fami! ies in urban conditions were under pressure from Native Administration 
officials, landowners threatening eviction, and declining real wages. 
The few benefits for urban African workers and recogni tion oJ urban rights 
were being undermined and would be restricted later. 
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General strike or racial conflict? 
During the late 1940s the left in the South African Indian Congress 
won its ascendency through championing the demands of the Indian people 
against segregationary measures, and against the vacillation of the pol itical 
leadership of the Indian trading class. This campaign involved a broad 
alliance between petty bourgeois strata (e.g. the Indian traders, teachers, 
landowners, and professionals) and the Indian workers, but was not an inward 
looking movement. By 1947 the left within the South African Indian 
Congress was strong enough to lead to the Dadoo-Xuma-Naicker pact which 
heralded the growing cooperation of the South African Indian Congress and 
the A fri can Nat iona I Congress. Despite these achievements of the new 
leaders who 'were radicals fixed with a burning desire to articulate in a 
forthright, militant manner the grievances and aspirations of the Indian 
people,70 the unity of African and Indian workers in Durban was distant 
and the brood cooperation and collective organization of the early 1940s 
had disintegrated. In advancing the struggle against all forms of racial 
oppression experienced by t~e Indian people the Indian working class leader-
ship was brought into direct support for mass campaigns taking up the demands 
of the Indian petty bourgeoisie, a group which had an exploitative relation-
ship with the masses of African people. In response to the increasingly 
militant advance of the interests of the Indian people by the left leadership 
in the South African Indian Congress, a basis for common political cam-
paigns with the African people was created (as argued by Pahad), but also 
distrust of the motives of Indian politicians was voiced (most emphatically 
by the trading section of the African petty bourgeoisie). 71 
The immediate post-war period was characterized not by united 
working class action but by the growth of an African cooperative movement 
which included many African workers (at least two of the cooperatives were 
based on compounds). By June 1946 there were 95 cooper:ltives aHil iated 
to the Bantu Cooperative Society, most of which were buying clubs. 
These cooperatives (popularly known as Nabantukop) penetrated the rural 
areas and 'whipped up considerable enthusiasm •.• particularly because of 
its nationalistic slogan of "Mazibuye Emasisweni": "Let them (our cattle 
and our wealth) come back from foreigners~ 11 • .72 The journal of the 
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Bantu Cooperative Society, U kubambisana, carried reports on the growth of 
the movement and also exposures of the prices of goods in Indian shops. 73 
The revival of the cooperative movement among African people in the post-
war period continued a I ine of Cathol ic thought and action initiated by 
Father Bernard Huss which aimed at developing popular movements led by 
Christians which could displace mass organizations which tended towards 
'1' k' I . d M . I 74 ml Itant wor mg c ass action an arxlst anguage. 
The African trade union movement which was described as not com-
paring unfavourably with similar movements in other areas was in a state of 
decay. The movement was weakened by a lack of stabil ity rather than by 
a decrease in the number of unions. There was a lack of cooperation 
between them, and no African organization in Natal could claim to represent 
the movement as a whole. The nearest approach was the Natal Federation 
of African Trade Unions which had five unions affiliated in 1947 and which 
took an Africanist perspective and rejected non-African members. 'It 
would not accept as a member any union which had non-Natives in its 
membership roll, or which had a political creed.' The Federation, which 
was described as 'neither very active nor very representative' in 1947, was 
moribund by 1948. 75 Gilbert Coka {who stood trial after the 1946 strike 
of African mine workers} described the trade unions in 1948 as 'fast going to 
76 
sleep' and argued there had been a backward trend in political organization. 
In comparison to the early war years there was a decline in strike activity 
although strikes continued in industries likely to employ migrant workers: 
sugar plantations, dairy, and quarrying. Emergency regulations intro-
duced during the war were not withdrawn and there was a tendency to 
tighten controls both over the residence of African workers in town and at 
348 
the workplace, and to prosecute workers who Came out on strike. The 
employers in the docks produced a new series of regulations which were 
only withdrawn after decisive resistance by the workers. The new regula-
tions laid down that if the workers went on leave for three months or more 
they would be dismissed on return, or be re-employed as beginners at a 
lower wage. Workers were also told they would be penalized if any of 
them stopped work to meet relatives {who would have come long distances 
to see them} or if they arrived late for work. When these regulations 
were explained to the workers early in June 1948 they immediately came 
out on strike and some 2,000 workers marched to the railway system manager's 
office. The manager refused to come out and the workers were told to 
appoint a delegation. They refused, demanded that the regulations be 
withdrawn immediately, and argued with officia Is for several hours. They 
only returned to work when assured that the regulations would be reconsidered 
and warned that if the regulations were not withdrawn altogether, they would 
'k . 77 stn e again. 
The incident displayed the uneasiness of the workers after the war at 
finding that the material sacrifices which had been imposed on them as part 
of the war effort were being intensified. Zulu Phungula, who had com-
pleted his term of banishment, openly returned78 to Durban in 1948 to take 
up his former occupation as a togt worker. On 20 September 1948 he 
issued a report on the increased impoverishment of African workers; des-
cribing both the problems of getting employment, the needs of squatters, 
and the problems of the rura I popu lation. 79 What was needed was an 
expansion of employment for the waves of migrant workers streaming into 
Durban: 'One generation came in yesterday (by train) ... all this genera-
tion will never get work. I Women were settling in town with the aim of 
supplementing male wages to provide collectively for the children and 
ill icit brewing (isigata) was essential for the fami Iy to survive. Peasant 
production, he argued, was becoming impossible because the land hod been 
appropriated by the state for white farmers ('its all farms allover') and 
intensive farming required a much higher level of capital investment. 
Rural food production was becoming impossible for the most impoverished 
peasants who no longer owned oxen and had no money for agricultural 
implements. 
Ploughing requires oxen and oxen require grazing grounds 
and they cost money because we haven 't got them .•. we 
have got to hire them. Cultivators, rakes, sowing 
machines (planters), etc., all cost money. How can one 
plough because all this (costs) money? 
The relative surplus population was rapidly expanding in the reserves as a 
product of the homestead growing within a confined land area, and arable 
land was no longer available. 
In the location my grandfather had 5 wives and 20 young men. 
Let me mention one hut of the 5. My father had 4 brothers. 
His elder brother married 2 wives, the second had 4 wives, my 
father had 2, the other had 2 and the 5th had 3 wives. I am 
not mentioning the 15 half-brothers to him. Let us now look 
back to my father's brothers living on the area where my grand-
father lived. Is this not crowded, because the land does not 
expand? Which place can be ploughed by the present 
generation? 
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Phungula's solution to impoverishment and proletarianization was not peasant 
but working class action. Rather than demanding more land, oxen for 
ploughing, or schemes for increasing rural production, he acknowledged 
that migrant workers were basically dependent on wage labour and proposed 
a wage demand of £ 1 5s per day or £32 lOs per month. Armed with 
these proposals, he approached the African trade unions and political 
organ izations of Durban. He asked Christopher Mbonambi, a leading 
member of the African National Workers' Federation, a loose coordinating 
group of African trade unionists which had campaigned around the issue of 
unemployment insurance, for support for a general strike including all races 
across industrial divisions for a demand of a minimum wage of at least £ 1 a 
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day, This proposal had the popular S'upport of the workers, but Mbonambi 
told Phungula he was putting forward a revolutionary demand which would 
b "'bl I' h 80 A h f d' e qUite ImpoSSI e to accomp IS , S t e rumours 0 propose action 
spread through Durban the Divisional Inspector of Labour called in Mbonambi 
and warned him of the consequences of a general strike, He told Mbonambi 
to instruct the workers that demands should be put in a 'constitutional ' way, 
industry by industry, and that the strike movement had to be stopped, 
Mbonambi arranged a large meeting at the Bantu Social Centre at which 
Phungula was called upon to explain his strategy, The meeting of African 
workers, which was attended by the Department of Labour officials, the 
Security Branch, and secretaries of African trade unions, gave Mbonambi a 
Inasty time ' at the start of the meeting, He explained to the workers how 
to make wage demands in terms of the existing regulations promulgated in 
terms of War Measure 145 of 1942 and said it would be impossible to get to 
£ 1 from an existing wage of 55 a day; a demand should be made somewhere 
between. Gradually, despite the popular feeling for a general strike, he 
won the workers over to his gradual ist approach, and the proposed general 
str ike was defeated. Phungula returned to his fellow dock workers, 'those 
were the people who understood him well, they did not want to understand 
what we said at the meeting l said Mbonambi later, A Ithough in retreat, 
Phungula did not change his views. 'He would test out his ideas among 
the people and when he had the right response nothing would move him from 
h' d' 181 IS stan pomt. 
Despite opposition from the African trade unionists of the time, 
Phungula had correctly assessed the mood of the African workers and their 
desire for mass action to change their conditions. As a dock worker he 
may well have been aware of the strikes and resi stance to colonial ism in 
other African ports from seamen on the coastal routes. In Lourenro Marques 
there had been radical discontent in 1947 combined with political agitation 
which produced a series of strikes in the docks and in neighbouring plantations, 
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which had culminated in an 'abortive uprising' at Lourenro Marques in 
1948. There had also been strikes of dockers in Dar es Salaam and a 
I 'k' Z 'b 82 Th f I' k h ' genera stn e In anzi ar. e strategy 0 a genera strr e aVlng 
been defeated, the African workers turned towards more nationalistic forms 
of action. Instead of closs action the African workers turned against 
Indian people; both petty bourgeois shopkeepers and landowners, and 
Indian workers. 
The riots wh ich broke out on 13 January 1949 in the afternoon after 
an incident between an African youth and an Indian shop assistant were one 
of the most destructive social upheavals in South African history. The 
most dominated and repressed section of the South African working class 
turned against a minority group which possessed urban land and trading rights 
and preferential treatment in employment, The newly elected National 
Party government stood back at first from the spectacle of two oppressed 
groups in struggle among themselves before ordering in police and troops to 
restore order. In the violence which took place 142 people were killed: 
87 Africans, 50 Indians, 4 'others', and 1 White; a large number of people 
were injured, and considerable amounts of property was destroyed or 
83 damaged. African workers housed in compounds, and the togt workers 
in particular, took a leading part in the violence against Indian people. 
Easu Laflete, considered by the authorities to be the spokesman for Cato 
Manor, said in evidence to the Commission of Inquiry which followed, that 
the worst attackers of Indian property in Cato Manor came from the Point 
barracks in the dock area through the central area of the town into Booth 
Road and then on into Cato Manor' itself. 84 In the Report of the Commis-
sion, the fact that African males were 'herded together' in compounds was 
considered a contributing factor to the riots. 'Such congregations of men 
are ready tinder to any spark, and it is clear that the compound-dwellers 
took an important part in the excesses. ,85 In his evidence to the Commis-
sion of Inquiry which followed, Phungula proposed a radical solution to 
racial confl ict and redirected attention to the role of the state in generat-
ing antagonism among racial groups. 
My Lord th is land of ours is in a state of great confusion, it 
is a country that has already been steeped in blood .•. if 
we had our way we would tell the Government •.. 'you are 
no longer competent to govern th is country, it wi II be better 
for you to hand it over to the coloured people' .86 
Through selective legislation the state had given Indian people privileges 
over African people whose hearts 'are red because of the encouragement 
which the Government gives to the Indians to lord it over us'. Finally, 
however, he succumbed to the mass feelings of the time and said that the 
Indian people shou Id be repatriated, even though they were only as much 
foreign as the Whites. 
The violence between African and Indian people in Durban was a 
severe setback to the working class and national movements. The post-
war resistance of the working people in the colonial world which took on 
a mass anti-imperialist form -had, under backward petty bourgeois leader-
ship in Natal, turned perversely inward. Leaders such as Champion, 
who had done his share in stumulating hatred for Indian people, attempted 
to address the African rioters but were repudiated and even assaulted 
although under police escort. 87 
The African National Congress issued a statement shortly after the 
upheaval which accepted that the events constituted a 'race riot', resulting 
from differential and discriminatory treatment of various racial groups. 
Described in 4hY terms, the riots were catastrophic and dwarfed other 
violent struggles of the period. In Chicago 15 Whites and 23 Blacks 
were killed in race riots while the anti-colonial demonstrations in the Gold 
88 f Coast in 1948 led to the deaths of 29 people. By avoiding mention 0 
the actual relations between Indian and African workers and petty bourgeois 
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and the manifest points of conflict, the statement tended to reduce the 
actions of African workers to that of a haphazard and uncontrollable out-
burst. The government's pol icy of racial differentiation, it argued, 
has rendered the African the football and servant of all which 
he silently resents. It has given him an accumulation of 
grievances and a sense of frustration which find expression in 
unpredictable actions of vio lence or otherwise, to wh ich no 
section is immune. 89 
In the later documents setting out a common strategy for both the African 
National Congress (Natal) and the Natal Indian Congress, united action 
between Indian and African workers was not mentioned, and the forms of 
inter-racial solidarity suggested were joint councils. In the uneasy 
situation following the riots African traders and landlords mobil ized rapidly, 
extended the building of shacks, raised rents, and formed business groups 
which capitalized on anti-Indian feeling. 90 
The only leader who was able to intervene in the cauldron of hatred 
which erupted and continued after the riots and direct the African people 
away from attacking the fellow oppressed and exploited was Zulu Phungula. 
Although he had not condemned those participating in attacks on Indian 
workers, he attempted to redirect the violent energy of the migrant workers 
away from the petty Indian landowners and traders against the employers and 
the state. As the leader of the Natal Zulu Workers' Union he called a 
meeting on Sunday, 16 January 1949, to press forward with revolutionary 
wage demands, which drew some 20,000 African workers before it was dis-
persed by the police. 91 Despite this setback, Phungula continued in 
agitating for strike action in support of demands for an immediate doubling 
of wages or more. Early in April 1949 he called a meeting of sanitation 
workers employed by the Durban Corporation and said if the employers did 
not listen to the demands of the workers a general strike would be called. 
He was brought to court on a charge of calling a meeting without permission, 
found guilty, and fined £ 10 or one month's imprisonment. 92 later 
that month he issued a pamphlet as President of the Natal Zulu National 
Workers' Union which called on all African workers in the Durban area 
to demand £32 lOs a month. If the demand was not met the workers 
should strike from 1 May. This call met with an immediate response 
from the docks. On Monday, 2 May 1949, according to press reports, 
800 stevedoring workers refused to start work. The strike movement 
spread to workers in the ship painting, baking and milling, whaling, 
timber, sugar, and chemical industries. Armed pol ice and armoured 
cars were called out and the industrial workers were threatened with 
immediate prosecution in terms of war measures if they did not return to 
work. The general strike did not have the momentum that Phungula 
would have wished (he was arrested on the first day) but it was certainly 
more widespread than the initial newspaper reports described. The 
strike was strongly criticized by the Afdcan trade union movement and 
by the District Committee of the Communist Party as undermining the 
African trade un ions. The occasion was used to repeat demands for the 
recognition of these unions. The leaders of the strike 'cannot be des-
cribed an anything but irresponsible'. 
By co" i ng for a stoppage of work on th e part of a II A fr ican 
workers in Durban, they have not only usurped the authority 
and function of existing African unions, thereby creating con-
fusion among the workers, but alienated the sympathy of trade 
union leaders. As the strike has demonstrated, such action 
can only end in defeats and disillusionment for the workers. 
While condemning the leaders the Communist Party acknowledged the 
underlying discontent of the workers without mentioning the wage demand. 
'The fact that the so-called Natal Zulu Workers' Union's call for a strike, 
irresponsibly led and badly organized though it was, met with some response 
is a clear indication that the African workers have real grievances, which 
can be removed not by repression but by doing away with the causes of such 
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grievances' • By making an appeal for the 'elementary democratic right 
of collective bargaining' to the government and employers of African 
workers, the statement avoided the issue of uniting all sections of the 
working class in Durban around the wage demands which had been sup-
ported by hundreds of unorgan ized workers. 
It also attempted to revive hopes in the forlorn campaign to have 
African trade unions recognized in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act 
when the issue had been decided against the workers in 1943 and every 
subsequent action by the National Party Government elected in 1948 con-
firmed that further political action against the working class was on the 
agenda. The African trade unions which were so emphatically endorsed 
were in a stage of advanced decay as the intelligentsia which had taken up 
their leadership realized there was no possibility of a secure livelihood in 
the future under an increasingly repressive regime. Far from trying to 
provide leadership to the African working class and developing fighting 
demands, the unions were being wound up. Trade unionism hod become 
identified with reformism in the eyes of the migrant workers who took an 
independent course of action. The strike had not been a success, but 
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neither was it a decisive defeat for the African workers resulting in demoraliza-
tion. Had it not been smothered by the trade union reformists some time 
late in 1948 it would have had the chance of much greater success and con-
centrated the energies of African workers against the employers rather than 
against the Indian people. The strike, even in its muted form, had also 
popularized the wage demand of £ 1 a day, a slogan which became the 
demand of SACTU in the late 1950s.
94 
Phungula was brought before the Native Commissioner's Court on 
the first day of the strike for a judie ial inquiry in terms of Section 29 (the 
vagrancy clause) of the Native {Urban Areas} Act of 1945. The court 
was filled with African workers and armed police. Evidence was led that 
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Phungula had no visible means of support as leader of the Natal Zulu 
National Workers' Union which did not keep proper books of account 
and that he had worked only five days in 1948. 95 Phungula said that 
the people he organized gave him money for food and collections were 
taken at meetings, and that he had been unemployed for long periods 
because the employers called him 'H itler ' and would not take him on. 96 
After hearing evidence that Phungula had persisted in making 'excessive' 
wage demands at a time when tensions had not subsided after the riots, 
the Assistant Bantu Affairs Commissioner, J. J. M. Stander, ordered that 
he be banished to Ixopo for ten years and not be allowed to return to 
Durban without the written consent of the Secretary for Native Affairs. 97 
The Durban District Committee of the Communist Party protested vigorously 
against this measure as a threat to the right of all workers to organize freely 
and withhold their labour and called for its withdrawal. 98 Phungula's 
banishment was a prelude to a vigorous reassessment of the controls oyer 
togt labour and a determination to crush mil itancy in the harbour area at 
a time of a virtual collapse of trade union organization among African 
workers. 
Influx control, wage struggles, and the labour supply company 
During the early 1950s the National Party government enacted a 
variety of measures to maintain the circulation of African labour between 
the reserves and wage labour and to provide a basis for 'rural urban ization I • 
Amendments were made to African labour legislation to encourage a more 
efficient migrant labour system; labour bureaux were established to direct 
the supply of labour, and tribal government was strengthened to reinforce 
controls over the industrial reserve army of labour. 99 Contrary to liberal 
opinion on the implementation of these wide-ranging measures, employers 
were not opposed to more controls over the supply of African labour, 
although there were negotiations and on occasion arguments over their 
imposition in particular sectors. Labour-intensive industries and services 
obviously benefited from a system which encouraged and later forced 
African workers to return to the reserves after completing a period of 
service, 'for otherwise the subsidiary means of subsistence would disappear 
and the labourer would tend to become a permanent resident .•• with 
. d' ,100 Increase regulrements. 
The general principles contained in 'Bantu labour regulations' 
were phased in through negotiations in the dock area. The stevedoring 
companies, the municipality, and the departments of state grappled with 
the problems of maintaining policies which could be in conflict: influx 
contro I and a low wage structure. The problem was to ensure unl imited 
access to a reserve army of labour for employers while implementing a 
state policy of influx control and regulation of all service contracts. 
These two policies were not directly contradictory, although there could 
be short-term confl icts between particular employers and sectors and the 
overall program of systematic controls which reguired greater sophistication 
in their operation and even new administrative institutions. The imme-
diate problem of the state in the post-riot situation in Durban was to limit 
the number of unemployed workseekers who could be drawn into radical 
political and industrial action. Investigations were made by officials of 
the Native Administration Department into the number of workless African 
people in the Durban area and wide publicity was given to the figure of 
10,000 'surplus' Africans. 101 On 8 July 1949 it was decided to take 
decisive action: the Durban City Council decided to enforce strictly the 
provisions of Proclamation 39 of 1940 which prohibited entry of African 
workseekers into the urban area if there was already full employment and 
for the removal of all unemployed Africans. 102 The implementation of 
influx control had an immediate effect on African workseekers pouring in 
from the rural areas. The Native Commissioner for Natal reported that 
many Africans c~uld not find the work they wanted to do and were forced 
to accept work at lower wages; in this sense the regulations were serving 
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the function of redirecting labour and depressing wages. The Native 
Commissioner for Durban reported that the restrictions had resulted in the 
reduction of the estimated surplus of African workers in Durban from 
103 10,000 to 6,000. 
While these restrictions were implemented with the general consent 
of employers through their representative organizations, the effects of a 
restricted and directed labour supply affected certain groups of employers 
more than others. The employers of togt labour were most directly 
affected and their position was further aggravated by the City Council IS 
policy of refusing to issue any further togt licences until more accommoda-
tion was provided by the employers. Some anxious negotiations and an 
appeal to the Minister of Native Affairs followed, resulting in a temporary 
administrative suspension of part of the regulations restricting the issue of 
togt licences to the amount of suitable accommodation available, and the 
threat to the supply of togt labour was removed. As a quid pro quo the 
stevedoring employers agreed to extend the existing accommodation to pro-
vi de for 1,500 I abourers at th e i r own expense. When the national system 
of labour bureaux was brought into operation, further concessions were 
granted to togt employers to avoid having to register service contracts every 
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day. Stevedoring employers were also exempted from having to contribute 
to the Unemployment Insurance Fund. 104 
Despite the banishment of Phungula and the implementation of influx 
and other labour controts, strikes continued in the dock area. Rai Iway 
workers came out on strike for short periods in 1950 and 1951. Painters 
and chippers demanded lSs a day in a strike which started on 2 June 1952 
and lasted for over fifteen days. 105 As the African trade unions of the 
1940s disintegrated in a period of declining wages and official repression, 
working class action was driven underground and led by politically active 
106 h d . d 
workers such as Fanyana Majosi in the dock area. T e most etermme 
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thrust of working c lass action in the docks came in the period between 
1954 and 1959. The stevedoring togt workers came out on strike on 
1 July 1954 with a demand for 4s. 9d a day wage increase which would 
have brought their wages up to 15s. This strike, in which the painters 
and chippers joined, was well organized by the workers with pickets 
throughout the harbour area who acted against scab labour. 107 After 
some offers of small wage increases, S. D. Mentz, the Chairman of the 
Central Native labour Board was brought from Pretoria to settle the strike. 
He addressed the strikers with armed police standing by, told them to 
appoint spokesmen, and threatened to have them replaced un less they acted 
on his advice. 'like an indomitable army, however, the strikers faced 
Mr. Mentz and an armed police force, refusing to return to work or to 
appoint a deputation and expose their leadership.' The strikers used the 
occasion to demand the return of Zulu Phungula: 
When we are speaking to our employers the Government inter-
feres. The man we want back to speak for us has been taken 
away. We are still looking for him. 
Faced with the determined opposition of the strikers, the company served 
notices on the workers either to go back to work within 24 hours or be 
charged with trespass. This was a new tactic, and combined with an offer 
of further negotiations, was sufficient to break the strike. The workers 
returned without illusions about the possibility of increases being made with-
out pressure from the workers. 
We can barely exist on our present wages and have nothing 
left over to send our wives and children. Only a substan-
tial increase will save our families from starvation. We 
will return to work only for the purpose of keeping a roof 
over our heads, and until we are better organized, but we 
will strike again and again if we do not get more money. 
We strike not to make trouble, but because we must live. 
The strike which demonstrated the workers' contempt for the Native 
labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act which was being used to eliminate trade 
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union organization among African workers received the unqualified support 
of political movements and from the Transvaal Council of Non-European 
Trade Unions. The Congress of Democrats statement declared: 'A 
victory for the dock workers is a victory for the entire working class of 
South Africa' . As promised, negotiations began on 8 July between the 
Central Native Labour Board, executives of Durban stevedoring companies, 
and nine spokesmen for the togt stevedores. 108 The stevedoring com-
panies finally conceded ah increase of 1s 3d per day with a variety of 
smaller increments. Mentz recommended the establ ishment of a permanent 
labour force on a weekly or monthly basis, 'the number of men to be 
employed based on the lowest number of men employed during any week over 
109 
the past year'. Such a system would not eliminate the necessity for 
casual labour but would reduce the rei iance of the stevedoring trade on 
this form of labour and a central core of workers would be employed who 
would be under direct contractual obligation to the employer. Further 
negotiations with the Central Native Labour Board followed in 1954 and 
1956 in which the workers were assisted by Fanyana Ma josi {who had been 
dismissed from employment in the docks} and Stephen Dhlamini of SACTU. 
In the late 1950s the conflict between dock employers and the state 
which had been temporarily resolved in 1950 flared up again. In Novem-
ber 1957 the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr. H. F. Verwoerd, announced 
that most of the stevedoring compounds at the Point dock area would have 
110 
to go and that only 2,000 African stevedores would be allowed in that area. 
Employers of labour in the dock area protested that there would be a serious 
decline in the efficiency of work at the harbour if the workers were housed 
at Kwa Mashu to the north of Durban, that they would possibly refuse to 
work overtime because of the long hours which they would be away from 
their homes, and that there was a possibility that Durban would be by-
passed by ships which would be diverted to Lourenro Marques. The 
Stevedores' Association which housed 1,520 workers submitted a memorandum 
to the Government pointing out the 'serious repercussions' which could 
follow if their compounds had to be demolished. 111 While the future 
of togt labour was being discussed by officials, the workers responded to 
the call of the African National Congress for a three-day stay-at-home. 
361 
The employers, local authorities, state departments, and the pol.ice 
reacted vigorously to the threat of moss strike action. A meeting was 
called by the local Native Commissioner .of all African foremen ('indunas 
and boss-boys') which was addressed by the Chief of Police, the head of 
the Durban City Council Native Administration Department, and by A. W. G. 
Champion {no longer president of the Natal African National Congress}. 
This meeting 'received a most hostile reception from those present for sug-
gesting that all workers should go to work on these three days'. The 
workers wanted a response to the demand of £ 1 a day put forward by SACTU 
and the Congress Alliance, and reportedly said they would not work on the 
three days of April 14, 15 and 16. The Natal Mercury printed a message 
from the Zulu Paramount Chief on the front page calling on African workers 
not to take part in the strik~. 112 The stay-at-home in April 1958 had 
mixed success {it was described by the New Age as 'on the whole a failure'} 
and was called off by the African Notional Congress. In Durban the 
strike was 30-40 per cent effective, many factories closed completely and 
others carried on with considerable absenteeism, the market was deserted, 
and Indian shops were closed. The dock workers responded to the strike 
call and many left the dock area altogether. Those who remained were 
forced out of the privately owned compounds by the police but struck at 
work and demanded £1 a day. The police and Deportment of Labour 
officials 'intimidated and coerced the workers to return' and many arrests 
were made but these workers refused to do any overtime during the three 
days of the campaign. When those who had left the dock area returned 
the workers unanimously decided not to work overtime unless they were 
poid £ 1 a day. 113 Harbour congestion resulted from the three-day stay-
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at-home and was aggravated further by the tactic of banning overtime as 
a bargaining lever. The standard amount of overtime was four hours, 
but from Monday, 14 April 1958, the first day of the stay-at-home, the 
workers refused to work after 5 p.m. On the Sunday after the overtime 
ban had begun the workers again came out on strike and demanded £ 1 a 
day. Negotiations between the workers and employers followed and 
the togt workers gained an increase of 1s 6d per day with improved condi-
tions of overtime and better Sunday wages. 114 After this pay increase 
was announced 2,000 railway workers gathered outside the offices of the 
Port Goods Superintendent demanding increases, and negotiations were 
started. Pressure on the employers was increased on Sunday, 27 May, 
when no workers reported for work. An emergency meeting was held 
between stevedoring employers and the Divisional Inspector of labour and 
negotiations continued between the workers and employers. A settlement 
was reached on Sunday at 11 a.m. providing for a basic wage of 14s per 
day and other increases, and the workers returned to work. 115 The 
tactical weapon of boycotting overtime and Sunday work (both theoretically 
voluntary) proved an extremely successful technique of increasing pressure 
on employers without jeopardizing the position of the workers housed in the 
compounds. Throughout the period of the overtime ban severe congestion 
resulted in the docks; on Sunday, 27 May, there were over 25 ships lying 
idle in the port. 
The disruption brought about by strike acti:>n and prohibition of 
overtime coupled with the state policy of tighter control over surplus labour, 
brought together offic ials and employers to consider measures to contro I the 
workers more effectively. The Nata I Employers' Association convened a 
meeting of the employers, the Department of labour, the Department of 
Native Administration, and municipal officials, on 27 November 1958. 
The chairman of the meeting, a stevedoring employer, said the meeting 
had been called to extend controls over stevedoring labour and to eliminate 
the togt labour system; two changes which were intimately related 
given the relatively 'free' form of contract in day labour. A centrally 
administered compound system had been accepted by the Durban Steve-
dores' Association which controlled the large compounds, as an answer 
to the 'complete lack of discipline over the togt labour force' • The 
new system would be introduced by the formation of a separate non-profit-
making company which would have, as its directors, nominees of each of 
the existing stevedoring companies in Durban. This company would then 
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control all the barracks then owned by the various companies and all 
employers would draw on the labour of the monopoly labour supply company. 
The employers' response to working class militancy in the dock area was the 
concentration of controls in one central institution and the elimination of 
competition for labour. While previously a labourer out of favour with 
one company could find employment at another company, with the new 
system of labour control 'undesirable' labour would be eliminated from 
116 
employment by the employers and from the area by the state. 
Since 1949 there had existed in legislation provision for the centra-
lized control over African labour supply by employers 117 but, given the 
conflicts over labour supply in the 19505, the approval of the Department 
of Native Administration was essential to the new plan. The Assistant 
Secretary of the national Department of Native Affairs, H.H. L. Smuts, 
outlined the policy of the government to the meeting. He felt that 
although there was a great amount of work to be clone in the 'cleaning up' 
of Durban he could see Ino objection whatsoever' to the accommodation 
being controlled by a central labour supply company. Confl icts between 
the employers and the state would be resolved by a division of administration: 
the labour supply company would exercise complete discipline over the 
workers, and the only aspect not controlled by it would be the actual 
authorization of the worker to be in the urban area which would remain 
364 
with the local authority. The other officials were not unexpectedly all 
in favour of the central supply company, although the Divisional Inspector 
of Labour correctly forecast trouble in the transition from togt to a monthly 
contract system of employment. He optimistically foresaw that the new 
form of control would permit 'weeding out troublemakers' in a short time 
and 'peace in th e industry for the rest of your lives'. Such were the 
hopes and aspirations of the Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company. 118 
As foreseen, there were severe difficulties in changing the structure 
of employment in the stevedoring trade to contract labour. The Company 
itself was only successfully inaugurated after the most severe resistance of 
the workers had been broken by employer action fully supported by the 
state. The first step towards its construction were measures designed to 
incorporate indunas more effectively into the structure of authority of the 
stevedoring companies. 119 Previously, it would appear that the indunas 
had some independent position in being partly responsible for recruiting and 
marshaJling workers in particular gangs for which they received a bonus from 
employers and a cash payment from workers. In a centrally administered 
compound system these tasks were removed from them and performed by the 
labour supply company, and the indunas' tasks were transformed into that of 
sergeant-ma jors of the company. The indunas were compensated for this 
change of status by a substantial wage increase. This led to further indus-
trial action by togtworkers; the immediate cause being the differential 
introduced between the basic wages of indunas and labourers. The issue 
came to a head after the Wage Board had investigated the trade for the first 
time in 1958. The local committee of SACTU, having given evidence 
that some workers were without employment for weeks, had suggested that 
the workers should be paid weekly, and had demanded a considerable inc-
rease in the existing daily rate: R2.50 for labourers, R2.70 for gangway-
men/winchmen, and R3.00 for indunas. 120 The workers had looked to 
the Wage Board for relief, but the Wage Determination 183 which resulted 
from the investigation provided no wage increase for labourers, laid down 
differential rates for winchmen and gangwaymen, and had prescribed large 
increases for indunas. The strike broke out on 24 February when it 
became known there would be no increase for labourers and a 4s increase 
for indunas. Two stevedoring labourers were arrested on a charge of 
assaulting an induna in a compound, and the workers demanded a pay inc-
. h d h' d 121 R h h rease proportionate to t at grante to t e In unas. at er t an 
negotiate with the workers, the employers, the Department of Labour and 
the police went ahead with the plan to force the labour supply company on 
the workers. A II the strikers were dismissed and ordered to leave the 
premises of the stevedoring company's compounds. A strong detachment 
of pol ice arrived at the compounds, an induna called upon the workers to 
disperse, and the police made a baton charge and attacked those in the 
immediate vicinity. Some thirty minutes after the attack at least four 
seriously injured workers were still lying on the ground in pools of blood, 
and 87 workers were arrested. These workers were defended by lawyers 
briefed by SACTU, although some pleaded guilty of trespass and were fined 
£5 with the alternative of 25 days imprisonment with hard labour. 122 The 
companies took advantage of the defeated strike and the pleas of workers 
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for re-employment to introduce the labour supp'ly company, and the majority 
of the strikers, together with other workers, were re-engaged on a p'drmanent 
basis. The change was initially seen by SACTU as an advance in the con-
ditions of employment. 'T ogt labour has long been a source of friction 
between the workers and employers, and the introduction of a weekly-paid 
permanent labour force is a definite gain by the workers'. Despite the 
low wage offered (£3 per week) the introduction of permanent employment 
seemed to offer the basis for union organization. With the establ ishment 
of a permanent labour force it is now possible to organize the workers into a 
union and we hope that the employers will negotiate with this union and 
• 
avoid any further trouble in the docks. 1 123 But the men objected to 
the new wage system on the grounds that they could earn more under the 
previous system if work were avai lable throughout the week (a potential 
of 84s per week) as opposed to the 60s weekly wage. Again they 
demanded increased wages and refused to work overtime. A severe 
crisis resulted as the ships were unable to be unloaded and labour disci-
pline in the dock area was being threatened with impossible strategic 
implications. The workers complained about the intensification of 
labour in the docks as a result of the ending of the togt labour system. 
The employers want to kill us with overtime. In the past 
we used to take off a day or two whenever we felt tired, but 
now that we are employed on a weekly basis we could not do 
this. We feel that more workers should be employed by the 
stevedoring companies and at the same time we should be 
paid a decent wage for the hard work we do. 124 
The employers responded by dismissing the entire labour force and recruiting 
new workers from Zululand to take their places. Despite the congestion 
in the harbour which resulted and a high accident rate suffered by the 
inexperienced workers who replaced those who were dismissed, the success-
ful operation of the labour supply company was secured. The pattern of 
mass discipl ine establ ished by employers and the state during the war was 
again enforced to break down the workers' resistance to a system which 
they correctly saw as dramatically increasing their employers I control over 
their labour-time. 
Far from decasualization strengthening the position of the workers 
and even providing the basis for open trade unionism, the transition from 
daily to weekly paid labour was the final stage in the employers' offensive 
against independent working class action during the 1950s in the docks. 
366 
Conclusions 
The social actions of the Durban dock workers throws some light 
on the debate on the relative consciousness of a particular group of 
migrant workers and on their level of proletarianization. Their con-
sciousness was evident both in the statements of their leadership which 
came up from the ranks and their actions and demands. For the over-
whelming mass of African workers during this period agricultural produc-
tion in the reserves became insignificant and the statements and wage 
demands of the workers were part of a general struggle to have their rights 
as proletarians acknowledged. As a leader, Zulu Phungula was possibly 
unique in being able to link ~ffectively the issue of rural impoverishment 
and working class struggle in the Cities. No other leader of the same 
calibre can be found in the ranks of African workers during this time. 
Phungula was a revolutionary worker who was prepared to defy all existing 
views of the established leadership of the trade unions and working class 
political organizations as well as an increasingly repressive state. He 
was able to put his finger on the reformist confusions of the trade unions 
and provide a clear alternative. Before the Industrial Legislation Com-
mission he repudiated the political rule over th~ African working class: 
'Well insofar as we are concerned, we are being treated as a burnt out 
match by the European, a match which has not been used is of considerably 
more use than a burnt out match. ,125 In simple language he was able to 
portray the inseparable connection between national oppression and the 
exploitation of the working class. In particular he was able to repudiate 
the racist denigration of the African working people by their political 
rulers: 'We are treated as chattels, as people with no reasoning power, 
126 but they are wrong. I His development as a worker-intellectual and 
leader, owing little to the established paths of learning in bourgeois educa-
tion, was a living contradiction to the view that African workers were 
incapable of taking a dominant part in ruling a revolutionary South Africa. 
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Phungula was able to avoid the worse aspects of labour organization which 
historically had been evident in Africon trade unions (despite his inability 
to keep proper financial records); the bureaucratization of the Industrial 
and Commercial Workers' Union with its political confusions and financial 
excesses, and the dependency of the African trade unions of the war period 
on state benevolence. Despite being described as a 'one man show' by 
'African trade unionists of the time, he was able to articulate the ideology 
and demands of the migrant workers while avoiding all forms of petty-
bourgeois personality cult (as can readily be seen in contrast to the 'great 
leader' style of A. W. G. Champion). 
But despite these enormous achievements Phungula was not a simple 
heroic figure. At times he alternated between a firm working class 
position and a popul ism which bordered on demagogic nationalist appeal, 
particularly when he did not make clear his repudiation of action against 
Indian people. In general he drew on national resistance of the African 
people to develop a view of an African proletariat and to I ink traditional 
struggles to those in production. His national ism appears to be an anti-
dote to the reformism of the working class leadership. When he returned 
to Durban in 1948 he formed the Natal Zulu Workers' Union in contrast to 
the reformist African trade unions, to represent the aspirations of the radical 
migrant workers. This tendency was evident in the earlier period but was 
overcome by a desire to build the national unity of the dock workers on the 
basis of fighting demands. But with the Communist Party emphasis on 
broad democratic demands in the late 1940s rather than clearly class-based 
strategies, national resistance around class demands seems to have been the 
alternative presented by Phungula. He made a conscious break with the 
Communist Party about a week before the anti-Indian violence broke out 
and afterwards he even argued that Africans rejected communism and 
wanted to 'belong to the Government, but it is the Government which 
369 
ignores us and pushes us down into the mud ,•127 In response, the Com-
munist Party attacked his leadership but did defend him in court. 
The numerous strikes of the 1950s showed that Phungula and leading 
workers had been able to develop a form of underground organization in 
strike committees. The workers were able to get their views into news-
papers like New Age without the leaders being victimized. As SACTU 
developed rapidly in Natal in the late 1950s, the dock workers' organization 
was strengthened. But the SACTU leadership seems to have had illusions 
in the possibil ity of open trade union organization even as late as 1959 when 
all indications were that the form of decasual ization forced on the workers 
had been aimed at destroying their resistance. Far from decasual ization 
in itself making trade union organization and negotiations possible, as was 
suggested, the need for underground organization was more necessary than 
ever. Any further strike action by the workers was met by mass dismissals 
arid purges of the workers' ran ks. Duri ng the mass stay-at-home after 
Sharpeville, the Durban d.:>ckers were disorganized and unresponsive in 
comparison to workers in Cape Town. 
While the legislation on African labour supply provided the general 
context in which the employers and the state acted to crush the unity of the 
workers and extend the system of contract labour, the 'Bantu regulations' 
were implemented and modified to meet the particular conditions of working 
class struggl e. The means by which migrant labour was reinforced by the 
action of employers and the state, from the dock strike of 1942 until the 
culmination of collective capitalist reaction in 1959 in the form of the labour 
supply company, helps to illuminate the processes by which ideological and 
physical forms of control over the black working class as a whole were 
enforced. During this period 'tribal' government, wh ich has a vested 
interest in the continuation of the contract migrant system, was strengthened 
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and the regulations which reinforced migrant workers' dependence on land 
in the reserves (such as the 'one-man-one-Iot' system) meant proletarianiza-
tion was accampanied by 'rural urbanization'. 
After the banishment of Phungula the dock workers' resistance took 
a leaderless form, not because of the primitiveness of their struggle (the 
first recorded collective action of dock workers took place in 1875 and sub-
sequent developments showed that dock workers were prepared to lay down 
a bedrock of informal organization during periods of intense repression), but 
because of their relatively odvanced nature and experience. These 
organizational forms were able to survive longer among these workers than 
among those with more formai methods of organization. This is not to. 
glorify the dock workers as a heroic group of workers who set the pace in 
industrial struggles but to argue that the forms of control which forced 
organization 'underground' in the 1950s made them more capable of sustain-
ing social action. The evidence tends to contradict those who would argue 
that compounds are total institutions and make impossible collective action 
among African workers. The concentration of workers in increasingly 
centralized and controlled barracks both facilitates greater communication 
among workers and more effective control over these workers when on strike. 
The coordination between employers and the state changed over time 
in response to the different objectives at hand; the development of 'tribal' 
governments and controls over African workers in urban oreas on the one hand, 
and i.ncreasing the rate of emploitation (increasing the pace at which workers 
were loading and unloading cargo in the main port of South Africa) on the 
other. While the workers were advancing in social action and in strategy, 
it is also demonstrably true that employers and the state were learning from 
the struggle of the workers in Durban ond internationally. The issues 
were not resolved to the point where no further contradictions within the 
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system of control were possible; it was not as though there is an undifferen-
tiated and unrelentingly successful form of repression despite the tremendous 
powers wielded by capital. But it was certainly true that new forms of 
organization would be required by the dock workers. 
372 
Notes to Chapter 5 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
Palmer (1930) and Daily News, 4 April 1931. Although it has 
not been possible to develop this point in depth here, the use of 
physical controls against sections of the African working class who 
are seen to be threatening the livelihood of urban African workers 
has formed a persistent thread of argument by liberals in South Africa. 
Simons (1969): 616 
Woddis (1960): 252 
Natal Mercury, 19 March 1942 
Basner (1946): 13; Kahn (1949): 285, and Senate Debates, 1942, 
Column 1583. Convictions in terms of the pass laws dropped from 
105,304 in 1941 to 53,866 in 1943. 
Natal Mercury, 12 November 1941 
Described in Stein (1979) 
CPSA (1936): 19-20. The difference between the two forms of 
political rule was made originally in Dimitrov's writings on fascism 
and in the decisions of the Seventh Congress of the Communist Inter-
national. 
Brookes (1967) implies a unilinear development in the CPSA from class 
struggle to national Hberation during the important war period. The 
actual history of party policy was certainly more complex as the 
previous chapters have shown, and during the Second World War within 
the general demands for democratic rights there were a number of ten-
dencies. J. B. Marks, for instance, supported the organization of 
an African trade union movement, while CPSA pol icy aimed at bui Id-
ing a broad multi-racial trade union movement. Brookes (1967): 104 
R.H. Smith, 1950, Labour Resources of Natal, Oxford University Press, 
and John R. Burrows, 1959, The Population and Labour Resources of 
Natal, Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal. 
1936 Census, UG 12/1942, p.80 
Ibid., xiii, Table 7 
Harold Wolpe, November 1972, 'Capitalism and cheap labour power 
in South Africa: From segregation to apartheid', Economy and 
Society, 1 (4) pp. 425-456. 
Ibid., p.425 
Report of Native Affairs Commission, 1939-40, UG 42/1941, p.16. 
The Native Affairs Commission argued that the African workers living 
in urban areas were being undercut by 'subsidized' migrant labour from 
the reserves. This called for tighter influx control. 
373 
16. Smith (1950), p. 65 
17. The Call, April 1940, 1(4) 
lB. Report of the Inter-Departmental Commission on the Social, Health, 
and Economic Conditions of Urban Natives, 1942, para. 20B and 209. 
19. Dai Iy News, 13 May 1949. Ixopo was also the home district of 
another unorthodox war-time leader of the African working people, 
James Sofasonke Mpanza, who led the struggle of squatters in Orlando, 
Johannesburg. Mpanza successfully resisted being banished from 
Orlando to Ixopo, a course of action which was also taken by the 
state against Phungula. Ixopo was also the final setting for Alan 
Paton's Cry the beloved country. Whether there is a thread linking 
these coincidental facts it is impossible to say. See Simons (196B): 
56, for a discussion of Mpanza's legal arguments against banishment. 
20. Monthly Labour Review, September 1943. Wartime labour control 
in the Union of South Africa, 57(3) pp. 473-483. 
21. Wage Report No 460, para. 36 and 59. 
22. Report of the General Manager of the Railway and Harbours for the 
Year Ending 31 March 1940, UG41/1940. One harbour ton equals 
2,000 lb. 
23. This and subsequent references come from records of the Department 
of Labour held in the Transvaal Archives. I had permission from 
the Minister of National Education to consult these files, but this 
permission was later withdrawn without reasons being given. File 
1496, Controller of Industrial Manpower, Strike: Stevedoring, Durban. 
24. Meeting held at Native Commissioner's Office, Durban, 11 March 1942, 
File 1496, and Natal Mercury, 19 August 1941, p. 10. 
25. Notes of meeting held in the Government Buildings, Durban, on Tues-
day, 19 August 1941, in connection with the Native togt labour strike 
at the Point, F ite 1496, and Report of Divisional Inspector to the Con-
troller of Irdustrial Manpower, 1B August 1941, File 1496. 
26. Ivan Walker was later joint author with Ben Weinbren of 2,000 Casual-
ties, a book on trade unionism in South Africa which does not mention 
tJ;E; struggle of the Durban dock workers despite first hand experience. 
27. Notes of meeting held in the Government Buildings. .• File 1496. 
28. These conditions were published in the form of a proclamation GN 1163, 
1941. 
29. Monthly Labour Review (September 1943) gives a summary of these 
powers and other war-time emergency measures affecting workers. 
374 
30. The Guardian (editorial), 28 August 1941. Inkundla responded 
more affirmatively in an article 'Good news for workers', 5 August 
1941, and asked the question 'What would heppen if all the Natives 
in Durban would follow the same lead?' The radical Call wrote 
that the emergency regulations raised the spectre of a fascist order 
in South Africa. 
31. Thera is some confusion on this point, but during the Wage Board 
investigation preceding Wage Determination No 76 it was undoubtedly 
true that the stevedoring employers had offered to pay 9d an hour; in 
equivalent terms 6s per day. During the early negotiations on 17 
August 1941 the employers, who were mainly concerned to get·the 
state to legislate wages rather than be forced to grant increases, may 
well have said they would pay 8s or any wage the government decided 
upon. 
32. Meeting held at Native Commissioner's Office, Durban, 11 March 
1942, p.2.· 
33. Ibid. 
34. Official translation of article in Zulu appearing in Inkululeko, 
August 1942, File 1496. 
35. The Guardian, 30 July 1942 and 6 August 1942. 
36. CPSA, 1944, Communists in conference, p.5. See also Brookes 
(1967): 58. This policy was established in previous years. 
Inkululeko, the organ of the CPSA, reported approvingly on 27 March 
1943 that iron and steel workers were instructed to make every effort 
'to see that no unnecessary stoppages of work took place'. See also 
Simms (1969): 555-6. 
37. Natal Mercury, 5 and 6 August 1942 
38. The Guardian, 13 August 1942. As late as 18 .August a correspon-
dent of Inkululeko reported the docks 'as quiet as Sunday' . There 
was widespread protest against War Measure 86 of 1942 from the left 
trade unions and some Labour Party MPs. The Guardian, 27 August 
1942. 
39. The Guardian, 3 September 1942 and 17 September 1942. The 
relative liberalism of the authorities at this point has to be seen in 
conjunction with the relaxation of the administration of the pass laws, 
and the statement by Madeley that .African trade unions would be 
recognized. This liberalization period died with the onslaught of 
War Measure 145 of 1943. 
40. Willie Kumalo, who accompanied Phungula during negotiations, ha~, 
however, previously mentioned that he earned a 6d bonus for oper?tlng 
a winch while Coloured and White workers earned £ 1 a day for dOing 
375 
the same work. This statement was heavily underscored by the 
Department of Labour officials but wage differentials were not 
demanded by the workers as a whole and Kumalo's arguments have 
to be seen in the context of his stressing the collective skills of the 
stevedoring dock workers. 
41. Abel M. S. Mhlongo to Divisional Inspector of Labour, Durban, 10 
September 1942, File 1496. 
42. Meeting with representatives of stevedoring togt labourers at Durban 
on Friday, 20 November 1942, p.1. . 
43. Meeting, 20 November 1942. There was no letter in the file to 
give the precise level of the wage demands, but in speaking of these 
demands the Deputy General Manager of the Railways wrote as 
follows: 'The wages they asked to be paid were very high and we 
are sure that neither Phungula nor Sumongo (confusion for Mhlongo) 
ever really expected that such high rates of pay would be granted to 
non-European workers. Some of the rates mentioned by Phungula 
and (Mhlongo) are higher than those paid to skilled European workers'. 
pp. 1-2. 
44. House of Assembly Debates, 29 February 1943, Col. 579-582. I am 
indebted to Baruch Hirson for sources on the strikes preceding the pro-
clamation of War Measure 145 of 1942. For a list of strikes in Natal, 
1882-1946 (which does not specify the industry and exact dates and 
omits the Dunlop strike, but is otherwise very useful), see H. G. Ring-
rose (19497), 'A history and description of trade unions in Natal', 
Cyclostyled. The version of this work published in the Natal 
Regional Survey leaves out many of the statistical and other tables. 
45. Ibid. 
46. War Measure: Settlement of Labour Disputes, 318 of 1942 (War 
Measure 145 of 1942) amended by Proclamation 210 of 1944 (War 
Measure 81 of 1944), Proclamation 202 of 1944 (War Measure 82 of 
1944) and Section 3 of Act 18 of 1948. 
47. Simons (1969): 557 
48. Ibid.: 555 
49. Stein (1979) deals with the 1942 strike wave and argues that the 
workers in metal and mining industries particularly were held back 
from strike action by promises of wage reform. For the rapid inc-
rease in African wages during this period see Steenkamp (1963). 
50. Information on the Dunlop strike from M. P. Naicker, interview 12 
April 1976. 
376 
51. Department of Economics (University of Nata!), 1950, The African 
Factory Worker, Oxford University Press, Appendix III, p.213. 
52. Inkululeko, 11 April 1943, 'Union leader deported'. 
53. Neither during nor after the war did this union lead the struggles of 
the dock workers in Durban. The first meeting did, however, pro-
test against the action of the state in banishing Phungula. The 
Guardian, 8 April 1943 and Inkululeko, 11 April 1943. For a 
description of the propaganda work of the union see Inkululeko, 
11 April 1943, 8 July 1944, 16 May 1945. For a discussion of 
the turmoil in the Natal branch of the African National Congress 
during the war see Walshe (1970): 393-5. 
54. Ringrose (1949?) reported that 'as for as Natal is concerned at any 
rate, the presence of political influences among Native trade unions 
is not as serious as is sometimes alleged', and 'as for as Indian unions 
are concerned, the grouping of a number of them in offices near the 
headquarters of the Natal Indian Congress does perhaps suggest some 
form of affinity, but it is easy to overrate this suggestion', p.106. 
55. For a description of the 1946 campaign and the rise of the 'radicals' 
in the South African Indian Congress see E. Pahad, July 1972, 'The 
Development of Indian Political Movements in South Africa, 1924-
1946' (Ph.D., Sussex, 1972). 
56. Commissions were held investigating the 'penetration' of Indian land-
owners into 'White' areas and official action against Indian people 
culminated in the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Bill 
of 1946. Both Pahad (July 1972) and Frene Ginwala, 'Class Con-
sciousness and Control: Indian South Africans 1860-1946' (Ph. D., 
Oxford, 1974), deal with these events in some detail, but in neither 
is there an analysis of the class alignments withi,n the Indian political 
movements nor accounts of the attempts during the war years to 
develop united action between Indian a~d African workers. Ginwala 
does, however, bring out the relationsh ip of Mahatma Gandhi to 
Indian traders and his reluctance to endorse the revolt of Indian workers 
against indentured labour in 1913. Pahad has argued that the struggle 
against control over Indian people own ing land was a campaign involv-
ing all classes as many Indian workers owned land and the Indian people 
as a whole were desperately overcrowded. 
57. Natal Mercury, 2 September 1944. 
58. Department of Economics (University of Nata!), 1952: The Durban 
Housing Survey, University of Natal Press, pp.344-345. 
59. See the following investigations in the Report of the Witwatersrand 
Mine Natives Wages Commission, UG 21/1944, especially paras. 
114-238 The Native Reserves and their Place in the Economy of South , 
377 
Africa, Report No.9, Social and Economic Planning Counci I, UG 
32/1946, and the Report of Native Laws Commission, 1946-48, UG 
28/1948. These investigations are related to the level of prole-
tarianization during the war years in Dan O'Meara, July 1975, 
'The 1946 African Mine Workers' Strike and the Political Economy 
of South Africa', The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative 
Politics, XIII (2): 146-173. 
60. UG 21/1944, para.220. The same arguments apply to workers in 
those sectors of employment avoided by settled urban workers, e.g. 
the stevedori ng trade. 
61. Report of the Department of Native Affairs for 1944/45, UG 44/1946, 
p.116. 
62. Report of the Department of Native Affairs for 1945/47, UG 14/1948, 
p.24. 
63. Figures on maize production in selected areas provide evidence for the 
collapse of subsistence agriculture in certain districts where production 
had formerly been quite high in per capita terms, e.g. Polela and 
Ubombo. 
64. Mayor's Minute, Durban, 1944, Native Administration Department, 
p.91. 
65. The Guardian, 22 June 1944, 8(18): 6. 
66. Durban City Council, November 1947, Memorandum for Judicial Com-
mission on Native Affairs in Durban, Annexure C to Chapter VII. 
67. Quotations from Durban City Council, ibid., para. 29. 
68. See on this subject Margaret Ballinger, October 1944, Industry versus 
Agriculture; the problem of Native labour, South African Industry 
and Trade Revi ew, 40( 10): 35T -4 1T • ' 
69. \langa lase Natal, 14 February 1948. 
70. Pahad (July 1972): 216 
71. The interests of the African and Indian trading class were in many ways 
sharply in conflict. Champion and other traders gave evidence to 
the Rural Dealers' Licensing Inquiry Committee in 1941 to the effect 
that preference should be given to African applicants in African areas. 
Indian taxis serving in Africa areas should be withdrawn. \langa 
lase Natal, 6 December 1941. 
72. Vilikazi, A., January 1958, Zulu social structure and its dynamics 
today, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Natal, p.228. 
378 
73. U kubamisana, June 1946, l( 1}. The principal cooperative, 
Umgungundlovu in Pietermaritzburg, had a turnover of £7,350 7s 6d 
and a gross profit of £ 1,497 13s 11d in 1946. Maydon Wharf 
cooperative, consisting mainly of migrant workers in compounds, had 
35 members and had accumulated £35 14s 7~d, showing the capacity 
for organized action by migrants. Ukubamisana, August 1946. 
When the cooperative movement collapsed the stores reverted to 
private ownersh ip. 
74. Huss developed his views within the context of Papal Encyclopals 
and attempted to break the ho Id of the ICU on the masses in Nata I 
by stressing hard work, rural development ('People's Banks'), and use 
of Africanist slogans. Vilikazi limits his analysis of the coopera-
tive movement to the distrust created by 'its too obvious Catholic 
leadership'. Vilikazi (1958): 228. 
75. Ringrose (1949?): 104 and 115. The five unions affiliated to 
the Natal Federation'of African Trade Unions were the African 
General Labourers' Union, the African Building Workers' Union, 
the African Municipal Employees' Union, the Natal Iron and Steel 
Workers' Union, and the Natal African Hospital Workers' Union. 
Two of these unions had originally been formed by members of the 
Communist Party. By 1948 two of these unions had gone out of 
existence. 
76. Ilanga lase Natal, 12 June 1948 
77. The Guardian, 17 June 1948: 6. No mention was made during 
this strike of the South African Railways and Harbour Workers' Union 
which had 2,700 members in 1948. 
78. Some Durban trade unionists state he had returned clandestinely on 
several occasions during his banishment to keep in contact with the 
workers' movement. Information from Baruch Hirson. 
79. Dock Workers' Union, Report of our workers in Natal, 20 September 
1948. File 1496. The address on this report was that of the 
Communist Party in Durban. 
80. These extraordinary events are not mentioned in lIanga, whose editor 
may have been restricted in his report of the issue. The events 
are, however, corroborated by other African trade unionists of the 
time. 
81. These are Christopher Mbonambi's views on Phungula. 
82. Eduardo Mondlane, 1969, The Struggle for Mozambique, Penguin 
African Library, p. 115, and John Jliffe, 1970, 'A history of the 
dockworkers of Dar es Salaam', Tanzania Notes and Records, 71,. 
pp.131-134. 
83. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the riots of Durban, UG 
36/1949, pp.4-5. 
84. Judicial Commission appointed to enquire into the Durban riots, 
1949, Transcript of evidence, Volume 1, p. 159. 
85. UG 36/1949, p.20. 
86. Judicial Commission (1949), Volume 1, p.169. 
87. Ibid., p.53. 
88. These comparisons were made by Mary Benson, 1966, The struggle 
for a birthright, Penguin African Library, p. 124. 
89. Statement on the Durban riots, by the Working Committee of the 
379 
ANC, signed by Dr. A. B. X uma, 20 January 1949. Publ ished in 
Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter {eds.} 1973, From Protest 
to Challenge, Volume 2, Hope and Challenge 1935-1952, Stanford, 
Hoover Institution Pr~ss, pp. 286-7. 
90. L.K. Ladlau, December 1975, The Cato Manor Riots 1959-1960, 
MA Thesis, University of Natal, Durban, describes the 1949 riots 
and their aftermath. 
91. Minutes of Evidence, Industrial Legislation Commission, 1949, p.2956. 
92. nanga lose Natal, 14 May 1949. The editor had warned African 
workers in April that employers considered the wage demand 'absurd' 
and that if the demands were conceded many companies would have 
to close down. - !langa lase Natal, 2,A'pril 1949 
93. Natal Mercury, 3 May 1949 
94. The Guardian, 12 May 1949, p.3, and Natal Mercury, 3, 4, and 5 
May 1949. The strike was one of the few occasions in which a 
coordinated campaign around immediate industrial issues had been 
attempted. 
95. Natal Mercury, 3 May 1949 and 7 May 1949. Phungula was 
defended by Roley Arenstein, a leading member of the Communist 
Party. 
96. Natal Mercury, 14 May 1949 
97. !langa lase Natal, 21 May 1949, and Natal Mercury, 17 .August 1950. 
98. The Guardian, 26 May 1949 
99. There was a decisive increase in pressures for the retention and exten-
sion of the migrant labour system in the 1950s. See particularly 
Martin Legassick, October 1974, 'Legislation, ideology, and economy 
in post-1948 South Africa', Journal of Southern African Studies, 1(1), 
pp.5-35. 
100. 
101. 
102. 
103. 
104. 
105. 
106. 
107. 
108. 
109. 
110. 
111. 
112. 
113. 
114. 
115. 
380 
This quotation is taken from the Lansdown Commission, UG 21/1944, 
para. 309 and describes how the mining industry benefits from the 
migrant labour system. The argument also applies with consider-
able force to labour-intensive services and industries such as hotels, 
docks, civil engineering, and construction, which employ almost 
exclusively migrant labour. 
See flanga lase Natal, editorial comments, 23 July 1949. 
See Mayor's Minute, Durban, 1949, Native Administration Depart-
ment, p.132, and Natal Employers' Association, 7th Annual Report, 
1949/50, p.19. 
Report of the Department of Native Affairs, 1950, UG 61/1951, p.44. 
Natal Employers' Association, 7th Annual Report, 1949/50, p.19. 
The Clarion, 12 June 1952 
There is a short profile of Majosi in New Age, 29 October 1959. 
Daily News, 1 July 1954 
Ibid., 5 July 1954, Advance, 15 July 1954, and Daily News, 8 July 
1954. 
Daily News, 9 July 1954. 
Ibid., 21 November 1957 
do., 22 November 1957 
New Age, 17 April 1958: 1 and 3, which also reported that the 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Durban City Corporation, 
and the pol ice used 'every possible intimidation' to get workers not 
to participate in the political strike. 
Ibid., 24 Apri I 1958: 5 
Daily News, 21 ppril 1958 
New Age, 1 May 1959: 1 and 5 
116. Minutes of a meeting .•• Durban, 27 November 1958. File 1496. 
117. Important amendments to the Native labour Regulations Act (No 15 
of 1911) provided in Act No 56 of 1949 for the formation, registration, 
and control of groups of employers recruiting labour in agriculture and 
enabled the Min ister to declare African workers in industries other 
than mines to be employed on the same basis os those employed on mines 
and works, Official Year Book, 25, 1949, p.503. 
118. Minutes (27 November 1958), p.6. 
119. Indunas are African foremen; the language of tribal ism has been 
381 
incorporated into South African industrial relations. Management 
has embedded the concept of induna with its mil itary and triba I 
associations into the supervision of labour at the place of work. 
120. Workers' Unity, May 1959, 'Dock strike: the facts'. This unfor-
tunately is the only reference I have been able to locate in Workers' 
Unity to the struggle of dock workers in Durban. An interview 
with Stephen Dlamini in 1977 did not add any further information or 
additional interpretation of the dock workers' struggle beyond th is 
descri pt ion. 
121. Daily News, 25 and 26 February 1959. 
122. New Age, 5 March 1959: 3 
123. Ibid.: 5 
124. Ibid., 9,April 1959: 6. 
125. Minutes of Evidence (1949): 2955. 
126. Industrial legislation Commission, Minutes of Evidence (1949): 2959. 
127. Ibid.: 2960. 
CHAPTER 6 
NATIONAL OPPRESSION, MIGRANT LABOUR, AND THE DOCK LABOUR 
J,'OOL, 1960-69 
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By extending the working day, capitalist production ••• not 
only produces a deterioration of human labour-power by 
robbing it of its normal moral and physical conditions of 
development and activity, but also produces the premature 
exhaustion and death of this labour-power itself ••• Experience 
shows too how the degeneration of the industrial population 
is retarded only by the constant absorption of primitive 
and natural elements from the countryside. 
Marx, I (1976): 376, 380 
The Bantu who corne to work here (in the White area) accept 
employment here on the basis of migratory labour; they 
come to sell their labour here. All we are doing is to 
import labour into South Africa, and when those labourers 
have completed their work here, they return to their 
homeland ••• They only come here to supply labour. They are 
only supplying a commodity, the commodity of labour. Just 
as someone overseas who sells machinery to us is supplying 
a commodity, so the Bantu labourer is supplying a commodity 
to us ••• 
National Party MP, House of Assembly Debates 1965, 14, 
C5460-5461. 
In pursuit of maximum profits, capital has a constant 
tendency towards reducing the cost of labour, of depressing 
wages below the value of labour-power. The amount of surplus 
labour which can be extracted from the workers can be 
increased by lengthening the working day, intensifying labour, 
increasing its productivity, or by producing an abundance of 
d. 1 lsposab1e or unemployed wage labourers. All these factors, 
with differing emphasis, were brought into operation by the 
labour supply company in the stevedoring trade in the 1960s. 
The DGLSC exemplified many of the solutions of capital to the 
'very exacting problems' of working class struggles during 
the earlier period. 2 The amount of labour-time extracted 
from the permanently employed dock workers was increased 
considerably, not only by the more efficient operation of 
labour supplies to stevedoring companies, but also by the 
careful adjustment of migratory labour to new demands. The 
development of the company, its assertion of discipline over 
the workers, and reproduction of the migratory labour system, 
fo1low~in phase the changing policy of the ruling class. 
Towards the end of the 1960s the labour supply company is seen 
as a model apartheid institution, providing a lead to other 
labour-intensive services and industries; combining efficiency 
with control. 
With the suppression of the mass moveUlent of resistance 
ln the early 1960s, the apartheid state was free to take 
decisive action to arrest the social and political effects of 
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accelerated proletarianization. In essence the policy of an 
increasingly confident ruling class was to separate the 
expenditure of labour power from its reproduction, to attempt 
to locate the families of workers in the reserves, and to 
suppress all political organization of the African working 
class in the cities. Political repression was accompanied by 
a crucial change in migratory labour towards a contract labour 
system where African workers would only be permitted into the 
centres of employment on contract to a specific employer for a 
definite length of time. The re-stabilization of the economy 
after the outflow of capital following the Sharpeville massacre, 
and its subsequent rapid growth, was accompanied not by reforms, 
but by a sharp increase in the national oppression of the 
African masses. A central feature of this oppression was an 
attack on the actively employed black working class through 
the mobilization of the reserve army of labour on a nationally 
co-ordinated basis. The Bantusmn policy was the political 
expression of this strategy, developing a black petty bourgeoisie 
in the countryside which, through its position in the state 
apparatus, posed deep antagonism to the African working class. 
While homestead food production in the reserves per family 
declined rapidly with an increased dependence on wage labour, the 
apartheid state stepped up the programme of rural resettlement 
in collaboration with the rural African petty bourgeoisie. 
384 
The Bantu Labour Act of 1964 expressed the state's determination 
to reorganize labour supplies and develop the homeland concept in the 
minds of African workers. The political authority of the chiefly 
bureaucracy in the reserves was vastly increased by the insistence 
t~at all workers should be recruited through the rural labour 
bureaux. The national network of labour bureaux co-ordinated 
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through a central office was more precisely developed, with 
increased powers to deport 'idle' or 'undesirable' Africans from 
the urban centres. This mammoth piece of legislation passed on to 
statute book without the mass protests and resistance which had 
characterized all major legislation in the earlier period. The 
national liberation movement which faced defeat after defeat 
following the Sharpeville massacre was also turning away from the 
strategy of mass resistance towards one of armed struggle, 
concentrating all its energies on the development of a military 
cadre group. With the failure of the 1961 stay-at-home in 
support of the demand for a national convention, working class 
action was judged to be of limited significance in the struggle 
for the seizure of political power. 
While the economy expanded at a fairly low rate between 
1957-62, by the period 1963-68 there was a tremendous pace of 
expansion of 6.2 per annum. 3 The upturn in the economy was 
characterized both by the increase in imports of machinery, and 
the greater exports of raw materials and some manufactured goods. 
This increased movement of commodities was crucial to the 
pressure of work in the docks, the expansion of facilities, and 
the inauguration of the labour supply company to meet the 
increased workload at the lowest wages. The increased trade 
objectively strengthened the position of the dock workers as 
employers became more dependent on their skills and strength 
in handling masses of material, particularly important in the 
case of loading ships with manufactured goods. 4 The tremendous 
increase in goods handled in South African ports eventually 
posed the problem of productivity in the docks, how to load or 
unload ships at the fastest pace to achieve a rapid turnaround. 
Increasingly employers demanded that all bottlenecks in labour 
supply and the racial allocation of work should be abandoned and 
that a full programme of mechanization should be adopted. 
At this point there was a transition in the views of the 
employers of the African working class. From being a mass un-
differentiated labour force, the necessity for training, wage and 
skill differentiation, and professionalism was accepted. Despite 
this development and the subsequent advance of mechanization 
with more opportunities for urban workers, the labour supply 
company still insisted on migratory (and increasingly contract) 
labour as the basis for the recruitment and replenishment of 
workers in the docks. The accelerated pace of work in the docks 
tended to 'use up' the labour power of older and experienced 
workers, exhausting their productive capacity and increasing 
injuries and death. 5 New migratory workers eager for work and 
capable of doing the heaviest work could replenish the gaps in 
labour supply. Migratory labour, the movement of large numbers of 
workers in and out of the active reserve army of labour, would maintain 
the strength of the employers against the growing cohesiveness of 
workers steeled in the harsh discipline of the dock speed-up. 
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With the expanded powers in terms of labour recruitment and the 
network of labour bureaux, the stevedoring labour supply company 
had in its hands the levers of labour discipline and flexible 
supplies. With a growing industrial reserve force experienced in 
dock labour in the reserves (those resting and previously 
employed) the entire active labour force could be duplicated. 
The advantage of continual ebb and flux would dampening 
the formation of class consciousness. The Bantustan policy 
also strengthened the hand of the labour supply company 
politically, byellablillj if to playoff one reserve with its 
political authority against another, by dangling the prospect 
of employment before workers who were prepared to accept the 
discipline of the company without protest, thereby establishing 
a number of regional identities within the labour force. 
While the constant movement of workers strengthed the hand of 
the employers, the alternative of taking on urban workers would 
always be on hand. The latter process was dependent on the 
transition from 'pure' expenditure of labour power towards 
mechanization and eventually containerization. The employment 
of urban workers would mean a substantial revision in wages. 
An advantage of the contract labour system, particularly 
in its more refined aspects, would be that the transition 
could be managed with the lowest costs by a selective employment 
policy, merely, for example, by taking on an urban Hyster driver 
and not re-employing the migratory and exhausted stevedoring 
hand. This option could even be held back until the pace of 
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mechanization was fairly well advanced; no costs for 
pension schemes, sick pay, or redundancy payments having to be 
met. 
Organization of the labour supply company 
The Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company which was 
born out of the crushing of workers' resistance in March 1959 
was termed by its management as being 'an organized and planned 
attempt to pool labour resources' and to create a stable, 
. d 6 exper~ence , and permanent labour force adequate to any demand. 
That it was able to achieve these objectives without eliminating 
the continual movement of workers ~n the migratory labour system 
is testimony to the effectiveness of the labour bureaux in allo-
cating labour, and to the greater efficiency of the company after 
the power of the stevedoring companies had been concentrated in 
one central command. What the national network of labour bureaux 
sought to achieve in relation to thousands of companies, the 
labour supply company worked out (not on the basis of a state 
bureaucracy as such, but directly on the foundation of the profit 
system) in relation to the stevedoring companies. 
The company was able to achieve a more efficient allocation 
of labour previously employed by the stevedoring companies and to 
extend working hours. Soon after the DSLSC had been forced on the 
workers, the regular hours of the night shift were extended. In 
September 1960 it was reported that harbour workers (probably the 
more organized white workers) asked that the night shift should be 
389 
suspended until shipping activity agaln increased towards 
~he end of the year. The employers and harbour authorities 
were unsympathetic. They argued that the principal reason for 
the continuation of night work was that it reduced the number of 
ships in Durban harbour at anyone time more than the seasonal 
decline in arrivals. If night work was stopped, it was argued, 
periodic shipping congestion would return to the harbour. Indeed, 
the harbour authorities, far from considering suspending working 
at night, were extending its scope. Representatives of shipping 
companles ln Durban were anxious to see the night shift remain 
'a permanent feature of the port'. In September 1960 the Bluff 
bulk loading appliances for manganese ore, coal, and pig iron, were 
operated both day and night. To the shipping companies the night 
shift meant the difference between ships spending 10 hours in every 
24 hours lying idle, or getting away promptly without any wasted 
time; in short, a matter of profit. The night work had effectively 
speeded up the turn-around in Durban, so that while other harbours 
to the north and south continued to experience occasional congestion, 
the free flow of ships through Durban remained unimpeded. Official 
statistics showed that although the night shift strength was only 
15 per cent of the day shift, each night an average of 13,500 tons 
of cargo was handled. 'This is sufficient to maintain the port 
free of hold-ups and enable authorities to send ships on their 
way immediately they are finished.' 7 The increased demands for 
overtime and night shifts on the workers could only be made with the 
greater control brought about by the labour supply company, creating 
the basis for the pace of work to be speeded up. While previously 
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each company had had to maintain a surplus of workers to 
meet the highest possible demand, which in practice meant a 
perpetual collective oversupply, the labour supply company was 
able to reduce this daily surplus to a minimum. 
The daily surplus of workers prior to the inception of the supply 
company obviously represented some cost to the compan~es if they were 
to employ workers on a weekly basis although it also represented 
the social power of the employers to decline to take on workers 
every day and their ability to replace any troublesome workers 
at will. The labour supply company achieved a decline in the 
overall daily surplus while consolidating the collective power 
of the employers. The DSLSC 'selected carefully' from the existing 
9 labour force. The ability of the employers to replace militants 
from the first line of 'retained' workers in the compounds, was 
considerably strengthened by the growth of the national labour 
bureaux which presented employers with a second line of workers 
'on tap' when required. The Bantu Labour Act of 1964 made the 
industrial reserve army in the countryside immediately available 
to employers who were demanding increasing supplies of labour 
during the 1960s boom. 
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Although the transition from daily to weekly wage contracts 
increased the control of the workers by the labour supply company 
but also added considerably to its wage bill, workers having to be 
paid an attendance fee for reporting when no work was available. 
The total cost to the company could be trimmed by cutting down the 
surplus workers to the lowest possible number, making the workers 
interchangeable between companies, extracting more labour time from 
thoseemployed (particularly through overtime), and by intensifying 
the pace of work. All these steps, coupled with a gradual increase 
in mechanization and training of the workers, had a noticeable 
effect on the productivity of the workers and on the tonnage 
shifted each year. All these factors secured Durban as the major 
port of South Africa. 
The labour supply company operated as the central intelligence 
for the stevedoring companies, planning for future labour demand 
and controlling the daily movement of workers. The primary task of 
the company was making an accurate assessment of the quality and 
quantity of labour required by the stevedoring companies. Wage 
registers of previous years were studied to determine the skills, 
experience and inter-changeability of the workers. The company 
operated on a non-profit basis to supply stevedoring labour to the 
four shareholding companies ~n Durban which act as its principals, 
each principal having equal access to the resources of the labour 
pool, requisitioning labour on a daily basis. The company makes 
the fullest use of the labour employed, breaking through the 
boundaries of previous company employment or skil1s,deploying 
workers at will. 'The workers can be freely allocated and have no 
c~oice where and whom they wish to serve. ,9 This mobility 
of workers under the command of the supply company was crucial 
for the extraction of greater amounts of labour time from those 
employed, and at one level reduced the workers to a uniform 
quantum of labour power. The countervailing force against the 
brutal reduction of all workers to interchangeable labour units, 
was the existence of skills, specialization, and the fostering 
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of group identity. In the interests of continuity, skilled groups 
of workers are allocated to particular companies requiring those 
skills; with the proviso that if there was no demand by that 
company, the individual worker or group of workers could be 
10 
transferred to another company. 
The centralization of control in the labour supply company 
resulted in economies of scale in the accommodation of workers. 
Under the previous system the individual stevedoring companies 
employed five compound managers, but after the formation of the labour 
supply company this was reduced to two compound managers and 
one Bantu Personnel Officer. The clerical staff was also pruned, ~n 
1970,the Company employing 10 African and 4 Indian clerks to 
mtaintain personnel records and to administer the compound. 
The detailed control over the stevedoring workers under the new 
regime of the labour supply company did not require an expansion 
of the company bureaucracy; centralization was accompanied by 
a smaller and more effective bureaucracy officialdom, 
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Division of labour and social control 
The greater flow of goods through Durban docks during the 
1960s increased the demand for skills and experience on the part 
of the stevedoring workers and of their discipline in work. Prior 
to the establishment of the labour supply company the indunas 
(African foremen) had the power to gather a team of workers under 
their own direct control. Under the company their powers were 
reduced and compensation paid in terms of a substantial wage 
differential between their wage and that of the stevedoring labourer. 
In reorganizing the workers in the wake of the 1959 strike, the company 
was not able to dispense with the traditional 'boss' authority of the 
indunas. The attitude of management towards the indunas was (and 
still is) ambiguous; aware of their skills and experience but 
11 
suspicious of their former ambitions as potential labour sub-contractors. 
There exist three types of induna in the dock area, which may help 
to explain some of the insecurity the employers feel in relation to 
their'sergeant majors.' The compound indunas, militarist in spirit, 
puffed up with petty authority, and linked to chiefly authority in 
the reserves are unambiguously the police power of the employers. 
The stevedoring labourers have a more analytic approach to those indunas 
who work with them in the holds of the ships, having to share the 
danger and sweat of work. Their ability to earn the wage 
differential is based on their ability to keep up a steady pace 
of work. This may be done either by having a sympathetic and 
solidaristic relationship with the labourers or a reliance on company 
authority, and the workers respond in their assessment of their 
position accordingly. Their standing among the labourers is more akin 
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to a chargehand than a foreman, and they are vulnerable 
"to the immediate sanctions of workers either physically ln 
a dangerous workplace or by going slow. Finally there is the 
senior induna, whose task is to liaise with the white foreman 
and to oversee the work in each hold. 
The company, aware of the distinction between formal authority 
d . fl' 1 .. 12 an ln orma SOC1a organ1zat1on, attempted to make use of the 
closeness of the indunas to the labourers to maintain social 
discipline. The management of the company built social restraints 
into the structure of labour organization by allowing the indunas 
to select the members of their gang, and the labour force was 
organized into a series of gangs each under its induna. The 
gang was seen as the core institution within the labour process. 
As the deputy manager quoted approvingly from the Hawthorne 
Experiment: 'The primary group is the instrument of society 
through which in large measure the individual acquires his 
attitudes, opinions, goals, and ideals, it is also one of the 
d · .. d . 1 1 ' 13 fundamental sources of lsc1pllne an SOCla contro s • 
Management fought to transform the objective existence of 
solidarity among workers into a force for its domination of the 
labour process. Its distortion of social science is shown by 
blurring over the difference between the 'primary group', an 
association of workers in production, and the gang, directly 
controlled by the instrument of management the indunas. Rather 
than acknowledging that workers 'attitudes and opinions' derive 
from their experience of productive labour, the company management 
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stressed the cultural background of the workers so as to derive the 
form of command over labour in the docks. Because of the 
cultural background of the workers management argues that 
'competent Bantu leaders completely adjusted to the demands 
of the trade' should be appointed and trained for supervision. 
'They will be the first line supervisor in the primary work groups 
and will playa vital role in the achievement of the objects 
14 
of the trade. Given a situation of national oppression in 
which African people as a whole were denied social advancement, 
management considered the immediate supervisors of African workers 
should be African foremen to achieve higher levels of productivity. 
White supervisors should be provided with an anthropological 
15 
approach to African workers ,stressing their 'cultural backgrounds'. 
With the considerably increased power of the employers following 
on the establishment of the labour supply company, management 
adopted a reformer's zeal to the reorganization of social 
relations among supervisors and supervised, black and white: 
Management can therefore, manipulate inter-relationships 
within these groups to a certain extent, and so achieve 
desired objects such as stimulating the will-to-work, 
increased productivity, a different attitude, etc •.• 
Its task in this regard is to use every opportunity to 
remove pin-pricks, to act immediately where incidents 
occur which lead to strained relationships (abusive 
language, assaults) and constant guidance i~ mat~ers16 
relating to personal relations in the job S1tuat1on. 
Yet in one crucial area the management claims to leave the 
authority over workers to the induna: in selecting the members of 
a gang. In the language of bureaucracy the gangs became called 
Stevedoring Labour Units (SLU) and consisted of eight stevedoring 
hands selected by the induna to which were added the semi-
skilled winchmen or gangwaymen. The SLU was seen as an answer 
to the problem of labour discipline as management claimed there 
was considerable prestige attached to membership in what were 
considered the best Units. 'The natural tendency to group 
f t' , d d ' , ,17 orma ~on ~s use an a team sp~r~t emerged. By acting 
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at one step removed from the selection process, management hoped 
to be able to use the existing complementary relationships and 
networks within the labour force to secure the highest output. 
A heightened esprit de corps in one group sets ~n motion competition 
with the others; competitive human interaction ~n the service of capital, 
In discussing the combination of workers ~n 
co-operative labour Marx argues there is an increase ~n the productive 
power of the individual but also the creation of new productive power 
which ~s intrinsically a collective one. 'Apart from the new power 
that arises from the fusion of many forces into a single force, 
mere social contact begets in most industries a rivalry and a 
Stimulation of the 'animal spirits', which heightens the efficiency 
f ' d' 'd ' 17 Th , , f h . 1 o each ~n ~v~ ual worker. ~s ar~ses rom t e SOCIa nature 
of human beings. In South Africa employers are well aware of the 
expanded productive powers of combined workers under the command 
of capital and the organization of African workers in gangs 
characterizes the policy of management particularly in transport, 
municipal services, mining, and agriculture. The gang asserts 
the sociability of workers as human beings, and by regulating the 
expenditure of labour power (particularly with work songs) extends the 
labour power of the workers. In this way municipal gangs, 
for instance, can maintain vigorous work by co-ordinating their 
movements to thump out carefully marked trenches in the roads. 
Similarly railway workers in gangs are adept at throwing railway 
tracks onto the wagons by skillfully co-ordinated collective 
effort, this co-ordination emanating from the workers themselves 
in shout and song. 
While management has placed a strong emphasis on the 
development of gangs and the efficient allocation of labour on a 
daily basis to the principal companies, the demands of greater 
productivity in the docks to meet the inrush of imports during the 
1960s required increasing differentiation, division of labour, and 
the growth of skills by the workers. While the whole tendency of 
the more exacting regulations on movement of workers and centralized 
control of the 1960s was towards making African workers units of 
labour and inter-changeable between one job and another. and to 
reducing the cost of contracted labour, the demand of capital in 
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the docks for higher output and lower costs meant some increase in the 
skills of African stevedores was needed. The growing differentiation 
of the workers took two main forms: the establishment of a definite 
group of black supervisors and increasing numbers of workers to 
operate the machinery on the ships and in the holds. 
According to management, the indunas 'select themselves' on the advi. 
of the supervisory staff who assess the 'natural leaders'. Their role IS 
particularly important in setting the pace of work and co-ordinating 
the work of the gang with that of the specialized workers: winchmen, 
gangwaymen. and crane drivers. The group of specialized workers 
reflects the slowly increasing mechanization in stevedoring in the 
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1960s. The winchmen operate the winches when required and on 
the more modern ships, the electrical cranes, when they are 
sufficiently experienced. The gangwaymen have the important work of 
communicating by signa1bat with the crane operator or the winchmen 
and in warning the workers in the hold when cargo is being lowered. 
The maize trimmer's job has grown with the introduction of advanced 
mechanization in grain loading; the work is one of spraying the maize 
evenly so it will not shift when the ship heaves Ln rough weather. 
When the specialized workers are not required for therr task they 
have to fill in with the stevedoring workers; centralized management 
breaks down any elements of job demarcation. 
This level of differentiation among workers, although evident 
earlier in Cape Town, came rather later to Durban where it seems 
management did not have the same urgency to increase the division of 
labour. The distinction between different types of work is one not so 
much based on an apparently objective difference Ln skill but one of 
specialization and wage differences. The stevedoring labourers are 
not 
not 'unskilled' and thereforejeasily replaced. Although they are 
directed by the induna they acquire considerable ability in moving cargo 
in the hold and securing it properly before being hauled up. 
Co-ordinated collective work is essential when very large and heavy 
objects are being moved. All this work has to be done at speed. The 
ship's owners are anxious to keep shipping costs low by turning about 
as soon as possible. This criterion affects the overall pace of work 
and the levels of accidents and injuries; the stevedoring workers have to 
be able to work effectively in the fastest possible time. 
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Over the years since the inception of the labour supply 
company a growing number of experienced and specialized workers has 
been built up to be available for a variety of work operations. 
The control over the workers and higher rates of exploitation made 
possible by the DSLSC were not incompatible with certain limited 
'welfare' activities (such as attempting to reduce assaults) and 
raising the skills of the workers to perform new work. This was 
spelt out by the management in describing the necessary function 
of the company: 'It must effectively control the labour force and 
guard its welfare, but must also ensure that the workers render 
the service required of them, that they possess the skills 
necessary or are afforded the opportunity to acquire such skills 
as rapidly as possib1e.,18 
Stevedoring labourers Gangwaymen/Winchmen 
2,259 
2,239 
164 
250 
Indunas 
122 
107 
The composition of occupations 1n the company shows that despite 
the oppressive conditions following the 1959 strike and the increasing 
powers of management, rising productivity in the docks was secured by 
intensifying labour time and increased mechanization. The middle group 
of workers, the gangwaymen and winchmen, increased by 52 per cent 1n 
the period 1964-68 making a marked increase in the capacity and 
adaptability of the workers as a whole. The increased organization 
of the workers as a who,le under the regime of the labour supply company, 
the specialized SLU, command structures from the management to the 
ships, actually permitted some reduction in the number of 
indunas by 12 per cent. Management was also able to prune 
the bureaucracy of control and achieve some economies of 
scale. Under the old system five compound managers were 
required, while the Company compound which centralized control 
of accommodation needed only two compound managers and one 
Bantu Personnel Officer. 
Types of work and labour organization 
Despite the fairly steady increase 1n foreign trade, the 
amount of work which is available each day 
fluctuates considerably. Over the broad 
post-war period there were several changes in the methods of 
shipping and packing which considerably changed the nature of 
the work. Loose cargo became increasingly palletized, 
mechanized and bulk loading of major exports such as sugar, 
maize, manganese, became universal. Greater uniformity in the 
size and quality of the cargo (either bulk, packaged, or 
loose) was achieved. Management claimed that improved command 
over stevedoring labour in the docks resulted 1n the lowering 
of the breakage rate and lessened the danger for the workers. 
Through the changed nature of the work and successive wage 
determinations, different forms of work became classified: 
general, cold, bulk, dirty, and maize. Systematic wage bonuses 
were paid for each type of work defined 1n the wage 
determinations. 
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Work is divided not only among the workers in each SLU 
but also these groups become specialized and tend to handle 
the same types of cargo and machinery. There are 90 SLU 
controlled by the DSLSC which have a certain permanence, 
as members are changed only through leave, sickness or injury. 
The induna who is permitted by the Company to personally chose 
his group of eight men is placed in immediate command of the 
workers. The s~ze of the work group (the SLU and specialized 
workers) is adjusted in conformity with the material handled, 
combining particular clusters of workers for each work operation. 
The DSLSC estimates it requires a gang of ten stevedoring 
labourers with gangwaymen and winchmen for each crane, to which 
~s added derrick gangs if bulk cargo is being handled. 19 
Particular SLU become specialized to handle certain kinds of 
work, a development which 1S encouraged by management which feels 
the specialist teams provide considerable status for their members 
'which then becomes a powerful control measure'. Further 
specialization was achieved by linking the SLUs with particular 
foremen which lead to greater output with fewer supervisory 
. ,20 problems and 'excellent labour relat~ons. Management sees 
improved output as a result of its direct intervention in the 
workplace to establish social groupings to regulate 'work habits 
and attitudes' and to provide pressure on non-conforming members. 
This is seen as particularly important in establishing co-operative 
relations between rulers and ruled, supervisors and workers, as 
well as in intra-group relationships. 'A group ••• softens the 
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adaptation problems for each other, which is very important, 
where representatives from the two different cultural groups 
f d · h . b' . ,21 are oun Ln t e JO sLtuatLon. The possibility, and 
inevitability, of clashes of real interests between the 
supervisors, black and white, and the supervised, the mass 
of stevedoring workers is not explored. 
The gangs on each ship are made up of SLU and specialized 
workers according to the work in hand. The gangs in the holds 
of the ships tend to operate fairly autonomously under the 
general supervision of a hatchman or foreman and the immediate 
direction of the induna. The work requires close co-ordination 
between the crane operator on the quay and the gangs in the holds; 
the day's work is set out by the foreman from instructions and 
the ship's plans. 
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(The work of the hatchman is not defined by wage determinations and 
becomes taken over by the senior induna). 
The co-ordination of the two spheres of work; on the quay 
and in the holds is dependent on the gangwayman who signals 
directions to the crane operator. In turn, the pace of work in 
the holds is determined by the speed with which the crane 
operators move the cargo and are ready to take on the next 
load. 
Within the labour process significant changes are taking 
place; both in the structure of command, and in the racial 
allocation of jobs. Although there has never been a job 
reservation determination for the stevedoring trade (possibly 
because the lack of mechanization which could have provided an 
opening for white labour on the basis of a substantial wage 
differential), the structure of command in the dock area 
duplicates that of apartheid society as a whole. The conventional 
colour bar operating in the trade debars the indunas (who are 
often fully conversant in English, who understand the ship's 
plans, and who have acquired the skills of administration) from 
further progression up the hierarchy of job classification. 
Yet the racial allocation of jobs is not absolute: during the 
1960s the immediate supervisors of the workers increasingly 
became the black indunas rather than the white foremen. This 
change was prompted by the need of capital to 'Africanize' the 
employers' command over the workers, to replace the white 
foremen who were increasingly attracted to other work and 
substituted by inexperienced white immigrants, and to lower the 
total costs of supervision. The work of the foreman stevedore 
was increasingly taken up by the 'senior induna', a job which was 
included for the first time in Wage Determination 308 of 1969. 
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This job, as defined, includes the supervision, under the 
general direction of a foreman stevedore, of two or more indunas 
, 22 
and theIr teams of stevedoring labourers. In practice the 
indunas had previously been recognized to be authorities on moving 
cargo and within general instructions had been granted considerable 
autonomy. The white learner stevedores, inexperienced in the 
trade, are advised by their companies to heed the advice of the 
experienced indunas. 
The other areas of change reflect the growIng mechanization 
~n the docks; the power driven equipment for trimming maize during 
bulk loading, and the fork-lift trucks used to load, unload, and 
stack cargo within the holds. 23 The maize trimmer and fork-lift 
truck driver were included ~n wage determinations for the first 
time in 1969, a reflection of capital investment by SARH on the 
wharves and speeded up work within the holds during the 1960s. 
There were 11 Indian fork-lift truck drivers ~n the holds of 
ships in November 1963 and subsequent expansion increased both the 
number of African and Indian workers in this occupation as the 
physical strength of. the workers became increasingly supplemented 
b b ' h' 24 y mo lle mac Inery. 
The labour process in the docks is fairly rigidly divided 
into two sections: that under the control of the stevedoring 
companies on board the ships, and that under the control of SARH 
on the wharves. As the tonnage of cargo passing through Durban 
increased dramatically during the post-war boom, so both employers 
4M 
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searched for means of raising the output of the workers. While 
mechanization was always a possibility constantly explored by 
the SARH in relation to bulk cargo exports such as coal, maize, 
sugar, and manganese, the problem of achieving a fast turn-about 
of ships unloading manufactured goods and machinery, for example, 
still remained. The immediate response of employers to the 
lengthening queues of ships outside the harbour was to extend 
working hours and attempt to build up better co-ordination between 
the two parts of the labour process. Steenkamp, the Wage Board 
chairman during this period felt that despite the limitations on 
mechanization and problems 1n developing skills of stevedoring 
workers, 'productivity can be increased considerably through better 
co-ordination between the parallel stevedoring labour forces on 
h 1 d h 'd ,25 t e vesse an on t e quaysl e. In his view there was much 
room for improved co-operation. Following the crisis in shipping 
during the 1970s with ever-increasing delays in unloadin& the 
solution to the problem came to be seen in increased capital 
expenditure in the harbour and in bringing African workers into the 
key job of crane driver. This has been one of the most important 
changes 1n the labour process, and puts African workers in a 
commanding position both on the ships and on the wharves. 
It is not possible to present a comprehensive and finalized 
map of the labour process which is shaped by mechanization and by 
struggles over racial allocation of work. These struggles are not 
necessarily fought in these terms but at one step removed: over the 
wages of the most exploited sections or over the hours of work. Changes 
in the labour process have to be presented dynamically 1n terms of 
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crisis which quickens their pace and chronologically to 
sort out causal from associated factors. 
Intensified labour and m1grancy 
During the 1960s the labour supply company attempted to 
attain a 'fine tuning' between the peaks of demand for labour 
and the supply from the reserves. In essence the inauguration 
of the labour supply company had cut the pool of workers 
available to employers to somewhat above the maximum demand for 
labour on any day, a considerable difference from the situation 
in the 1950s where about 6,000 workers could apply for 1,000 
. b d 26 h' d JO s on a aYe T e 1ncrease outlay which employers had to 
make to maintain the varying number of surplus workers on each 
day was more than made up by extending the working day (both the 
hours worked normally before overtime and by the addition of a 
permanent night shift). The added expenditure on a permanent 
workforce was also more than compensated by the steadily rising 
tonnage of cargo passing through the port (Appendix), as the 
economy moved into the higher growth rates of the 1960s. After 
the black workers had been brought under tight central control, 
the white railway workers (crane drivers and wharf workers) 
could be compelled to increase the hours they worked parallel to 
the stevedoring workers in the hold. 
The first wage determination in 1959 laid down the 
extraordinarily long hours worked 1n the docks, hours the Wage 
Board claimed were unilaterally set by the SARR. While the 
Factories Act prescribed a maximum of 46 hours a week, the 
normal hours to be worked in the docks were 48, and the rema1n1ng 
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hours of compulsory overtime and work on Sunday could bring 
the total hours worked a week to 82 • Throughout the 1960s 
the workers employed by DSLSC were required to work every day 
of the week, the only daylight hours free being Saturday 
afternoon. And even on Saturday the ordinary hours could be 
extended by two hours overtime and then even further if the work 
d 1 d b k b h h · 28 was ec are to e emergency wor y t e port aut orlty. Despite 
a clause providing for limits to overtime, the regulations were ln 
effect flexible enough should there be a peak demand for the workers 
to be taken to the extremity of physical endurance. 
The amount of labour-time expended by the workers every day 
was in fact even longer; they presented themselves for duty up to 
forty-five minutes before the ordinary hours were calculated. The 
time spent waiting in queues and being transported to the berths, 
often a considerable distance from the compound, does not 
constitute working time. Work officially only began at 0720 on the 
ships. There was a lunch break from 1200 to 1300 and then work to 1700. 
If overtime was worked, a tea break of 20 minutes was allowed 
between 1700 and 1900, and work may have continued until 2100. 
If the work was not completed by then, a night shift was meant 
to take over. During the weekend, work continued until Saturday 
noon, unless extended by overtime and emergency work. Sunday 
work was (and still is) compulsory and is paid for at higher rates 
as well as the daily allowance. 
It is important to describe the hours of work ln the 1960s in 
some detail for two reasons: the make up of hours in the working 
day 1S a matter which leads to many disputes, and the provision 
for extending the working day to these extremes helps us to 
understand the overwhelming dependence of stevedoring on migrant 
labour. While during the togt period these extreme hours did not 
weigh down as heavily on the workers who could take a day off 
or decline to work on Sundays, ~nder the strict regime of the 
DSLSC workers were required to report for work every day. 'The 
employers want to kill us with overtime', the workers complained 
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when the labour supply company was formed. 29 The extreme 
prolongation of the working day in the docks marked capital's demand 
for higher output from an almost fully employed and smaller workforce. 
This was only possible on the basis of the poverty wages paid in the 
industry by drawing on workers from the most distant reserves, not 
only to replace those experienced workers who resisted the higher 
levels of exploitation, but also those who were exhausted or 
injured. The strategy of the employers was to base the industry on 
migrant labour, the harsh oppression and exploitation driving away 
urban African workers. The stevedoring industry particularly during 
the early 1960s invested in comparatively little mechanization and 
maintained its profitability on the basis of extracting absolute 
surplus value: intensifying labour and extending the working day. 
The DSLSC adopted an active recruitment programme initially as a 
strike-breaking tactic to replace strikers in 1959 by fresh workers 
from the reserves. Later evidence shows a more sophisticated 
approach in recruiting labour, management becoming more confident 
of its ability to meet the demand for labour, and more concerned about 
the quality of the workers and their stamina for prolonged and 
exacting work. While in the wake of a strike workers from the most 
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have 
desperately impoverished reserves maYlbe~suitable to re-establish 
the employers' control, recruitment from selected areas would 
later become important as mass unemployment made a better 
quality of worker available to the stevedoring employers. 
The only basis on which a constant supply of labour could be availabl( 
for the exhaustingly longer hours worked in stevedoring was by 
entrenching migrant labour which was effectively separated from 
family life and so prepared for a 'staple die~ of long hours of hard 
work, little recreation, and sleeping quarters under the control 
of the employers. As the pace of mechanization slowly picked up 
during the 1960s it became more important fJr management to 
search out the most capable workers to take over key jobs and maintain 
the migrant labour system at the same time. Management became 
highly selective in its recruitment,benefitting from the vast 
industrial reserve army created by growing capital-intensity in 
industry, mining, and services. 
The position of employers who looked towards the reserves as 
their hinterland for labour supply was considerably strengthened 
by the growing effectiveness of the pass laws and increased powers 
to regulate the movement of African labour in the Bantu Labour 
Act, No.67 of 1964. The systematic controls exacted over mine 
workers from 1911 were extended by this Act over all African 
workers, increasing capital's power to direct African workers to the 
lowest paid and most exhausting work. During this phase of capital 
accumulation the state's emphasis was not so much on forcing African 
workers out of the reserves to work (by this stage even sizeable 
adjustments to the land available to Africans would not have 
secured their 're-peasantization' as returns from the land 
declined drastically) but rather to limit the rapidly grow1ng 
urban working class and channel African labour effectively to 
increase the total amount of labour time available. 30 Another 
crucial feature of the legislation and administration was to 
1ncrease the powers to expel African workers from the industrial 
centres, and to send certain classes of workers to work colonies, 
an acknowledgement that for increasing numbers of workers the 
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reserves had completely lost their attraction even as places in which to 
die. The Bantu. Labour Act provided a more developed network of labour 
bureaux extending from the Bantustans to the urban centres, limiting 
the access of workers to the towns to seek work, and even further 
granting powers to officials to cancel existing contracts of service 
between African workers and employers on the basis of wideranging 
conditions. The Act increased the political and workplace controls 
over African workers. Contracts of service could be cancelled if 
the employment of an African worker 'impairs or 1S likely to 
impair the safety of the State or of the public or of a section 
of the public or threatens or is likely to threaten the maintenance 
of public order. ' 
The long list of offences in terms of the Act increased the 
employers control over African workers sharply, Desertion, strikes 
and go-slows, neglect of duty, refusal to obey a lawful command of 
an employer, the use of abusive language, or acceptance of other 
contracts of serV1ce were all made criminal offences in terms of 
Section 15. Bantu labour inspectors were empowered to inspect 
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compounds, to inquire into and redress grievances, and to do other 
duties. These inspectors were given wide powers including 
those of summary trial of African workers for committing any of 
the offences above. An inspector may caution, reprimand, or fine an 
offender up to two rand which is deducted by the employer from 
the worker's wage. These legal powers which made resistance to 
employers a criminal offence strengthened the employers in their 
domination over the workers but were not used uniformly, in most 
cases the employers were able to maintain control through their 
social power over the working class, by dismissing workers and in 
effect handing them over to the state for expUlsion from the urban 
centre. 
The recruitment of African workers is a highly defined legal 
and administrative process, and the DSLSC follows the precise 
methods laid down by apartheid legislation. In trying to maintain 
cycles of employment which would provide an average number of 
workers appropriate to the demand for labour in the docks, the 
Company follows a definite strategy. Work-seekers are not drawn 
from the municipal labour bureau .• as was the case with most 
manufacturing industries during the 1960s, and virtually all 
workers are recruited from rural areas at a considerable distance 
from Durban. Although recruiting practices are formal, they 
do not approach that of the highly developed form in the mining 
industry, and no agents or runners are used. The impression 1S 
gained of recruitment through the Assistant Manager, Dreyer, being 
conducted on the basis of personal contacts with the BAD bureaucracy 
supplemented with some discussion with chiefs and headmen. 
A definite procedure is followed by the Company. When more 
workers are to be recruited a requisition is first sent to the 
municipal labour bureau,whidhinvariably indicates that it 
is unable to fill the positions required at the wage rates 
offered. Urban workers are not prepared to work the 
exhaustingly long hours when other employment is available, 
and only very rarely are workers recruited from the Durban 
municipal areas. The requisition is then passed on to the 
district labour bureau with forms indicating the areas 
preferred and the numbers of workers required. 
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The Company has been granted a preferential choice by BAD of 
workers in the areas north of the Tugela, and asks for workers from 
four or five districts which are particularly favoured: 
Nongoma (the home district of the Paramount Chief), Nkandla, 
Hlabisa, Mtonjaneni, and Mahlabatini (the home district of 
Chief Gatsha Buthelezi). Permission is then requested to 
recruit workers from those areas from the Pietermaritzburg 
labour bureau which controls the movement of African workers 
from Kwa Zulu districts. The forms are then returned approved, 
and the district labour bureau is advised on what days the 
Company will be visiting the areas. Dreyer says he has built up 
his own intelligence service and can telephone key persons in 
various areas and collect workers within forty-eight hours 
or less. 
The Company officials then proceed to the districts 
where the workseekers have been marshalled at the Bantu 
Commissioner's Office. Apparently many more workers apply to 
be employed than are requested, and the Company can afford 
to be highly selective. Officials report that workseekers 
can exceed requirements by up to 600 per cent, and cite 
this as proof of the high standing of the company rather than 
. 1 . h 31 t L_ mass~ve unemp oyment ~n t e reserves. Workseekers are ~;J/ ~oc 
judged primarily in terms of physique, but the Company also 
claims to spread its labour requirements throughout a number 
of districts. The precise policy which is adopted is not 
spelt out by the Company: it ~s likely that quite abrupt 
changes take place when there are wholesale dismissals of 
strikers who are replaced with fresh recruits from the reserves. 
Recruitment, it will be argued, is not a matter of employing 
objective categories such as physique and dexterity or even 
'balance' between different areas, but heavily influenced by 
political rule in the reserves. It ~s this quality which gives 
the process of recruitment directly from the reserves a dynamic 
context, responsive to the growth of a massive industrial 
reserve army of labour and of the changing political environment 
. 32 ~n the reserves. 
Once a worker is approved, his particulars are taken and he 
is given a summary of the rates of pay and conditions of work. 
A contract form is then made out (apparently not specifying the 
precise length of service which is governed by the Bantu Labour 
Act as a maximum of one year or 360 shifts), and the worker is 
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given a slip of paper with the Company's address. Contrary to 
th~ policy of the mining companies, the Company is opposed to 
providing transport or granting advances. Management argues 
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the 'good faith' of the recruit is proved when he turns up at 
the right time in Durban, i.e. they do not feel any inducements 
to report for work in Durban are needed. The overwhelming 
supply of labour available to the Company in the reserves can be 
explained not only in terms of the rising unemployment of the 
1960s but also by the growing effectiveness of the apparatus of 
passes, labour bureaux, and influx control which severely 
restricts free access to the cities to seek work. 
Because of its semi-official standing with the Department of Bantu 
Administration, workers who are recruited by the Company are 
released from the myriad restrictions on entry into Durban. 
The slip of paper enables the workers to bypass the barriers 
of influx control in a similar manner to recruited mine workers. 
Official approval is granted to the Company, not only because of 
its strategic location 1n supplying labour to the most important 
port in South Africa, but also because none of the workers 
recruited will become a 'burden' on the totally inadequate housing 
provided in the townships or even the official hostel accommodation. 
By recruiting workers on limited contract (length of service is 
limited by the Bantu Labour Act to 360 shifts), the Company 1S 
not adding to the growing urban African working class which is 
completely separated from the land. 
Migrancy is perpetuated by effectively carrying 
out state regulations controlling the movement of workers, 
by providing centrally controlled compound accommodation, 
and keeping up an active recruitment of workers from key 
reserves. These objectives of the Company in keeping wage costs 
to a minimum while extracting the maximum amount of labour time 
from the workers are an important aspect of state policy. As in 
the case of railways and the police, there are no difficulties 
in bringing African workers from any 'Bantu area' into the 
prescribed urban area of Durban. 33 
The Company has built up consistent relationships with 
particular magisterial districts in Natal and the Transkei, 
although these are not necessarily the obvious relationships 
spelt out by management or academics adopting the perspective 
of the Company. The management presents a view of the workforce 
being basically Zulu-speaking and ideologically tribal ~n terms 
of their home-orientation and associations at work. This view 
is echoed in a recent study of social action among stevedoring 
workers which adopts an ethnological approach to the actions 
of stevedoring workers and separates non-Zulu speaking workers 
. l' 34 completely from ~ts ana yS1S. This, it is argued, completely 
misrepresents both the history of contract labour to the docks 
from Pondoland dating back to the early 1900s and of united 
working class action in the docks in support of demands for a 
living wage and in action against employers and the state. 
The patterns of recruitment are considerably more complex than 
a certain preference for workers from one district or another and 
show changes over time. 
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TABLE 6.1 ORIGINS OF STEVEDORING WORKERS, JANUARY 1970 35 
Region 38, 
Kwa-Zulu 'heartland' 
Nongoma 
Nkandla 
Mtonj aneni 
l-Jqutu 
Region 21, 
Pondoland 
Mount Alyff 
Bizana 
Tabankulu 
Flagstaff 
Region 33 and 39, 
Kwa-Zulu coastal areas 
Hlabisa 
Mtunzini 
Region 34 and 36, 
Inland and Midlands 
Estcourt 
Kranskop 
Region 35, 
Ixopo 
Alfred 
Other regions 
Notes: 
Numbers 
290 
227 
175 
56 
215 
170 
169 
40 
186 
42 
138 
84 
88 
32 
218 
2,130 
Sub-Total % 
748 35.1 
594 27.9 
228 10.7 
222 10.4 
120 5.6 
218 10.2 
99.9 
Rank 
1 
2 
5 
11 
3 
6 
7 
13 
4 
12 
8 
10 
9 
14 
See Figure 6.3. 
The regions are those grouped for official statistical 
purposes. 
The statistics show a pattern of areas of origin concentrated 
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~n regions fairly remote from the urban areas where homestead production 
declined seriously only during the 1950s, and where the production 
of use values (cattle, beer, beadwork) within the homestead still 
assumes some importance. These areas could be considered appropriate 
SOURCES OF LABOUR SUPPLY DSLSC JANUARY 1970 
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for capital in the stevedoring trade precisely because they 
are areas of relative rather than absolute impoverishment and 
destitution, and the rural homestead production still retains 
some ability to provide a subsidy to wage labour. The areas 
from which labour is drawn could be characterized as between 
the most remote and the primary supply areas to the urban 
industrial centres, where proletarianization IS advanced but 
the homesteads not reduced to complete destitution. 
From the Company's view these areas possess definite advantages 
during a period of extraction of absolute surplus value, 
long hours and intense work. In contrast to the reserves 
supplying labour to Northern Natal towns, Pietermaritzburg, and 
Durban-Pinetown (those from which workers have evolved a 
pattern of weekly migration) migration from the more remote 
36 
areas has a long-term character. Once the workers have been 
accepted for employment in the urban centres they tend to stay 
on for the full length of the contract if possible to maintain 
their savings rather than spend their wages on costly transport. 
This certainly has the advantage for the Company which worked 
seven days a week during the 1960s, there was little incentive 
for the workers to leave during the weekends. Resistance to 
long hours being worked during the weekends would be correspondingly 
less, and management would have the advantage of a full complement 
of labour on Monday rather than higher absenteeism after workers 
extended their visits home into the following week. 
While management of the Company obviously attempts to 
ta~e fullest advantage of the different characteristics of 
labour in different regions, it is not capable of a completely 
objective manipulation of the migratory system. While workers 
from areas undergoing rapid proletarianization (as opposed to 
those in which proletarianization is complete) are preferred 
for a number of reasons, the Company has been forced to adopt 
the recruitment strategy because of the resistance of experienced 
workers particularly during the late 1950s to the low wages and 
intensified labour demanded of them by the employers. The 
hostility of urban workers and those workers who still possessed 
certain rights to seek employment at the urban labour bureaux 
to the desperately low wages and exhausting hours of stevedoring 
labour which characterized the extraction of absolute surplus 
value in the docks during the 1960s, forced capital into long-
range migration in an attempt to find fresh workers of the right 
physique and uncontaminated by notions of class consciousness. 
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It was only at the periphery of commodity relations, in the reserves 
where the ideology of clan and ethnicity was being strengthened 
under a salaried traditional bureaucracy that there was the 
supply of appropriate labour. In these areas a migrant working 
class was being reproduced under conditions which fitted the 
level of exploitation of labour power in the docks. In the dying 
patriarchal society of the distant reserves, capital could take 
advantage of the ideological and material conditions of the 
reproduction of labour power. The wives of workers continued to 
maintain the gardens and fields of ma~ze and sorghum to subsidize 
the wages drawn from the urban areas in the form of irregular 
remittances. Through cattle ownership and kin, homestead landholding, 
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and the reinforcement of ethnic consciousness 1n the 
Bantustans, the state and employers struggled to maintain a 
social and political orientation to the reserves while material con-
conditions forced the men and growing numbers of women into wage labour. 
When the forces of attachment to the land 
weakened under the fastp.r pace of proleterianization 
in the 1960s, the state intervened to maintain a legal 
relationship with the countryside by stepping up the state 
apparatus repelling impoverished workers from the cities 
and recycling them again into sectors paying the most desperate 
poverty wages. In sectors like the docks where a low organic 
composition of capital demanded the most rigorous direct 
controls over workers, employers were impelled to draw upon 
labour under the sway of ideological notions such as the 
induna system. Only in the more distant reserves did chiefly 
authority and the command of indunas carry any social weight • 
• 
Employers hoped to carry this ideological baggage over to the 
workplace under the immediate direction of management. Only 
in the most distant reserves did the 'natural reserve' of 
fresh labour for exhausting work exist. In the closer areas 
ravaged for decades by free commodity relations, a permanent 
export of labour power and import of food, impoverished workers would 
become absorbed into urban life and threaten the high levels of 
exploitation of dock workers. It was only on the basis of long 
range migration that the separation of the worker from the 
homestead could be achieved and the extended hours throughout 
the day and deep into the night be worked. 
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Within this portrayal of the employers' successful 
exploitation of differences in social relations in the reserves 
two contradictions existed. The first was that the general 
picture of the distant reserves and their functionality to inten-
sified wage labour concealed the growing numbers of workers from 
these regions completely dependent on wage labour for the 
reproduction of themselves and their families. Along with these 
objective developments, the continuity of class consciousness and 
a sense of history of themselves as dock workers was not 
obliterated by migration and class suppression. (This point will 
be developed further in the following chapter). The second 
was that a 'pure' migratory system was never achieved although 
the number of workers living in Durban residential areas remained 
small. As the Company gained in experience in its recruiting 
activities and 1n meeting the daily demand for labour these workers 
were not seen as posing a major problem in themselves; the 
conditions of work were set in the context of the overwh~lming 
dominance of the migrant workers. As mechanization advanced 
towards the late 1960s the permanent urban workers could be seen 
by employers as adding a stable element necessary for the 
development of operative skills: it was only if their presence 
created new demands from the workers that difficulties would be 
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created for management. Yet the small proportion of workers who 
managed to secure houses or set up shacks in the urban area showed 
that some workers managed to overcome or evade the repressive 
legislation. This group of workers could have succeeded 1n 
qualifying for urban residence through being employed by the same 
employer for over ten years while working in the stevedoring trade 
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and by gradually shifting their energy to secure urban residence. 
Workers who have permission to live in Durban are not attracted 
to work in the stevedoring trade. They have other employment 
opportunities in less strenuous and higher paid work. In the past 
many stevedoring workers lived beyond the control of the Native 
Affairs Department in Cato Manor. By 1970 altogether about 
125 workers, according to management estimates, lived in Kwa Mashu, 
Umlazi, Lamontville, or in the backyards of the white residents 
of Durban as they have done for decades. But during the 1960s 
the tendency was for even this small proportion to decline, and 
in 1967 it was reported that 135 workers employed by the Company 
were urban residents, and in 1964 the Wage Board reported 
38 that 250 employees were not housed by the Company. The figure 
probably demonstrates that even on the basis of limited mechanization 
and longer contracts the long working hours and early starting times 
worked to reduce the urban workers employed by the Company, quite 
apart from stricter enforcement of apartheid legislation. For the 
urban workers considerable expenses in transport would have to be 
met, a cost which was deliberately excluded by the Wage Board from 
its estimation of the needs of the workers as the large majority 
lived in the compound. According to the Wage Board in 1964 the 
Company paid the cost of transport for urban residents, a practice 
. .. 39 
which was not claimed to be in operation in subsequent ~nvest~gat~ons. 
The gradual reduction of the number of urban workers employed by the 
Company marks a completely opposite tendency to the demands of 
urban segregation in the 1950s when the Minister of Native Affairs 
proposed in 1958 that the workers should be gradually moved to 
Kwa Mashu. Ironically this development would have accelerated 
the transformation of the migrants into an urban working 
class, and as we have argued the opposite tendency is apparent. 
While the state may have proposed urban segregation as 
basis for ideological control over the workers, the employers 
preferred the 'great advantage' of direct rule over the workers 
in compounds. By the mid-1960s the National Party's argument 
about compelling workers to live in the townships was dropped, 
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and the compound controls were approved. The question of 
the appropriate form of control over African workers undergoing 
intensified labour was decided in favour of direct rule by 
the employers. African workers in the stevedoring trade are now 
in a position where it is virtually impossible to qualify for 
urban residence and thus get rights to accommodation in African 
residential areas. Even if the right to live in the urban area 
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is granted, access to housing is certainly not guaranteed. Despite 
these formidable obstacles: employers' concern that urbanization 
would challenge their rule and the basis of the cheap labour system, 
and legislative controls which deny any legal right to 
residence and accommodation, workers are determined to gain these 
rights for their children. The very denial of access to urban 
residence and employment except on contract has made these rights 
more precious to migrant workers who try to gain legal entitlement 
even if they do not themselves want to live in the area. For 
those who find they do not qualify for urban residence 1n terms 
of the law or find that accommodation is not available 1n the 
townships, the alternative is the growing squatters' camps on the 
outskirts of the city. 
For the overwhelming majority of workers, access 
to urban residence was eliminated by socio-economic and 
increasingly legal controls. Yet the patterns of migration 
and length of contract were certainly not set and fixed 
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at a certain level at the inception of the labour supply company 
and continued throughout the 1960s. But while there were 
significant shifts in the length of service and month of 
termination of contract (two issues which will be discussed 
at this point as means of measuring changes in amount of labour-
time and relation of contracts to seasonal changes) there was 
also no inevitable progression towards a twelve month cycle 
of employment and complete separation from cycles of 
agricultural production. These factors do, however, have to 
be judged against a complete view of the nature of 
exploitation of migrant labour, the exhaustion of workers having 
inordinately long hours, and the response of capital as a whole 
(both employers and the state) to overall rapid proletarianization 
in a period of speeded capital accumulation. While management 
had powers to adjust the areas of recruitment and the cycles 
of employment, other issues also affect questions of 'labour 
commitment' such as growing impoverishment in the reserves, 
the demand for labour in the docks, differentiation of workers, 
mechanization, and importantly, wages. All these factors have 
a direct bearing on the number of months worked and the workers' 
relationship to the land. But the data will first be presented 
before these factors are related to changes over time. 
AVERAGE 
MONTHS 
PER 12 
MONTH 
PERIOD 
The average months worked by stevedoring labourers 
and gangwaymen were calculated to give some idea of the 
total amount of labour-time expended over twelve month 
periods. 
FIGURE 6.4 
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Source: Record cards survey 
The most immediate obvious difference between the length 
of contract among the workers is the difference of wage 
differential and skill between stevedoring labourers and 
gangway/winchmen. Over the whole period (eight years in the 
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case of gangwaymen and seven for labourers) the average 
contract was 8.52 months per twelve month period for stevedoring 
labourers as opposed to 10.19 months for gangwaymen. While 
a full survey of the average contract of black supervisors was 
.not made, in the year 1961/62 it was 10.17 with many 
indunas working 11 or 12 months during the twelve month 
period. Generally specialized workers and supervisors were 
more 'committed' to wage labour in the stevedoring trade 
because of their relative experience of the work (necessary 
to be able to qualify for promotion) ,and higher wages which 
provided a greater return on hours worked. 
What requires to be explained is the uneven amount of 
labour-time worked each twelve month cycle. Instead of a 
steady progression towards ever-increasing contracts each 
year, the average contracts served fluctuate annually, even 
declining slightly on average between the first four and 
the last three years. While these changes could be ascribed 
to management controlling the cycles of employment, 
bringing in short contract workers to displace or supplement 
the longer contract workers, a more powerful determinant 
of the length of contract seems to be the demand for 
labour in the docks, and the determination of the workers 
to maintain and exceed the previous levels of 
earnings. 
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TABLE 6.2 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
CHANGES IN LABOUR-TIME AND TONNAGE LANDED* 
(percentage) 
1 Length of contract 
+ 
+ 
+ 
1 Tonnage landed 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
1Changes in the average length of contract are between 
averages calculated around the mid-point of the year 
(e.g. 1961/62-1962/63) and those on tonnage landed 
between each year (e.g. 1961-1962) 
* Tonnage landed is used as a measure of the demand for 
stevedoring labour rather than the total tonna{'"c 
};itndlecl in t Le tort it:; i t rl~~'I'e:;ents more r,eneral carr:o 
requiring the skill and ahili t~, of steverlorinr: ~ nbour 
than tlw hid, t.onn:l£-e nnd low v,-l1u n bulk f'xnorts·which 
ar(' h!lnd1t'd at hi!~h1.',' r1f>chanized df'roL;. . 
With the exception of 1962 when there was a small 
increase in the percentage of tonnage landed, in the years 
for which data is available on changes in the length of 
contract, an inverse relationship exists between length of 
contract and tonnage landed. This can be explained in terms 
of the determination of the workers to maintain their annual 
earnings; more than half the wages of the workers being made 
up of overtime, Sunday pay, and special allowances. During 
a time of rapidly increasing imports, 1962/66, reaching a 
,/",,., tA.~ tOll"U ;to I'~'" .j.~(. _ktrs 
record level not yet exceeded/were likely to·be exhausted 
by long hours but be able to earn slightly more 
per week (depending also on the Company's ability to draw 
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more labour from the reserves). Under these conditions 
the average contract was likely to decline. The opposite 
effect was likely during a time of contracting tonnage 
landed, under conditions of slightly less than full 
employment, workers were likely to stay on longer to earn 
h h . 42 as muc as t e preV10US year. Simultaneously, while 
the average length of contract was related directly to the 
intensity of labour in the docks, behind this average 
differentiation was becoming marked. A number of workers 
were becoming fully dependent on wage labour and extending 
their contracts up to 11 months in a 12 month cycle. It 
is these workers who overall expended more labour time 
during the year, because of the long hours worked, than those 
in comparable sectors such as engineering, construction, 
and electricity generation. While the average length of 
contract fluctuated each year, these were the workers who 
steadily extended their time in wage labour or maintained a 
length of contract approaching the maximum possible under 
conditions of intensified migrant labour. 
FIGURE 6.5 
DIFFERENTIATION IN LENGTH OF CONTRACT z STEVEDORING LABOURERS 
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Certain brqad trends are evident from the figures: a 
growing concentration of workers serving 9 or 10 months contract 
although a marked fall-off in any longer contracts, a temporary 
~ncrease in short-term contracts during the rapid increase ~n 
imports 1963-66, and an eventual grouping of all contracts within 
the range of 6 to 11 months. The steady elimination of the extra-
long contracts (11 and 12 months) suggests that the 10 months 
contracts constitute the upper limits of expenditure of labour 
power in the hothouse conditions of the docks. The longer 
contracts were possibly exhausting the workers and encouraging 
employers to step up recruitment. The abrupt decline in the 
short term contracts, 4 and 5 months, in 1967-68 suggests that a 
core of workers, particularly specialized workers, were being 
consolidated,particularly towards the end of the 1960~ who were 
experienced at dock work and steadily becoming as dependent on 
wage labour as urban workers. This transformation in the 
workforce, the accelerated pace of proletarianization, was 
impelled by capital's need for higher levels of exploitation from 
a smaller labour force. 
Attachment to the land and 'peasant-workers' 
While the whole direction of capitalist exploitation was to 
draw workers to the city, to increase the level of exploitation 
by lengthening the working day and contract of service, a counter 
force wi thin clpi tal repelled the workers at the termination of 
their contract. The argument that the regime of absolute surplus 
value limited severely the development of urbanization among 
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stevedoring workers has already been presented. Long working 
hours in the docks depended on the effective separation of the 
worker from his family, but the continuation of the migratory 
system depended on the periodic return of the worker to the 
homestead both to rest and to oversee the remnants of an 
agricultural subsidy to wage labour. In response to the 
quickened pace of growth of an urban proletariat in the 1960s, 
added to by migrants 'going over' to urban life by squatting 
or being absorbed in the townships, the state made an annual 
h 1 1 bl " " 43 return to t e reserves a ega 0 19at10n. Capi tal depended 
both on the material addition to subsistence of the workers' 
families on the land (not least of which made rent an 
unnecessary item in the composition of the costs of subsistence) ana 
increasingly on the ideological control over a sizeable proportion 
of the African working class through the Bantustans. 
While the objective conditions of wage labour were tearing 
workers away from an orientation towards and dependence upon the 
land, the migratory labour system depended on some form of 
attachment to the land, limited though it might be. As 1n the 
case of length of contract, a survey of the stevedoring worker~ 
relative attachment to the land has to take into account the 
differentiation between the absolutely landless who Vlew the 
reserves as a rural township, between those who are bound by kin 
ties and the necessity of accommodation, and those to whom the 
ownership of cattle and the production of food still assumes some 
importance. The average conditions are, however, important in 
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assessing the general environment in which migratory workers 
struggle to reproduce themselves. The month in which the 
contract is terminated by the worker is here taken as a measure 
of the workers' ability to participate in essential agricultural 
tasks like that of ploughing. A disproportionate number 
of workers terminating their contracts shortly before or during the 
ploughing season would indicate that these workers were able to 
perform agricultural work despite the powerful pressures of 
capital towards eliminating seasonal variations in labour supply 
and a general constant obligation to labour under the command 
of capital. 
FIGURE 6.6 
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Source: Record card survey aggregating statistics on termination 
of contract for years 1961/62, 1963/64, 1965/66, 1966/67. 
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The most obvious point about the termination of 
contract of the stevedoring workers is that the general 
conditions are sharply different from the cycle of industrial 
production which rises steepest towards the end of the year, having 
an abrupt decline over the holidays, and then a slow decline 
~n the beginning of the following year. As the pace of production 
speeds up towards the end of the year workers are less inclined to 
leave and overtime worked ~s at its highest level. This is then 
followed by a peak number of workers terminating contract 
and in January by the highest number of workers signing on again. 44 
What is noticeable in the case of the stevedoring sample ~s that 
there is not a sharp disjuncture between workers leaving in 
December and in January; January is the fourth most common 
month for workers to leave employment. During the ploughing 
season, which varies between mid-September to mid-November (roughly 
two months) more than 40 per cent of the workers terminated their 
contract. 45 What was also unusual was the decline in the number 
of workers leaving employment between November and December. 
The opposite tendencies are shown in the months June and July 
when only 6.4 per cent of the workers terminated their contracts. 
The general cycle of termination of service in the period 
October to December and engagement during June and July is 1n 
conformity with the seasons Rhen male labour is most and least 
needed in the reserves. 
These, however, are the average conditions in the 
relationship of wage labour to agricultural production and an 
examination of the data over time shows significant variations and 
a distinct movement towards the industrial pattern of employment. 
This, it is argued, is a consequence of the growing dependence of 
the workers on wage labour which suppresses the seasonal 
variation in labour supplies. In the docks which work without 
an annual break (as in the case of manufacturing, building, 
and construction), capital is demanding steady supplies of 
labour throughout the year. Only the export of agricultural 
commodities follows a seasonal pattern, and exports of these pro-
ducts are the greater proportion of cargo handled in Cape 
Town. During a time of rising unemployment as in the later 
1960s the inclination of workers to plough and maintain a rural 
orientation is increasingly threatened by the possibility of 
not being re-engaged. By extending working hours in the 
docks the employers were wrenching workers away from strictly 
seasonal work. The tendency of rising lengths of contract of 
service was to place the full burden of what agricultural 
production was· still possible in the reserves fully on to the 
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shoulders of the women in the homestead. 
TABLE 6.3 
MONTH OF TERMINATION OF CONTRACT BY YEAR, STEVEDORING 
LABOURERS 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Ju Jly Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
1961/62 + + + + + 
1963/64 + + + + + 
1965/66 + + + + + + 
1966/67 + + + + + + 
432 
Source: Record card survey, + above average figure for termination 
- below average figure for termination 
A yearly analysis of the month of termination does not 
reveal a fundamental shift during the 1960s in the average 
pattern over this period: June and July remain the months 
during which the workers are least likely to terminate their 
contract and October to December the most likely. What change 
is evident is that the peaks and valleys of movement of the 
workers become more pronounced over time, that above average 
departures between March and May become eliminated and concentrated 
towards the end of the year. What is even more significant 1S 
the movement of the highest departures per month steadily 
towards the end of the year, more in conformity with the pattern 
of industrial employment. In 1961/62 October was the month 
of highest departure, in 1963/64 October,November and December 
were equally important, in 1965/66 November, and in 1966/67 
December. 
Taking the evidence on the lengthening contract of service, 
the rising demand for labour in the docks, and the tendency for 
change within the seasonal variation towards the industrial pattern, 
it is argued that a core of workers existed within the workforce 
completely dependent on wage labour for their families' livelihood. 
The general conditions of the stevedores were those of a section of 
the African working class increasingly dependent on wage labour and 
detached from the land. Despite management's adoption of a 
strategy of long-range migration,with the new workers from the 
reserves supplementing an increasingly exhausted workforce, the core 
of migrant workers totally dependent on wage labour was needed by 
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the DSLSC as a reservoir of the collective skills of the 
workforce. These workers were conscious of their added powers 
and their central position in the labour process. 
Earnings and the Wage Board 
Because of its importance, the wage ~ssue is taken up here 
only after the labour process, length of contract, and the system 
of long-range migration have been discussed. It was the persistent 
demands of the workers for wage increases during the 1950s which 
provided the impetus for the formation of the DSLSC and the 
suppression of working class action in the docks. As wages formed 
such a large part of total costs ~n stevedoring, during the 
conditions of intensified labour and lengthened hours during the 
1960s,employers were determined to reduce the cost of labour. Apart 
from the suppression of working class resistance in the docks, 
employers could keep wage costs to a minimum by taking on as few 
workers as were necessary, lengthening hours, and introducing 
labour-saving mechanization. 
Yet it was precisely as the DSLSC came effectively in 
control of resistance and the supply of labour that the Wage Board 
became active in investigating wages and in proposing increases. 
Under conditions of national oppression of African workers and 
intensified labour in the docks, the intervention of the state 
through the Wage Board may appear as contradictory. Given the 
increasing efficiency of the army of officials in channelling 
labour to the lowest wage sectors and the determination of 
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employers to reduce labour costs to a minimum in the struggle 
to maximise profits why should wages be raised at all? As the 
mass movements of political resistance and the trade unions had 
been smashed through intense repression and legal prohibition, 
or reduced to insignifican~by bannings, the pressure was not 
coming from political or working class organizations. Given a 
declining strike rate after the industrial battles of the 1950s, 
the nation-wide insurrectionary movement in 1960, and the 
stay-at-homes, the pressure was not coming directly from the 
workers either in spontaneous strike movements. The increased 
activity of the Wage Board in the stevedoring trade has to be 
related to its activity as a whole to be able to get some answer 
to these questions. 
The increased activity of the Wage Board in the later 1950s 
can be directly related to the bus boycotts, stay-at-homes, and 
the campaign organized by the South African Congress of Trade 
Unions for £1 a day. These demands produced in turn a response in 
the liberal bourgeoisie which argued that some increase in wages 
should be encouraged to create demand particularly for the 
products of manufacturing. The reactivation of the Wage Board 1n 
1957 has to be seen in the light of these struggles, as a step 
towards halting the decline in African real wages, by making 
investigations, and tentatively suggesting wage increases where 
high rates of profit were being earned. While the Wage Board 
is legally entitled to make substantial increases 1n wages and 
even through revision of unskilled determinations to 'put a bottom' 
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to·wages of all workers in the major industrial areas. in 
policy and practice this has never been its aim. A study of 
the practice of the Wage Board in an earlier period concluded 
that the wage determinations it issued reinforced the tendency 
towards a higher organic composition of capital, and its 
welfarism limited to bringing the smaller capitals under 
1 47 h . f h . contro. T e chaIrman 0 t e reactIvated Wage Board In the 
WF.J. 5t~~"'l' 
late 19S0~/spelt out its policy in unambiguous terms; rapid 
increases in wages 'a violent change in the cost of production' 
were not to be prescribed because they would lead to rising 
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unemployment. Against the arguments of a broadened internal 
market, an expansion of industrial capacity through the economies 
of scale, Steenkamp posed the argument of low costs of production. 
The Wage Board was involved in measuring the interests of capital 
as a whole in arriving at a minimum wage; while employers in each 
sector under investigation would plead insolvency if wages were 
raised, the Wage Board would have to take into consideration the 
interests of employers as a whole, for instance, the food and 
garment industries which were likely to benefit from some increase 
in the wages of the mass of workers. Steenkamp saw the work of the 
Wage Board as one of gentle upgrading of wages through a policy of 
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'benevolent paternalism' and as the encouragement of personnel management 
and he vigorously contested the demands of trade unions.'ln all 
the writer's dealings with black trade unionists ••• he found them -
not unnaturally of course - to be as blind to our unemployment and 
underemployment problem as are their white compatriots: very large 
pay rises and a shortening of the working day are their chief 
concern. ,49 From his view of South Africa as a 'dual economy', a 
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'peculiar admixture' of the 'mature white free-enterprise 
economies of the West' and the 'backward black societies of 
Africa', increased wage rates would only increase unemployment. 50 
He advocated increasing the uneven development of South Africa 
as a means of stimulating black employment through suspending 
minimum wages in the border areas. Against the general concern 
of the liberal bourgeoisie in favour of arguments for raising 
the level of black wages, Steenkamp posed the problem both of 
unemployment and of method. Increases in black wages should only 
51 be encouraged during full employment, and cautiously then. 
Even if a sound argument could be made generally for increasing 
wages, Steenkamp disputed whether concrete policy proposals 
would follow logically: 
A lot more of factual investigation and macro-economic 
estimation must intervene between these two phases of 
the argument. Whereas this does not mean that we must 
sit still in the meantime, it does mean that we have 
to move forward cautiously, guided by the trading results 
and operating methods of efficient firms and by what 
general economic indices are available to us. 
In short, the most intelligent Chairman of the Wages Board had no 
solutions to the question of poverty wages for the overwhelming 
mass of workers in South Africa or the high level of unemployment 
except through advocating even lower wages in border areas. The 
strategy of the Wage Board was simply to follow the upward trend 
in wages in the most capital intensive firms and to even out these 
wage increases throughout the industry by setting them as the 
minimum wage, thus putting pressure on less efficient capitals. 
This approach 1S, of course, completely dependent on the 
phenomenon of 'wage drift' in the most advanced firms which 
is the extra price for selection and more productive labour. 
In many industries and services (particularly the municipalities) 
the upward tendency of black wages did not exist at all. The 
stevedoring trade was a notable case in point. 
The Wage Board has conducted investigations into the 
stevedoring trade in 1958, 1964, 1968, and 1972; four times 1n 
fourteen years. The appearance of regularity, of wage increases 
being a matter .of routine investigation, belies the specific 
context of each wage investigation. Given the approach of the 
Wage Board chairman and the function of the Wage Board within 
the economy as a whole, these investigations were not part of an 
autonomous state process imposed on the employers but responses 
to the problems faced by employers in recruiting suitable labour, 
in compensating for the rises in the cost of living, or in 
meeting demands for changes 1n conditions made by the workers. 
While the Wage Board relies on an approach of encouraging rather 
than prescribing wage increases, in an attempt to regularize 
wage increases and increase the workers dependence on employers, 
the stevedoring employers have struggled to avoid at any stage 
making wage increases outside the operation of the Wage Board 
investigations. 53 Quite apart from their determination to keep 
wage costs to a minimum, employers wanted to avoid if at all 
possible granting wage increases when workers made demands. 
Formally, they could argue with the workers and the Department 
of Labour that they were bound by contract to shipping 
companies and that all wage increases should be legally 
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promulgated for them to be able to amend their contracts. 
This was the argument made during the Second World War and it 
d Od t 0 h ff' 0 0 54 1 no conV1nce testate 0 lC1als at the t1me. 
During the strikes of the late 1950s the employers were 
seen by the workers to make wage increases under pressure 
without jeopardizing their relationship with the shipping 
companies. But after the employers had regained full control follow-
ing the formation of the DSLSC and working class resistance 
was suppressed, it was more important than ever that increases 
1n wages should be made an 'objective' procedure outside 
of the control of employers. This would be ideologically 
important in shifting the focus of workers' demands on to 
a distant and 'rational' institution of state, rather than their 
immediate exploiters. The employers could then argue that they 
would be prepared to pay any wage the Wage Board laid down, but 
no wage increase would be made until the legal procedures had 
been completed. In this way any upward drift in wages, even 
in the small cargo allowances, could be avoided altogether. Any 
flexibility in the form of the wage, any fissure permitting 
bargaining between workers and employers would be eliminated. 
This common approach of all stevedoring employers to the 
workers was the corrolary of the cartel operating between the 
stevedoring firms in relation to the shipping companies. 
Identical prices and conditions were tendered, and the rates 
and percentages applied to tonnages fixed. Any wage increase 
by one company could have had a ripple effect throughout the 
trade and strain the cartel arrangement. For all these reasons 
the employers were not hostile to operating under a wage 
determination which regulated wages from an apparently 
external vantage point, evened out the discrepancies ~n 
wages between one firm and another, and eased in 
wage increases applicable to all firms in the trade. 
From 1959 when the DSLSC was formed to 1971, the only 
time that wages increased was after Wage 
Board investigations. During these investigations a thorough 
examination was made of the wages paid, the number of 
worke rs emp loyed, and the p'rof i ts made. This data wi 11 be 
examined during the 1960s to illustrate the effect of wage 
regulation upon the earnings of workers, and the division 
of surplus value into the revenue of capitalists and the 
means of subsistence of the workers. 
The early 1960s were marked by a rising growth rate ~n 
the gross domestic product, and by a particularly sharp 
increase in imports. The tonnage of cargo landed by 
stevedoring workers in Durban rose steadily from 1960 to a 
record peak, which has not subsequently been matched, of 
8,557 thousand tonnes in 1966.* The rise in production after 
the post-Sharpevi1le slump affected stevedoring employers in 
two ways; it increased the demand for dock labour to handle 
the huge volume of imports, and simultaneously drew experienced 
workers into the leading manufacturing sectors. These two 
*See Appendix A 
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tendencies reduced the size of the pool of labour immediately 
ayai1ab1e to stevedoring employers and affected the quality 
of workers. The supply of workers was stated to be sometimes 
inadequate during peak demand in Cape Town, Durban, and East 
London, and in Port Elizabeth the pool of stevedoring labourers 
decreased progressively from the end of 1963. In addition 
the low wages did not attract sufficient labour 'of the desired 
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1 . ,55 qua l.ty. It was in this context that a Wage Board investigation 
was initiated in 1963. 
The Wage Board report which followed provides some insight 
into the form of wages in stevedoring; the compound of basic 
rates, daily allowances, overtime, and cargo allowances. The 
problems in making comparisons between different areas and in 
working out the actual earnings of the workers are, however, 
made great by the exemption of the DSLSC from having to present 
data on the earnings of workers. This exemption provides further 
evidence of the tolerance of the Wage Board for large employers and 
the semi-official status of the Cbmpany. This omission makes the 
otherwise comprehensive analysis of wages and employment useless 
for the purpose of comparing the earnings of workers employed 
. . 56 Th by different companies and Ln dl.fferent areas. e most 
powerful determinant of wages for stevedoring workers was 
obviously the wages of the SARH workers on the wharf; any 
increase in stevedoring wages would plainly stimulate a demand 
for an equal increase by railway workers as was the case in the 
1950s. 57 As the Wage Board put it delicately: 'Not only is 
some of the work done by the stevedoring and railway workers, such 
as the carrying of articles and the loading on to slings or 
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platforms for hoisting by cranes, similar in nature, 
but these groups come into close contact with each other.' 
As the SARH is a state department managed on the lines of 
a public utility corporation on a non-profit basis, for the 
provision of 'cheap transport' to promote the most rapid 
capital accumulation, a policy of cheap labour is integral 
t 1 f · h 58. h' d" . o ow re1ght c arges. W1th t 1S om1nant 1nterest 1n 
maintaining the lowest possible labour costs, the state's 
and employers' resistance to increased wages combined 
directly in committees of action during times of crisis. Because 
the stevedoring workers had always made the most concerted 
thrust towards ending the poverty wages in the docks, the 
attention of the employers and state institutions such as the 
Wage Board and the police was concentrated on suppressing 
independent working class action and controlling any wage 
increases which were introduced. The pressure to phase in 
wage increases through the Wage Board came from the workers 
themselves although the immediate threat of strike action 
need not always have been present. Resistance to employers 
could take the form of finding work elsewhere (during the 
upward phase of the cycle of boom and slump), go-slows and 
declining productivity, or reluctance to do the dirtiest and 
heaviest form of work. The employers were always aware that 
the rapid decline in earnings through cost of living 
increases or increasing of demand for workers would make 
strike action inevitable unless a regular review was made of 
wages by an external and apparently impartial body. A yawning 
gap between what could be termed the 'customary expectations' 
of earnings in the docks, quite apart from the forward 
demands of the workers, could create a movement of workers 
which would cut across the division of workers into 'stevedores' 
and 'wharf labourers'. 
The Wage Board acknowledged that almost without exception 
110 .or e thoA 
workers were paidjthe wages laid down in Wage Determination 183 
of 6 February 1959. With the exception of Durban where the 
DSLSC had been forced to provide a daily allowance of 15 cents 
for every day worked, as a means of holding on to the most 
experienced and capable workers, workers had had no wage 
. 59. . lncreases. The wage drlft on which the Wage Board relled to 
test out the wages which could be paid without affecting 
profits simply did not exist. None of the wage determinations 
provided graded increases to be introduced annually (as is the 
case in many industries covered by the Wage Act) and the movement 
of wages upward took the form of discrete 'leaps' followed by 
long plateaus. (See Appendix F). While the Wage Board did not 
disclose the criteria by which it raised wages, there was no 
discussion of the needs of workers, of any measure of cost of liv-
ing;- but onlYof the employers 'readiness to accept increases. 
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Employers were agreed on the need for wages to be increased because 
of periodic shortages of labour, and more particularly because 
the right quality of labour was not attracted to stevedoring 
employment. The Wage Board adopted a special approach with the 
DSLSC: instead of raising the weekly wage the daily allowance of 
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of 15 cents for stevedoring labourers was raised to 50 cents. 
This point provides a useful illustration of the 'collective 
bargaining' between employers and state officials. The Wage 
Board arrived at its decision not autonomously, but in response 
to the 'unanimous request' of the employers and the Central Native 
Labour Board, set up to substitute for unregistered African 
trade unions, a state institution which had been closely 
associated with the preliminary steps towards the formation of 
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the DSLSC. By approving this method of introducing wage 
increases, the 'interested parties' and the Wage Board were 
providing the DSLSC with the cheapest method of financing increases 
h .· . . 61 and strengt en1ng 1ts pun1t1ve powers. The daily allowance 
was cheap for stevedoring employers for two reasons. It lessened 
the wage bill by a proportion equal to the earnings of workers 
saved on days work was not available, and possibly as 
importantly, it lowered the overtime and Sunday pay rates as 
a proportion of the basic wage rates. What was granted with one 
hand in the form of a daily allowance was removed with the 
other; the reduction in overtime and Sunday and public holiday 
rates. What was required as an inducement to labour after the 
overtime ban in 1958 could be proportionately reduced as the 
DSLSC and the state brought workers more effectively under control 
in the 1960s. 
TABLE 6.4 
PROPORTIONS OF WAGE COMPONENTS, DURBAN STEVEDORING 
LABOURERS 
Basic wage, Overtime, Sunday and public 
normal time , basic wage holidays, basic wage 
cents/hour = 100 = 100 
6 Feb. 1959 12.5 180 21.9 
1963 14.4 156 190 
24 July 1964 18.8 133 171 
3 April 1969 21. 7 133 174 
Source: WD 183, WD 251, WD 308. The basic wage is calculated 
by adding the dai ly allowance for six days to the 
weekly wage and dividing the total by 48 hours ordinary 
time. The Sunday and public holiday wage is based on 
an 8 hour day. 
Through the determined strikes of the late 1950s the workers 
had achieved wage rates on overtime and Sunday time which were even 
higher than those in the most highly organized industries such as 
" d . . 62 pr1nt1ng an englneerlng. The Factories Act which lays down 
minimum conditions in relation to hours, sets overtime rates at 
time and a third. 63 The stevedoring workers in the early 1960s 
were earning overtime at more than time and two-thirds, and Sunday 
wages at more than double time. These levels had been won by 
refusing to work overtime and by making specific demands for 
overtime and Sunday rates, not simply accepting a proportional 
adjustment. But the employers only agreed to these higher rates, 
it is argued, because the basic wage was not increased at all. 
With the wage adjustment forced on the DSLSC in 1963 in an effort 
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to retain the most capable workers who were being attracted to other 
sectors with higher wages, total earnings increased but the 
proportion of the overtime and Sunday rates started to decline. When 
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the Wage Board accepted the argument of the DSLSC that basic 
wages should not be increased in 1964, but the daily allowance 
increased, the proportions declined even further. The Wage 
Board found it 'somewhat unusual' that specific amounts should 
be laid down for overtime and Sunday work (usually these 
rates are simply regulated by laying down their proportions to 
basic wages) but acknowledged that 'this principle has become 
entrenched'. In an ambiguous statement it wrote: 'In view of 
the increased wages the Board is recommending, the amounts pay~bk 
in respect of overtime and Sunday work are being appropriately 
d ' ,64 a Justed. What was camouflaged by this sentence was that while 
increases were being made in the overtime and Sunday rates, the 
proportion of both these rates in terms of the basic wage was being 
adjusted downwards. What was being argued was that wage increases 
justified a change against the interests of the workers. In 
effect the Wage Board carried through a reduction in overtime 
rates from more than time and two-thirds to the standard time 
and a third, and in Sunday time from more than double time to 
just above time and two-thirds. 
Before examining the demands of workers and employers and discussing 
the precise increase in wages agreed to by the employers and put into 
effect through the Wage Board there are two other issues to examine. 
The first is the extent to which national regulation of wages 
through a state institution such as the Wage Board tends to even 
out the difference in wages between industrial centres. The 
second is the question of whether the wage investigations accentuate 
or even out the wage differentials among the workers. 
Although the Wage Act sets out a number of criteria for 
the Wage Board to take into account before making a recommendation, 
it does not lay down an obligation to set national wages throughout 
industry which would even out the differences between the principal 
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industrial districts. The emphasis of the criteria is on procedures 
th h .. 65 ra er t an prLncLples. The policy as spelt out by the former 
chairman of the Wage Board was in fact to increase wage 
differentials between the industrial centres and the border areas, 
to fix wage rates at levels 'favourable' to the increased 
employment of African workers. 66 With this emphasis it is unlikely 
that the disparities between the wages of workers in different 
areas employed in the same industry and doing the same work would 
become EqU alized. Trade unions under capitalism struggle for a 
national market in labour power in which differences in wage and 
working conditions are reduced and Ln which the organization of the 
workers puts an end to the constant tendency of capital to reduce 
the cost of labour where the workers' resistance is weakest. For 
employers differences in wages are an important element of competitive 
capitalism; areas of lower wages enable firms employing more workers 
to compete with more technologically advanced firms. For these 
firms a proportional difference in wages is natural, an article of 
faith, customary, and necessary for an increase in employment. 
The attitude of the Wage Board to this issue is an important 
indicator of its inclination to reform the existing wage system. 
In the stevedoring trade the level of wages follows the 
general wage pattern for labourers; highest in the Cape (where 
labourers have been better organized and Coloured labourers are paid 
slightly higher to differentiate them from the mass of black workers) 
a~d lowest 1n Durban (where migratory labour is most extensively 
employed). The Wage Board had to face the contradiction , 
however, that the workers who handled the most cargo and worked 
the longest hours were the worst paid, earning even less than the 
workers at the relatively less important ports of East London 
and Port Elizabeth. In 1958 the Wage Board argued there should 
be no necessary connection between the tonnages of cargo handled 
per worker (highest in Durban) and the level of wages. It is 
argued that Durban had more bulk cargo which was relatively easier 
to handle mechanically, and therefore less manual labour was 
d d '1" h" 'f' d h 1 'd 67 nee e. By 1mp 1cat10n t 1S ]Ust1 1e t e ower wages pa1 • 
The justification for the 'bottom of the rung' wages paid to 
Durban workers was according to the Wage Board the fact that the 
workers were housed in a compound and did not have any transport 
costs. Because average wages were higher in other sectors in 
Durban than in East London the Wage Board ,grouped the wage rates 
68 for these areas together. The realignment of area differentials 
reduced the difference in daily wages paid between Cape Town and 
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Durban from 82 to 90 per cent. But by accepting the daily allowances 
in Durban instead of prescribing a general increase in weekly 
wages the Board weakened the tendency towards uniformity 1n wages 
decisively. Even if Durban workers were employed a full six days 
a week their basic wages would still amount to 90 per cent of Cape 
Town wages; the uppermost limit on parity. These wage 
differentials carried through to all other components of wages; 
overtime and Sunday pay and cargo allowances. 
The differentials between workers in different occupations 
may be viewed from a variety of standpoints. At one level they 
are the price that capital has to pay for the experience and 
training of workers for particular occupations. 69 But they are 
also a means by which workers are divided, 'marked off' from 
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other workers, and the collective capacity of the workers is rewarded 
only to a few occupations. The whole process of dividing workers into 
different occupations with corresponding wages was late in becoming 
developed in stevedoring. It was only with the formation of the 
DSLSC that the classification and grading of workers became 
institutionalized; previously the workers were seen as a 
relatively undifferentiated mass. As Steenkamp has written, Wage 
Board investigations are intended to stimulate the grading and 
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selection of workers and strengthen personnel management. In 
response to the demands from employers for precise job definitions 
the wage determinations expanded the number of jobs for which wages 
were laid down from nine in 1959 to thirteen in 1969, including 
drivers, foremen, gangwaymen, indunas, leaders, learner stevedores, 
liaison indunas or serangs, maize trimmers, mobile hoist operators, 
senior indunas or serangs, stevedoring hands, storemen, and 
. h 71 Wlnc men. While some new jobs sprang from the nature of the 
mechanization being introduced,the largest group of occupations 
72 
were concerned with the supervision of the stevedoring labourers. 
The conflict between these workers and the stevedoring labourers has 
been the stuff of working class struggles in the docks as employers 
attempt to withdraw from the immediate supervision of the workplace 
and retain a certain reserve as an apparently reasonable arbiter. 
The increasingly black 'front line' supervisors were handed the 
responsibility of day-to-day pace of work. The numbers of black 
Supervisory workers did not necessarily expand, but their powers ~i~. 
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In the docks the special tasks of black supervisory 
workers have made the contradiction between them and the mass 
of workers as much an issue for open dispute as with white 
foremen. While strike action has always been directed against 
employers, who wield the immediate social power against the 
workers, and the state, which supports the decisions of the employers 
and actively suppresses the industrial and political organization 
of the workers, it has also exposed the collaborative role of 
the black supervisors. A central theme running through the 
demands expressed by the stevedoring labourers has been the 
difference between themselves and their immediate supervisors: 
the African indunas. While the national oppression of the 
African people has created the opportunity for supervisory 
workers and the African petty bourgeoisie to say 'We are all 
oppressed', every forward movement of the workers has sharpened 
the differences in class position among the oppressed. The 
history of struggle in the docks has brought out the immediate con-
tradictions between the supervisors and the supervised as 
. . . h h 1 73 a secondary confl~ct to the pr~mary struggle w~t t e emp oyers. 
In this context the wage differentials between the supervisory 
and labouring workers are important, as well as the tendency for 
employers to create a series of intermediary rungs to heighten 
the differentiation among the workers. 
The inception of the DSLSC was marked by a bitter struggle 
between employers and the labourers over the question of wage 
increases for indunas while no increases were made in the wages 
of the labourers. These increases were made in the interests of 
the employers gaining full command over the workers, binding 
the partially autonomous indunas to the new form'of authority 
in the docks. This period saw an increase in the wage 
differentials between black supervisors and the labourers who 
earned 54.5 per cent of the basic wage of the indunas. 
Subsequent determinations have tended to narrow some~hat the 
gap in wages between all supervisors and the labourers. 
TABLE 6.5 WAGE DIFFERENTIALS, SUPERVISORS AND LABOURERS* 
WD 183 
1959 
WD251 
1964 
WD308 
1969 
WD348 
1972 
Foreman 
100 
100 
100 
100 
Induna 
42 
45 
39 
45 
Labourer Induna/1abourer 
23 55 
30 67 
26 67 
31 69 
*Wage differentials calculated on the minimum basic wages (weekly 
wage plus daily allowance) assuming six days worked per week. 
Note: The last column measures the percentage of the induna's 
wage earned by the labourers. 
The statistics bring out sone of the problems in considering 
wage differentials apart from the changes in the labour process, 
the actual earnings of workers, and the effective command over 
the workers of the employers. Purcell, after making a thorough 
statistical study of wage differentials in minimum wage rates 
laid down by the Wage Board, concluded that wage determinations had 
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'f ' 1 74 no real effect in narrowing the skilled/unskilled wage d~ ferent~a • 
The Wage Board's decisions in the stevedoring trade reflect 
.the increasing command of the employers over the mass of 
workers; as the DSLSC came to control more effectively the 
supply and demand for labour through a centralized management, 
the need to reward the indunas for their work declined. 
Correspondingly, as the black supervisors increasingly took 
over the overall supervision on the ships, the more capable 
indunas could be promoted to the 'senior induna' category with a 
higher wage. The long term trend was therefore one of gradual 
decline of the wage differential between labourer and induna. 
The question of the wages of the white foremen provides an 
insight into the way the Wage Board both 'ratifies' the 
interests of the employers and presents an impression of change 
in important areas of dispute, such as the wage gap between 
black and white. The Wage Board consistently has prescribed 
minimum wages for foremen which are considerably below their 
kl . 75 wee y earnl.ngs. During a time in which employers were 
concerned to lower the overall cost of supervision, the Wage 
Board prescribed a wage which did not protect the position 
of the white foremen while simultaneously giving the impression 
that black supervisors and labourers were improving their 
position relative to the foremen. By this method the Wage 
Board narrows the black/white wage gap through holding down white 
wage increases. This is not an insignificant and statistical 
point as this trend is apparent in all wage determinations, 
this policy both increases the dependence of white workers on 
their employers and more importantly keeps the highest prescribed 
wage rate at about the lowest wage paid for the job. 76 This 
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principle is important in an increasingly fluid work situation, 
as it would enable employers eventually to bring in African 
workers as foremen at the minimum rather than the going rate for 
the job. Prescribing minimum wage rates in this way enabled 
employers to keep the overall wages paid at their lowest level. 77 
While all employers are concerned with occupational wage 
differentials as a means of rewarding certain classes of worker 
without raising the overall wage bill significantly, the 
occupational hierarchical structure also serves important 
ideological purposes. With the advance of mechanization in the 
docks certain work became 'graded', that is distinguished from 
labouring work. The graded work did not necessarily command 
more than the most petty wage differential. What was more 
important for the employers was that the workers who had been 
selected to take on the new work should consider themselves in a 
substantially different position from the 'common labourers'. 
Their differentiation could be important during crises such as 
strikes if it would lead to the graded workers standing to one side, 
and the DSLSC requested the Wage Board to make provision for 
workers such as maize trimmers, fork lift truck drivers, and 
particularly winchmen. In many ways the winchmen provide a good 
example of the way in which the employers strove to separate graded 
workers from other labourers and graded workers. While WDl83 
of 1959 defined a winchmen simply as 'an employee who operates 
a winch', by the 1964 wage investigation the DSLSC waS insisting 
on providing a wage differential between the winchmen and 
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gangwaymen as it had introduced in the daily allowance. 78 
The management and the workers it permitted to present their 
views at the sitting pressed strongly for a wage differentiation. 
They argued that in Durban the winchmen had to operate more 
powerful winches and to move larger quantities of cargo. In 
the other ports it was said the winchmen only did the 'breaking 
out', that is dragging the cargo from the wings to the square 
of the hold. While in other ports there was opposition to 
dividing the winchmen from the gangwaymen the Wage Board 
conceded the demand of the DSLSC and agreed to make a 'slightly 
higher allowance' for winchmen 'to mark a difference between 
79 them and gangwaymen.' While the basic wages remained equal, 
the daily allowances, overtime rates, and Sunday rates, were 
changed to give winchmen in Durban the edge over gangwaymen and 
over the labourers. The DSLSC returned to this demand during the 
1968 investigation, that the work of the winchmen should be 
redefined and rewarded at a higher wage rate. In the wage 
determination which followed the work of a winchman was 
extended to include that of a gangwayman (giving directional 
signals) and to take in specific new tasks such as operating 
h . , 80 a s l.p s crane. The wage differentiation applied only to 
Durban. From being equal in 1959 the petty wage differentiation 
increased with each determination; winchmen's basic wages being 
3 per cent greater than gangwaymen's in 1964, 5 per cent in 1969, 
and 14 per cent greater in 1972. 81 
By 1969 a simple division of the workers into supervisors 
and supervised no longer applied. There was considerable 
differentiation between black manual workers, black operators, 
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black supervisors, white clerical workers and white 
supervisors. The occupational and wage hierarchy took the 
following form: from the bottom upwards, stevedoring 
labourers, leaders, fork lift truck drivers, gangwaymen, 
winchmen, grain trimmers (a considerable gap in wage rates), 
liaison induna, induna, driver, senior induna (a further 
wage gap), assistant foremen, storemen and foremen. These 
divisions among the workers were social rather than technica~ 
and their introduction accelerated by the Wage Board. 
'Collective bargaining' and national oppression 
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A feature of the operations of the Wage Board which has always 
attracted unregistered black trade unions has been its open nature. 
Public sittings are held at which the workers' representatives 
can place before the employers and the Board the demands of 
the workers. This is one of the few areas in industrial 
legislation (which subordinates African workers out of collective 
bargaining) which can provide a legitimate platform for the 
demands of the workers to be presented and some form of 
recognition granted to trade unions not registered with the 
state. In the 1940s and again in the late 1950s, black trade 
un10ns took advantage of the Wage Board sittings to put forward 
demands for a living wage and the transformation of conditions 
of service. While in the 1940s black trade unions could turn 
the procedures of the Wage Act into a form of collective bargaining, 
by the late 1950s the state was acting to suppress all 
manifestations of working class organization and the unregistered 
. trade unions got a hostile or at best polite hearing. 
During the 1960s when the largest federation of unregistered 
trade unions, SACTU, was being suppressed, open mobilization 
of workers' demands was halted. The representation of workers 
at Wage Board sittings became reduced to indunas and to 
members of works committees the employers allowed to attend 
(the sittings are invariably held during working hours). 
During periods of intense industrial struggle with strikes 
threatened in the industries under review, the Wage Board 
sittings offered to the unregistered trade unions some means 
of confronting the employers directly and having a state 
institution which could possibly make some revision in wages 
and conditions. This was the closest that the mass of workers 
in South Africa came to collective bargaining, and with the 
suppression of the working class and national movements, the 
wage investigations became introspective exercises by employers 
and a specialized organ of state. The problem for employers was 
that by the late 1960s as the number of workers taking strike 
action began to increase,it was important that the wage 
investigations appear to permit worker representatives and the 
final determinations actually make some changes. Without some 
increase in wages and improvement in conditions the wage 
investigations would be shown to be an obscure activity on the 
part of the employers with no significance for the workers. 
Industries such as stevedoring where the workers had taken 
militant action to support their demands were vulnerable to the 
radical disillusionment of workers in all of the operations of 
the employers and the Wage Board. Some changes would have to be 
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made to prove that the employers were not acting in bad 
faith, and that the impartial and external organ of state 
h d h · . 82 a t e1r 1nterests at heart. 
As we have mentioned, the intervention of the Wage 
Board in laying down minimum wages in the stevedoring 
trade led toincreased differentiation among workers, changed the 
basis for composition of the wage against the interests of the 
83 
workers, and did Ii ttle to reduce differentials be tween 
ports. If anything, the latter were more entrenched than ever 
before through the acceptance of the daily allowance as part of 
the basic wage. If the Wage Board investigations were, however, 
a straightforward adjustment of conditions against the interests 
of the workers it would lack all credibility among the workers 
and spur them into action. There are two primary areas in which 
the Wage Board does respond to the long-standing demands of 
the workers by making concessions and reforms: in the overall 
level of wages and in certain important conditions of service. 
The employers supported, and indeed called for significant 
changes to be made in these areas. Their action can be seen 
as 'pre-emptive' of revolutionary wage and other demands being 
made by the workers. The function of the Wage Board in this 
context was to take over the responsibility of all the 
stevedoring employers and calculate a wage which would not affect 
profit margins but would also at a minimum stop the decline in 
real earnings and provide incentives and inducements for more 
intensive work in the docks. 
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Before the employers strategy for adjustments in 
wages and conditions is examined, it is important to retrace 
the demands of the workers and their trade unions during the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. The demands of the workers, 
reflecting their fundamental aspirations, present the 
most obvious contradiction to capital in the docks and provide 
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a measure of the underdeveloped nature of 'collective 
bargaining'. The organization of workers is suppressed, employers 
refuse to negotiate, and the only concrete 'industrial' demands 
which can be put to the employers are at the Wage Board sittings. 
The employers are forced to respond to the elimination of any 
open organization by substituting a form of company unionism, 
selected black supervisors and graded workers, to put forward 
some demands which could be met through the wage reviewing 
of the Wage Board. In turn, the employers put forward requests 
to the Wage Board which lead to the change in certain conditions 
of work which are crucial to providing the appearance of 
vitality in the bureaucratic procedures of the Wage Act. The 
Wage Board is, of course, not neutral in relation to the 
submission of demands and requests from the three types of 
parties: the trade unions, collaborators, and employers; and 
attempts to strengthen the position of the employers. This 
action is not, however, without its contradictions as the 
relationship between wage adjusting procedures and strikes 
have shown. 
Open trade union demands have never characterized the 
stevedoring trade except for short bursts of activity during 
relatively favourable conditions of class struggle. In 
assessing these relatively short periods of open trade union 
organization among the mass of African workers, the ruling 
class has argued that this is evidence of the incapacity of 
African workers to sustain modern industrial organization and 
that the mass of workers remain in conditions of tribal 
84 backwardness. The repression of all forms of class organization 
among African workers is not acknowledged,nor, as importantly, 
the comprehensive measures taken to reproduce a migrant labour 
force and to control African workers ideologically. Neither 
does this view recognize the increasingly sophisticated methods 
used by employers to disorganize collective action by workers; 
personnel management, works committees, and human relations 
ideology. Both the repression and employer co-optative 
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strategies, it will be argued, have led to the formation of underground 
organization strongly resistant to both forms of class suppression. 
The wage investigation in 1958 was the first and last time 
that unregistered trade unions representing the mass of workers 
in the docks were able to present these demands to the employers 
and Wage Board. The local committee of SACTU attended the 
Durban sitting, and at Port Elizabeth the Dock Workers' Union. 
These two unions presented demands for a wage of R2.50 a day for 
Stevedoring labourers, a higher wage for winchmen, and a wage for 
indunas between 20-30 per cent above that of the stevedoring 
labourers. In Durban, SACTU pressed for an end to casual labour 
and for the workers to be employed on a weekly basis. 85 The 
remnants of the Cape Town Stevedore and Dock Workers Union 
made rather lower wage demands of Rl.90 for labourers. The 
class character of the Wage Board was clear in its contempt 
ro~ the demands of the Dock Workers' Union and the SACTU local 
committee in Durban. The Wage Board argued that these unions 
had pressed for wage increases but had 'found themselves in the 
embarrassing position of having no real knowledge of the work 
and practices involved.' It attempted to drive a wedge between 
the workers and their representatives. 'The result was that 
some suggestions were advanced which the Board had every reason 
to believe did not represent the wishes of the workers actually 
d . . k ,86 engage 1n stevedorlng wor • The unregistered trade unions 
were in this way undermined by the Wage Board on the grounds 
of incompetence as representatives of the workers, as 'outsiders' 
to the labour process, and as general rather than industrial 
organizations. The report creates the illusion that reasonable 
collective bargaining with free access to information was 
an alternative to militant demands. This had historically only 
been possible for a limited period in the industrial council in 
Cape Town, and the wage demands made at this port conform more 
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closely to a 'negotiating stance'. Union representatives in this part 
demanded a wage for labourers closer to the existing level (the 
wage demands in the other centres being about double the existing 
wage~ requested increasing differentiation between gangwaymen and 
winchmen; and a lower wage for the black supervisors than demanded at 
other centres. None of the unions demanded that wage differentials 
be abolished. The wage demands for winchmen ranged between 8 and 
20 per cent higher than that of the labourers, and those of the indunas 
between 20 and 47 per cent above the labourers' wage demand. The 
Cape Town workers demands reflected a different tempo of class 
section from the other ports, not taking up the slogan of'El a day' 
which was the basic wage demand of SACTU, and requesting increasing 
differentiation among the workers. These demands were related 
to the possibility (though rapidly fading under increasing 
repression) of collective bargaining in the Cape docks in the 
. d . 1 . 87 ~n ustr~a counc~l of workers and employers. The local 
committees of SACTU in Durban and the Dock Workers' Union ~n Port 
Elizabeth put forward demands £or raising substantially the 
labourers' wage and reducing the difference between the wages of 
labourers and indunas (Appendix D ). 
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The early 1960s were characterized by the most severe repreSSion 
of working class and national organizations, mass arrests, bannings, 
political trials, and other forms of counter-action to the rising 
swell of resistance to the apartheid state. The dock area became 
a crucial arena for political control as workers came out in strike 
action particularly in the Cape. Instead of the organizational 
work of SACTU in the docks being able to expand, the organization 
of the mass of South Africa's workers was forced back to the 
offices, and finally out of open existence. Underground working 
class organization took form but faced enormous problems in 
mobilizing workers politically and in terms of industrial demands. 
The priorities of all resistance to the Qpartheid state and the 
ferocity of repression tended to put the organization of workers in 
strategic sectors of the economy as a secondary issue to the 
overriding importance of engaging in armed resistance to the 
state. The fragile networks of social relationships holding the 
stevedoring workers in touch with the wider nationally 
organized movement snapped, and the militants turned towards 
an underground strategy which involved securing their positions 
at work and taking up day-to-day issues. These demands would, 
however, have to be pursued within the confines of the docks 
as 'bridging' contacts with other workers through trade unions 
became increasingly difficult and dangerous. 
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In the wage investigations of 1964 and 1968 representation by 
open trade unions representing the mass of workers in the stevedoring 
trade was no longer possible. The strategy of the employers, 
possibly stung into action by the demands made in 1958, was to permit 
black supervisors, gangwaymen, and winchmen to represent the 
workers. During the investigations these selected workers 
made requests for changes which would both consolidate their own 
position and provide some amelioration in conditions of employment 
for the others. The DSLSC safety committee appeared to provide make up 
most of the 'employee representatives' at the Wage Board sittings 
in Durban and presented a definite spectrum of workers' requests. 
Without some form of worker representation at the sittings the 
chances of the new wage determinations being rejected by the workers 
were considerably raised. The employers could argue that 
representations from the workers were taken into consideration by 
88 the Wage Board and that the outcome was thus reasonable. 
For what it was worth, the worker representation encouraged 
by management would be likely to create illusions even among 
a minority that improvements could be expected from the benevolent 
decisions of employers and the Wage Board. In this way the employers 
could hope to divide the workers and create a minority 
who would be opposed to militant demands and united class 
action, and thus weaken the impulse to strike. 
The employee representatives from the DSLSC were 
encouraged by their employers to make representations at the 
Wage Board sitting and their memorandum (with which management 
was in full agreement) was typed by company clerks in 1968. 
The investigation during that year provides a useful 
illustration of the pressures and counter-pressures exerted 
during wage investigations where trade union organization is 
suppressed but employers forced to respond to the historic 
demands of the workers for a living wage. The employee 
representatives requested changes in their conditions of service 
which would strengthen their own positions, but also ameliorate 
certain specific difficulties experienced by all the workers. 
Significantly, the indunas and graded workers did not put 
forward any specific wage demand but rather requested a general 
increase in wages to combat the rising cost of living. 
This nebulous request showed the limited pretentions of the 
collaborators who did not aspire to present trade union 
demands. A precise wage demand could have caused both themselves 
and their employers real difficulties: a wage slightly above 
the existing level would be decisively rejected by the workers 
and held up to ridicule, while a higher wage would be 
repudiated by the employers. The other requests made by the 
collaborators concentrated on the variable components of the 
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stevedores' wage: ~ncrease in special cargo allowances, 
for oxides to be included in the definition of 'dirty. 
cargo'and thus paid for at a higher rate, and that travelling 
allowances be made. None of these requests posed any 
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challenge to the employers who did not oppose them, but they 
would give the impression to the workers that the wage 
investigations could benefit the workers in certain important 
areas. The sectionalism of the employee representatives is shown 
by their request that the wage of a winchman be increased more 
than that of a gangwayman. By pressing for petty differentiation 
between the graded workers, these representatives accentuated 
the egotism of more skilled workers without compensating at all 
by raising general class demands. While the overwhelming 
majority of the workers were concerned about large increases 
in the basic wage rates, the collaborators were requesting 
more divisions between the workers. A dem~nd such as this 
would attempt to strengthen the dependence of the graded workers 
on the employers (who supported this request) and 
separate them from the mass of the stevedoring labourers. It 
would also, however, reduce the credibility of the collaborators 
in the eyes of most of the workers who would see the employee 
representatives as a self-seeking collaborative pressure group 
unable to put forward the fundamental demands of the labourers, 
or for that matter, of all workers in the stevedoring trade. 
While the 'works committee'(workers approved by management) 
was not challenged at the 1964 Wage Board sitting, by 1968 the 
workers had organized themselves sufficiently to have found 
that a wage investigation was taking place and sent 
representatives to the hearing on 24th June. 89 An official 
of a registered trade union present at the meeting said that 
this independent group of stevedoring workers was told to 
leave the meeting by the management, which they were forced 
to do. The 'works committee' in their absence adopted an 
ingratiating manner, bowing, and asking the Wage Board to 
do the best it could for the stevedoring workers. 
The new factor at the 1968 wage hearing was the presence of 
two registered trade unions, the Republic Transport Workers' 
Union (RTWU) representing Indian and Coloured transport workers, 
and the co-ordinating body of the reformist Trade Union Council 
of South Africa (TUCSA). The RTWU had been active in organizing 
Indian fork-lift drivers, pay-loader tractor drivers, and truck 
drivers, many of whom were employed in the docks. The union 
had been formed after the Motor Transport Workers' Union had 
decided to restrict its membership to white workers only. 
Despite their compliance with every measure of the law, the 
RTWU officials were under strong pressure from the Security 
Branch to withdraw from recruiting workers from the dock area 
and membership had slumped. The union members had, however, 
established contacts with the African stevedoring workers,which 
is the possible explanation for the presence of an independent 
group of workers at the Wage Board hearing. Having been forced 
to adopt a very cautious strategy of organizing, the RTWU took 
the Wage Board hearing seriously as a means of keeping up its 
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struggle to organize all transport workers who could be 
b f . d· 90 m~m ers 0 reglstere unlons. 
The presence of TUCSA at Wage Board sittings in Durban can 
be explained by the attempt of the co-ordinating trade union 
body to speak on behalf of all South African workers, and in 
particular to orientate some of its activities towards the 
organization of the unorganized masses. In the late 1960s 
TUCSA was making tentative moves towards organizing black trade 
unions on the Rand, and this policy was reflected by the 
appearance of its officials at Wage Board sittings to represent 
the workers in industries where no trade union organization 
. d 91 eXl.ste • At the hearing TUCSA broadly supported the demands 
of the RTWU without substituting any of its own. 
The RTWU presented a comprehensive set of demands on 
behalf of all workers in stevedoring, from labourers to foremen. 
These demands if accepted would have virtually doubled the 
earnings of the labourers and comprehensively reduced the 
differentials between supervisors and supervised. 
TABLE 6.6 WAGE DEMANDS, DURBAN 1968 
Source: 
Occupation Weekly wage· (R) 
Drivers 
Foremen 
Labourers 
Gangway/winchmen 
Leader 
Induna 
WBR, 1968 
22.50 
44.00 
15.00 
17.00 
16.00 
22.50 
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Although it 1S not completely unambiguous, it appears 
as though the demand of R17 a week made on behalf of the 
labourers meant a rejection of the daily allowance system, and 
its replacement with a considerably higher basic wage. At this 
time the earnings of the labourers in Durban, including all 
92 allowances and overtime, were R9.00 a week. 
The highest increases 1n wages proposed were those applying 
to the labouring work, and the RTWU also demanded overalls for 
all workers, an increased special cargo allowance, and increased 
overtime rates. The stevedoring employers responded to these 
comprehensive demands by describing them as 'excessive and 
unrealistic'. Their main weapon against these sweeping demands 
was the works committee which repudiated the representations 
made by the RTWU and claimed that they and not the RTWU were 
. f f . k 93 representat1ve 0 the A r1can wor ers. 
Because the wage determinations, unlike in other industries, 
fundamentally affect the wages and working conditions of the 
workers and the cost structure of the industry, the employers 
were active in presenting their proposals for change. Rather than 
adopting a completely reactionary posture, rejecting all 
proposals which would increase wages, the employers, and 
particularly the DSLSC, were prepared to make certain changes. 
An apparently enlightened management would command more respect 
from certain workers and ensure the loyalty of the graded workers 
in particular. The employers at the 1968 Wage Board sitting 
accepted all the requests for increased differentiation of the 
workers and redefinition of the work of winchmen. The DSLSC went 
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e~en further in its 'enlightenment' and proposed that Republic 
Day be made a paid public holiday. The main emphasis of the 
employers was, however, to ~ncrease the differentiation of 
workers, with a subsidiary concern for limiting the extra 
demands on the time of stevedoring workers. The most important 
area of concern of the DSLSC was the winchmen. The company 
insisted that the definition of the winchman's work be widened 
to include the operation of a ship's crane. The employers' 
concern with the winchmen could have arisen from their claim 
that they were now doing more responsible work and should be 
rewarded correspondingly,By changing the definition of the 
work and not opposing the works committee's request for a wage 
differential between winchmen and gangwaymen, the DSLSC possibly 
thought this source of dissatisfaction could be removed. The 
other areas where increased differentiation was proposed were ~n 
black supervision and new mechanization. The DSLSC proposed to 
meet the shortage of white supervisors in the docks by 
considerably expanding the work of black supervisors with new 
titles and higher wage rates. Overall, the substitution would 
reduce the wage bill for supervision and increase efficiency. 
The senior indunas drawn from the pool of graded workers 
would improve communication and speed up the work. The main 
criteria for their promotion would be age and experience, 
although these would not be the only ones, and the company could 
ff . hi 1 . 94 a ord to be h~g y se ect~ve. Although this was not stated 
at the Wage Board sitting, the senior indunas would take over 
the work of the hatchman. The other supervisory job to be 
requested was the liaison induna whose work was to keep the 
employers in touch with the work on the ships and act as a kind 
of authoritative messenger and informer. The liaison indunas 
were also to intervene in minor disputes and report any problems 
95 to the personnel management. 
The major innovation requested was the replacement of the 
work of a hatchman (significantly never defined in a wage 
determination) with a senior induna. The white hatchman was 
rapidly disappearing from work on the ships because of the long 
hours and unrewarding pay. The ey,-seamen who had been preferred 
for this work were increasingly being replaced by white workers 
who had no shipping experience or knowledge of foreign 
languages. By the late 1960s there was a high turnover 
of these workers who were not provided with training for the work. 
The upward movement of promotion for white workers from hatchman, 
to learner foreman, and then finally foreman, was breaking down, 
and the senior induna was to take over most of this work. He 
would be paid a wage less than a half of that of a white foreman. 
The question of work appropriate to the new level of 
mechanization in the docks was raised by the proposal to define 
the work of a grain trimmer with a suitable wage rate above that 
1 h h · d 96 of the labourer and the winchman, but be ow t at of t e ~n una. 
During the 1960s there was an enormous expans~on of maize exports 
from South Africa,from an average annual level of 796 thousand 
tons in the period 1956/57 to 1960/61, to 1,388 thousand tons in 
the period 1961/62 to 1965/66. 97 Durban handled large quantities of 
this export trade, as much as 1,088 thousand tons in 1964. 98 This 
work was becoming increasingly mechanized as power driven machinery 
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was installed to load the ships, the grain being distributed 
under pressure rather than trimmed by hand by the labourers. 
The employers were not only concerned with increased 
differentiation and grading; requests were made to the Wage Board 
which indicated an attempt to make use of the wage investigation 
to define some limit to the hours of work which could be demanded 
from stevedoring workers. The request that emergency work- that 
is work outside the times of work laid down in the wage 
determination (in practice work demanded of the stevedoring 
labourers over the maximum overtime or on Saturday afternoon)-
should be more strictly define~ was made by the employers. They 
wanted to restrict emergency work to 'work when a ship is on fire 
or sinking or where there is a danger to life if the work 1S not 
done.' The employers were concerned that the workers should not 
become dissatisfied with the complete lack of control over the 
hours worked by their employees; these conditions being determined 
by the SARR. By being made openly to the Wage Board, the request 
indicates a tension between the stevedoring companies and the 
shipping companies and SARH, the latter being determined to extend 
the working day over the maximum if necessary to achieve the 
fastest turnabout of the ships. The incident shows the extent 
to which the workers had lost control over the hours worked 
because of the rigorous discipline imposed by the DSLSC. 99 Finally, 
the employers asked the Wage Board to lay down that workers should 
replace any clothing lost or damaged through negligence. 
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From the evidence of the 1968 wage investigation it is 
clear that the employers were as concerned as the workers to 
secure changes in the wage determination in their interests. 
The employers' 'innovative' approach to the Wage Board; 
requesting redefinition of jobs, concerned to ensure some 
concrete changes in conditions of work, and attempting to use 
the wage determination to reinforce their own rather than other 
authorities control over stevedoring labour, arose partly from 
the weakness of the stevedoring companies both in relation to the 
demands of the workers and to the SARH. By the late 1960s 
monopoly capital was involved in redesigning the division of 
labour on the factory floor on its own initiative, employing 
personnel managers and time and motion studies to achieve the 
h ' h " 100 19 est levels of product1v1ty. The monopoly companies were 
developing an increasingly sophisticated division of labour 
at the operative and artisan levels of work, and were generally 
critical of the rather crude specifications of the wage 
determinations. With a relatively low level of mechanization and with 
management keenly aware that only the strictest discipline over 
the workers would ensure the continued high profitability of the 
trade, the process of regrading and differentiation was more 
1 ' ,101 likely to be set in motion through externa lnterventl0n. 
Profitability and wage demands 
The Wage Board, charged with making a study of the 
profitability of an industry before laying down wage rates, 
found that the stevedoring companies were highly profitable. 
The trade did not require a high proportion of funds to be 
invested in plant and equipment, and the companies earned 
their income primarily through deploying labour with only a 
limited amount of equipment. Because the capital requirements 
were small in relation to turnover, the rate of return on 
capital was high - in 1962/63 it amounted to 67 per cent -
about th t · th t ft' l' . d 102 ree 1mes e ra e 0 re urn on cap1ta 1n 1n ustry. 
The Wage Board considered this figure 'exceptionally high' but 
not of great importance in assessing profitability because of 
the insignificance of plant and equipment in the labour process. 
But by every other criteria the stevedoring companies were 
proved to be as profitable as suggested by the enormous return 
on capital. Measured both in terms of total costs and turnover, 
profits are considerable. Despite the high proportion of profits 
in terms of costs and turnover, the stevedoring trade has not 
been exempt from the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, a 
factor which has constantly to be borne in mind in considering 
the intransigence of the stevedoring employers. 
TABLE 6.7 
1956/1957 
26.4 
Source: 
STEVEDORING.PROFITS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COSTS 
1961-62/1962-63 1965-66/1966-67 
20.7 13.6 
Wage Board Reports, figures for each year averaged 
over two year periods. 
Despite the tendency of the rate of profit to decline, 
this average movement does not bring out the differences between 
the companies. In 1966-67 only one firm suffered a loss, four had 
profits of below 10 per cent, while four had profits exceeding 
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2 103 o per cent on turnover. But while the rate of profit 
. was important in assessing the stevedoring companies over 
time and in terms of other industries, the mass of profit 
was crucial in understanding the ability of the stevedoring 
companies to absorb increased wages. 
In 1962-63 the fixed assets of the stevedoring 
companies consisting of vehicles, plant and equipment, land 
and buildings, were valued at just over half the profits earned. 
The mass of profits in the trade was virtually sufficient to 
replenish all long-term funds in a year's operation. 104 This 
level of profitability could enable a rapid pace of accumulation 
should thestevedoring companies have to invest in equipment 
rather than distribute dividends to shareholders. An analysis 
of profitability according to the labour theory of value and 
Marxist theory would view the productive process of 
loading and unloading ships~ a process in which constant capital 
is conspicuous by its insignificance, in terms of the exploitation 
of the workers and the division of income into the means of sub-
sistence for the workers, and the rewards of ownership for the 
capitalists. Marx describes transport as a productive process if, 
in the movement of commodities, it constitutes a stage 1n the 
production of the commodities being transported. Through 
transportation additional value is transferred to the commodities. 
Transport workers then, as other productive workers, labour beyond 
the hours of work in which they earn their means of subsistence 
and in the remaining hours create surplus value which 1S 
. db' l' 105 appropr1ate y the cap1ta lStS. Marx argues that the primary 
task in approaching the whole question of profitability is to 
assess first the rate of surplus value; the rate at which capital 
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can appropriate a proportion of the product greater than 
the outlay of expenditure of labour power. Profit then 
. , 
1S a converted form of surplus value, a form in which its 
origin and the secret of its existence are obscured and 
. . h d ,106 extlnguls e • Again, 'if the rate of surplus value is known 
and its magnitude given, the rate of profit expresses nothing 
but what it actually is, namely a different way of measuring 
surplus-value, its measurement according to the value of the 
total capital instead of the value of the portion of capital from 
which surplus-value directly originates by way of its exchange 
for labour. ,107 I V 1 I f C . 1 h h h d n 0 ume 0 aplta e sets out t e met 0 
for calculating the rate of surplus value: by reducing the value of 
constant capital which re-appears in the product to 
zero. Only the value that has actually been created in the 
process of producing the commodity then remains. The amount of 
surplus value is calculated by deducting from income the 
constant capital expended in the process of production. The 
formula s/v gives the ratio of surplus value to variable capital, 
that part of capital which is turned into labour-power. 
The analysis of the Wage Board of the stevedoring trade 
provides a basis for evaluating the division of the income of the 
stevedoring companies into the wages of the workers and the profits 
of the capitalists. The income of all stevedoring companies 
during 1962/63 was R\ 586 thousand. From this is deducted the 
expenditure on constant capital - predominantly vehicles, plant 
and equipment, and land and buildings - which amounted to R358 
thousand. From the total income, the value of labour-power 
expended in the productive process of transport was R~ 048 thousand 
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of which R699, 000 was appropriated in the form of profits 
and· directors' fees, and R2,329 thousand remained as wages 
f h 108 or t e workers and salaried employees. From these figures, 
the rate of surplus value, s/v, is 30 per cent. As surp1us-
value is in the same ratio to variable capital as surplus labour 
is to necessary labour, the working day can be divided into 
necessary and surplus labour in the same proportion. 109 The 
stevedoring workers thus spent two-thirds of their working time 
in paid labour and a third in unpaid labour. 
This method of evaluating the return to capitalists from 
their command over labour in the docks provides a higher rate of 
exploitation than that of the Wage Board's calculation in terms of 
total costs and turnover. That there was not an even larger 
difference between the two methods of approach; bourgeois 
political economy basing the rate of return on total capital and a 
materialist approach relating surplus value to variable capital; is 
a reflection of the relative insignificance of constant capital 
. d' 110 in steve orlng. The proportion of total capital expended on 
labour-power constituted the largest proportion of costs in the 
stevedoring trade. While the wages of labourers only constituted 
some 20 per cent of turnover in 1938, by 1962/63 they were 70.5 
per cent. 111 The enormous change in the proportion of variable 
capital in stevedoring reflects the struggle of workers to lower 
the rate of exploitation in the numerous strikes during the war 
period and the 1950s. Since the wages of labourers constituted 
such a large proportion of total costs, employers were likely to 
resist strongly any substantial increase in wages which would 
have an immediate effect on the proportion of paid to unpaid 
labour. 
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TABLE 6.8 WAGES OF LABOURERS AND OTHER OPERATING 
EXPENSES 
As percentage 
of total costs 
As percentage 
of turnover 
1956/57 
79.6 
63.0 
1961-62/1962-63 
83.5 
69.2 
1965-66/1966-67 
82.0 
72.2 
Source: Wage Board Reports, wages and salaries paid to 
clerical and managerial staff excluded, operating 
expenses include the costs of operating and maintaining 
the compounds (WBR, 1964: para 26). 
The proportion of wages in terms of the operations of the 
stevedoring companies have shown divergent tendencies over time. 
As a percentage of total costs wages h~ve shown a slight tendency 
to decline, although this has not been a uniform development as 
the figures indicate. As a percentage of turnover a firmer 
d . . d d' 1 . d 112 ten ency 1S eV1 ent, a stea y r1se over a ong per10 • 
In responding to the demands made upon it. the Wage Board 
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concentrated on a short-term analysis of capital in the stevedoring 
trade, not searching out the longer term trends in wages or 
profits. Broadly viewed, the suggestions of the employers we.re 
accepted (with some significant exceptions) and some of the 
requests of the works committee conceded. All the proposals for 
increased division of labour and differentiation were accepted; 
the work of winchman was widened to include operating a ship's 
crane, liaison indunas were provided for, the wages of a winchman 
were increased above a gangwayman only in Durban, and finally the 
. the wage for a maize trimmer in East London was made 
greater than that of a gangwayman. While some important 
requests made by the DSLSC were readily conceded, one of 
the most important, the issue of control over emergency 
work, was rejected. Obviously the Wage Board shied away 
from attempting to provide any limitation of the power of 
the SARR. By refusing to intervene in making a definition 
of emergency work the Wage Board implicitly tolerated the 
super-exploitation of stevedoring workers who were forced 
to work over and above the maximum hours of work prescribed 
1n the wage determinations. It did, however, agree to 
reducing the midnight break during the night shift to 
half-an-hour, but refused the request of the works committee 
that a free meal should be provided. In one area it declined 
to reinforce the disciplinary powers of the DSLSC; its 
request that workers should replace protective clothing lost 
or damaged through negligence was turned down. This was not 
the kind of issue the Wage Board tended to include 1n 
determinations; it could be seen as intruding into the area 
where specific employers should develop more rigorous conditions 
of service themselves. 
One of the most important areas in which changes were 
made with every wage investigation was in the definition of bulk 
and dirty cargo. With each determination these definitions were 
widened slightly and the allowances raised to make this unpopular 
and unhealthy work more attractive to the workers. Although these 
changes appear highly technical and routine, they were important 
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to the employers in attempting to demonstrate some vitality 
ln the legalistic procedures of wage investigation. The 
bureaucratic and technical language in which the special 
allowances were set out hid the significance of the issues 
involved~ In United Kingdom ports, for example, piece rates 
were paid for each type of cargo and the complex adjustment 
of the rates and definition of cargo formed a fruitful basis 
for consolidating local collective bargaining with employers 
and strengthening the trade unions. One of the problems 
faced by the employers which· prompted the formation of the 
DSLSC was the workers 'resistance to taking up dirty or bulk 
cargo work. The strict supervision of workers under the DSLSC 
meant that the employers freedom to deploy workers as they 
wanted was tremendously increased, the employers' freedom matched 
by the unfreedom of labour. Under the DSLSC the workers had 
no choice or freedom to refuse filthy and unhealthy work, and the 
definitions of bulk and dirty cargo can be seen as an attempt to 
reduce some part of the workers' resistance. But by being 
enforced in a highly legalistic and semi-legislative way the 
workers also lost the powers they had to adjust the special 
allowances through their demands by, for instance, refusing to 
work on a certain type of cargo. The changes in the definitions 
of 'bulk' and 'dirty' cargo indicate how arbitrary, and thus how 
subject to dispute, the distinctions are between different types 
of cargo (see Appendix £ ). The first definition (WD 183) 
tried to distinguish between bulk cargo in pieces or bundles, and 
d. . . 113 lrty cargo ln contalners. Exceptionally heavy cargo such as 
timber, steel, and pieces of machinery were specifically excluded 
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from the definition of bulk cargo. In subsequent determinations 
the cargoes for which there we IE extra payment were continually 
added to the definition of bulk and dirty cargo. In 1964 a 
division was made in the payment for bulk and dirty cargo; dirty 
cargo being paid for at about a third more than bulk cargo, and 
significantly maize was transferred to the definition of dirty 
cargo, increasing the inducement to do this work. Other changes 
were made: gypsum, potash, and superphosphate was added to the 
definition of bulk cargo, and triple superphosphate, whalebone 
meal, and lucerne meal in hessian bags to that of dirty cargo. Again, 
in 1969; oxide, chalk, clay, pitch, and asbestos in hessian or paper 
bags or in open compressed bundles were included in the definition 
f d o 114 o 1rty cargo. At one level the whole question of minute changes 
1n definitions is either trifling or otherwise technical - simply 
reflecting the changed composition of commodity trade and the 
increasing importance of chemicals in particular. But it is 
important to understand that many of the commodities introduced into 
the higher paid categories had been handled for many years previous to 
their being included in the definitions, and that the fundamental 
1ssue being addressed was one of wages. The expansion of 
commodities for which extra payment could be made (in the case of dirty 
cargo constituting about half of the daily allowance) was one method 
of increasing wages and output in the most unpopular types of work. 
Premium payments were also made for work in freezing and cool 
chambers. The complicated set of definitions was the furthest the 
employers and the Wage Board would go in making concessions to a 
totally different wage system, that of piece work, in which the rate 
of wages would be set for each commodity handled. Having the 
experience of employers in the United Kingdom with dock workers 
in mind (many of the stevedoring companies being linked to British 
shipping or transport companies), the employers in South Africa 
were understandably reluctant to allow a system of piece work to 
develop in which there would be constant renegotiation of rates, 
disputes over new commodities handled, and the growth of national 
trade unionism to co-ordinate the workers' struggle. The additions 
to the definition of bulk and dirty cargo can be seen as a hidden 
form of collective bargaining in which the employers manoeuvred 
to forestall disputes. The employers could present the wage 
determinations which widened the definition of bulk and dirty 
cargo as concessions to the workers. 
Wage rates and earnings 
In recommending wages in the stevedoring trade the Wage Board 
made no calculation of the ability of stevedoring companies to absorb 
the increased wages or on the needs of the workers. The data on 
operating capital, wages, and profit, was simp ly presented without 
l15 
comment, as were the final wage rates. With a few exceptions, 
some comments on the wages of particular types of work, the wage 
rates were simply recommended and the policy of the Wage Board and 
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the proportional wage increases have to be worked out from the results. 
In the 1968 Wage Board Report it was simply stated that a 15 per cent 
increase would be made in the wages of all workers. From an 
examination of the wage determinations, particularly WD 308 of 
3 April 1969, it will be argued that the actual policy of the Wage 
Board W$ considerably more complex than this simple statement 
and that each component of the wage has to be considered as 
well as the final earnings. 
TABLE 6.9 
24 July 1964 
3 April 1969 
INCREASES IN PRESCRIBED WAGES, PERCENTAGES, 
DURBAN 
Basic wage/ 
hour % 
50.0 
15.5 
Overtime 
% 
11.1 
16.0 
Sunday Time 
% 
17.3 
20.3 
Composite 
wage % 
33.1 
14.9 
Source: Wage determinations 251 and 308. The composite wage 
is constructed by making up a wage based on four 
days + Sunday + twelve hours overtime, giving 57 
hours worked weekly. For the figures on wages/hour 
see Appendix 
The percentage increases in each component of the wage glve 
some insight into the changing structure of earnings for stevedoring 
workers in Durban. Only the increases recommended by the Wage 
Board are considered, and so there appears to be a substantial 
increase in the basic wage in 1964. This increase was, in fact, 
phased in by the DSLSC providing a daily allowance in 1963 (which 
increased the basic wage by 15.0 per cent) and WD 251 which raised 
the daily allowance by a further 30.4 per cent. What is striking 
is the unequal increase in the basic wage and the overtime and 
Sunday time rates. While the basic wage had been increased by 
50.0 per cent since 1959, the increase in overtime was 11.1 per 
cent and Sunday time 17.3 per cent. Although concessions were 
, 
being made in terms of increased daily allowances, the worke rs 
earnings were being squeezed by smaller increases during premium 
wage time. In the important wage determination of 1969, some 
481 
compensation was made in the decline of premium wage rates. 
These small increases did not, however, compensate for the relative 
decline in premium wage rates over the whole period 1959-1969 
during which basic wages were increased by 73.3 per cent, overtime 
by 28.9 per cent, and Sunday time by 41.1 per cent. 
Most importantly, the uneven increase in components of 
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earnings has to be evaluated against a calculation of final earnings. 117 
In 1964 the composite wage was increased by 33.1 per cent, and in 
1969 by 14.9 per cent; over the whole period 1959-69 the composite 
wage had been increased by 52.9 per cent while the cost of living had 
. b 8 118 r1sen y 27. per cent. The percentage wage increases cannot be 
assessed independently from the demands and needs of the workers. 
They were made from comparatively low base figures, and by the end of 
the ten year period had only come up to two-thirds the wage level 
demanded by SACTU in 1958. 119 The only available statistics on 
calculated needs of African workers living in Durban are the poverty 
datum lines worked out by the University of Natal. The poverty datum 
line concept is a product of bourgeois social science in that it 
attempts to construct a scientific basis for estimating the 
minimum needs of working class families without reference to the 
workers' aspirations or demands. In South Africa the poverty line 
concept is racially determined (there is often an astonishing 
variation in the amount of food 'allowed' to different groups of 
120 
workers) and serves ideologically to buttress the cheap labour system. 
Nevertheless, the poverty lines are the only cost of living studies 
which are based on need, and do give some idea of the ruthless 
minimum needed by African families to survive in urban townships, and 
can give some reference point to dock wage rates. By 1969 the basic 
wage of stevedoring labourers constituted 85 per cent of the 
poverty datum line calculated for African families In Durban. 121 
Since workers would by no means be guaranteed this level of 
earnings under the daily allowance system, it is necessary to 
examine the actual earnings of workers during the 1960s to get 
some idea of the absolute level of earnings and the way in which 
wage determinations have affected the earnings of workers. 
Earnings of workers employed by the DSLSC have been 
calculated from record cards which were made available by the 
company. A survey of earnings enables conclusions to be drawn 
about the earnings of workers (as opposed to such flexible 
categories as the 'basic wage'), their increase over the years, 
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and the effects of wage determinations finally on the 'take home' wage 
of the workers. 
TABLE 6.10 AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS, DSLSC (R) 
1961/62 
1962/63 
1963/64 
1964/65 
1965/66 
1966/67 
1967/.68 
1968/69 
Labourers 
9.91 
9.68 
10.51 
12.92 
12.76 
12.74 
13.06 
Gangway/winchmen 
10.69 
11.15 
12.26 
15.00 
14.22 
15.11 
15.32 
15.43 
Indunas 
15.16 
15.33 
15.84 
18.31 
16.87 
16.20 
17.81 
18.61 
Source: Survey of record cards. In 1968 the cards become too 
scattered for adequate sampling in the case of 
stevedoring 1aboul'<:!rs. 
What is striking from an analysis of the earnings of 
.the labourers is that advances in wages were by no means 
automatic and between 1961/62 to 1962/63 and between 1964/65 
to 1966/67 wages actually declined. The increases in earnings 
then reflected the increase in wage rates in particular 
years (1963 and 1964), and with the exception of the increase 
in earnings in 1967/68 of 2.5 per cent, the workers were 
basically dependent on increased wage rates rather than more 
k h · f' d S d . 122 wor at t e prem1um wage rates a overt1me an un ay tIme. 
Despite the tremendous increase in cargo handled during the 1960s 
there was not an exactly equal increase in earnings because 
of the rising demand for extended hours of work; in part the 
123 increased tempo of work was met with increased employment. 
Despite changes in labour supply to meet increased demand, the 
premium wage rates of overtime and Sunday time increased from 
41.5 per cent in 1961/62 to 54.9 per cent in 1967/68. By the 
late 1960s more than half the earnings of the workers were being 
made up of the premium wage rates even though the wage 
determinations had significantly reduced these rates in terms of 
the basic wage. 
An examination of the earnings of the workers helps to 
provide some insight into the effect of the increases in wage rates 
which were introduced and the way in which they 'worked through' 
the wage components to affect earnings. The daily allowance of 
15 cents added to the basic wage by the DSLSC in 1963 raised the 
basic wage by 15 per cent, but increased earnings between 1962/63 
to 1963/64 by only 8.6 per cent. Similarly, the increase of the 
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basic wage by 30.4 per cent in 1964 increased earnlngs by 22.9 
per cent. The increase in earnings are also lower than that in 
the hypothetical composite wage constructed to reflect all the 
changes in the wage pattern. For example, the composite wage 
increased by 25.8 per cent between 1963 and 1964, while 
earnings between 1963/64 to 1964/65 rose by 22.9 per cent. The 
earnings figures also correct the view that the Wage Board 
introduced considerable improvements in the earnings of the workers. 
Considered over the whole ten year period, 1959-69, the minimum 
basic wage was increased by 73.3 per cent but earnlngs up to 1968 
had increased by only 31.8 per cent, a relatively minor lncrease 
over the rise in the cost of living of 5.9 per cent. 124 Considered 
from the perspective of the needs of the workers, despite the 
extraordinarly long hours involving extensive overtime, the earnlngs 
of stevedoring labourers did not approach the minimum effective level 
of the poverty line which is calculated to take into account 
the necessary additional income needed to maintain a minimum level of 
expenditure on essentials. 125 In 1968 the minimum effective level 
calculated by adjusting the 1958 poverty study upwards was R19.04 
a week. While capital logically assesses wages in terms of 
productivity rather than need, throughout the wage investigations of 
the 1960s there was no discussion about the amount of output per 
worker. While the subject was apparently avoided on technical 
grounds (that the type of cargo handled and the machinery employed 
gave a false impression in comparing the efficiency of the workers in 
one port against that of another) this was also a means of 
controlling disclosure of information which could be used by the 
workers to demand higher wages for more work. The question of output 
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~er worker; in a sector where the exploitation of labour was 
not obscured by high level technology and the value added to 
the commodities moved rested obviously on the labour power of 
the workers; came too close to the issue of the extraction of 
surplus labour. In 1966, a year in which a record cargo of 
4~ 
8.557m tonnes was landed (a figure which has not been equalled 
since), each stevedoring worker handled 6,573 tonnes, a considerable 
increase on the 4,114 tonnes handied in 1962. While admittedly 
the productivity of the stevedoring workers varied in relption to 
the amount of cargo directed to Durban, and more generally by the 
pattern of slump and boom in the economy, the obvious fact that 
the workers were handling ever increasing mass of cargo per 
worker was avoided in deliberations over wage levels. 126 
The earn1ngs data also give some idea of the actual 
differentiation among the stevedoring workers and the operation 
of wage differentials. Two tendencies are most evident: a 
decline in the differences in wages between labourers and 
indunas, and an increase in the difference of earnings between 
labourers and gangwaymen. The wage differential between manual 
workers and the indunas declined gradually over the period 1961/62 
to 1967/68. In the former year the labourers earned 65.4 per cent 
of the induna~ final wage, and in the latter 73.3 per cent. The 
wages of the gangwaymen rose more sharply, from 70.5 to 86.0 
per cent of the indunas' final wage in the same period. The 
narrowing of differentials between all manual workers and black 
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~upervisors which was forced on the employers because of 
resistance to this wage gap in the earlier period and the need 
to attract proficient iabourers, tended to disguise the rising 
gap between labourers and gangwaymen. While labourers earned 
92.7 per cent of the gangwaymen's final wages in 1961/62, by 
1967/68 this had been reduced to 85.3 per cent. This area of rising 
differentials reflected the employers' policy of increasing the 
rewards to the operatives in stevedoring in order to create 
a sense of professionalism and detachment from the stevedoring 
labourers. 
National oppression and contract labour 
The effectiveness of the DSLSC solved many of the pressing 
problems of the employers in labour supply, deployment of 
workers, and control over wages. The rigorous enforcement of 
detailed control over the workers was only possible because of 
the disorganization and repression of the working class and 
national movements carried through by the state and powerful 
employer organizations. Contrary to the prediction of the 
liberal bourgeoisie that racism would be dissolved by a vast 
expansion of capital such as the boom of the 1960s, national 
oppression was decisively intensified. Having regained the 
confidence of foreign capital in the early 1960s, the National 
Party pressed ahead with its programme of denying all political 
rights to the growing black working class. The policy took two 
main forms: the development of the Bantustans which reorganized 
the African masses into ethnic blocs under the direction of 
sections of the black petty bourgeoisie, and by transforming 
the flow of migrant labour to and from the industrial centres 
into a centralized movement of contract workers. 
The form of national oppress~on introduced in the 1960s, 
the cornrnoditization of black labour stripped of political demands, 
placed the pri~ary emphasis of state policy on a cheap labour 
policy to the benefit of employers. African workers were to be 
reduced solely to the role of sellers of labour power in the 
industrial centres; the question of the African petty bourgeoisie 
was secondary. They were either to be satisfied with a minimal 
participation in political life in the Urban Bantu Councils, or 
reorientated towards new political tasks in the Bantustans. The 
alienation of all African workers from the product of the working 
class was carried to extreme as the ruling class developed an 
ideology of African nations being the 'homelands' of the 
African workers. All political content was to be removed from 
the increased levels of proletarianization experienced by the 
African workers in the post-war period. The African workers were 
directed towards the countryside for political expression, 
legal authorization to be in urban areas, and as a final resting 
place. Initially the African petty bourgeoisie adopted a 
critical view of the Bantustan programme, but with increasing 
political office and soft loans, the Bantustans became more 
attractive. The rulers of the Bantustans soon took up the demands 
for more land, increased salaries, and greater powers. But every 
development of the Bantustans, the consolidation of power of 
sections of the African petty bourgeoisie, the extension of 
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'citizenship' in the remote Bantustans, acted against the 
interests of the African workers. 
The contradiction between the development of the Bantustans 
and the African working class was made most acute in regulations 
promulgated towards the end of the 1960s which had a vital 
bearing on recruitment and the consolidation of tribal authorities 
in the Bantustans. 127 These regulations had the primary feature 
of placing the control over movement of African workers in the 
hands of the chiefs and Bantustan authorities ('eflux' rather 
than 'influx' control), damming the supply of labour in the 
Bantustans to be on call to employers, and eliminating the 
possibility of migrant workers gradually consolidating their 
1 1 .. . h .. 128 ega pos1t10n 1n t e c1t1es. Through the new regulations 
migratory workers who were permitted to be in urban areas to 
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work for an employer for an indefinite period were transformed into con-
tract workers who were only permitted to be in the urban areas 
for wage labour for a specific employer for a contract not 
longer than 360 shifts. On termination of contract, the African 
worker was required to return to the Bantustan to wait for a 
further contract. The interest of the chiefs and Bantustan 
bureaucracy in the administration and control over the movement 
and contracts of service was stimulated by the employers being 
required to pay a Rl recruitment fee for each worker recruited 
to the tribal authorities. The workers were to be classified 
into seventeen different categories of labour, the last being 
'unemployable'. The regulations which provided for centralized 
control over the movement of workers (the Director of Bantu 
L-abour may zone the areas for which African workers may be made 
available for service), sharply increased the dependence of 
African workers on the Bantustan bureaucracies for employment. 
Stevedoring workers who were recruited from the Bantustan areas 
increasingly came under the detailed control of the numerous 
labour bureaux and the discipline of the employers. 
The armoury of regulations, labour bureaux, and service 
contracts, were the state's response to the declining rate of 
growth in the late 1960s and the growing presence of African 
workers in the towns who had either lost or had only relatively 
weak links with the countryside. In an attempt to avoid the 
demands of African workers for full employment, housing, higher 
wages, and political rights, the regulations intensified the 
national oppression experienced by the African people as a whole. 
This extension of the state into virtually all aspects of 
recruitment and employment of African workers was an 
acknowledgement of the growing strength of the black working 
class. 
The stevedoring workers, recruited from the distant reserves 
in Kwa Zulu and Pondoland, were particularly vulnerable to 
increasingly coercive labour controls. Throughout the 1960s the 
stevedoring workers were forced to reproduce themselves as a 
migrant labour force. While the earnings of the stevedoring 
labourers had increased slightly over this period, any subsidy to 
wages from agricultural production in the reserves by their 
wives had declined drastically. 
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TABLE 6.11 PER CAPITA CONSUHPTION OF MAIZE AND SORGHUM 
FROM PRODUCTION IN THE RESERVES 
1960 
1970 
Sources: 
Population 
(000) 
4,112 
7,003 
Production 
(000 t) 
294 
263 
Consumption 
(kg/year) 
(per capita) 
72 
38 
Population statistics from Knight (1977): 41 
1960 production figures an average from 1960-66 
1970" " " "1967-73 
With a potential decline in grain consumption from homestead 
production of 89.5 per cent, an increase in real earnings of 
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stevedoring labourers of 5.9 per cent would not compensate for the 
decline in grain available to the hom'·stead. The wage 
recommendations issued by the Wage Board can be understood as 
providing a limit to the decline in real wages rather than any 
material advance for the workers over the whole period. Despite 
this evident ineffectiveness of the Wage Board in raising real 
wages, the process of wage investigation had set in train 
expectations among the workers that advances would be made. 
One of the contradictory developments in stevedoring during 
the 1960s was the advance of the indunas into the role of effective 
supervisors of the workers. From a perspective of national 
oppression as a racial ordering of society under direct white 
rule, it could be expected that intensified national oppression 
would demand that supervision be directly in the hands of the white 
foremen. Increasingly the task of supervision was passing into the 
hands of the senior indunas as the real sergeant-major of capital 
on the ships. This important shift marked the growing maturity of 
capitalist control over the labour process, social controls 
ratper thana legal/racial command system increasingly characterizing 
the rule of capital even within labour-intensive industry. With 
the easing of racial conflict and hostility bred from the lack of 
understanding by the white foremen of African languages, production 
was increased and profits guaranteed. Without understanding this 
development the struggles of the workers and their demands are 
inexplicable. The extended hours of work and intensified labour 
in the docks would have been impossible without this modified 
form of supervision. 
Despite the increased controls over African labour in society 
as a whole, and the strengthening of the position of the employers 
through the DSLSC, the stevedoring workers paradoxically were ~n 
a strong position by the late 1960s. While the guerilla struggles 
of workers under the smaller employers before the consolidation 
of the DSLSC were possible to sustain, the centralization of 
accommodation and deployment under the DSLSC, also had the effect 
of concentrating the workers. The workers were at the centre of 
the dock labour process, rapidly becoming more conversant with 
the machinery being introduced, and aware of their employers 
dependence on their labour-power. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Marx (1974), III: 232-240, deals with these counteracting 
influences on the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. 
2. The phrase comes from management notes, I, (1966): 1. 
3. At 1958 prices. See Duncan Innes and Luke Malaba, 1978, 
The South African State and its Policy vis-a-vis Supplier 
Economies. Unpublished Paper, Part I. 
4. Hobsbawn (1964):207 argues that the stevedore'sability to 
stow export cargo provides them with considerable 
bargaining strength. 
5. A large proportion of workers listed in the Government 
Gazettes as not having claimed Workmens Compensation for 
injuries are employed by the labour supply company. The 
workers' view of their exploitation was clearly expressed 
in the following terms : 'The bosses treat us like an 
orange: they suck out the juice of our labour and then 
throw us away. I 
6. Management notes, I, (1966):1. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Daily News, 16 September 1960. Time clocks were installed 
in the sheds to enable tighter control of African workers. 
All workers were compelled to work on Christmas Day 1960. 
The latter issue caused public criticism of the SARR. 
Daily News, 29 April 1960, 19, 20, 21, December 1960. 
Managemen t no tes, II, (1966): 1. 
Management notes, I, (1966):2. The ability of workers to 
resist the prerogative of employers in changing the category 
of their employment and job definition is the essence of 
defensive trade unionism. Workers' job security and pace 
of work is very closely tied up with a narrow definition of 
'the job' in contracts of employment. A multiplicity of 
jobs is also some guarantee of more employment. It is 
precisely these restraints on management that the labour 
supply company was formed to dissolve. 
ibid., 2. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the deputy manager of the labour 
supply company blamed much of the unrest of the 1950s on 
indunas who resented their loss of power to hire or marshall 
workers each day. Given the low composition of capital in 
the harbour it would not have been improbable for the 
indunas to have aspired to a petty bourgeois status as 
labour contractors to the stevedoring companies. 
Books on industrial psychology take pride of place in the 
deputy manager's office, supplemented with anthropological 
literature on 'The Zulu'. 
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13. Management notes, February 1966: 8. 
14. Management notes, I, (1966): 7. In this passage 
management makes a complete identification between 
'primary work groups' and the stevedoring gangs, a 
unity of language and not substance with the voluntary 
associations of workers in production. 
15. This ideological approach is stressed by the Bantu 
Productivity Association which produces material 
developing what it considers are the customs and 
habits of African workers, deriving their background 
from cultural anthropology and tribalism. African 
workers appear as exceptional human beings with 
rather odd behaviour which has to be taken account 
of in the pursuit of higher profits. This ideology has 
been mainly employed by capital most heavily dependent 
on the exploitation of migratory workers. 
16. Management notes, I, (1966):7. My emphasis. 
17a. 
17b. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
Management notes, II,: 8. 
Marx, I (1976):443. This theme is developed throughout 
the Chapter 13 on co-operation; the contradiction for 
capital is that the heightening of collective productive 
power also strengthens the solidarity among workers. 
Management notes, II, (1966):10. 
Management notes, II, (1966): 1. 
ibid. ,8. 
Management notes, II: 4. 
Government Gazette, 3 April 1969: 3. According to this 
determination the minimum wage of a foreman was about 
2,3 times the wage of a senior induna. The senior induna 
replaced the 'hatch foreman' job which was not specified 
in the wage determinations but included in the wage 
analysis made by the Wage Board during each 
investigation up to 1972. 
ibid., 2. The official terminology for fork-lift trucks 
is 'mobile power-driven hoist.' 
Wage Board Report, 1964: Appendix II. 
Wage Board Report, 1958: 13. 
Natal Mercury, 4 November, 1972. 
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Made up of 8 hours 40 minutes ordinary time, 3 hours 40 
minutes compulsory overtime for five days Monday to Friday, 
4 hours 40 minutes ordinary hours on Saturday, and a 
further 12 hours and 20 minutes ordinary and overtime on 
Sunday. According to Wage Determination 183 the normal 
hours of work are 47hr 20 and maximum overtime 34 hours 20minute 
a week. Government Gazette, 6 Feb. 1959:9-11. 
28. Wage Determination 183, 5 (5). Emergency work is not 
rigorously defined,being merely any work which the port 
authority decided 'for good and sufficient reason' needs 
to be performed beyond the limits of overtime. 
29. New Age, (9 April 1959). 
30. The primary critique of these measures to perpetuate the 
migrant labour system made by the liberal bourgeoisie is 
that migrant labour was enormously wasteful in terms of 
labour time and the growth of skills of the workers 
(Houghton, 1964). The response of the state was to 
streamline control over the movement of workers to stop 
the 'aimless' movement of workers to town, and to allow 
them into the centres of employment only for a specific 
contract. The ready availability of black workers from 
the reserves for employers could be said to increase the 
total amount of labour time available to capital as a 
whole. 
31. Dreyer found it amusing that workers who had been rejected 
often tried again by joining the end of the que~ to be 
r-e-examined. 
32. This point will be developed at greater length in the next 
chapter, but at this juncture it is important to counteract 
Company arguments that it is a beneficial employment agency 
of eager workseekers attracted to its exceptional wages 
and conditions. 
33. See Bantu Labour Act of 1964 which makes special prOV1S10n 
for the exemption of the police and state industries from the 
barriers of influx control in recruiting African workers from 
the reserves. This exemption from the restrictions of state 
legislation enables the state sector to maintain a low-wage 
policy and constant labour supplies. Ironically, it also 
re-establishes the political nature of the wage contract for 
these workers, a relation of dependence and domination. 
During the strikes of 1973 the Minister of Labour stated 
proudly that no state employe had corne out on strike. 
34. Gerald D. Sack has made two studies of migrant workers in 
harbour employment in Durban. The first,his thesis, 
Izimpohlo: the bachelors; a study of black migrant labourers 
in Durban, (hereafter Sack I) concentrates on railway workers 
but also comparative material on the stevedores. The second, 
a paper, 'The 1972-73 strikes in Natal', (hereafter Sack II), 
is more. interpretive of the social organization of the steve-
dores and their political consciousness. In his paper 
., . (11:10) Sack simply writes that the 'Transke1ans presence 1n 
Durban is largely on 'official suffereance'. Because they had 
only the alternative of becoming mine workers, these workers 
took virtually no part in the strikes or in any other directly 
anti-institutional behaviour'. 
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35. 
36. 
37. 
Not all workers are necessarily recruited de nuovo 
or recruited at all; the stevedoring labour force 
being made up of those workers not victimised during 
the 1959 strike and those who applied for work in the 
post-strike situation. There is some discrepancy between 
the total number of workers employed, for example, in 
1968 when figures are available and the January 1970 
figure. I have taken the figures given by management to 
represent the 'home' districts of workers actively 
employed at the time, i.e. not taking account of 
those on leave. Sack (II: Table I) presents figures 
for 16 May 1972 and a comparison will be made below. 
Vilikazi (1958) and Mbatha (1960) in studying the people 
of a Valley of a Thousand Hills in the Ndwedwe magisterial 
district which borders the rail service from Durban to 
Pietermaritzburg through Botha's Hill pay particular 
attention to the 'weekend migration' phenomenon. During 
the 1970s the tendency has been for workers to commute 
daily from this area making use of the rail service into 
Pinetown and Durban. 
At the Wage Board sitting in Durban on 17 July 1972 the 
employers argued that the workers did not need a large 
wage increase as they had no transport expenses. A worker 
stood up and displayed a season rail ticket in support for 
demands of R18 basic wage per week. His claim that all 
workers had to meet increased transport costs was fiercely 
disputed by the employers. This is an instance in which 
the urbanization of a section of the workers created the 
basis for advancing the workers' demands and repudiating 
the argument of the employers that migratory workers did 
not have to meet the same expenses as urban workers. 
38. Natal Regional Survey (1969): 84, and Wage Board Report 
(1964): para 36. 
39. Wage Board Report (1964): para 48. The 1972 Wage Board 
Report is silent on the issue despite the matter being 
contested at the Durban sitting (para 74). 
40. National Regional Survey (1969): 82. 
41. The record card entries become rather scattered in the 
case of labourers during the period 1968/69 and could 
possibly represent a false tendency if used as a basis 
for calculations. 
42. This point will be returned to in the section on wages 
and earnings. What is not adequately developed in this 
section is the relationship of length of contract to rising 
unemployment; the more workers that the employers could have 
at their disposal the longer the possible length of contract 
if earnings were kept low by a relative oversupply of labour 
in the docks. During times of rising unemployment there is a 
marked decline in the turnover of workers. 
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43.· Bantu Labour Regulations (Bantu Areas),Government Gazette, 
29 March 1968 lays down the most stringent regulations to be 
enforced by the state and employers. Contracts of employment 
may not exceed one year and employers must undertake to 
repatriate workers to their homes at the termination of the 
contract of service. 
44. This is not altogether a voluntary process; many workers 
are fired by employers at the end of the year either to 
avoid paying holiday payor because employers do not want 
to pay the higher wage rates due to workers who qualify 
through length of service. 
45. On the basis of a 'normal' distribution of termination of 
contracts equally each month this figure would be 16.7 per cent. 
46. A number of studies show a rising tendency for the division 
of labour in homestead production to change. Whereas the men 
were responsible for ploughing in the past, women are 
increasingly taking over this work. 
47. Davies (1978). 
48. Steenkamp (1962):92. As one of the leading state economists 
of the time Steenkamp was generally aware of rising African 
unemployment; what he did not discuss was the growing state 
measures to channel these workers into the low-wage sectors, 
and the tendency of capital itself to increase the rate of 
exploitation and shed labour through competition with other 
capitals. 
49. Steenkamp (1962):98. Both ideologically and in practice at 
public sittings and in Wage Board reports, the state 
bureaucrats express their hostility to the organization of 
workers and the concept of basing wage levels on the needs 
of workers. 
50. Steenkamp (1962): 92 and 93. 
51. At no point does Steenkamp move on to a concrete discussion 
of the level of African unemployment or mention that statistics 
were not kept by the state. The arguments against increased 
wages are primarily those of ideology rather than bourgeois 
political economy. 
52. Steenkamp (1963):217. 
53. Until the 1950s the stevedoring employers in Cape Town were 
an exception to this rule as they negotiated conditions of . 
service on an industrial council with the Cape Town Stevedorlng 
and Dock Workers Union. 
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54. See earlier discussion of the strike wave in 1942. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
There is some evidence that tension between the 
stevedoring employers and state officials still 
exists. The Assistant Manager of the DSLSC has 
tried to persuade the Wage Board to make an 
annual review of wages in the trade but without 
success. 
Wage Board Report (1964): para. 42 and 56. 
A survey of the record cards of the DSLSC provides 
the information which is presented below on the 
changes in earnings on an annual basis. Unfortunately 
these figures cannot be directly compared with those 
in the Wage Board reports as the DSLSC figures are 
calculated on an annual basis and the Wage Board figures 
present earnings on the week ending 30 November 1963. 
A strike of railway workers followed the wage increase 
won by stevedoring workers in 1954. 
Natal Regional Survey (1969):48. 
WBR (1964): para 61. The precise point at which the 
'retaining fee' paid to DSLSC workers was introduced 1S 
not clear (from figures apparently after July 1963), but this 
method of raising wages would be the cheapest for 
employers. An increase in the weekly wage rate could cause 
workers to demand a corresponding increase in overtime 
payment. 
For some discussion of the functions and practice of the 
Central Native Labour Board, established in terms of 
the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953, 
see Muriel Horrell, 1961, South African Trade Unionism, 
SAIR~ pp.93-lll. Negotiations between the workers and 
the CNLB took place during the 1950s on wage increases; 
the action by the Board was an attempt to defuse a 
volatile situation for the employers by threatening the 
I workers by stating strikes were illegal and offering the 
carrot of negotiations. See above. 
During a time of relative oversupply of labour, company 
officials could allocate work to those workers they 
approved of, and deny it to those they wanted to discipline. 
62. The most favourable overtime rates negotiated by strong 
unions reach time and a half (150 per cent of hourly rates) 
and double pay for public holidays. 
63. Factories Act, No.22 of 1941, S2 (1). 
64. WBR, 1964; para 68. 
65. Wage Act No. of 1957, 58. 
66. Steenkamp, 1963: 217. 
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67. WBR 1958: 13. This apparently was one area where 
higher productivity did not justify higher wages 
as less 'pure' expenditure of labour power was 
needed! 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
73. 
74. 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
WBR, 1964: para 55. 
Marx, I (1976): 276. 
Steenkamp (1960). 
The Wage Board resisted being drawn into defining 
the jobs and wages of office and administrative 
staff and limited its scope to manual operations, 
'those engaged in the actual stevedoring operations'. 
The exclusion of white collar jobs from the wage 
determinations weakens their coverage considerably. 
WBR 1964: para 5. 
The foremen, indunas, leaders, learner stevedores, 
liaison indunas and senior indunas. 
It is, of course, in the interests of capital to displace 
the task of controlling the workers on to the shoulders 
of the indunas and it could be argued that sharp 
struggles between these two sections of the workers were 1n 
the interest of the employers. Against this trend it is 
argued here that the very nature of working class 
struggle (the independence from employers, demands for 
a transformation of property relations) makes 
resistance to the sergeant majors of capital a key 
component of class consciousness. 
Purcell, Donald E., June 1969. 'The Impact of the South 
African Wage Board on Skilled/Unskilled Wage 
Differentials' East African Economic Review: 73-81. 
In 1964 the minimum wage for a foreman was set by WD 251 
at R30 per week. The average weekly earnings for foremen 
in Durban, which was the lowest wage area for white 
workers as well as black, was R35.l9 in November 1963: 
WBR 1964; Annexure III. 
Purcell (1969) argues the Wage Board follows a 
conscious policy of trying to narrow the wage gap, the 
problem, he feels, is that the increasing demand for 
white labour in the 1960s forced their wages upwards. 
What is argued is that even under a regime of national 
oppression of African workers a completely separate 
'white' and 'black' labour market does not evolve. The 
concern of the liberal bourgeoisie about the black/white 
wage gap indicates its determination to reduce wages as 
a whole to a minimum level. 
The introduction of a daily allowance in 1963 was on 
the basis of 15 cents a day for labourers and 20 cents for 
winchmen. 
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79. WBR 1964; para 63. 
80. WD 308, 3 April 1969, p.4. 
81. Possibly more important was the growing differential 
between the winchmen and the labourers, 14% greater in 1964 
and 25% greater in 1972. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
The subsequent social action of the workers, it is argued, 
can not be explained unless it is understood that the 
Wage Board could make certain significant changes in 
conditions. If the whole exercise were demonstrably 
proved to be a sham, or simply and obviously consolidating 
the power of the employers, strike action by the workers 
would be inevitable and swift. 
Both through allowing the system of daily allowances and 
reducing the overtime and Sunday wage rates as a proportion 
of basic wages. 
This viewpoint is that of the Chamber of Mines in particular, 
but also that of the Minister of Labour in introducing the 
Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act in 1953. 
Workers Unity, May 1959. 
WER, 1958:2. Any worker appearing at the Wage Board would, 
of course, face the possibility of victimization despite 
the safeguards of the Wage Act. Another not bsignificant 
point is that translators are not available at the Wage 
Board sittings and that discussion is in the bureaucratic 
language of industrial relations. 
The participation of the majority of the stevedoring 
workers, the African workers, in registered trade unions 
was prohibited through administrative edict in 1945 and 
legislatively in the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) 
Act of 1953. The industrial council of the stevedoring 
trade in Cape Town apparently lingered on as an unregistered 
body, the union having to decide whether to exclude African 
workers and remain registered or participate in the industrial 
council only as an informal body. 
Workers were not likely to accept this explanation at all, 
but the action by employers in allowing some representation 
(in many other investigations during this period no 
representation at all was permitted) would be likely to have 
some influence on the thinking of those workers in the 
graded occupations, for whom defined occupations and wage 
rates provided them with some recognition, and those workers 
dominated by the notion of an enlightened management 
recognizing their needs. 
89. It is no easy matter for workers to find out about Wage 
Board investigations. The date and place of hearings is 
published in the Government Gazette but no longer as they 
used to he in the press. The information is socially, not 
legally restricted; the employers being forewarned both by 
the Wage Board and by their employer associations. The 
chance that unorganized workers would find out about wage 
investigations by casually glancing through the Government 
Gaze t te is ni 1. 
90. The trade union appeared to be a part time occupation for the 
main official of the union in Durban who was increasingly 
disillusioned with the possibility of the union surviving 
by the early 1970s as the Security Branch stepped up pressure 
against the organization of transport workers in particular. 
The relation between Indian and African workers in the docks 
has been complicated by a form of 'civilized labour' policy 
adopted by the SARRH which gave preference to Indian workers. 
Despite this, and other points likely to create antagonism the 
relationship between Inqian and African workers through the 
union was positive •• 
91. The twists and turns of TUCSA's policy towards the mass of 
workers in South Africa cannot be developed here (see Muriel 
Horrell, 1968, South Africa's Workers,SAIRR) but were as much 
related to its lack of recognition abroad, especially at the 
ILO, as with a serious attempt to relate to the pressing tasks 
of organizing the overwhelming majority of workers in South 
Africa. The 'forward' attitude of TUCSA in Durban was also very 
much the product of the activity of One official not always acting 
with the support of head office. 
92. WBR 1968: Appendix I This was the median wage of labourers 
not employed by the DSLSC in Durban, i.e. weekly employees of 
Grindrod and Gersigny. Their wages were, however, likely to 
be identical to those of the DSLSC workers. Once again during 
the 1968 wage investigation, this company was exempted from 
having to provide full disclosure of the wages of its workers. 
93. While it is superficially true that the 'Indian' RTWU did not 
represent the mass of workers in terms of having a mandate from 
these'workers, neither did the 'works committee'. Here, as in 
other points of conflict, the Africanism of the collaborators is 
used to obscure the fundamental common interests of all workers. 
94. The DSLSC says that all the senior indunas have worked their way 
up from labourers and are not inserted on the basis of other 
criteria (e.g. education) into positions of authority. 
95. Information from Dreyer. In 1970 the DSLSC employed two whites 
and five blacks in the work of liaison with the ships. The 
liaison indunas earned the same wage as the indunas working 
on the ships. 
96. The grain trimmers were eventually paid a wage considerably 
higher than a fork-lift driver. 
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97. FAO, World grain trade statistics, 1973/74: Table 35. 
98. Natal Regional Survey, 15: Table VI. 
99. The employers also proposed to cut down the work break for the 
night shift from one hour to half an hour so that workers would 
be able to finish half an hour earlier while working the same 
hours. This request was basically to ratify an already existing prac-
tice. 
100. This was particularly the case with factories using assembly 
lines and a continuous flow of production. While no studies of 
the restructuring of capital in the late 1960s are available, my 
impression is that companies like South African Breweries (which 
employed the leading social psychologists of the time), Dunlops, 
Alcan Aluminium, and Lever Brothers, were in the forefront of 
these developments. 
101. Because the stevedoring companies acted as a cartel there was 
not the same pressure as in industry to increase division of 
labour in order to compete. 
102. WBR, 1964: para 29. In 1965 the Anglo-American Investment 
Corporation had a return on capital employed of 13.3 per cent. 
In six of the companies the returns exceeded 75 per cent on 
capital. 
103. WBR, 1968:9. 
104. WBR, 1964:4 and 5. 
105. Marx, II: 54. With individual use, the value of transport 
disappears during its consumption. 
106. Marx, III: 48. 
107. Marx, III: 47. 
108. WBR, 1964: Table II. 
109. Marx, I, (1976): 326. 
110. The rate of profit in terms of total costs in 1962/63 was 21.6 
per cent while the rate of surplus value was 30.0 per cent. 
111. WBR, 1939; para 15 and WBR, 1964: Table II. 
112. Statistics both from an earlier and a later period reinforce 
this trend. In 1938 the wages of labourers and administrative 
staff constituted 52.5 per cent of turnover, and looking beyond 
the 1960s were 79.2 per cent of turnover in 1975. (WBR 1939: 
para 15 ~d Statistical News Release, 27 April 19?8:. Census of 
Transport and Allied Services, 1975). These stat1st1cs are not, 
however, directly comparable to those above. 
113. The distinction between cargoes loose or in containers 
led immediately to anomalies: coal being included in 
the definition of dirty cargo in containers! 
114. Many of the chemicals included in the definition of bulk 
and dirty cargo have become known as dangerous to the 
health of workers. Asbestos particularly is still 
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acutely dangerous to the health of dock workers; in the early 
1970s stevedoring workers were often seen covered white with 
asbestos dust. 
115. Each Wage Board Report concludes with the blanket assertion 
that the employers would be able to conduct their business 
successfully if the recommendations were implemented. 
116. This has been the approach of the most de-
tailed studyof the Wage Board which examined the rise in 
wages laid down by wage determinations over the existing 
wages paid in particular industries. Donald E. Purcell, 
June 1968,'Bantu Real Wages and Employment Opportunities 
1n South Africa~ SAJE 
117. As the Wage Board exempted the DSLSC during each 
investigation from providing comprehensive data on earnings, 
a 'composite wage' has been calculated which attempts to 
include all the major variations in the components of the 
wage: basic wage, overtime, and Sunday time. 
118. Pillay, P.N. 1973. 'A poverty datum line study among 
Africans in Durban'. Department of Economics: University 
of Natal, Durban. The 1958 poverty datum line has been 
adjusted upwards by the rise in the price of 
food, to give a figure of R25.46 a month, or R12.20 a week. 
119. Calculated from the index of the price of food, base year 
1970. Bulletin of Statistics. 
120. By 1969 the basic wage rate was 22 cents/hour, while the 
demand of SACTU in 1958 had been 31 cents/hour stevedoring 
labourers. If this wage demand was adjusted upwards to 
include the rise in the cost of living (giving a figure of 
40 cents/hour), the wage increases introduced through the 
Wage Board would be just over half of the workers demand. 
121. Following the mass strikes of 1973, for instance, the 
poverty line was used as a goal for employers to aim ultimately 
to achieve. When reached, the poverty line wages for African 
workers have not challenged the tremendous wage differentials 
between white and black workers. 
122. Unfortunately it is not possible to assess the effect of 
WD 308 introduced on 3 April 1969 on earnings as the 
record cards were discontinued in that year as most of the 
workers were dismissed for striking against the wages laid down. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
126. 
127. 
128. 
See above for figures on DSLSC employment on July 
of each year. 
Calculated from the index of food prices. 
Pillay (1973) deals with this issue; most researchers 
agree that the poverty datum line should be increased 
by 50 per cent to allow for expenditure on essentials 
to rise to the minimum levels established for food, 
light and fuel, and clothing. 
The question of the productivity of stevedoring workers, 
the 'efficiency' of the port as a whole, and the 
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problem of harbour congestion is not dealt with at length 
here, but forms part of the substantive debate on the 
crisis in the docks in the early 1970s. 
Bantu Labour Regulations (Bantu Areas) 29 March 1968. 
Previously African workers classified as SlO(d) in terms 
of the Bantu (Urban Areas) Act had the opportunity of 
qualifying for urban residence if they had worked for a 
single employer for ten years. 
CHAPTER 7 
Forced labour, strikes, and resistance to the apartheid state 
The advantages to the Port of Durban were very numerous and have 
stood the test of time ... since 23 February 1959 (we) can proudly 
state that not one day of work has been lost as a result of disputes 
or strikes. 
Management notes (1966) : 10, on the formation and operation of 
the DSLSC 
Apartheid is therefore a system of forced labour, and forced labour 
is cheap labour. African workers in South Africa are quite 
defenceless and have no means of ensuring that they receive ade-
quate and fa ir wages. 
Gervasi (1970) : para 79 
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The vast extension of state regulations into virtually all aspects 
of the sale and purchase of labour power in South Africa has sharply 
accentuated the conception of forced labour under the apartheid state. 
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By steadily consolidating the regulations which governed employer/ 
employee contracts, urban residence, and migratory labour, the apartheid 
state was seen to have constructed a mesh of interlocking bureaucracies 
which completely negated any resistance on the part of the African workers. 
Throughout the 1960s the number of workers deported from the towns rose, 
pass prosecutions increased steadily, and prison labour particularly in 
agriculture was being extended on a cooperative basis between farmers and 
the prison service. The housing of African households in the towns was 
limited to the strictest minimum, and the majority of workers were compelled 
to live in compounds and hostels under the twenty-four hour a day control of 
the employers and state officials, both during working hours and at rest. 
With the suppression of political and industrial organization of 
black workers, there was a dearth of resistance to these measures. The 
nature of exploitation and national oppression came to be seen as both 
institutional (with a strong emphasis on the overdevelopment of the Bantu 
Administration Department bureaucracy, police, and the state apparatus 
generally) and absolutist (with no serious check on the further extension of 
state power). Studies of the political economy tended to place the state 
at the fulcrum of capital accumulation; pol itics taking command of both 
the direction and pace of economic growth. In its strongest expression, 
the apartheid state had accelerated economic growth to the level of 'forced 
industrialization'. 1 The rate of accumulation was not seen as being 
governed by market forces, or related to the world-wide expansion of 
capital, but seen as governed by the accelerator of capital investment by 
the state. South Africa appeared to have an exceptional economy with 
a unique combination of parastatals and monopoly companies governing the 
forward movement of accumulation. 
A corollary to the massive expansion and concentration of capital 
was the forced labour system and the defencelessness and helplessness of 
the black working class prohibited from striking and threatened by an 
armoury of repressive legislation from taking collective action. These 
measures secured the ultra-exploitation of African labour and the boom of 
the 1960s. 2 While these studies did much to dispel the liberal optimism 
of bourgeois intellectuals about the possibilities for reform, they did not 
provide an understanding of the fundamental contradictions involved in 
capital accumulation in South Africa: the inabi lity of manufacturing to 
generate exports on any scale, and the growth of an increasingly confident 
and concentrated black working class. In many industries, in mining, in 
the docks, and in many other sectors of the economy, African workers were 
the core of the labour force and despite the numerous conventional and 
legal restrictions were performing skilled work. The apparent decline in 
strike activity from even the relatively low figures of the late 1950s (which 
Gervasi draws attention to) were only a partial indication of the conscious-
ness of the working class. A closer study of the strike figures would have 
indicated a gradual increase both in the number of strikes and strikers in the 
later part of the 1960s, low though these figures were. 
The rapid pace of accumulation in the 1960s had brought into being 
a black proletariat which had considerably lessened its ties with the land 
{both because of the declining food production in the reserves and the rising 
wages in the non-mining sectors} or completely severed these ties by 
struggling for accommodation in the townships or in the growing squatters' 
camps. Any rural alternative to wage labour, or even significant subsidy 
to household income, was rapidly becoming anachronistic, and rural 
impoverishment propelled the block working class forward in its demands for 
higher wages, housing, industrial and political rights in the factories and 
towns. The development of the Bantustans tended to obscure the massive 
industrial reserve army of labour moving in and out of employment, for the 
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most part retaining links to the land only because of the severity of influx 
control and the security which a dwarf plot provided in old age. The 
Bantustans were designed to increase the physical and ideological distance 
of the African workers from the industrial and political centres, to encourage 
a Ireturn to the land ' movement, and to make the land a basis for communal 
life and political values. Although formed on a tribal-language basis, 
the Bantustans encouraged a form of petty bourgeois nationalism which 
decried nationa I oppression and presented collaboration with the apartheid 
state as a 'statesmanlike ' way forward. Every legislative measure which 
consol idated the Bantustans, however, meant an attack on the African 
working class which was threatened with the removal of all urban-industrial 
rights in exchange for citizenship in a remote and oppressive Bantustan. 
An analysis of apartheid as a forced labour system locates compulsion 
in the political, legal, and institutional controls over the sale and purchase 
of labour power. Broadly then there would be three forms of labour markets: 
ultra-exploited contract workers as in the min ing industry, African workers 
with some urban-industrial rights, and politically free white workers. The 
compulsion in the contract between the worker and employer would be deter-
mined by the declining product from the land and starvation in the reserves 
with the additional burden of tax. The freedom of the African worker to 
contract the sale of his labour power exists only at the formal 'pre-negotiation' 
stage at which he can decide to starve or accept the wages and conditions 
offered. At the formal engagement period the substantial terms of contract 
are non-negotiable being statutorily defined maximum working hours and 
length of contract. The supposedly negotiable elements such as wages may 
be defined at minimum wage levels or prescribed by the employer; most 
contracts are completed to be attested by the worker. Once agreed to, 
the worker enters the formal sphere of legal compulsion, a 'slave period ' in 
which the penal prohibition on striking or terminating a contract is enforced 
and during which the worker is held by the employer to observe all conditions 
f . 3 o servIce. The institutional controls differ for workers housed in 
compounds or permitted housing in the townships, but this relates more 
to the question of enforcement of the elements of the contract rather 
than additional legal controls. lacking political rights, the African 
worker cannot transform the legislation which holds him in bondage or 
create greater institutional equality between employer and employee. 
Despite the insight which a radical critique of the 'freedom ' of 
contracts of service under national oppression provides, Marxist theory 
would argue that all labour under capitalism is forced labour. The 
question of compulsion is a social, economic, and material issue, as well 
as one of legal and political relations. Marx characterizes the use of 
state compulsion to labour as one preliminary to capital using the sheer 
force of economic relations to create a surplus of labourers. 
Centuries are required before the "free" worker, owing 
to the greater development of the capitalist mode of 
production, makes a voluntary agreement, i.e. is com-
pelled by social conditions to sell the whole of his 
active life, his very capacity for labour, in return for 
the price of his customary means of subsistence, to sell 
his birthright for a mess of pottage. 4 
The history of capital is one of expropriating the producer from the means 
of production, separating the peasant from the land, and producing the 
means of subsistence for the workers from that land. Capital then turns 
the member of a homestead into a 'free I worker, not on Iy through the use 
of state power to expropriate African tribes from most of the land and taxing 
the residents of the reserves, but also through the circulation of the com-
modities of capitalist production in competition with the use values of the 
homesteads. Those who have been expropriated are then free workers. 
Free workers, in the double sense that they neither form part 
of the means of production themselves, as would be the case 
with slaves, serfs, etc., nor do they own the means of produc-
tion, as would be the case with self-employed peasant prop-
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rietors. The free workers are therefore free from, 
unencumbered by, any means of production of their 
own. 5 
It is then in this sense that workers enter 'freely' into contracts of service 
with employers which are both ultra-exploitative and oppressive. As 
commodity relations have developed in South Africa, the role of the state 
in directly compelling Africans to engage in wage labour (in the form of 
hut and head tax) has receded in importance as African workers have sought 
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the means of subsistence through wage labour. The form of direct coercion 
(the cor vee) became wholly replaced by the need to satisfy the material 
needs of the homestead. 
Men were then forced to work because they were slaves 
of others; men are now forced to work because they 
are the slaves of their necessities. 6 
With the increase in the surplus population available for wage labour, the 
inequalities of capitalist society are increased - from a society in which 
capital suffered perennial shortage of labour at the wages offered, capitalist 
production now continues with long queues waiting the shoddiest recruiter. 
The forced labour of capitalist society does not depend on the over-
development of the state nor even the imbalance in bargaining power between 
capitalist and workseeker, but on wage labour itself: the division of the 
product into necessary and surplus product and necessary and surplus labour. 
Without the theory of surplus value it is impossible to explain the relation-
ship between the forms of political oppression experienced by the African 
mosses over centuries and the level of working c lass resistance. 
Accumulation and resistance 
The very high rates of growth in the early 1960s were not sustained 
towards the end of the decade as the economy faced a balance of p.ayments 
crisis with the inabil ity of manufacturing to go beyond import substitution 
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to compete on international markets. Despite these difficulties in main-
taining a high rate of growth, the apartheid state pressed ahead with its 
plan to devolve political power to the black petty bourgeoisie and chiefs 
in the Bantustans. These developments have to be related both to the 
question of a mounting liberation struggle in Southern Africa and the 
Wankie military struggle in 1967 in which African National Congress 
guerillas clashed with the Rhodesian armed forces. The acceleration of 
the Bantustan program was, however, more than a response to external 
antagonism to the apartheid state; it was also particularly related to the 
growth in the industrial reserve army inordinately larger than the possibilities 
of employment and to the ideological control over the African working class. 
The creation of 'territorial authorities I followed rapidly in the late 1960s: 
Ciskei (November 1968), Bophuthatswana (December 1968), Lebowa (August 
7 1969), Venda (October 1969), and KwaZulu (May 1970). One of the 
first tasks of these new authorities was the establ ishment of the tribal labour 
bureaux and the collection of labour registration fees, bringing the migrant 
workers under tighter control and making the new contract labour regime 
work. Politically, the Bantustan leadership was outspoken on the need 
for Africans to own more land, for an end to the 'kaffir salaries I they earned, 
and for themselves to be acknowledged as the authentic leaders of the 
oppressed masses. 8 While many of the debates of these authorities took 
tribal solidarity as a basis for ideological orientation, the leadership had 
to adopt a nationalistic stance both to gain some measure of acceptance by 
the workers and rural poor and some reputation for radicalism in international 
circles. The petty bourgeois leadership projected themselves as having 
made a 'historic compromise ' with the apartheid state in the interests of the 
people as a whole, while internal opposition was vigorously repressed. 
The falling pace of accumulation in the late 1960s had a considerable 
negative effect on the stevedoring workers. The boom of the earl ier 
period had demanded massive imports of machinery and raw materials, and 
with the decline in economic growth imports fell sharply. The tonnage 
landed in Durban fell correspondingly causing a shrinkage in prime cargo 
handled by the workers, even though the level of exports held steady. 
Exports of primary products such as maize, manganese ore, and coal were, 
however, increasingly mechanized and did not provide the same demand 
for labour-time. 
Table7.l 
Cargo landed in Durban, 1962-1970, tonnes 
1962 4,323 1967 4,217 
1963 5,568 1968 2,786 
1964 7,621 1969 2,618 
1965 8,469 1970 4,267 
1966 8,557 
Source: Statistical Year Book, 1976 
Employment in the Durban docks also started to decline from an all-
time high level in the mid-1960s both due to declining tonnages landed and 
to the increased cargo handled per worker. The DSLSC experienced the 
highest employment figures in 1964 during which an average of 2,923 workers 
were employed. By July 1969 employment had declined to 2,211 workers. 
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With a considerable decrease in real earnings between 1964/65, when the last 
wage increases were introduced through WD251, and 1967/68 amounting to 
14.6 per cent, the workers were expecting a considerable wage increase from 
the wage investigation of 1968. 9 A contemporary study of the Durban 
docks in this period argued that the dissatisfaction and unrest in the docks 
which had been experienced previously was a result of the casual or togt 
labour system, and that with the formation of the DSLSC the hardships of the 
past had been removed. 
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The security of permanent employment, the provision of 
adequate accommodation and of a canteen in the com-
pound at the Point and regular paid leave have resulted 
in a contented labour force. This is evident to any 
visitor to the compound, as is also the pride evinced by 
the Company's management in its achievements. 10 
This management was confident that it had the interests of the workers at 
heart, indeed, it claimed to have set the wage investigations of the steve-
doring trade by the Wage Board into motion. A system of communication 
had been developed which was in accord with what the management con-
sidered were the cultural and particularly I inguistic problems in the work-
place. Operating with an ethnological model of African workers, the 
company developed a train of communication which followed the line of 
command both at work and in the compound. Rather than see ing the 
workers as developing new industrial and political aspirations through the 
harsh discipline of the capitalist labour process, and solidarity from their 
concentration and oppression by capital, management put forward the view 
of the African stevedore trapped in backward magico-religious belief, 
superstitious, fatalistic and tribally orientated. 
The Bantu has his own background or environment, and he 
is its product because of a series of complex influences: 
religion and beliefs, social organization, rules of conduct 
(uhlonipha), political systems, traditional economic activi-
ties on which is superimposed a modern techno-industrial 
system, a particular milieu, his tribal history, etc. The 
unique role of the Ancestral Spirits is common to all Abantu, 
for instance, and it is common knowledge that the Ancestors 
jealously guard the ancient traditions. 11 
From this perspective the relationship between employers and 
workers is one of cultural contact, of reason aga inst obscurantism, rather 
than one of inevitable conflict between exploiters and exploited. The 
lack of understanding of the labour process and the aspirations of the 
workers was not one of misunderstanding, however, as the authority of the 
employers and the hierarchical system of command rested on such ideo-
logical formulations. For management in a trade which actively sought 
out workers from the most remote rural areas and wh ich was dependent on 
appropriating the maximum surplus labour from the labour force, an ethno-
logical perspective not only reinforced a strategy of divide and rule but 
also served as a means of ideologically justifying the role of the indunas 
as the sergeant-majors af capital. 12 The communication system set out 
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by management simply reproduced the lines of authority within the company, 
with the exception that the indunas at the workplace were allowed to have 
direct access to the management. The hierarchical structure provided for 
three intermediary tiers between the workers and management both in the 
compound and at work, although in principle no intermediary had the right 
to refuse to refer a complainant to the official higher up the ladder of autho-
rity. Unlike communication within a capitalist enterprise with a trade 
union, the only type of upward communication conceived of was that of an 
individual with a personal grievance; there was no provision even in 
theory for the collective views of the workers to be communicated. The 
whole edifice of 'communication' obviously depended on patronage and 
client relationship between labourers and bureaucrats. 
Wages, tax, and strike action 
Both the employers' ideological conception of the workers and the 
hierarchical structure of communication were strained by the wage investiga-
tion of 1968 and finally exposed by the most important industrial strike of the 
J960s. The preliminary agitation was both against the higher taxation imposed 
by the Bantu Taxation Act of 1969 and in support of the demand for R 14 a 
week. 13 This agitation and the attempt of a group of labourers to present 
their demands to the Wage Board indicated that after the devastation of 
mass expulsion of strikers from Durban in 1959 the underground organization 
of the stevedores was being revived and seeking new techniques of putting 
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forward demands under the vicious repression of both the DSLSC and the 
state. Even during the consolidation of rigorous control over the harbour 
workers in the early 1960s the employers had not gone without any challenge 
to their authority. Workers employed by Consolidated Stevedoring and 
Forwarding Agency (a component of the DSLSC) struck on 27 December 1961 
in support of a demand for an annual bonus and were subsequently prose-
cuted. 14 Again a strike had occurred in March 1966 by workers employed 
by C.G. Smith and Company in support of demands for wage increase, a 
tea break, overtime, and overalls. 15 The most consistent working class 
action, however, built up towards the end of the 1960s. The strikes 
which followed demonstrated the sol idarity of the workers and their re jec-
tion of management's ideology and the control of the indunas. 
A long time elapsed between the investigation by the Wage Board 
and the fina I determination. The first sitting was in Durban on 24 June 
1968, and the report with its recommendations appeared on 28 August 1968. 
The formal recommendation was publ ished on 8 November 1968, and the 
objection stage passed by 5 February 1969, almost eight months after the 
investigation started. 16 Shortly before the final determination appeared 
early in April, agitation started against the tax system. A leaflet on 
brown paper was pinned to the Company notice board stating that the 
workers were being taxed on wages they had not earned. The writer said 
that the workers were being taxed on R 14 a week while they were being paid 
a basic wage of only R6. The author of the pamphlet said the facts could 
be checked by asking the clerk who dealt with taxation at the Bantu Com-
missioner's office. The workers were protesting against the imposition of 
income tax on their earnings over and above the general tax, hut tax, and 
other fees imposed on them. With the enforcement of the Bantu Taxation 
Act Number 92 of 1969 all African workers earning above R360 a year were 
liable to income tax. 17 The increased taxation of African workers was 
not only a means by which the state took back what wage increases had been 
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granted during the 1960s boom but particularly a way of gathering revenue 
to pay for the increasing expenditure on the Bantustan program. On the 
basis of the principle that black workers should be taxed to pay for their 
own repression and services such as education, the increased taxation 
{which made all previous special taxes levied on Africans seem puny by 
comparison} was the burden the workers had to carry for the generous 
salaries and limousines of the Bantustan leadership. .African workers who 
were not earn ing even as much as paverty datum I ine were expected to pay 
higher rates of tax than white workers. 
The system of income tax gathering from stevedoring workers had 
been gradually tightened from the promulgation of the .Act. Previously 
it had been the duty of the tax officials to investigate the income of 
workers who fell into one of the income tax brackets and, if necessary, to 
prosecute workers who had not paid. Not unexpectedly there had been 
a complete lack of cooperation from the workers - Dreyer spoke of the 
workers using tax notice slips as toi let paper. With the migrant labour 
system, a fairly high turnover of workers, and many workers away on leave 
at any time, the tax officials no doubt faced many problems in securing 
prosecutions. The system was, however, abruptly tightened up when the 
DSLSC agreed to submit the earnings of all stevedoring workers to the tax 
office. Under this new arrangement many more workers actually paid 
income tax and the final earnings of workers were reduced correspondingly. 
Quite why the workers were being assessed at R 14 a week, as the pamphlet 
writer protested, is not clear. This could be an estimate of the average 
earnings of the workers over a week as on the basis of four days work, 
Sunday work, and twelve hours overtime, the final earnings would have 
. d h· f· 18 amounted to lust un er t ,s 'gure. 
A second pamphlet followed, demanding that wages should be 
increased and suggesting that the workers take up the question of taxation 
with the Bantu Commissioner and tell him they were earning R6 and not 
R14. The workers rejected the principle of taxation of earnings, parti-
cularly on the variable part of the wage - the daily allowances, Sunday 
time, overtime, and cargo allowances. With the more ri gorous means 
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of enforcement many workers would be paying income tax for the first time. 
As agitation against the tax system spread,and open dissatisfaction was 
expressed, the management acted together wi th the Department of Labour to 
prepare an explanation of the new wage rates to be introduced by the wage 
determination. The local branch of the Department of Labour contacted 
the head office in Pretoria which had a copy of WD 308 due for release on 
3 April 1969. An advance copy of the document was flown down from 
Pretoria, but the details could not be released until the Government Gazette 
was publ ished. Extracts from the determination were translated into Zulu, 
h ' • I . d' d 'I d ' d 19 t e more Important sections exp alne In some etal, an copies ma e, 
On Good Friday, 4 April 1969, the wage determination came into 
effect by being published in the Government Gazette. 20 The translations 
were posted on the notice boards and explained by management. The next 
day the strike broke out. A group of labourers blockaded the booking-on 
tables in the form of a picket and the other workers refused to break through. 
The strikers demanded a basic wage of R 14 and an end to taxation on overtime, 
About a thousand workers sat down in rows outside the Company's offices. 
Although it was reported that the indunas,gangNaymen, and winchmen did 
not join the strike these workers were laid off by the action of the labourers 
and the harbour was crippled. At Maydon Wharf, where a compound 
accommodating about 400 workers was administered by Grinrod and Gersigny 
(Pty) Ltd, only a handful of stevedores went to work. The bulk of the 
workers stayed in their compound after they heard from the ra ilway workers 
that the strike had been initiated at the DSLSC, Work on about thirty-
five ships was halted, and the losses sustained by the shipping companies 
per ship (estimated at R 1, 000) grew with each day of the strike, The 
police were mobilized with calls being broadcast at rugby grounds for 
policemen to report for duty in uniform. The South African Police 
Mobile Squad was placed on standby and the docks systematically pat-
rolled by the F lying Squad. 
Behind this display of force the employers, state departments, 
and police debated the best means of breaking the strike. The Saturday 
afternoon Daily News reported in headl ines that the stevedores were 
facing the sack, the type of reporting which would have been likely to 
create despondency among the workers. 'It is understood that if agree-
ment is not reached by tonight the entire labour force wi" be axed and 
efforts will be made to replace them immediately by Pondos. ,21 Two 
sessions of emergency talks were held on Saturday between the senior 
officials of the Security Branch, the Departments of Labour and Bantu 
Administration, and the directors of the four stevedoring companies. 
The open coalescence of the state apparatus and employers, the bodies of 
armed men and wielders of social and political power, took place to defeat 
the solidarity of the workers. Negotiations within the ruling class in 
advanced capitalist countries take place in the privacy of the club or are 
carried out in the utmast secrecy for fear of exposure, but here took place 
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without embarrassment in front of the eyes of the strikers. 22 The questions 
debated were obviously not published but must have involved the possibility 
of concessions, the fact that any concessions could inflame strikes through-
out industry, and the possibility of marshalling a substitute labour force at 
short notice. The most important issue for all concerned was, however, 
how to crush the strike and wreak the most devastating blow against the 
I eadersh i p. The difficulty faced by the ruling class in action was the 
impressive solidarity of the workers and the complete blending of the 
leaders with the mass of the labourers. 
In an attempt to soften the resolve of the workers, the DSLSC 
management and the Department of Labour called on the workers to 
negotiate. At Saturday lunchtime the Divisional Inspector of Labour, 
Jackson, addressed the stevedores and advised them to return to work. 
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This attempt to get the workers back on the ships without any concessions 
incensed the strikers - 'he was drowned out by a chorus of angry jeers'. 23 
The Security Branch and the Divisional Commissioner for Port Natal, 
Brigadier J. Benade, visited the compound in the afternoon. A tax 
official from the office of the Bantu Commissioner explained the tax system, 
but to no effect. During the afternoon the workers disappeared to the 
nearby beerhalls, but returned at 1700 to hear another address by Jackson. 
He explained the wage determination in detail, but the workers refused to 
accept the rates offered. The strikers demanded that the basic wage of 
R6 a week be increased to R 14 a week, the figure at which their income 
was taxed. They shouted that the overtime they earned was 'their sweat' 
and not to be taxed, and even that work in the sugar cane fields or coal 
mines was preferable to working for the oppressive DSLSC. They told 
. reporters that they had to work four hours overtime regularly, making their 
normal shift a fourteen hour working day. Jackson told the strikers that 
no decision had been made during the afternoon talks between the companies, 
police, and government officials, and that they should return to work 
because their action was illegal. 24 Negotiations would continue on the 
workers' grievances. The strikers said t hey were 'ready to go back home 
to Zululand' if their demands were not met. What do you do with a 
woman you don't want? ,25 The crowd of several hundred jeering strikers 
then left the company premises and said they would return to hear the 
employers' offer on the following day. 
On Sunday morning workers who crowded the premises of the DSLSC 
were told that their demands had been rejected. A meeting of officia Is 
from the Department of Labour and Bantu Administration, the employers, 
and senior pol ice officers had decided to force the workers back at the 
wages laid down by WD 308 or to expel them from the town. The 
workers rejected the employers' terms and were dismissed.26 Under 
the gaze of the massed police near riot vehicles, the workers were told 
to queue at the pay windows to co Ilect their severance pay. The 
1,043 dismissed strikers were given four hours to leave Durban by the 
Bantu Administration and the police who maintained surveillance. 
By Monday, 7 April 1969, it was estimated there were 40 ships 
needing stevedoring gangs. 27 At least two ships were able to persuade 
their crews to do the work of the stevedores and to sail: the American 
freighter African Mercury and the S.A. Nederburg. The Safmarine 
flag-ship, Table Boy, mode use of its Coloured crew to augment what 
stevedoring labour became available. Most of the sailors, however, 
refused to scab on the striking stevedores. The stevedoring companies 
worked furiously to build up skeleton gangs and get the cargo moving. 
Estimates varied on how long it would take to bring the movement of cargo 
back to normal. On Monday the Daily News shipping correspondent 
wrote that cargo working would be disrupted for at least seven days, but 
by Tuesday morning the Natal Mercury was more optimistic, reporting the 
docks 'almost normal' although shipping companies hod lost thousands of 
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rand. The management strategy was to take bock sufficient strikers 
who reapplied for work after careful screening with some of the labourers 
who had disappeared during the strike and trickled back after the mass 
dismissal. These workers would make up a core of trained workers to 
rebuild the stevedoring labour units. On Sunday afternoon the compound 
staff and drivers employed by the stevedoring companies were sent out to the 
beerhalls and further into the townships to gather workers to make up the 
gangs. These workers were token on as casuals, but it appears that others 
were recruited on contract from areas in Northern Zululand. Influx con-
trol was apparently suspended immediately after the dismissals, a measure 
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which created a short-term surplus in labour supply, and guarded the 
employers against having to pay considerably higher wages to scabbing 
workers. 29 About 450 of the dismissed stevedores, and those who had 
kept in the background during the strike, were re-engaged and by Mon-
day afternoon there were 1, 186 workers employed by the stevedoring 
companies. Skeleton crews were operating on 23 ships on Monday 
morning, and by 1 p.m. it was claimed that a" ships were fully manned. 
By Tuesday there were 1,502 workers available, plus another 250 for the 
night sh ift. 30 These figures demonstrate that the DSLSC was able to 
build up a considerable labour force from the reserve army immediately 
available in the city and environs, but still was falling short of the 
required strength of about 2,4~0. The bland statement by the manager 
of the DSLSC that there was ample manpower on wh ich to call to replace 
those workers who had been paid off, and that the pool would be back to 
the necessary strength 'within the next few days', did not take account of 
the enormous problems faced by employers in training new workers and 
b ·, d' , • I I 31 Th I'f' d " ringing pro uctlvlty up to prevIous eve s. e unqua I Ie optimism 
of the employers, wanting to reassure the shipping companies of their 
capable handling of the challenge to their control by the workers, belied 
the severity of a crisis which would grip the docks in the early 19705, 
The strike: an assessment 
The stevedoring strike, defeated though it was and bringing no 
advantages to the workers in concessions, was one of the most significant 
events in the post-Sharpevi"e period resistance to the apartheid state, 
It signalled the revival of black working class action after the dormancy 
of vicious repression and unparalleled economic growth; uncompromising 
hostil ity to the employers and the aparthei d state and a revol utionary con-
sciousness both of their needs and the necessity to overcome the institutions 
of violence used against the workers. An article in the African Communist 
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commented that the 'unparalleled' strike of the stevedores demonstrated 
the growth of underground internal resistance and the workers' rebuttal 
of a view that apartheid was an all-pervasive system of oppression from 
wh ich they had no escape. 32 In contrast to the demands of trade un ions 
under collective bargaining, the workers demanded a revolutionary trans-
formation of the wage system (an increase in basic wages of 133 per cent) 
and simultaneous changes in state policy {no taxation on overtime}. 
The workers did not regard these demands as fan.tastic, as did the bourgeois 
press, and were confident that with a sol id strike these goals could be 
achieved. 33 There was no basis for negotiation with the employers and 
state departments outside an acknowledgement of the validity of these 
claims and the recognition of their right to strike. 
A Ithough the workers I demands concerned their conditions of work 
they combined both political and economic aspects as class demmds. The 
wage demand expressed a determination not only to make up for the loss in 
real wages through inflation and to compensate for growing impoverishment 
in the reserves, but to alter the material basis of the cheap labour system: 
low wages and • defence less' workers. Even though the R 14 basic wage 
demanded did not exceed the poverty datum I ine it was considerably in 
advance of the basic wage of black workers in most industries in Durban at 
that time, and particularly the level of labourers in sectors such as wood-
working, commerce, chemicals, and textiles. A decisive victory for the 
stevedoring workers would have given a lead not only to these workers, but 
to all those workers housed in compounds and regarded as ultra-exploitable 
by their employers. Despite the ability of the employers to subject the 
stevedoring workers as contract workers to intense exploitation, it was they 
who led the revival in black working class struggles with demands and con-
sciousness in advance of those African workers having most legal security. 
Although in the early 19605 it had been thought that the common oppression 
of African workers dictated a strategy of general strikes for general demands 
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'rather than the traditional trade union pattern of each section fighting 
piecemeal for its particular demands in each particular industry or trade', 
with the rooting out of coordinated working class leadership, the con-
crete demands of advanced workers in certain sectors provided the basis 
for the forward movement of the workers after the deafening silence of 
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the 196Os. This source of continued vital ity in the working class 
movement could, however, only become a rallying point for the workers 
as a whole if the industrial struggles were broadened to inc lude all types 
of workers in regional general strikes. The decline in industrial battles 
in the early 1960s was explained in the following way: 
It is not that they (the workers) do not have plenty of 
reason for striking:' it is because they know that if 
one group of workers come out on strike on their own, 
all the forces of the state and the police will be 
brought in to hammer them, to arrest them, to victimise 
and deport them. 35 
It was precisely this dilemma which the stevedoring workers faced in 
throwing themselves into the struggle against the employers and the state; 
the broadening of the workers' strike movement was, without coordinated 
underground organization and demands, dependent itself on a victory for 
the workers in the docks. The deepening experience of workers' organiza-
tion in conditions of extreme repression and the rising mood of resistance 
meant that the defeat of the 1969 stevedore strike did not bring demoraliza-
tion, but a hatred of the DSLSC and its oppressive actions, and a steady 
increase of strike action in other industries. 
The most outstanding lesson the stevedores had learned from the 
repression of the post-war period was that leadership of the workers' struggles 
had to come from underground organization. Gone was the era of open 
mobilization and charismatic leadership as exercised by Phungula during the 
1940s; the possibility of democratic assembl ies and elected leadership 
had a Iso passed. In the period of fierce repression, leadership consisted 
523 
of the ability to crystallize the common demands of the workers through 
informal groupings and pamphlets. The most elementary principle in 
these tactics was to refuse to elect spokesmen to negotiate with the 
employers; those capable workers able to present arguments on behalf of 
all the workers were not to be exposed to victimization. Instead, 
assembled strikers shouted their demands in unison: the employers then 
had to accept their claims in toto or not at all. Negotiations and com-
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munication between employers and strikers was then I imited to the employers 
making a statement and getting a reaction from the workers in shouted agree-
ment or disagreement. This feature of the strike refutes a theory of 
strikes under national oppression being a result of a 'breakdown of communica-
tion', open communication of collective demands being only expressed during 
the strike. The communication flowing in the open confrontation of 
explo iters and exploited is not in doubt, the breakdown is that of the power 
of the employers and between the fundamental aspirations of the workers and 
the demands of the profit system. 
The growth of the underground and secret organization of the steve-
doring workers was a product not only of their determination to build class 
organization but also of their seasoning in the hard school of resistance. 
Organization of th is subtlety and versatility, involving investigation into 
the tax system, anonymous pamphlets, fixing the time for the strike and the 
setting up of pickets, was evidence of an active intelligence within the 
ranks of the labourers possessing a historical class consciousness. These 
workers were aware of the history of class struggles in South Africa as well 
as their own resistance and exel'ted leadership through ideas and strategies 
rather than through personality. The pamphlets which appeared on the 
notice boards under the noses of the company officials were models of the 
new style. Persuasive rather than prescriptive, informing workers of the 
tax system and inviting them to investigate the truth of the claims for them-
selves, the style was democratic rather than oratorical, feeling out the 
widest unity before expressing demands. This form of agitation aimed 
to build up the demands of the workers through discussion rather than 
announce demands in an autonomous manner. These techn iques never 
allowed the leadership to be separated from the workers and ensured demo-
cratic decisions without having the possibi lity of mass meetings and open 
committees. It was this capable and secret organization which achieved 
the impressive solidarity of the strikers in the face of threats and cajolings 
by employers and officials. The Department of Labour was forced into a 
reluctant admission that the attitude of the workers refusing to bring 
forward leaders was reasonable. These officials were struck by the unity 
of the workers and their organization which held fast against pleas to return 
to work and the pervasive threat of the police. 36 
While all commentators on the strike were agreed there had been 
agitation and organization, the theories about this agitation varied from 
the most exotic to arguments that reforms would have to be made. The 
strike caused widespread comment and discussion not only among the 
workers but also in employer circles and the press. The 'repressionists' 
(company officials and 'authorities') tended to argue that a conspiracy had 
been made against the employers, while the liberal press and white labour 
aristocracy bel ittled the agitation and argued that African workers should 
be a "owed trade un ions under wh ite I eadersh i p. 37 The repress ion i sts 
argued that the strike had been caused by agitators, 'a handful of trouble-
makers', who intimidated the others into striking. 38 Undisclosed 
'authorities' believed that the strike (which was similar to that of 1959 to 
the exact day) was planned by secret elements among the workers for the 
hoi iday weekend and 'could hardly have come at a more embarrassing time 
for the authorities' • 39 The DSLSC management said that workers who 
demanded and struck for a basic wage of R 14 a week feared intimidation 
from the groups of workers who mounted the picket on the booking-on 
tables. 40 The collective discipline among the workers was explained as 
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the fear of 'being sent to Coventry' by their workmates. The most 
sophisticated theory, one put forward by Dreyer, was that the strike was 
a revolt against the DSLSC stimulated by the indunas who wanted a return 
to the old system of labour recruitment which gave them the right to hire 
workers each day. This responsibility meant they had greater powers 
and were paid a special allowance. 
The management and police conspiracy theory credited the workers' 
underground with almost magical powers, manipulating the mass of the 
workers at will, and possessing ruthless discipl ine. This line of th inking 
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was more an attempt to present the DSLSC as a reasonable institution 
employing devoted and docile workers, rather than a serious attempt to face 
the workers' demands. The more fanciful ideas reflected the bad faith of 
management, and possibly their uneasiness at their ruthless use of power. 41 
The suggestion that the majority of workers were opposed to the demand of 
R14 a week and the strike itself is not borne' out by the fact that more than 
a thousand were prepared to be dismissed rather than accept the DSLSC's 
terms. These workers could have melted away during the strike and 
waited until the 'trouble' had passed, but they preferred to stand firm with 
the active group and suffer the consequences. While some workers did 
take the soft option by staying away whi Ie the employers and officials decided 
what to do with the strikers, it was never seriously contended that they 
stayed away because they feared intimidation. Throughout the strike the 
workers were closely watched both by company officials and a large force 
of police; the intimidation and constant threat of violence came from the 
employers and the police. The suggestion that the strike was started by 
dissatisfied indunas appears more credible in the I ight of the narrowing wage 
differential between their earnings and those of other workers, but is also on 
reflection rather .ridiculous. During the 1959 strike it was the indunas who 
got a wage increase who were assaulted by the workers for trying to break 
their strike. In the following years in which the indunas were given 
greater powers on the ships there is no indication that the relationship 
between the supervisors and supervised became any warmer. While the 
strikers may have shouted the old system of work was better because of 
the intense exploitation which followed the formation of the DSLSC as a 
supreme strike-breaking instrument, th is could not be interpreted as the 
labourers wanting to revert to the casual labour system wh ich could be 
managed in the interests of the indunas. 42 The indunas, gangwaymen, 
and winchmen, did not join the strike and the labourers made no demands 
on their behalf. From the outset the agitation centred on the most 
exploited and oppressed section of the workers, the labourers, and all the 
evidence indicates that it was the leaders of the labourers who took 
direction of the strike. 
A somewhat different response came from the liberal press and wh ite 
labour. Concerned with the prospect of unprecedented struggles by 
African workers, the liberal bourgeoisie was reluctant to adopt the view 
that agitators were responsible for the dock strike. The editorial in the 
Daily News on Monday afternoon, 7 April 1969, deprecated the practice 
of blaming 'agitators' for precipitating pay disputes when black wages were 
involved: 'Perhaps a handful of mischief-makers has tried to exploit the 
docks dispute for its own ends. But is this so surprising when Africans are 
debarred by law from engaging in collective bargaining for better pay and 
conditions of service?' This rejection of racial discrimination in collec-
tive bargaining was tempered by the editor's view that African trade unions 
should be formed under white guidance to be 'tutored by wh ites in the ways 
of mature and responsible bargaining'. In the meantime, employers had 
an 'acute responsibility' of reviewing the wages of black workers. The 
editor did not consider how the managed African trade unions could be 
grafted on to the cheap labour system, his concern was to reduce the dock 
workers' struggle to an economic question and to suggest reforms to bring 
the workers' leaders into the open. The forward thrust of the black 
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working class represented by the dock strike attracted the sympathy of 
white labour leaders and democrats. Frank Mossman, trade union 
leader of carpenters in Durban, protested that the only way African 
workers had of bringing their grievances to the notice of their employers 
was through breaking the law. Dockers' leaders were castigated by 
employers and the police as agitators and banished from Durban. He 
proposed accepting 'all African workers in "key" industries as organised 
workers who are legally entitled to enter into collective bargaining under 
our recognised conciliation machinery'. Other writers to the letter 
columns were also sympathetic to the dockers' cause, protesting against 
Government and security police support for the employers and suggesting 
double shifts in the docks to increase employment and bring the exhaustion 
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of the workers to an end. The liberal bourgeoisie was generally 
cri tical of the inept and oppressive way in wh ich the stevedoring compan ies 
and the police had handled the strike, and the company officials appeared 
defensive and uneasy. 
Finally, the public criticism of the DSLSC was to little effect. 
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The company and the police had secured their objective in inflicting severe 
punishment on the strikers and mobilizing a substitute labour force from the 
reserve army of labour in the city. With the workers' demands requiring 
both a drastic revision of wages and changes in the tax system, the possibility 
of compromise was limited. No concessions were offered, the employers 
standing firm on the wage rates set by WD 308 and the state departments 
adamant that the new tax system be vigorously enforced. While some 
modification in wages could be considered (but turned down), any com-
promises on the tax system would have national implications. The state 
would have been seen to have to retreat from implementing legislation by 
the workers' resistance, and the new tax system being introduced would have 
been nullified. In the early 1960s it had been argued that industrial 
struggles should be supported by revolutionaries 'for a single victory, even 
a small one, in a single strike, may be enough to spark off and inspire 
a whole series of similar actions among other workers, a process which 
the authorities may be unable to subdue'. 44 The same point was well 
understood by the capitalist state acting on behalf of all employers in 
putting down the dock workers' strike. Did this mean that the under-
ground wh ich brought the workers to an uncompromising struggle against 
the employers and the state was over-confident and had made a basic 
miscalculation of the relative strength of exploited and exploiters? 
There is no easy answer to this question, the underground having raised 
the questions without spell ing out a strategy. Possibly the advanced 
workers expected workers inother industries to join in a common struggle 
against the tax system. In the course of the strike certain weaknesses 
in the workers' position became apparent: the fact that the gangwaymen 
and winchmen, who had benefited through increased differentiation from 
the labourers, stood aside for the first time; the 'melting away' of a 
minority of the labourers during the strike; a tendency of some workers 
to think that breaking contract and 'going home' would be the strongest 
penalty against the DSlSC, and the ready availability of scab labour in 
the city. But if the employers were not to compromise, then neither 
were the workers. The late 1960s marked a new sense of urgency in the 
black working class and a determination to resist whatever the consequences. 
Throughout the 1960s the objective conditions of proletarianization were 
becoming evident in longer contracts and greater rural impoverishment; 
the subjective conditions were now coming to the fore. 
Crisis in the port and workers' resistance 
The crushing of the workers' strike and engagement of new recruits 
on the employers' conditions solved the immediate impasse faced by the 
stevedoring companies, but in the period which followed the companies and 
SARH entered into a crisis of productivity and efficiency on a larger scale 
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than ever before. Public criticism of the harbour authorities became 
general as the queues of ships standing idle outside the port increased, 
and the shipping companies operating the South African route introduced 
a surcharge on freight,to Durban because of the costly delays they faced. 
As the crisis deepened, solutions to the problem of overall productivity of 
the workers in the port which had never been considered before, such as 
providing a two shift system and incentive bonus schemes, were discussed 
by the employers. The memory of the suppression of the 1969 dock 
strike came to haunt the DSLSC company officials as the workers entered 
into a phase of unprecedented mass strikes and resistance to the apartheid 
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state. As the conditions for workers to increase their resistance to 
the employers improved, the workers' demands increased proportionally 
and their organizations took shape in the semi-legal sphere of unregistered 
trade unions. For the white workers in the port employed by the SARH, 
the crisis marked the beginning of the end of their employment, and their 
fairly swift despatch to other sectors of the economy. Private capital, 
particularly commerce, demanded a 'black port' in wh ich African workers 
would take over all operative and most of the supervisory work in the docks, 
and white workers would be either transferred to other railway work or 
shifted to technical tasks. While the most dramatic changes took place 
in SARH employment, the stevedoring workers were obviously not unaffected 
and took advantage of the increasing importance of African workers in the 
docks and the reorganization of production to press home their demands. 
The port crisis itself was both complex and often contradictory. 
The main problem for capital in the docks seemed to be the slowing rate at 
which stevedoring and railway workers were able to get cargo landed and 
railed away from the port. There were no open complaints about the 
movement of exports. The problem as presented in the I ibera I press was 
that the railway administration was unable to move the landed cargo away 
from the port with sufficient speed because it was committed to using white 
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labour and had delayed introducing mechanization. Quite why there 
should be a falloff in productivity is not clear; superficially it was 
argued that sufficient white workers were not available and that state 
departments were always inefficient. A curious feature of the crisis 
in the early 1970s was that it resulted from an increase of tonnages landed 
at Durban which were nothing as large as those of the 1960s, during which 
there had been no complaints from shipping companies of congestion and 
declining productivity. While 8,557 tonnes were landed in Durban in 
1966, the revival of the rate of growth in 1970 only increased tonnage 
landed to 4,267 tonnes, although this was a considerable increase on the 
1969 figure of 2,618 tonnes. But the rate at which cargo was being 
handled was slowing down even during the late 1960s when the tonnage 
landed was declining steadily; the increase in imports in 1970 only served 
b . h . . . h 46 Th hi' f to ring t e CriSIS out Into t e open. e woe question was one 0 
great controversy for capital, with a sudden increase in the number of 
articles appearing in the press criticizing the SARH and calling for the 
displacement of white labour. The unseemly publ ic disputes and allega-
tions, with the sharpest criticism coming from the shipping companies, 
indicated the severity of the crisis. The docks had been converted from 
a quiet backwater of the accumulation process into the controversial centre 
of discussion because of the importance of transport both to the rising turn-
over of capital in South Africa and capital locked up in idle ships. As 
Marx has argued, transport becomes crucial for capital when the distance 
of the market from the point of production is long; the speed of the physical 
movement of commodities is then closely related to the turnover of produc-
tive capital. 47 The shipping delays were adding to the time that exports 
to South Africa were in the form of commodity-capital, and leading to a 
dec! ine in the return on capital for exporting companies. The pressure 
for speeding up the movement of commodities would then come from the 
shipping companies which relied on a higher velocity of commodities to 
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realize the capital invested in the ships. 
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Since the dock workers had managed to cope with the huge cargoes 
landed and shipped in the mid-1960s, the decl ining productivity in the 
early 1970s has to be explained in terms of the lack of willingness and 
abi lity of workers to keep up high levels of output. Immediately after 
the strikers had been dismissed, the press was forecasting that the delays 
caused by the strike would last a week. 49 The disruption to cargo 
handling in fact lasted considerably longer, and it seems as though the 
congestion caused by the 1969 strike and the lower productivity which 
resulted from employing new workers carried over into the period of rising 
imports causing the extraordinary delays in 1971. The stevedoring com-
pany worked on a short-term policy of replacing the strikers w ithany 
workers who were wi II i ng to scab; these workers were apparen tly pa i d on 
a dai Iy basis and came from the Durban townsh ips. The longer-term 
strategy of the company was to replace this Icasual l labour (which the 
company may have had to pay higher wages) with contract workers from 
the distant reserves. By Tuesday, 8 April 1969, the company had suffi-
cient labour to man the ships but the workers were inexperienced and 
inefficient. As the shipping correspondent of the Daily News reported: 
Imany of the men are unfamiliar with ship-working and there is a conse-
quent loss of productivity and the possibil ity of delays to shipping for the 
rest of this weeki. The DSLSC was taking active steps to visit the 
reserves to recruit permanent labour on contract, and possibly to cal I back 
about 300 or 400 regular workers who were on leave. On the following 
day, Wednesday, the recruiting drive was continuing, the work was going 
slower than the pre-strike rate of handling, but the gangs were being rein-
forced by experienced workers and the Inew casuals l working together. 
The future of the strike-breakers was by no means secure, but if they proved 
to be efficient the DSLSC said it was possible some of them would be taken 
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on to the permanent staff. 
The strike threw the complex system of labour recruitment and leave 
cycles out of phase. By 1969 the DSLSC estimated the average length 
of contract was nine months; in the post-strike situation each nine month 
group had to be evened out, a difficult task as the company had been 
forced to take on a large number of workers suddenly. The new contract 
workers had to be trained and incorporated in a SLU under an induna. 51 
The uneven labour cycles, with a large mass of workers starting in April, 
were eventually smoothed out by giving some workers early leave. The 
DSLSC implied that the labour supply situation was soon under control and 
daily meetings were held with the stevedoring companies to study and 
improve on the productivity of the new workers. Although there were 
not persistent complaints of delays and congestion, the general air of 
optimism masked the deeper problems management faced in reorganizing 
the handling of cargo. 
In the absence of statistics on the rates of landing and shipping 
cargo per gang, statistics on the accident frequency rate give some idea of 
the disturbance in the pattern of work. The work of loading and unload-
ing ships is fraught with danger: the area of movement is confined, con-
siderable masses are being moved, and the cranes are I ifting and lowering 
cargo directly above the workers in the hold who are unprotected against 
any falling objects. The accident rate is not a purely random figure, it 
indicates both management's concern to reduce the figures (in the interests 
of cutting its assessment in terms of the Workman's Compensation Act and in 
attempting to improve the morale of the workers) and the relative experience 
of the workers in keeping up high levels of output without endangering them-
selves. The accident rate costs the DSLSC money, both in terms of its 
assessment for accident insurance and in terms of lost time, and a Iso reflects 
the efficiency of supervision on the ships. 52 The effect of a mass influx 
of inexperienced workers in stevedoring is shown by the figures of the 
accident frequency rate supplied by the company. The figures represent 
lost lives, severe injuries, as well as the most common injuries to feet and 
hands. 
533 
Table 7.2 
Accident frequency rate 
Month 1967 1968 1969 1970 
January 257 143 131 205 
February 180 135 131 291 
March 183 129 127 249 
April 157 104 203 212 
May 148 185 274 145 
June 203 169 313 227 
July 182 189 308 218 
August 249 138 277 210 
September 141 125 276 204 
October 165 160 217 227 
November 127 124 228 223 
December 168 129 172 219 
Average monthly 180 144 221 219 
(Note: the accident frequency rate is calculated by dividing 
the number of man-hours worked into the total number of lost-
time accidents multiplied by a million. The frequency rate 
is thus expressed as a rate per m i" ion man-hours.) 
Between 1967 and 1968 the acc ident rate showed a tendency to 
decline, due to the growing experience of the workers, and a campaign 
by management to cut its WCA assessment. Helmets were supplied to the 
workers in 1968 and the company insisted that the workers bought tough 
boots before being allowed on the ships. The improvement these measures 
had on the accident rate was completely nullified by the mass dismiss.::sl. 
While the last time the accident rate had risen above 200 was in August 
1967, in the month of the strike, April 1969, the rate soared above the 
200 mark to an unprecedented 313 in June 1969. The strike had a lon9-
term effect in terms of the workers' ability to safeguard themselves from 
injury; the 1970 figures do not show much of an improvement, most 
months recording a figure well over 200. 
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The high level of accidents indicates how the DSLSC was prepared 
to squander the lives and potential labour-power of the workers to regain 
control over the workers and speed up the pace of work to copy with the 
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rising level of imports. The high level of accidents after the strike proved 
the importance of the collective skills possessed by the gangs of labourers. 
In the struggle to regain productivity, management was more concerned with 
the tonnage of cargo handled per gang than their safety, but despite this 
compulsion the number of ships anchored outside the harbour grew larger. 
The high accident rates seemed to show that collective skills of the workers 
were taking longer to rebuild than management had anticipated. 
A Ithough the stevedoring workers load or unload virtually all cargo 
handled in Durban, their productivity does simply express the efficiency of 
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the port as a whole. The pace at which cargo is handled depends on 
the cooperative labour of the gangs of railway workers, the crane drivers, 
whose work is central, and the stevedoring gangs. The efficiency of the 
port depended on the coordination of these workers as well as other factors 
wh ich were more technical: the breakdown of machinery {particularly the 
older cranes} and delays in getting importers' clearance papers. The 
problems faced by the railways in moving cargo out of the sheds tended to 
work their way back to the ships, clogged sheds slowed down the pace of 
discharge from the ships. And it was the rate of handling cargo on the 
ships which was the prime concern of the shipping companies pressing for 
the fastest turnabout for their ships. 
The port crisis was undoubtedly set in motion by the dissatisfaction 
of the workers, the stevedores' strike, and the workers' exhaustion from 
prolonged hours of work. Holiday periods and occasional clustering of 
ships provided graphic proof of the crisis in the form of large numbers of 
ships at Durban's outer anchorage. After the Christmas holiday in 1969 
there were 16 ships anchored off Durban facing delays of between three and 
four days. Shipping congestion was said to be second only to Dar es 
Salaam on the eastern African seaboard where ships had to wait up to 
th irteen days for berths in the port. The mass dismissals had been a 
major setback for productivity. Sh ipping agents complained that 
Durban could not handle the tonnage of general cargo passing across its 
wharves in spite of the fact that there had been no significant increase in 
tonnage during the past few years. 54 The extent of the crisis faced by 
capital in steadily decreasing worker output was shown in figures produced 
in a 'hard-hitting report' publicized by the Natal Mercury. 55 The 
report produced evidence of an astonishing drop in productivity in general 
cargo hand I ing which had dropped about 40 per cent in the period 1962-69. 
In 1962 a gang discharged an average of 11.3 tons in an hour and loaded 
12.2 tons in an hour. In 1969, the year of mass dismissals and employ-
ment of hundreds of inexperienced workers, these rates dropped to 6.4 tons 
an hour for discharging and 7.9 tons for loading. The significance of the 
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crisis was not generally apparent to all shipping companies, some felt that 
the situation in which twenty ships were lying at the outer anchorage waiting 
to enter the port would be solved in a few weeks, others were pessimistic 
about the future. Commercial capital's agitation on the reorganization 
of the harbour abated in the following months, but the congestion in the 
harbour mounted enormously in the following annual holiday period, Christ-
mas to New Year in 1971. At the beginning of the year there were 
twenty-two ships lying idle off the Durban port, some of them facing a five 
day delay in getting a berth. As previously, the crisis produced a series 
of statistics which were used by commerce to demand drastic reforms by the 
SARH. It was estimated that the number of general cargo ship days lost 
each year was growing rapidly from 364 in 1968, to 521 in 1969, and to 
1, 189 in 1970. The Durban Chamber of Commerce estimated that unless 
urgent action was taken the figure could exceed 2,000 ship days lost at a 
cost of R4 million in berthing delays to shipowners, quite apart from other 
costs. The slowdown in the movement of commodities was extending the 
period in which they were locked in the form of commodity-capital, 
affecting the turnover of capital in shipping but also acting as a brake 
on the rate of capital accumulation in the South African economy. 
The crisis caused by declining productivity of stevedoring and railway 
workers worked its way through the chain of economic relations in a 
circular way. The shipping companies who claimed they lost up to 
R2,000 for each day a large freighter lay idle in the anchorage off 
Durban raised their freight charges to commerce and industry twice 
towards the end of 1970. 56 The charges to capitalists in South Africa 
were eventually passed on as rising prices, as inflation gathered momen-
tum in the early 1970s. The rising freight charges raised the spectre 
of the shipping companies' 'fining' Durban for unreasonable delays by 
adding a surcharge to freight rates. I t was reported that 'international 
shipping is fed up with the log-jam in Durban' which faced the prospect 
of having a surcharge slapped on freight rates as on lesser ports such as 
Beira and Mombasa. In an act of desperation, the SARH attempted 
unsuccessfully to stop larger tonnages being landed. 57 With world trade 
entering into the boom of 1970-72 one shipping firm had even faced the 
Port of London with a 25 per cent surcharge. 
approached this boom in a weak position. 
Stevedoring in South Africa 
While all sections of capital and the state coalesced to break the 
dock workers' strike in 1969, the crisis in productivity of the dock workers 
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and rising freight charges forced open divisions and public disunity. 
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With the increasing numbers of ships lying idle off Durban harbour, capitalists 
involved in transport and commerce, led by the vanguard' anonymous 
shipping agencies, developed a critique of the harbour administration. 
There were three main elements to the criticism of the SARH: the steve-
doring companies themselves were exonerated from criticism because of 
their ancillary position to the harbour administration and as fellow capitalist 
en terpr i ses. The main thrust of the criticism was against the 'administrative' 
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racial job allocation practised by the SARH. 59 'White job reservation 
is crippling Durban harbour' was the slogan of the liberal press and shipping 
companies; the blame for the congestion lay on the shoulders of the SARH 
which only allowed whites to operate the harbour crane, to drive the fork-
I ift trucks, to check the cargoes being landed on the wharf, and to super-
vise the gangs of African workers. White labour was presented as pro-
tected, without the spur of unemployment to raise its pace of work, and 
expensive. Black labour should be employed to do the work more 
efficiently and cheaply. The issue was presented as pol itical and ideo-
logical: the SARH administration being governed by pal itical criteria to 
maintain an immobile race-grade structure of employment which was 
causing dock efficiency to decline rapidly under the strain of the white 
labour shortage. The growing queue of cargo ships off Durban was due 
not to the slackness on the part of the stevedoring labour units, but to a 
shortage of white shunters, checkers, crane operators, and fork-lift truck 
operators. The issue was not a simple one of liberal ization of what the 
capitalists called the 'traditional labour pattern', but also a demand for 
the employment of labour which could be subjected to the long hours and 
lower wages than white workers were prepared to a:cept. Part of the 
problem of the white labour shortage was that white workers stayed away 
from harbour employment as it meant they barely saw their wives and 
children by working fourteen hours a day. Contract workers were 
separated from their famit ies by long distances and the force of law, and 
housed in compaunds at the port, could adjust more easi Iy to the harsh 
regime of fourteen hours heavy manual work, limited recreation, and 
disturbed sleep. Urban African and Indian workers would be attracted 
to the port to take up operative and clerical work not available elsewhere, 
at lower wages and without complaining about conditions. In this sense, 
the liberal demand for an end to job reservation was also one for the 
employment of workers able to be subjected to higher levels of exploita-
tion as a solution to capital's problems. 
The second element of the capitalist critique followed from the 
first: the SARH was a department of state bound by political considera-
tions and policies and as a state enterprise wholly inefficient. 'Instead 
of good, red commercial blood pumping through the arteries of the work 
force, the harbour has to rely on stuffy red Government tape', wrote the 
Sunday Tribune, advancing the interests of the stevedoring and shipping 
companies. 60 For the first occasion since the state took over the 
Durban harbour in 1916, suggestions were made that more of the work in 
the harbour be handed over to private compan ies. 61 In the words of a 
shipping agency: 'If necessary, whole berths in the harbour should be 
handed over lock, stock and barrel to private stevedoring companies, who 
are not bedevilled by labour policies and could use non-Whites to operate 
cranes, fork-lift trucks and move cargo generally. They can a Iso ensure 
ff ' • .• ,62 Th I d . I' h more e IClent supervIsion. ese proposa s to e-natlona Ize t e 
docks demonstrated the increasing confidence of private capital now that 
the harbour admin istration faced the enormous problems of getting the 
overall efficiency of the port improved. 
The final issue in the criticism of the harbour administration was 
that of mechanization. Private capital argued that the SARH had dragged 
its feet in bringing in advanced cargo-handling equipment on the wharves 
and that what was introduced was not used to capacity because of the 
shortage of white labour. The shipping companies appreciated that the 
S.ARH had ordered more machinery and fork lift trucks but felt that had 
been left too late. 'The equipment should have been ordered years ago. 
d I . h' . d ,63 If it had been here, there would be no e ays In s Ippmg turn-croun s. 
Mechanization was seen as a means of advancing black workers into opera-
tive work and floating the colour bar upwards to release white workers to 
fi II vacant positions as supervisors, drivers, and tally clerks. The spokes-
man for Holland .Afrika Lines situated the cargo-handling in Durban between 
two periods. 'The whole pattern is changing from physical handl ing to 
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mechanical handling, and we have not yet reached the stage of fully 
containerized or palletized cargoes. ' But urgent action was needed 
to introduce the appropriate equipment. The whole question of 
mechanization was closely related to that of the level of productivity 
of the workers, and the private companies argued that the harbour 
administration's attempts to mechanize hod been hampered by pol itical 
considerations such as the need to employ whites only as operatives. 64 
The campaign by private companies against the harbour adminis-
tration was supported by the United Party opposition in parliament. 
The criticisms were tempered by avoiding censure of the local officials 
in the Durban port and by keeping the more sharply expressed points 
anonymous. The railways administration, operating as a public service 
to the profit-making system by providing transport at the lowest cost, was 
obviously sensitive to detailed criticism by its partners in the exploitation 
of the workers. Far from struggling to maintain a rigid racial structuring 
in the docks, the harbour administration claimed to have moved African 
workers into all operative work on Maydon Wharf as an 'experiment' and 
to have allowed other black workers to take up the work of 'shunter's mate', 
deckhands on harbour craft, and other berthing work. 65 There had been 
no resistance from the railway worker associations which are forms of white 
company unions subordinate to the interests of the apartheid state and anta-
gonistic to the interests of the mass of railway workers. The expansion of 
white employment during the boom of the 1960s had created many other 
opportunities for white workers and the maintenance of the policy of 
sheltered employment lost the attraction it held for white workers during 
the depression. White workers were prepared to allow African workers 
to move upwards into previously 'white' jobs if this were proved to be in 
the state's interest, defined in legislation as the provision of cheap transport. 
The harbour administration had also provided for increased employment of 
Indians in the docks, initially as a type of secondary 'civilized labour' 
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pol icy, but later in clerical work .66 
The increase in black employment in the harbour was predicated 
on the implementation of racial wage differentials, an explicit policy of 
not paying the rate for the job in the interests of keeping black labour 
cheap. Their conditions of service and wages were considerably worse 
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than those of the stevedoring workers. Unl ike the stevedoring companies, 
the harbour administration did not feel compelled to introduce weekly 
employment for the wharf workers and the casual labourers employed by 
the railways earned a daily basic wage of R 1.40 in 1969, in comparison 
with the dai Iy wage of a stevedore set by WD 251 of R 1. 80. 67 The rai 1-
way compounds were considerably worse than those of the stevedoring com-
pany, although the controls may not have been as rigorous. 
The free availabil ity of African labour to the rai Iways and the 
. I' , f" k 68 d'd 'd h h Intense exp Oltatlon 0 Its wor ers I not provi e muc pressure on t e 
harbour administration to extend facilities and mechanize. Despite a 
number of investigations into the possibilities and necessity for mechaniza-
tion, surprisingly I ittle advance was made in the post-war period. The 
movement of cargo in the docks was an industry which developed plant 
and equipment sufficient for a certain number of workers, but did not 
necessarily increase constant capital in the same proportion as employment, 
By extending working hours 69 and increasing the intensity of work in the 
early 1960s after the formation of the DSLSC I production had been con-
tinued on the basis of absolute surplus value. 'The production of 
absolute surplus-value turns exclusively on the length of the working day, 
whereas the production of relative surplus-value completely revolutionizes 
the technical processes of labour and the groupings into which society is 
divided. 170 The record imports in 1965 and 1966 in the Durban harbour 
were handled by increasing employment and working hours and maintaining 
the degree of intensity of labour, despite formal agreement in the railway 
administration since the end of the war that mechanization should be under-
taken. In 1955 the SARH had declared itself 'fully committed to a 
policy of the highest degree of mechanization of cargo-handling'" but 
the first record of its implementation in 1957-58 was the purchase of 
only eighteen fork-lift trucks. 71 No further mechanization is recorded 
in the survey of the port published in 1969, althouth the large sugar 
t . I . .. 1964 72 B h I 1960 h d k ermlna came Into operation In • Y t e ate s t e oc 
workers in Durban were handling 59.2 per cent of the cargo and 35 per 
cent of the shipping with only 33.7 per cent of the capital invested in 
plant and equipment in South Africa's harbours. 73 The extraordinarily 
low level of mechanization in Durban, against the declared policy of the 
SARH, was the result of the extraction of surplus labour from a cheap and 
efficient labour force. Such high rates of exploitation were possible 
because of the suppression of the working class organization in the early 
1960s and the severity of national oppression. But they a Iso made the 
harbour administration and stevedoring companies very vulnerable to 
decreases in the intensity of labour and the cost structure more responsive 
to increases in wages. In short, the gains made by capital in the early 
1960s were being wiped out by the rising level of class struggle in 1969. 
The harbour administration was sensitive to the charges made by 
the private companies led by the Durban Chamber of Commerce, and did 
not dispute the criticisms. The problems of Durban harbour were pre-
sen ted by the harbour adm in istration as beyond human contro I. We are 
doing our best. The port is operating at peak capacity and we are doing 
the maximum. If there are too many ships for the number of berths we 
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have that is for the shipping world to sort out. I When the congestion 
became critical early in 1971 a deputation from the Chamber of Commerce 
met the SARH assistant general manager to discuss methods of speeding up 
the handling rate. In its representations the Chamber asked for African 
indunas employed by the SARH to be given more authority, as was the case 
in stevedoring, to release white supervisors for checking duties. The 
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other issues raised were not mentioned in the public reports but the 
Chamber must have insisted on more mechanization and 'Africanization'. 75 
Despite criticisms of the SARH being unprepared to make changes 
in employment, the dual process of increasing cargo-handling equipment 
and moving white workers out of operative jobs proceeded steadily. 
Ironically the harbour administration had I ittle difficulty in displacing 
white workers with black workers at considerably lower rates of pay because 
the white railway workers' union is tied politically to the apartheid state 
and is committed to the profitabil ity of the SARH. The harbour adminis-
tration sought time to introduce the changes by placing a restriction on 
tonnages landed per ship, to come into operation on 1 April 1971, but 
these were relaxed after agitation and pressure from shipping companies. 76 
The railway administration gradually introduced changes in employment on 
the dockside by allowing Indian shunters' 'mates' (workers who were 
employed to do the same work as whites but in a subordinate position at 
lower wages), by stepping up the purchase of cargo-handl ing equipment I 
and then by taking on 130 African fork .. lift drivers to work in selected 
areas. These drivers were first employed at Maydon Wharf and the new 
pier, and the white operators moved to other areas. The new drivers 
were given an intensive two-week training program. The harbour adminis-
tration could be highly selective in recruiting African workers for these 
'privileged' jobs and most of the workers had heavy duty or light vehicle 
driving licences. The African fork-lift drivers were employed at lower 
wage rates than the whites and the harbour officials refused to provide 
information on their actual scales. These new harbour workers were said 
to be ?roud of their work and the press reports give the impression of the 
workers' dependency on the harbour administration being considerably more 
than that of the white workers they replaced. 'They maintain their 
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vehicles with the pride of a new car owner. ' The harbour administration 
selected the workers from within the railway service and said the job was 
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'jealously-guarded' among the African workers. The Natal System 
Manager, L.M. Englebrecht, said: 'The Africans have a high aptitude 
for th is type of work; they work hard to keep their jobs and they do 
the task well. ,78 The harbour employers seemed intent on creating a 
new grade of African worker: obedient, grateful for the opportunity of 
doing 'white' work, and independent from the mass of the railway 
labourers. Following further negotiations with the white railway staff 
association, an additional 41 Africans began work as fork-lift drivers at 
the new pier, bringing the total number of African fork-lift drivers to 170. 79 
The insistence of private companies on rapid mechanization in the 
docks reflected the need for capital to respond to the day-to-day resistance 
of the workers (decl ining intensity of work) and strike act"ion. It was not 
simply the transformation of absolute to relative surplus value, although 
this was the tendency and ultimate objective of capital. Both the harbour 
administration and private companies wanted to combine the Africanization 
of supervision to smooth the flow of production from ship to shore with the 
faster movement of cargo on the wharf: to combine mechanization with 
greater economy of labour. The cargo-handling equipment would increase 
the tendency to organ ize production around mach inery, increasing the sub-
ordination of labour to capital, cheapen ing and increasing production. 
Each fork-lift truck could be evaluated in terms of the labour-time saved 
and wages 'freed' by higher productivity. I t was the workers' obstinacy 
to working themselves to the limit wh ich hastened the introduction of machinery. 
Wh ile capital presented the introduction of mechan ization as an aspect of 
'modernizing' the harbour, an inevitable progression into the modern world, 
the timing of mechanization in response to the workers' resistance demon-
f I f "k ,80 strated that mach inery is 'the most power u weapon or suppressing strl es , 
Under capitalism machinery also is a means of driving the workers to greater 
exertion, In the docks, if the fork-lift trucks could help clear the 
wharves, the stevedoring workers could be freed to work faster I and the 
overall efficiency of the port increased, 
This partial reorganization of the labour process did not solve all 
the problems of capital. The increase in the working day which was 
introduced in the early 1960s managed to clear the harbour of congestion 
and the transpart equipment helped to remove bottlenecks on the wharf, 
but the fundamental problem remained of increasing the intensity of labour. 
Work in the harbour did not take the form of an assembly I ine with the 
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workers under the direct discipline of machinery, and although some modifica-
tion of supervision over the labourers on the ships and the wharves was made 
by giving increased powers to the African indunas, productivity remained 
unacceptably low. The 'slave driving' tactics which characterized white 
supervision, based on an exercise of social and political power (in short the 
right to fire, and to call a policeman), was being replaced by more efficient 
black supervision. Not all white foremen were necessarily slave drivers 
using racial abuse and assaults as a method of increasing the intensity of 
labour, and it was counter-productive to capital to have unnecessary fights 
and minor stoppages through confl ict between wh ite and black at work, as 
I d" I' II b . ., d 81 Th ff' , ong as ISCIP me genera y was emg mamtame • e most e IClent 
white foremen were, moreover, those who did not employ racial oppression 
in the drive for production: management's ideal being the Zulu and foreign 
language linguist who got on easily with the labourers and developed a 
'special relationship' with the African induna. The white foreman's ideal 
was possibly (as Zulu Phungula liked to point out) reading the newspaper and 
letting the workers 'get on with it'; this would mean slack supervision and 
allowing the workers to set their own pace. The advance of African indunas 
to the central position of immediate command over the workers would smooth 
over the problems of language and unproductive antagonism between white 
foremen and black labourers. 82 With the additional wage differential for 
senior indunas in stevedoring and the increasingly privileged position of all 
African indunas in the reorganized labour process, capital would be guaran-
teed detailed supervision over the labourers and an increase in the rate of 
exploitation. Expensive supervision would be replaced by cheaper and more 
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ff ' , ,,83 Th d h I e IClent supervIsion. ese a justments in t e abour process permitted 
the more economical use of labour and were welcomed by the shipping com-
panies, but the problems of output per worker became crucial as a wave of 
imports swept into South Africa in the early 1970s. 
While the decline in productivity of the dock workers precipita-
ted a crisis after the stevedoring strike in 1969, the problem itself was 
inherent in the solutions capital found to the rising resistance of the workers 
in the 1950s. While the record cargoes in 1965 and 1966 could be handled 
on the basis of extensive hours and small amounts of additional labour, by the 
late 19605 the workers were becoming exhausted and increasingly resistant to 
the high levels of exploitation. The decline in productivity which resulted 
counteracted the cheapening of the worker of the earlier period and caused 
the rate of surplus volue to decline even though real wages were not advancing.84 
For capital in the harbour a decisive point was being reached where the 
extension of the working day and intensification of labour were becoming 
mutually exclusive so that the lengthening of the working day became com-
patible only with a lower degree of intensity. A higher degree of intensity 
could only be achieved with the shortening of the working day. 85 This 
inevitable conclusion was only forced on the harbour administration and steve-
doring companies after the course of further open struggle by the workers 
against the employers. Capital was to wrestle with the question of raising 
output under existing conditions before being forced to the reluctant conclu-
sion that the solution lay in shortening the working week. 
Before coming to this conclusion, the harbour employers had to 
struggle with the problem of increasing output before reducing the working 
week. Rather than employing more workers and inaugurating a two shift 
system the employers considered an incentive bonus system. Capital was 
constrained in employing more workers for the following reasons: the value 
of labour-power had been raised through the decline in productivity, labour-
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power was not the cheap commodity of the earlier period, and there was a 
problem of a shortage of skilled labour. The possibil ity remained that 
with a higher level of mechanization and a general 'push ' to increase output, 
the problem of congestion could be solved. The employers immediately 
ran into problems in changing the form of wages, an unprecedented develop-
ment in South African harbours. The planned bonus scheme would reward 
the workers for cargo tonnage in excess of a defined 'normal ' tonnage dis-
charge rate which would be based on the previous year's figures. The 
scheme was negotiated between the railway administration and the Con-
ference lines, a cartel of shipping companies, and did not directly involve 
the stevedoring companies. It was planned to improve output by 25 per 
cent over the 1970 figure, which would be sufficient to clear the backlog of 
shipping. There were a few concessions in the form of shorter hours; the 
scheme would give the harbour workers one long week-end a month, and 
where workers had finished loading or discharging a ship by 5 p.m. they would 
not be called upon immediately to start work on another ship. 86 This was 
the scheme in broad outline; by late July it was announced that the new wage 
system would be introduced within a week, and that there would be a signifi-
cant rise in wages for workers prepared to work overtime. The shipping com-
panies had been asked by the Railway Administration to work out a table of 
'normal ' tonnage rates which would apply only to general cargo working and 
would differ for ships lin the various trades I • The norm would have to be 
exceeded for the bonus to be paid. This bonus would be set at R25 for 100 
tons, but this figure would only be paid if a ship was discharged in the time 
allowed based on the fixed normal discharge rate. For example, a ship 
arriving with 5,000 tons to discharge would pay a collective bonus if work 
was completed in the allotted time of R 1,250, which would then be divided 
by the Ra ilways between the stevedoring and ra ilway workers. The bonus 
would be paid by the shipping company and debited to the various ships. 
'The bonus money will be well spent if the incentive brings to an end the 
chronic congestion which has riddled the port for many years, hitting its peak 
this year', wrote a local shipping correspondent. 87 Great optimism 
was shown in the possibilities of speeding up production. In the last 
two weeks of May 1971 delays which grew to as much as 10 days per 
ship were eventually reduced to five days through concerted effort, and 
the employers believed the harbour workers could be considerably more 
efficient. 
The introduction of the incentive bonus scheme was, however, 
deferred early in August because agreement could not be reached between 
the harbour administration and the shipping lines. The two main points 
of disagreement were apparently over the setting of 'normal' tonnage dis-
charge rates to be met by the workers before the bonus became operative, 
and the fact that at one shed the workers would stand no chance of earning 
the bonus money. These were the publicly reported differences, privately 
there were a number of other points not only expressed by the two main 
protagonists (the harbour administration and shipping lines) but also the 
stevedoring companies. The most important questions raised by the steve-
doring companies were those relating to the possibility of workers gaining 
control over the pace of work. The whole idea of incentive bonuses and 
adjustable 'norms' raised the spectre of trade union power; any change in 
the norms would involve the workers discussing their output. Under trade 
unionism, Dreyer alleged, the pace was set for the least efficient worker. 88 
There was likely to be continual controversy over the norms which could not 
be guaranteed to be easily understandable; incentive schemes could work 
in assembly line conditions where quotas could be establ ished through time 
and motion studies, but not in the harbour. Discussions broke down on 
this issue, the Conference Lines arguing that the norms laid down by the 
SARH were too low and would cost them more than the savings they would 
make by possibly gaining a day at sea. The SARH felt that only the 
shipping companies would benefit, had problems with their white workers, 
and eventually a compromise could not be reached. There were numerous 
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ancillary problems to the difficulty of establishing norms; stevedoring 
workers moved from ship to ship depending on demand; a ship would start 
to be unloaded with five gangs and end with two; inferior winches on old 
ships would penalize some gangs; there were difficulties in estimating 
precisely how many tons were landed by each gang; and the workers could 
not calculate their earnings. The difficulties were mainly related to 
the problems of the stevedoring workers. It would apparently have been 
easier to operate with the SARH workers who were assigned to particular 
sheds. There were even doubts among the sh i ppi ng lines; some were not 
convinced that a speed up of work beyond the existing rates would not 
cause a fall of working standards in the rush to reach the norm. During 
the negotiations over the incentive bonus scheme the stevedoring companies 
were relegated to the position of junior partners of the shipping lines. 
Apparently they argued that the time had come to consider whether long 
working hours were necessary if there were such diminishing returns. 
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I t was reported that most of the dock workers were dropping from 
fatigue from the pressure under which they had been working since late 1971. 
Since the beginning of the year there had only been two days on which no 
general cargo carrying ships had had to wait for berths in the congested 
harbour. This meant that all workers were having to work overtime for 
four hours every night. Normally, it was reported, the Christmas rush 
was cleared by February, but in 1972 there seemed no end to the congestion. 
Delays could still run at three to four days with more than 12 ships waiting 
daily for berths. 'The whole problem revolves around labour and until 
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this is rectified congestion will continue', reported a local newspaper. 
The contradictory reports on the incentive bonus scheme indicated 
the urgency on the part of the harbour administration, the uncertainty on 
the part of the shipping companies, and the general crisis in confidence of 
dock employers. The shipping companies evidently felt the workers were 
capable af producing more under existing arrangements. They feared 
that the previous year's figures could easi Iy be surpassed and that they 
would have to pay considerable sums for the increased efficiency of the 
docks. Although the shipping lines would in effect only be paying what 
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they would otherwise lose in reduced turnover they must have been calculat-
ing on the wave of imports coming to an end and did not want to enter into 
long term contracts which could be to their disadvantage. With the 
sudden change of plan in August 1971 the question of intensified labour 
was dropped for the moment by employers and in the lack of any other 
initiative the long working hours were maintained. 
Agitation and mass strikes 
The 1969 strike had set in train responses from a variety of social 
groups. To the black working c lass the strike represented a tremendous 
step forward, desp i te its suppress ion. The new determination of the 
workers to resist the employers and the state was echoed in a number of 
strikes and bus boycotts. _In the reserves the African intelligentsia viewed 
the independent action of the workers with some unease. In the aftermath 
of the strike the stevedores had been forced to return to the reserves and the 
authorities were concerned that the strike could become a struggle against 
the tribal authorities and strike-breakers in the rural areas. 90 In a more 
general political sense the strike marked an independent resistance to the 
apartheid state, and the rural African petty bourgeoisie and chiefs were 
concerned lest their collaboration with the apartheid state be exposed not 
on Iy by a vociferous black consciousness youth movement but also by the 
workers demanding to know why it was that their movement to the towns 
should now be under the control of the Bantustan officials. Why should 
the rural African petty bourgeoisie gravitate to the pol itical institutions of 
the Bantustans when the peasants and workers had struggled against their 
precursors, the tribal authorities in the 1950s? There was considerable 
debate about the importance of opposing Bantustans among workers in Natal 
in the late 1960s, and the dockers strike could have opened a series of 
industrial and political struggles beyond the control of the political 
representatives of the ~frican petty bourgeoisie. 91 The decision of 
Gatsha Buthelezi to campaign for the acceptance of a territorial authority 
in the reserves of Natal and Zululand (now termed Kwa Zulu) was an 
indication of the political leadership's response to the rising resistance to 
the apartheid state by black workers and youth. With high-flown prin-
ciples and passionate rhetoric the political representatives claiming to 
speak for the Zulu nation and the African oppressed grasped the role of 
collaboration with the apartheid state. 
The strike provoked a rather different response from white students 
who felt that the tactics of open protest against apartheid in education 
were becoming exhausted and were even becoming ritualized and plati-
tudinous. Rebuffed by black students determined to shake themselves 
551 
free from the liberal wh ite student movement, the student radicals interpreted 
the 1969 dock strike as the opening of a mass movement of the black working 
class which would eventually sweep away the apartheid state. One strike 
by black workers was felt to be equal to ten student protests, and the strike 
marked a period in the white student movement of 'turning to the workers' 
in the search for a vital force against apartheid and the hypocrisy of the 
liberal bourgeoisie. In the first half of 1971 these student radicals formed 
a Wages Commission at the University of Natal to conduct research into 
particular industries, to present evidence to the Wage Board, and to agitate 
to encourage working class organization and demand higher wages and better 
working conditions. The student radicals did not arrogate a leadership 
role to themselves, they saw their work as initiating a movement under the 
leadership of black workers, by providing information and technical assis-
tance; the black working class was seen to have vast resources of leader-
ship. After an initial stimulus the working class organizations of the past 
would be reactivated and the past leadership embedded in production would 
guide the movement in its pol itical orientation. 
552 
The Wages Commission prepared information on industrial legislation, 
trade unions, and works committees. More importantly, it published a 
newspaper Isisebenzi/lndustrial Worker to provide information which workers 
could use in putting forward demands, to carry strike news, and to discuss 
the struggles of workers in particular industries. The fi rst issue carried an 
article on the history of strikes and workers' demands in stevedoring, and 
news on the strike of abattoir workers demanding the reinstatement of a 
worker. 92 Subsequent issues would be devoted completely to the steve-
doring workers. 93 While some prel iminary attempts were made to gather 
information to provide evidence to the Wage Board to raise the wages of 
workers at least to the poverty datum line, the publication of the Wage 
Board's recommendations for unskilled wages in Durban provided the Wage 
Commission with the opportunity of conducting mass agitation for higher 
wages in Durban. About 10,000 pamphlets were distributed on 8 June 
1971 ca II ing on workers to support th e demand for at I east R 7.97 a week 
(the current poverty datum I ine) and to attend a meeting to protest the 
Wage Board's recommendation for unski lied labour in Durban. More than 
400 workers attended the meeting, demanded a minimum wage of R20 a week, 
and signed a petition protesting against the recommended wages. The 
following day a strike broke out at a local steel foundry at which the workers 
used the pamphlets to support their demands for higher wages. 94 In a 
relatively short period the Wages Commission in Durban had established a 
method of work in placing demands before the Wage Board in particular 
industries and conducting effective industrial agitation. I ts weakness 
was a belief in the spontaneous movement of the working class independent 
of organized leadership, an economistic view of class struggle, and an under-
developed understanding of the African petty bourgeoisie. These weak-
nesses were not immediately apparent, however, because of the extraordinary 
popularity of the wage demands and the warm response of African workers to 
the newspaper. The agitation of the Wages Commission had a considerable 
influence not only on the course of struggle in the stevedoring industry but 
also in the subsequent mass strikes. 95 
The stevedoring workers were obviously not unaware of the 
increasing number of strikes by African workers in Durban, in parti-
cular the McWillaw strike which involved skilled metal workers, and 
the general demand of the mass meeting in June for R20 a week. 96 
In an interview Dreyer blamed the Wages CO,mmission for raising the 
expectations of .Africans irresponsibly and for causing unemployment for 
the workers who had been misled into taking strike action. He said 
that he had received assurances from the workers that they would 'cause 
trouble' with anyone interfering with them as they were aware of the 
plight of the strikers in 1969. This certainly was not the view of the 
stevedoring workers who were both aware of the general demands of 
African workers in Durban and the discussions about the incentive bonus 
system between the SARH and the shipping companies. Naturally, the 
proponents of the scheme tried to impress the few workers who were con-
sulted about the great advantages for earnings which could accrue from 
speeding up production. No doubt the workers discussed the matter at 
length among themselves. On Thursday, 16 September 1971, six weeks 
after it had been announced that the incentive bonus scheme would be 
deferred, a notice in Zulu was posted in the DSlSC compound. The 
notice was addressed to the senior liaison officer telling him that the 
workers were not satisfied with their wages and that they wanted an 
increase by the following Friday. The demand of R 14 a week, wh ich 
could have been eliminated by the suppression of the 1969 strike, was 
restated. The DSLSC management described this demand as 'vague' 
but said the position was delicate and that they were anxious to find a 
quick solution to avoid any strike action. 97 The technique of ag itat-
ing through pamphlets on the company notice board, which proved so 
successful in arousing the workers to collective action while safe-
guarding the leadership, was again being employed. Despite the 
massive retaliation through dismissals during the 1969 strike, the under-
ground organization of the workers had by no means been eliminated. 
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Either hardened underground leadership had managed to slip through the 
screening of those workers who were re-employed, or new leadership 
was carrying forward the lessons of the immediate past. The DSLSC 
management was placed in a dilemma: to provide an increase would 
acknowledge the authenticity of the underground as the voice of the 
workers, to ignore the pamphlet could lead to another disastrous strike 
just as congestion was beginning to ease. 
By Monday, 20 September 1971, the four stevedoring companies 
had adopted a 'wait-and-see' approach, although collective action was 
provisionally planned in response to potential strike action. The strike 
threat had come at a time when the port was relatively quiet after deter-
mined efforts had been made to el iminate delays. But o ffici a Is were 
wary in regard to the threatened strike, and one port official said: 'That 
is all we need now. The harbour is at its quietest in months, but a 
strike by the stevedores will throw a giant spanner in the works. ,98 
The dock workers, who had received local and international sup-
port in the aftermath of the 1969 strike, had support for their demands from 
the Wages Commission and an offer to mediate from the Trade Union Council 
of South Africa (TUCS,A). The Wages Commission issued a statement 
defending the workers' wage demand for a basic wage of R 14, which it said 
was the same amount asked for in 1969, and there had been a big increase 
in the cost of I iving since then. It called on the employers to negotiate 
with the stevedores with the assistance of an impartial board of inquiry. 
The danger was that the employers would resort to their strategy in the 1969 
strike. 
,A pattern emerges. Without a negotiation apparatus strikes 
are bound to occur. Port activities are disrupted. With 
the standard reaction to strikes from employers, the police are 
called in, arrests are mode and unskilled workers are recruited 
on Iy to make the same demands at a I ater date. Shou I d not 
an impartial inquiry be set up to prevent yet another crisis 
situation at the docks?99 
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The statement was not so much an attempt to set such an inquiry into 
motion (it was highly unlikely that the Department of Labour or the 
employers would tolerate any such move), but to draw off any public 
support from the DSlSC and indicate support for the workers' demands. 
Without any specific coordination with the Wages Commission, a local 
official of TUCSA, which represents the labour aristocracy and reformist 
industrial unions, offered to mediate between management, officials, and 
the workers. This offer by the Natal Secretary-Organizer, Jock Espie, 
was sharply rejected by the Department of labour. The Department 
said that TUCSA could deal with Whites, Coloureds and Asiatics, but not 
with disputes involving African workers. This was disputed by Espie who 
quoted the Minister of Labou~ in support of his claim that TUCSA had the 
right to become involved in representing the interests of African workers 
during wages negotiations. 'If the stevedores ask for TUCSA's help we 
will give it to them', he said. 'It is possible that while the stevedore 
leaders are reluctant to identify themselves to their employers or the 
Department of Labour they might feel more at ease with a representative of 
TUCSA,.100 Not surprisingly this suggestion did not receive a welcome 
from the DSlSC which could not have wanted a free exchange of views 
between the workers even wi th a representati ve of the labour ad stocracy. 
In particular, any publ ic discussion of the demands of the stevedoring 
workers would bring out the extraordinarily long hours worked and the 
question of compulsory overtime. 
Before Friday, 24 September 1971, the day the incentive bonus 
scheme for railway workers was to be introduced, the Assistant Manager, 
W.S. Dreyer, announced a new set of wage scales for stevedoring which 
would be introduced from 1 October. He presented the wage increases 
as being prompted alone by the new wage system of the railways. 'The 
stevedore companies of Durban employ a parallel labour force and, obviously, 
if one section working the harbour is to be afforded benefits, then the other 
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section should receive similar opportunities. ' He said that the increases 
had been under consideration since May and were not the resul t of the 
strike threat. The bonus scheme he said was not suitable for stevedoring 
operations. 'The wage determination applicable to the stevedoring trade 
is generally accepted by all concerned to form the basis of remuneration 
for its employees. ' But since the existing wage scales had only come 
into effect during April 1969, the employers felt they could not rightly 
seek a revision at this stage. He said that too much had been made of 
the anonymous note pasted on a wall in one of the compounds. 'The 
system of communication between employees and management is based on 
custom and common usage. It has not failed because we have received 
repeated assurances that there is no support for whosoever wrote the note. ,10 1 
This rather defensive statement tried to obscure the most important issue in 
the discussion of wages: that the employers had been forced to make a 
uni lateral wage increase independently of the operations of the Wage Board. 
While the stevedoring companies had always argued they were bound by 
contractual obligations to the shipping companies not to increase wages 
unless required to do so through statutory regulation, under pressure from the 
workers the wage system was made more flexible. Despite the employers' 
argument, the system of wage determinations which served the interests of 
the employers and from which the labourers had been excluded in 1969 was 
not agreed to by the workers; the wage determinations did not provide 
for an annual increase in wages and were not a product of agreement bet-
ween workers and employers. The attempt to discredit the underground 
organization of the workers by arguing it had no support from the workers 
was unconvincing; it was a similar note in 1969 which had brought out 
the workers on strike. Far from the relations between workers and 
employers being one 'communication' through indunas they were based on 
commands from the employers via the indunas. I t was the supervisors whom 
the management was relying on for reassurance that the underground was 
unrepresentati ve. Far from their authority being accepted by the workers, 
the relations of domination and exploitation within the DSLSC were to be 
profoundly shaken by the workers' increasing resistance. 
557 
Under the new rates the stevedoring workers received a basic R8. 50 
a week (an increase of R2.00), winchmen and gangwaymen R9.90 (an 
increaseofR2.30) and the indunasR15{an increaseofR3.40). If a 
stevedoring labourer worked Monday to Saturday he would receive a total 
of R3.90 in daily allowances in addition to the R8.50, making R12.40 basic 
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wage a week. The increase in the minimum weekly wage did not 
bring about rises in the overtime rates, Sunday rates, or cargo allowances, 
and so constituted the cheapest method of responding to the demand for 
higher wages. It also meant that the corresponding relative decrease in 
the 'premium' wage rates in terms of the basic wage was likely to cause 
further antagonism from the workers. Not being in touch with the workers 
nor continuing to support their demands, TUCSA welcomed the new wage 
scales and Espie said he was pleased that a confrontation had been avoided. 
'I don't know how the stevedores feel about it but I should imagine they 
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feel as I do that half a loaf is better than no bread at all. ' The Wages 
Commission, looking to the stevedoring workers to provide a lead to other 
workers, condemned the R2 increase as an answer to the crisis in the docks. 
'Until there are legal and effective channels of communication, and a 
renunciation of force by employers, there will be continuous problems at 
the docks. ' It attacked the employers' projection of the indunas as the 
'customary' representatives of the workers. 
At the last Wage Board hearing in 1969 the indunas who were 
present absolutely rejected the representations of the Republic 
Transport workers who were asking for pay increases. Far 
from putting forward the workers' demands, the indunas said 
the workers were happy, and their fathers would decide for 
them. But when the determination was announced the 
workers went on strike, and 1,500 were sacked. This shows 
that the workers rejected the 'customary' representation. 104 
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Despite the relatively small increase in wages in comparison to the demand 
for R14, the workers did not strike on Friday, 24 September. This did 
not indicate that the underground demands of the workers had been modified 
by the employers' response ,on the contrary. The demands of September 
1971 showed that the stevedoring workers had sufficient resilience to 
recover from the repression of 1969, to make the same demands, and to 
employ similar tactics. 
A Ithough the DSLSC management wanted to present the wage increases 
as inevitable and in line with the introduction of the incentive scheme for 
railway workers, the company had never made unilateral wage increases 
willingly. Almost without exception the company had refused to make 
wage increases under pressure from the workers, fearing this would open the 
floodgate of demands. It was certain that the DSLSC would have preferred 
ta have had a further wage investigation by the Wage Board, but officials 
of the Wage Board had said they were already overloaded with work on hand 
and that the stevedoring trade which had had a wage investigation 'only' 
. I Id h t .. I· 105 A h . h two years prevIous y wou ave 0 wal t In me. t t e t I me t e 
incentive bonus scheme for harbour workers was dropped (it was apparently 
revived only for harbour workers possibly on a different basis), there were 
certainly no definite plans for increasing wages. It seems likely that the 
stevedoring wage demand stimulated both the SARH and stevedoring companies 
to reconsider both minimum wages and the incentive scheme as a matter of 
urgency. Certainly there was no announcement in the press that the SARH 
would continue with the incentive scheme on its own prior to the wage 
demand of the stevedoring workers. 
The prospect of workers making an independent and decisive forward 
movement on wages and against the system of cheap labour excited the Wages 
Commission and even drew on the sympathy of the I iberal press. The 
Wages Commission stepped up production of pamphlets and a workers' news-
paper, while in an attempt to gain credibility as representative of dock 
workers TUCSA initiated the preliminary steps towards a registered union 
for Coloured and Indian workers in the docks. In an editorial entitled 
Wage slaves' the Daily News used the occasion of the workers' demands 
to argue for a narrowing of the black/white wage gap and for wages above 
the povertY'1 ine. It complained that the stevedores were only earning 
R 12.40 for a six day week compared with the R34.40 a week earned by 
British dockers before overtime and fringe benefits. 'The work may not 
be strictly comparable but it is hard to justify such a high disparity in 
unskilled rates', the editor wrote. The lesson for the I iberal press was 
that employers should take action to increase wages and provide training 
to make the workers more productive. 106 The generosity of the liberal 
press was very much tied up with that of the liberal bourgeoisie which saw 
that an increase in wages for African workers would widen the internal 
market for manufactured goods. 
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The forward movement of the African workers also made the Indian 
and Coloured workers employed by stevedoring and shipping compan.ies as 
drivers and office workers eager to cooperate with the attempt by TUCSA to 
establ ish a registered 'coloured ' trade union. The strategy of TUCSA was 
to focus on the organization of white collar workers when the manual workers 
were taking the lead, trying to manoeuvre within the legislative framework 
for trade unionism in South Africa. When the attempt to form a trade 
union was announced the Natal Secretary, Espie , said: 'There is nothing 
underground about the proposed un ion. The formation of a un ion wi th 
b ' 'h' h I 1
107 Th b ' Asiatics and Coloureds as its mem ers IS WI.t In t e aw. e aSlc 
demands of the union were to be a guaranteed minimum wage (the shipping 
clerks were covered by the Shops and Offices Act which does not regulate 
wages) and definite payment for overtime and Sunday .work. 108 The 
inaugural meeting was held on 27 November and attended by 200 Coloured 
and Indian shipping and dockworkers, A working committee of eight 
dockworkers representing shipping and stevedoring companies was elected 
b t dl h ° 0 ° 109 S b f h y a repor e y ent uSlastlc meeting. u sequent meetings 0 t e 
working committee decided on the name Shipping Harbour Industrial 
Personnel Society (SHIPS) and a constitution was drawn up. It was 
planned to establish the union in Durban and then to recruit members from 
other ports, from the docks, shipping companies, and SARH. Eventually 
it was hoped to include seamen on board ships sailing under the South 
African flag. 110 Despite the evident enthusiasm of the white collar 
workers for some farm of organization, and the careful legalism of TUCSA, 
the attempt to form SHIPS floundered as a result of the hostility of the 
employers, the Department of Labour, and interrogations by the Security 
Branch. The employers and state departments were firmly opposed to 
having any form of working class organization in the docks, and given the 
fierce repression of the African workers, it would not be I ikely they would 
tolerate organization by other workers. The wide publicity and open-
ness of the TUCSA strategy, an inherent aspect of its reformism which 
declares We have nothing to hide', alerted the forces of repression and 
worried the white collar workers who were desperately insecure at work 
and reliant on the benevolence of their employers. 111 Without the 
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endorsement of the majority of the workers in the docks, the African workers, 
the attempt to form a registered union was likely to be seen as a consolida-
tion of white collar workers against the manual workers. The SHI PS 
exercise raised the hopes of Indian and Coloured workers in the docks with-
out being able to make an advance. The struggle of all workers in the 
docks could have made a considerable advance if the better educated workers 
had been able to combine with the militant labourers, but the whole tendency 
° 0 • h ° dO to 112 Th f t of registered trade uniOnism was In t e opposite Irec Ion. e u ure 
demands of the workers for higher wages and improved conditions in opposition 
to the employers and the apartheid state, were to be made by the labourers ° 
Wage demands and organization 
In the period after the workers had forced a wage concession from 
the DSLSC the internal organization of the workers was consol idated and 
systematic demands made both by workers 'openly' organized and through 
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the underground. The growing organizational strength of the steve-
doring workers and the coherence of their demands was a factor in the 
general movement of the workers towards the end of 1972 which burst into 
the mass strikes of 1973. While the whole history of the stevedoring 
workers has been one of forward movement followed by fierce repression, 
in the early 1970s the workers laid the basis for permanent organization in 
terms of demands and ideas. In response to the growing determination of 
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the workers, the KwaZulu Bantustan leaders were increasingly uneasy and 
the DSLSC management drew heavily on the new forms of political authority 
in the Bantustans for control over the workers. The rising struggle of the 
workers encouraged in management not the detai led control of the oppressive 
legislation (although this was capably utilized when needed) but a tendency 
towards 'autonomous' control over production by the workers. 114 This 
surprising development was based on greater authority being given to the 
indunas and the institutionalization of social controls over the pace of 
production. 
The stevedoring workers were eager for contacts outside the work-
place and their compounds in the early 1970s. For the first time in the 
history of stevedoring struggles, the workers away from the Point, those 
employed by Grindrod and Cotts on Maydon Wharf, came to take a crucial 
part in organizing the stevedoring workers throughout the harbour. The 
principal agencies for stimulating the workers' organization in this period 
we-ethe Wages Commission and the General Factory Workers' Benefit Fund, 
both of which strengthened the underground organization of the workers. 
The principal cause of the heightened activity of the workers was the Wage 
Board investigation which followed the wage increase which the DSLSC had 
to concede in September 1971. 
The Wages Commission gave special attention to propaganda for 
the stevedoring workers after the September 1971 demands. In an issue 
of Isisebenzi which followed, an article traced the history of the struggle 
of the stevedoring workers from the inception of the DSLSC in 1959, dis-
cussing how the company had introduced wage differentiation among the 
workers as a means of maintaining control over all the workers. The 
1971 increase in the minimum wage had not affected the 'premium' rates 
of overtime and Sunday time, and the workers were still being required to 
work up to 90 hours a week. But despite the oppression of the workers 
after the 1969 strike, the attention of the world had been drawn to the 
struggle of the stevedoring workers, and protests had been made to Prime 
Minister Vorster. The article concluded by arguing for the formation of 
a trade union which could present the demands of the workers. 115 
Another article, written by A. W. G. Champion, discussed the struggles of 
the togt workers up to the time of Zulu Phungula. Finally, figures were 
presented on the wage differences between white and black workers, link-
ing the poverty of African families to high disease rates. This issue was 
directed primarily at the stevedoring workers and distributed at the Point 
and a railway station. The Wages Commiss ion was surprised to receive a 
response from the workers which was obsequious ('We greet you who have 
been sent by our Lord to enlighten us .•• I), but also contained some of the 
concrete demands of the workers. The letter complained of the danger at 
work and the fact that the employer fired workers who were in jured because 
they were useless at the job. The tax system was a major grievance: the 
workers were being compelled to pay tax even though other workers at the 
same wages did not. When the workers complained about the tax system 
they were sacked. 'The old system of income tax was better because we 
paid taxes to the Bantu Affairs Office ourselves, but today's system we don't 
understand. 1 Collaborators at work were a stumbling-block. 'The 
people who talk for us are toadies of the boss and these people give the boss 
power to play around with us. I The final question was that of those 
562 
workers fired during the 1969 strike and specific districts were mentioned; 
Mahlabathini, Nkandla, Nquthu, Nongoma, Matubatuba, Estcourt, and 
Ixopo. 'The employers go to the farms to recruit new workers before 
they have begged the old workers to return to their job, even though they 
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were sacked for absolutely no reason.' This letter was published 
(without the name of the writer) in the second issue of Isisebenzi, which 
argued that the monopoly of stevedoring employers in the docks demanded 
careful organization. 
While the open agitation of the Wages Commission established a 
basis for exchange between the editors and workers, and letters were 
received regularly, the question of the basis for mass organization was 
being examined in discussion with officials of the Garment Workers Indus-
trial Union (Natal) and the Furniture Workers Industrial Union (Natol). 
These two unions, representing basically Indian workers, were led by 
Harriet Bolton who made available the union hall and facilities. She 
suggested that a mass workers' organization could be built up by starting 
a benefit fund which could attract workers to a common organization. 
Once the basis for association had been establ ished, the question of indus-
trial organization could be discussed in the I ight of the fear of the workers 
of police and employer repression. The garment union would provide a 
loan to establish the benefit fund which should eventually be registered in 
terms of the Friendly Societies Act. After discussion with African workers 
in the garment and furniture industry it was decided that the benefit fund 
should provide death benefits for the workers and their families. The 
General Factory Workers Benefit Fund, established in June 1972 was the 
first attempt after the mobilization of workers under SACTU in the 1950s 
and early 1960s to build up mass organization of workers. 117 The GFWBF 
almost immediately drew thousands of workers, and a special effort was 
made to recruit stevedoring workers from the Point and Maydon Wharf (the 
latter being geographically closer to the offices). 118 The immediate 
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strategy of the Wages Commission and the GFWBF was to help to organize 
works committees of members in the factories and to get these registered 
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in industrial law to provide some form of protection for the workers' leaders. 
The early attempts at developing workers' organization within each 
company and more broadly within an industry posed enormous problems. 
The agitation of the Wages Commission was immensely popular among the 
workers and each issue of Isisebenzi disappeared within minutes (usually 
before the police arrived), and often workers who had received earlier 
copies complained when the current issue had run out. 119 Complaints 
such as these exposed not on Iy the immediate problems of distribution but 
also the direction of agitatio~ - whether it should be general and possibly 
diffuse, or aimed at leading industrial groups such as the dock and abattoir 
workers which had taken the lead in strike action. The question was one 
of ideology and strategy. The Wages Commission felt that at best it 
could have an 'enabling' function, establishing a vehicle through which the 
underground workers' voice could be heard. At a future date it was con-
sidered that politically conscious workers, such as the thousands of workers 
who had been members of SACTU unions, would take over the editorial 
functions and-the Wages Commission's work would then become technical: 
reduced to research and printing. 120 Under the dominance of the black 
consciousness critique of wh ite student action, the Wages Commission did 
not seriously engage in a study of revolutionary underground organization 
linked to trade unionism. The Marxist ideas which were presented in 
Isisebenzi, those of surplus value and unpaid labour, were only related to 
trade unions which were seen as the 'biggest weapon' to advance the workers. 121 
The struggle of the workers was presented as one for 'a fair share of what they 
make' and for a living wage. As the possibility of establishing close 
relations with African workers increased, the need for a workers' newspaper 
was seen by leading members of the Wages Commission to be less urgent than 
the immediate organizational tasks. With every advance in organization 
there was a corresponding decrease in public agitation as the members of 
the Wages Commission took up the work of building the GFWBF. As 
the members learned the lessons of semi-secret organization in relation to 
groups of militant workers to avoid bringing the forces of repression on 
their own heads and to safeguard leading workers in the factories, the 
generol agitation seemed less important than the painstaking and time-
consuming work of developing contacts, studying wage agreements, and 
trying to understand the welter of complaints and grievances put forward 
122 by the workers. Articles putting forward the demands of workers 
with whom the Wages Commission was in touch were thought to endanger 
these workers by drawing the attention of employers and the pol ice to 
militant groups of workers. Not having an understanding of the pol itical 
aspirations of the working class and the need to bui Id the underground 
political organization of the workers as well as the semi-legal groupings 
in the GFWBF, the Wages Commission tended to dissolve with the growth 
f b h ' 123 o mass mem ers 'p. 
The struggle for higher wages and organization in stevedoring 
brought out both the strengths and weaknesses of the Wages Commission's 
approach to agitation and organization, The loose contacts which the 
Wages Commission established through the early editions of Isisebenzi were 
immensely strengthened by the wage investigation into stevedoring con-
ducted by the Wage Board in the wake of the concessions forced from the 
DSLSC in September 1971. The wage investigation gave the Wages 
Commission the opportunity of publicizing the wage sitting widely and 
transforming the wage investigation into one of the most decisive confronta-
tions ever experienced by the Wage Board between workers and the 
employers and state officials. By championing the demands of the steve-
doring workers, the Wages Commission laid the basis for the initiation of 
independent organization of workers in one of the most repressive areas of 
employment in South Africa. The advances were, however, made at a 
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high cost to advanced workers, particularly those employed by the DSLSC, 
and the victories of the workers in open confrontation with the employers 
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were not able to be repeated. Without exaggeration it could be claimed 
that the impressive demonstration of solidarity by the stevedoring workers 
at the wage sitting, which was repeated by workers in Cape Town, was 
instrumental in changing legislation to ensure that such confrontations were 
not to be repeated in the future. The increased activity by the steve-
doring workers,had important political implications for the African petty 
bourgeoisie. In particular those sections taking up the leadership of the 
KwaZulu Bantustan were posed with the contradiction between their 
collaboration and the independent organization of the workers. 
The investigation of the Wage Board into the stevedoring trade in 
July 1972 gave an immediate impetus for a campaign on the wages of the 
workers. The Wages Commission produced a special edition of Isisebenzi 
which gave publicity to the specific time and place of the Wage Board 
sitting and encouraged the workers to make the strongest representations. 
The newspaper pointed out that the employers would be claiming that the 
indunas would be speaking for the workers and that the workers should reject 
their ingratiating appeals and make their own demands. The workers were 
informed of a method of presenting demands based on their needs in the form 
of budgets, and the demand was made that the hours of work should be 
reduced from 56 to 40 a week. 124 The conditions of the stevedores should 
be at least brought up to the minimum standards of the Factories Act. 125 
The Natal Branch of TUCSA, which had attempted to organize a registered 
un ion for Indian and Coloured dock workers, supported the demand to end 
poverty wages. 'If the recommendations of the Wage Board are not above 
the nationally agreed poverty datum line', said Espie, the organ izing 
secretary of the Natal branch, 'then it will seem to be Government pol icy 
k k . I I' 126 0 h' . h . t d to eep wor ers on starvation eve s . n tiS occaSion t e regl sere 
trade unions represented by TUCSA, particularly the local official of the 
National Distributive Workers Union, gave support to the demands to 
double the wages of the stevedoring labourers. 
The workers received copies of the special edition of Isisebenzi 
enthusiastically. At the Grindrod premises at Maydon Wharf members 
of the Wages Commission were taken around the buildings by the workers. 
On the day of the wage sitting, 17 July 1972, the Wages Commission 
received a letter from the workers which spelt out the concrete demands of 
the workers and rejected any representations apart from those of the 
labourers. The 16 points contained in the letter were systematically 
developed and constituted the fundamental demands of the stevedoring 
workers in the forthcoming period. The letter, wh ich appeared to come 
from the writers of the pamphlets in 1969 and 1971, complained that the 
workers had been instructed by their employers not to attend the sitting. 127 
The DSLSC management had told the workers that they would select some 
people to represent the workers at the meeting. 'The problem is we do 
not know these people and also we don It know whether those people will 
be Ii ke those who stood for us in 1969.' The demands were firmly located 
in the labourers with a strong accent on the right of manual and productive 
workers to higher wages. The Icustomary' representation of the indunas 
was repudiated, the labourers having the right to put forward demands on 
behalf of all the workers because of the lead they had taken in strike action 
and the losses they had suffered. 
In all strikes which we have had here not a single induna was 
chased away. How many people were chased away from 
work in 1969 in connection with strikes for money? Among 
those people who were chased away how many indunas were 
there? Why do the bosses give enough money to those people 
who said they were satisfied with the amount which we earn? 
All the demands for increases made at strikes come from people 
who are working very hard and who are not satisfied with the 
money wh ich we earn. The indunas just laugh at us and say 
you are playing if you ask for higher wages because the money 
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we earn is enough. When the manager called them and 
asked about the wages we earn they said clearly they were 
satisfied. The question is this: Why do the bosses give 
them higher wages when they said they were satisfied? 128 
In the letter highly specific demands were made around the basic wage 
demand of R 18 basic wage and 50 cents per hour overtime. 129 The other 
important demands were a night shift allowance, better food during the 
night shift ('even the prisoners don't eat this food'), an annual bonus, and 
for damaged helmets to be replaced by the employers. 
Despite the DSLSC management's refusal to allow those employed 
on 17 July to appear at the Wage Board sitting, more than 200 stevedores 
crammed into the small hall in the Department of Labour building used for 
the heari ng . The partitions between two rooms had to be removed to 
allow all the workers to hear the proceedings and the employers and state 
officials shifted uncomfortably as the crowd of workers pressed against their 
130 
seats around the U-shaped tables. The large number of workers who 
arrived at the Wage Board sitting could be attributed not only to the infor-
mation carried by Isisebenzi (many workers openly displayed their copies), 
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but also to the fact that the writers of the letter had agreed that there should 
be independent representation of the workers by those not at work that day.131 
The hearing opened with a short statement from the Wage Board Chairman, 
H. W. Tindale, who appealed to those 'Aho wanted to speak to be brief. 
He granted permission to the Bantu liaison officer of the DSLSC, J. B. 
Buthelezi, who was described as the leader of the stevedoring workers, to 
put the case for the workers. 132 Buthelezi opened his address with the 
claim that the works committee (himself and the indunas beside him) repre-
sented the workers and that they had a good relationship with their employer. 
He asked for a general increase in wages without specifying a demand, 
leaving that for the Wage Board to make a reasonable decision, and proposed 
other minor improvements in conditions. He was interrupted in his 
del ivery by a representative of the Wages Commission who suggested that 
the proceedings should be translated so the large numbers of workers who 
had come to make representations could follow the arguments. This 
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was reluctantly conceded by the Wage Board Chairman, and an independent 
part-time court translator brought to the hearing by the Wages Commission 
was permitted to go ahead. Buthelezi then appealed to the students' 
representatives and those he described as outside the industry not to inter-
fere in the representations to the Wage Board or to 'raise unfounded hopes' 
among the workers. He argued that they, the works committee, and their 
employers were the parties primarily concerned with the investigation and 
knew best the conditions of the industry. He reminded 'well intentioned 
persons' of how similar minded people in 1969 had lost the jobs of 900 
workers but had not brought about any improvement in conditions. He 
pointed out the copies of Isisebenzi which he said were circulating among 
'uneducated and ignorant workers' and wh ich wou Id I ead the workers to 
believe there would be results far beyond what could be achieved. 'We 
don't appreciate going behind doors', he said and asked the Wages Commis-
sion to leave the workers alone; they were quite able to look after them-
selves. In a most important remark which gave an insight into his political 
position he said: 'If we are fighting a losing battle, we will refer these 
matters to our own governments. ' The pamphlets which were being distri-
buted, he argued, should be sent to the Minister of Justice for him to take 
action. If the people who wrote them wished to apply their energies in a 
good cause he suggested they should turn their attention to the unemployed 
and 'get them something to eat', rather than misleading those already in 
employment and robbing them of their jobs, as had occurred in 1969. 133 
Buthelezi was speaking not only on behalf of the 'works committee' of 
selected indunas keenly defending their position, but also as a leading repre-
sentative of the Bantu Labour Regional Committee, charged in terms of the 
Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953 of representing the workers 
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and setting disputes under the direction of the Department of Labour. 
The employers said his request for an upward adjustment to basic wages 
and overtime, and a special allowance for workers handling poisonous 
loads was justified. 
His vigorous denunciation of the Wages Commission and attacks 
on the labourers caused rising resentment and frequent interjections from 
the workers. Who is this man, who elected him to represent us?' they 
asked. Others attacked Buthelezi for sitting in an office and not dirty-
ing his hands by working on the ships. The employers were alarmed with 
these attacks on 'their' African representative and Dreyer demanded that 
the Chairman call on workers who spoke to identify themselves. This 
suggestion caused an uproar, and the Wages Commission spokesperson 
accused the employers of trying to victimize the workers who addressed the 
Wage Board. The Chairman appealed for calm on two occasions and 
asked the employers not to victimize workers who had made representations; 
he also said he and other officials had a plane to catch and the representa-
tions should be shortened. Under these constraints the workers were 
allowed to speak. 
The TUCSA representative, Espie, argued that the workers should 
earn at least the poverty datum line. 'This allows a person to live and 
nothing more. It is better to starve and not to work, than work and 
starve. These people are on starvation wages. They should get no less 
than R 18 a week. It is not enough, but we will accept that.' The 
workers argued they had families in the reserves who were starving, they 
had put their case time and again to the employers, but had only met with 
repression and dismissals. All the workers who spoke rejected completely 
the 'works committee' and demanded it should stop claiming to represent 
them. When the director of the Natal Employers' Association, L. D. 
Thorne, said there was no reason for increasing 'what are already good and 
fair wages' and that each African family had more than one work, he was 
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shouted down by the workers. In contradiction to the employers ' claim 
that the workers had the 'advantage ' of being housed in compounds and did 
not have to meet housi ng and transport costs, a worker stood up and d is-
played his rai Iway season ticket. The Wages Commission presented a 
memorandum to the Wage Board which contained a translation of the letter 
received from the workers and demanded R18 a week basic wage, overtime 
at a rate of time-and-a-half, Sunday time at double the daily rate, an 
annual bonus, that the workers be free not to work on Saturday, and that 
all overtime should be voluntary. The memorandum called for an end to 
the recruitment of workers from remote rural areas and to migrant labour 
generally: wages should be raised to a level which would allow the 
workers ' households to live in urban conditions. It also pointed out that 
stevedoring was highly profitable and the employers quite able to meet the 
increased wage costs. In response to the bitter attack on the Wages 
Commission by Buthelezi and the Natal Employers I Association, the spokes-
person, Halton Cheadle, referred to the memorandum and the lack of 
democratic representation of the workers: 'This memorandum represents 
only part of our evidence. The rest lies there I , he said, pointing to the 
workers packing the hall. He accused the Wage Board of not publicizing 
wage investigations. 135 The hearing was dominated by the destructive 
presence of J. B. Buthelezi and the Wage Board's supposed questions of time; 
the workers, for whom this sitting was one of the few opportunities for dis-
cussing their wages in a place outside the control of the employers, were 
only allowed brief interventions at the end of the sitting by an increasingly 
impatient Wage Board. The officials of the Wage Board made no attempt 
to convince the workers of their impartiality, despite the juridical aura which 
the officials cultivated. At the end of the hearing the Chairman said: 
We will do the best we can. We hope you won It be disappointed ' • 
This statement indicated that the demand for R 18 was not likely to be met, 
a position which was reinforced when he said that the wage of the stevedores 
was higher than wages in other industries and that the picture painted of 
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poverty and starvation was not as desperate as some people claimed. 136 
As has been argued in the discussion of the activity of the Wage Board in 
the 1960s, its prime function was to modify the wage system in the 
interests of the employers, to even out the wage increases conceded by 
some employers throughout the trade, rather than to act as an independent 
and authoritative state institution. As all state institutions in capitalist 
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society, it served to reconcile the class interests of the workers to the over-
whelming dominance of the social power of capital; the forthright repudia-
tion of the claims of the workers by the Wage Board Chairman reflected 
his class position as a state official. 
Despite the commanding position granted to J. B. Buthelezi at the 
hearing which put the workers and the Wages Commission on a defensive 
footing, having to argue against the employers in a setting in wh ich the 
force of state repression was being evoked, the workers were in a buoyant 
mood. They felt that Buthelezi had exposed himself as an agent of both 
the employers and the state, and a comradely relationship developed bet-
ween the burly and self-confident workers and the radical students. On 
the way out of the Department of Labowr bui Idings one of the workers 
reassured the Wages Commission that they had made a tremendous step for-
ward: 'J.B. won't see Christmas'. The problems of transforming this 
enthusiasm and determination into semi-legal or underground class organiza-
tion in the savagely repressive regime as maintained at the docks remained 
a fundamental problem for the officials of the GFWBF. 137 Communication 
between the officials and workers was difficult as few of the workers spoke 
English and few of the officials Zulu. Any discussion about organization 
immediately after the hearing was limited by the presence of state officials 
and probably the Security Branch: open discussion between the white 
students and black workers on the pavements would have attracted the 
police's attention. Quite apart from the workers' caution in having dis-
cussions with a relatively unknown and untried social group, the workers 
had different levels of consciousness and differing strategies for organizing 
under highly repressive conditions. For some workers the strategy was a 
simple one of 'getting rid' of the person who personified the oppression of 
the DSlSC, J. B. Buthelezi, and this did not necessarily imply long-term 
organization and universally agreed demands. For others, possibly more 
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cautious at the initial stages, J. B. Buthelezi's dictatorship rested on the 
power of the DSlSC and the state over the expenditure of their labour power. 
For these workers secret but large-scale organization was essential for any of 
the demands of the workers to be met. The differing tendencies among 
the workers took time to be appreciated and understood, especia lIy after 
the elation of a successful manipulation of the procedures of the state. 
Employers throughout Durban were disturbed by the wage hearing 
being transformed into a mass meeting; it gave the workers the opportunity 
of placing demands before the employers and the Wage Board which were not 
likely to be met (the R 18 demand constituted an increase of 118 per cent 
over existing wages), and being able to hold the threat of strike action over 
the heads of both. A similar strategy conducted by the Wages Commission 
in conjunction with advanced workers in an industry being investigated by 
the Wage Board could have the same results and create a groundswell of 
working class action. The Natal Employers Association, of which the 
DSLSC was a leading member, was most alert to these possibilities and felt 
the Wage Board hearing had been turned into a demonstration against exist-
ing legislation which did not allow African workers to organize freely. 
The Director, l.D. Thorne, was concerned that the strategy of the Wages 
Commission which had been used in the investigation into the cement pro-
ducts industry in June 1971, and the next public hearing wh ich Was on the 
stevedoring trade, would be repeated in the future. I n his words, th is 
would cause 'the uninitiated worker to believe that results will accrue that 
cannot in fact occur', and the interests of the ,African worker would be 
damaged. 
The (Wage) Act permits only interested parties to take part 
in such investigations and it may well be that the Board 
will be forced to apply this strictly in future if such liber-
ties are to be taken with its procedures; certain Iy no use-
ful work could be undertaken in the detailed examination of 
a wage determination in such an atmosphere. 138 
Like the other employers present at the wage hearing, Thorne had been 
shaken by the determination of the workers to more than double their wages 
and the vehemence with which they had rejected the authority of black 
company officials and the arguments of the employers. As an employer 
his first response was to limit, control, and repress, the forthright articula-
tion of the workers' demands. For the stevedoring employers, as for the 
NEA director, the lesson of the hearing was a simple one: there were to 
be no more public hearings conducted by the Wage Board into the wages and 
d· . f k· d· 139 con Itlons 0 wor ers In steve orlng. 
Bantustans and 'responsible autonomy' 
The question of the form of control of the workers by the stevedoring 
employers after the 1969 strike was raised acutely by the growing power of 
an African official within the DSLSC: J. B. Buthelezi. From one 
perspective the advance of an African person into a commanding position of 
management in a company indicated a general movement away from racism 
towards a managerial view of the necessary upward mobility of African 
workers and an end to the colour bar in industry. African workers would 
be promoted to those jobs for which they had a particular aptitude and 
would become part of a management team and not just 'window dressing'. 
The growing authority of black officia Is and the indunas in the DSLSC was 
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not simply a superficial change in the appearance of authority in the company, 
it is argued, but a response to the crisis of productivity in the docks and to 
the workers' struggle. African supervision was both more effective and 
cheaper, deepened the divi&ion of labour, and secured a loyal section of 
the work force during strikes. With the acceptance of the Bantustan pol icy 
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by the chiefs and sections of the African petty bourgeoisie, however, the 
rural links of the workers became both more important ideologically and 
pol itically. The DSLSC which recruited selectively from particular 
reserves, and which encouraged its indunas to select workers for their gangs, 
was bound to establish reciprocal relationships with chiefs and Bantustan 
bureaucrats. It was this policy which attracted favourable comment from 
h I · d" k' D b 140 S k . an ant ropo oglst stu ylng migrant wor ers In ur an. ac s inter-
viewed the stevedoring workers employed by DSLSC, and wrote approvingly of 
the 'ethnic' managerial policies. An anthropology graduate was in 
charge of the compounds and white officials spoke African languages. 
Dreyer supplemented his anthropological knowledge with an understanding 
of industrial legislation, and wages and working conditions were centrally 
controlled. Because management recruited workers from certain districts 
only and selected the indunas and clerical staff carefully it was 'at all times 
aware of what is going on among its employees'. 
The stevedores who were interviewed .•• showed a high degree 
of commitment to their employer. Many· pointed out that they 
had more than doubled the wages they earned at their previous 
jobs; others liked the many opportunities for overtime that 
existed at the time of the research; nearly all thaught that the 
system whereby they were paid a guaranteed wage whether there 
was work available or not, was most fair; and several men said 
that it was important to have White managers who understood 
their customs. 141 
Management was said to grant workers who wanted to make ancestral sacri-
fices leave without question. In the company, Sacks wrote, he found 
none of the inter-racial tension that was prevalent in the SARH because the 
workers were 'largely self-supervised'. These idyllic conditions carried 
out by 'an exceptionally benevolent and considerate' employer encouraged 
the recruitment of abakhaya (men from the same home district) which then 
f h d" 142 worked together under an induna likely to come rom t e same IStriCt. 
'In general, indunas are most likely to supervise their abakhaya.' 143 The 
arbitrary power of the indunas was said to be limited by the attitude of 
fellow abakhaya and by the holding of 'kangaroo courts' before which an 
induna could be required to appear. This court would be composed of 
the liaison officer, J.B. Buthelezi, the compound indunas of the parties 
concerned, the respective witnesses, and, as in a traditional indaba, an 
interested audience. A court procedure would be followed with parti-
cipants being able to make remarks and interjections. 'Thus all indunas 
are immediately subject to the disciplinary sanction of public opinion in 
such a court. ,144 Sacks reported that he had heard of indunas being so 
ridiculed by such courts as to ask for demotion or having to resign. The 
indunas then had to rely on social rather than formal authority in keeping 
up the pace of work, they had to have the 'aptitude for controlling their 
fellow workers' and an 'ability to win and maintain the respect of the men 
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they control' • Following the analogy used by Sacks: Dreyer was 
the chairman of the school board, Buthelezi the headmaster, and the 
indunas the prefects. The system described is a far cry from the demo-
cratic control of the workers over the indunas, as the judges were the 
senior black compound officials and even the 'ship' indunas were not 
involved in deciding on discipl ine of their own grade, but it did indicate 
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a certain devolution of power from management to Buthelezi. The recruit-
ment of workers from selected areas plus a measure of 'self-supervision' was 
an attempt to fuse the notion of an induna as a commander in the Zulu army 
with that of being the sergeant-major of capital commanding the labour-
power of the workers. Sacks presents the supervision of the workers by 
the indunas as completely unproblematical because of the ethnic and 
political policies of the DSLSC. 
The Company's indunas ••• seem to fill most of the traditional 
roles of 'tribal' indunas: they represent large bodies of men, 
some of whom are kin, from particular areas; their roles are 
ascribed: they are the 'mouthpieces' of the economic autho-
rity that organizes the men's economic activities just as the 
'traditional' chief used to; finally, like the 'tribal' or 
'traditional' induna, they have their own particular friends, 
interests and loyalties, but these did not detract unduly from 
the popular acceptance of their circumscribed powers. 146 
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Such an analysis is taken at the level of appearances: ideologically 
management and the senior officials present the black supervisors as having 
the traditional mystique of Zulu military grandeur; in practice the black 
supervisors are engaged in the service of the employers in extracting the most 
unpaid labour from the workers. Despite this material relationship with 
their employers, the powers of the black supervisors were I imited not by kanga-
roo courts, or even by 'ethnic' bonds, but by the solidarity of the workers in 
production. The growth of class consciousness and independent action by 
the labourers necessarily involved a rejection of Zulu militarism, which would 
constitute a barrier with workers from other backgrounds and reinforce the rule 
of the black supervisors, and the development of new forms of association and 
ideology. The advances made by the stevedoring workers in developing 
underground organization, new strategies for resistance under the most vicious 
repression, and by taking strike action in the face of armed police, were testi-
mony to the growth in consciousness of the workers under the harsh discipl ine 
of capitalist production. It was precisely these advances which forced 
management to depend more resolutely on African officials such as Buthelezi 
and to encourage a degree of autonomy to the black supervisors. 147 Far 
from limiting the power of the indunas, the 'kangaroo courts' built the autho-
rity of the 'judge', J.B. Buthelezi, and confirmed his rule both over the 
workers and any recalcitrant indunas. 
These modifications in the rule of capitol over the workers were 
hardly typical of companies in Durban or elsewhere {although similar 
strategies are possibly adopted by capitol in mining} and completely bemused 
Sacks, who contrasted this 'benevolence' with the ruthless dictatorship over 
the workers exercised by the SARH. 148 This approach does not compre-
hend that all sections of capital, including state enterprise, are united in 
the pursuit of the most rapid rate of accumulation and that the exploitation 
of workers by each section merely follows different forms of domination by 
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capital. Both the stevedoring companies and the SARH are united in 
moving cargo at the lowest cost to capital as a whole; genuine differences 
in approach to the workers are based only on calculations of the most effec-
tive methods of explo itation. The form of rule of capital in the DSLSC, 
expressed through the growing power of Buthelezi, was a product both of 
the overwhelming dependence of management on the direct labour of the 
workers (rather than its augmentation through the accumulated labour of 
the past - mechanization) and was a response to the struggle of the workers 
and the level of class struggle in apartheid society as a whole. 
The firm resolution of the workers to continue the strike in 1969 to 
the point of mass dismissal not only resulted in a disorganization of produc-
tion (to which the management put a brave face and brought in short-term 
scab labour) but also confused the recruiting relationships which had been 
developed over the 1960s. Obviously, management was not forthcoming 
over the precise re-arrangements which were in the wake of the strike, but 
one over-riding principle was observed. No workers who had participated 
in the strike were to be re-employed. The victimization of the strikers 
thus extended from the docks to the countryside, and the confrontations 
between victimized workers and those hurriedly being engaged at the newly 
constituted tribal labour bureaux can be imagined. The situation was 
compl icated by the large number of workers who were on leave at the time 
of the strike and who may well have had close affinity to those victimized 
and even worked in the same gangs. 
The growing importance of the reserves to the DSLSC in reorganizing 
production took place at a time when the Kwa Zulu Bantustan was being 
conso I idated. The question of accepting this form of political control 
was highly controversial to the workers and the remnants of the peasantry in 
the Natal and Zululand reserves, and the acceptance of Bantu authorities 
by the Paramount Chief by no means settled the issue. The debate raised 
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arguments about the benefits of collaboration (e.g. the increased state expendi-
ture which would follow) or the most appropriate form of resistance to over-
throw the entire system of apartheid. During these debates the position 
adopted by Chief Albert Luthuli, the banned President of the African 
National Congress, was discussed as well as the need for resistance to 
counter the attraction of the chiefs and sections of the African petty bourge-
oisie of the Bantustan scheme. Armed guerillas of the African National 
Congress (ANC) moved into the countryside and attempted to set up training 
camps to establish bases for armed resistance. One group approached 
Chief Gatsha Buthelezi for his cooperation in training the youth in the 
techniques of armed struggle. All apparently were rounded up by the 
Security Branch and eleven guerillas and Dorothy Nyembe, a leader of the 
ANC, were brought to trial in Pietermaritzburg early in 1969 charged in 
terms of the Terrorism Act and the Suppression of Communism Act. Gatsha 
Buthelezi gave evidence against the accused who were convicted and given 
long prison sentences. The episode indicated the intensity with which 
pol itically advanced African people resisted the approach of the Bantustan 
scheme in the Natal and Zululand reserves. 149 Once the opposition of 
the people to the Bantustans had been overcome, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi 
was elected as the Chief Executive Officer on 9 June 1970. He promised 
the Minister of Bantu Administration his full cooperation in implementing 
the Bantu authorities and called for the policy of separate development to 
be made to work as soon as possible. 150 The chiefs were particularly 
enthusiastic about the formation of a KwaZulu Bantustan. Their position 
was consolidated by an expansion of office buildings and a petty bureaucracy 
to implement the decisions of the territorial authority and more importantly 
to build the tribal labour bureaux which served as a major source of income 
for the chiefs. 151 Many chiefs made use of their increased authority to 
impose arbitrary taxes on the people. In one case a ch ief called on his 
migrant worker 'subjects' to pay R2 whenever he felt it necessary in lieu of 
the labour in his fields he was traditionally entitled to; the money going 
on whisky, improvements to his house, or on a new car once every three 
152 S"I II • f years or so. Iml ar a egatlons 0 extravagant expenditure were 
made about Gatsha Buthelezi, although strongly denied. 153 Whether 
through statutory or corrupt means the growth of the KwaZulu Bantustan 
entailed increased taxation and suffering for the workers and peasants, 
and a rapid acceleration of class formation in the reserves. With the 
granting of 'citizenship' of KwaZulu in 1970 to Zulu-speaking people, 
an additional tax of R3 per head was imposed for the 'development ' of the 
people. l54 While at the outset the ideology of the KwaZulu leader-
ship was one of tribal sol idarity, with its growing aspirations nationally 
and internationally, leaders such as Gatsha Buthelezi presented them-
selves as authentic black nationalists and the true representatives of the 
oppressed black masses. Their nationalism was an attempt to overcome 
the glaring class contradictions between their collaboration and accumula-
tion and the increasing misery of the African working people. 155 
With the growth of Bantustans throughout South Africa, both the 
apartheid state and employers looked to the Bantustan leadership for a 
repudiation of armed struggle and the political control over its citizenry: 
the African working class. The DSlSC in particular was looking to the 
Bantustan authorities to provide the kinds of social and pol itical controls 
wh ich would bring the devastating strikes such as 1969 to an end. The 
relationship with the reserves, which formerly was predominantly economic 
(the areas most likely to provide the right type and sufficient supply of 
labour), was becoming politicized. 156 A mutual relationship developed 
between the chiefs and bureaucrats in the reserves confronted with the 
daily demand of workers for jobs at the tribal labour bureaux, and the com-
panies concerned with employing contract labour. This point could pos-
sibly be over-developed, as the most advanced sections of capital were 
looking to more sophisticated social controls, but for labour-intensive 
sectors, such as stevedoring, mining, construction and agriculture, these 
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new relationships with the reserves were important. For the DSLSC, 
re-organizing labour supplies in the post-strike situation, the political 
relationship with the Bantustans was crucial. 
After the 1969 strike the DSLSC made some significant changes in 
the areas from which it drew its labour supplies. 
Table 7.3 
Sources of labour supply, DSLSC 
Magisterial district Percentage of total employment 
Nongoma 
Nkandla 
Mount ~yl iff 
Matatuba 
Melmoth 
Bizana 
Tabankulu 
Estcourt 
Ixopo 
Kranskop 
Nqutu 
Mtbhunzini 
Flagstaff 
Camperdown 
Umbumbulu 
Mahlabathini 
Other districts 
1970 
13.6 
10.7 
10. 1 
8.7 
8.2 
B.O 
7.9 
6.5 
4. 1 
3.9 
2.6 
2.0 
1.9 
1.3 
1.0 
0.0 
9.4 
99.9 
1972 Change 
17.2 +3.6 
9.2 -1.5 
6.7 -3.4 
4.4 -4.3 
B.8 +0.6 
7. 1 -0.9 
7.4 -0.5 
1.6 -4.9 
3.0 -1.1 
. 1.8 
-2. 1 
1.4 -1.2 
1.9 -0. 1 
1.1 -0.8 
1.0 -0.3 
1.2 +0.2 
16.6 +16.6 
9.6 +0.2 
100.0 
Source: Interview with Dreyer in 1970 and Sacks, II, Table 1. 
The figures refer to January 1970 and 16 May 1972. 
Note: The distri cts are ranked according to their importance 
in 1970 but dropping the relatively insignificant districts 
not mentioned in Socks, II, Table I. 
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The figures wh ich are presented here refer to the post-strike period 
{starting nine months after the strike} and do not measure the transforma-
tion which must have taken place as a means of both breaking the strike 
and providing a short-term reconstruction of the labour force. But 
they do indicate highly significant changes as management attempted to 
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lay the basis for a stable labour fore e in the future. There are, however, 
some clues to the districts wh ich suffered most from the victimization of 
strikers in 1969. Employers appear to have a typology of areas and 
h . .. d h . . d··· k 157 W k et mc groups In min w en recruIting or Ismlsslng wor ers. or ers 
from Mthunzini were regarded as undesirable, in the words of one employer: 
'A man who recruits there must be mad. They are lazy, poor workers, 
th i eves, and are often absent on Mondays, or after Pub I ic Ho I idays. ' 
For reasons which are not immediately apparent, these workers have a 
higher degree of resistance to employers and stronger class consciousness. 
Sacks reports that the DSLSC experienced 'considerabl e unrest' from these 
'spirited and independent' workers, and the majority wer;: dismissed. 
The DSLSC decided never to recruit in that area again. 158 Other districts 
may also have been subject to a 'black list' depending on the workers' 
independence from traditional authority and bourgeois ideology. Con-
versely, the DSLSC would seek out the areas from which management would 
calculate the workers would be capable, sturdy and docile. 
The figures show a continued and increased dependence on workers 
from districts most remote from the towns and a more 'Zulu' emphasis, with 
a decline in workers from the Transkei and an increase in those from KwaZulu. 
The most remarkable increase in employment is from workers from Mahlabathini 
followed by Nongoma. 159 The areas from which most of the workers are 
recruited are 'all places of great historical importance in the development of 
. k . f I ,160 Th the Zulu, and where the past constantly ma es Its presence e t .' ese 
areas are the 'heartlands' in the formation of the Zulu people from smaller 
tribes, the places where Chaka fought his rivals and gained ascendancy, 
and where kings were buried. The workers recrui ted from these areas 
were basically traditionalists in religion and poorly educated, 'the man 
for the job' in terms of the stevedoring employers. 161 About 70 per 
cent of the workers employed by the DSLSC are illiterate, and the propor-
tions are likely to be higher in the case of workers from the heartlands of 
162 KwaZulu. These areas were those where a sense of Zulu 'national' 
pride and the great military tradition were strongest, and the tribal system 
maintained some vitality. Workers from these areas were I ikely to give 
some traditional ideological content to the workplace 'induna', to accept 
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a militaristic discipline, and to have most faith in the KwaZulu Bantustan. 
Drawing on labour from these areas was not totally without its contradictions 
for the employers, but these were seen as secondary to the primary advan-
tages of political control by the chiefs and collaborating petty bourgeoisie, 
and the continuing importance of a homestead subsidy to wages. The pos-
sible disadvantages to employers were the use of Zulu 'national' pride in 
resisting imperialism in great military confrontations against their conditions 
of exploitation, and the underdevelopment of bourgeois ideology in the form 
of Christianity. As has been argued, however, the heroic military resis-
tance to imperialism of the Zulu people was an ambiguous legacy for the 
struggle of African workers, Pondo, H lubi, Sotho, Xesibe and Bhaca, in the 
stevedori ng trade. I t provided a focus for resistance to the roc ia I form of 
capitalist rule, but also made the workers more susceptible to the sergeant-
majors of capital: the indunas. It also could not serve as a basis for 
class organization with other African workers from peoples who had been 
subjected to Zulu military domination. There was a sense in which Zulu 
workers would object to their gross exploitation because of their pride in 
their historical greatness, but resistance on this basis could only strengthen 
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possible antagonism from other workers. As one of the older workers 
told Sacks: 'Before we fought you Whites; now we fight our pride. 
Both battles are, however, for our families. ,164 Armed resistance to 
white domination is now taking place on a national basis, Zulu pride being 
an obstacle to the unity of the oppressed, particularly its leading force, 
the black working class. The lack of enthusiasm of the people in the 
Zulu heartland for Christianity is possibly more significant. Conversion 
to Christianity has been one of the most significant cultural features in 
the proletarianisation of African workers, revolutionizing consumption 
and ensuring the ideological subordination of African workers to the 
capitalist system. In whatever denominational form, including the 
independent African churches, Christianity has served to adjust African 
workers to their exploitation as contract workers in single sex compounds 
by stressing moral fortitude and an 'other-worldly' viewpoint. While 
Christianity has stressed obedience to authority 'in this world', the tradi-
tionalists have maintained a view of filial piety - loyalty and reverence 
for the homestead. 165 Traditionalists or atheists have not had to under-
go the moral anguish over the use of force in resistance to the apartheid 
state. 
With the growth of the KwaZulu Bantustan and its leadership, the 
reserves increased in political significance as a whole, but each district 
faced the pressing demands of the workers. As the workers queued out-
side the newly constituted tribal labour bureaux waiting for the recruiters, 
the local pressures on the leadership must have been intense. These were 
the difficulties faced at an early stage in the development of the Bantustan 
584 
by Chief Gatsha Buthelezi in Mahlabatini, the Paramount Chief in Nongoma, 
and Barney Dladla in the Estcourt district. The increased number of 
workers employed from the heartland by the DSLSC relieved some of the 
pressure on the leaders in Mahlabatini and Nongoma, but not in Estcourt 
where employment fell rapidly between 1970 and 1972. With the 
ascendancy of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi to the political leadership of KwaZulu 
it is remarkable that from no workers employed in 1970 there was an increase 
to 426 from Mahlabathini in May 1972. This period also marked the 
growth in power in the DSLSC of J. B. Buthelezi, the paternal uncle of Chief 
Gatsha Buthelezi. 
I t is not possible to trace the precise relationship between the 
political authorities in Mahlabathini and the DSLSC. It was unlikely 
there were no workers from Mahlabathini employed by the company before 
the 1969 strike, it could even have been that these workers took a leading 
part in that struggle. 166 What is certain is that prior to the establish-
ment of the KwaZulu territorial authority there were no workers employed 
from that area, and after Chief Buthelezi's election as Chief Executive 
Officer there was a sudden increase in employment. Whatever the 
specific terms of the relationship, the general question which is raised by 
the relief of the pressure of unemployed workers on the tribal labour 
bureaux in Mahlabathini, is the political control over a large section of 
the DSLSC workers. If, as Sacks argues, workers were recruited on a 
basis of abakhaya and controlled by indunas from their home districts, the 
growth of the KwaZulu Bantustan brought the DSLSC workers more closely 
under the control of the chiefs and petty bureaucracy of the tribal labour 
bureaux. 
As a member of the African petty bourgeoisie which voiced public 
~pposition to the apartheid state while implementing its policies, J. B. 
Buthelezi wavered between articulating some of the demands of the workers, 
and acting as the executor of the policies of a company privileged to recruit 
north of the T ugela. In his letter to the Wages Commission he employed 
the ingratiating and obsequious manner of the African petty bourgeois while 
also documenting the demands of the workers for the re-employment of the 
workers victimized in 1969. Before the Wage Board sitting he had 
rejected his potential role as an intermediary between the workers and the 
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Wages Commission. With the continued agitation of the Wages Commission, 
and in the face of the rising demands of the workers, he took on an increas-
ing Iy repressive role. At all times, however, there was no question of his 
independence either from the determined exploitation of the workers or the 
oppression of the workers and impoverished peasantry in the countryside. 
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increases for representatives and chiefs. Wage increases for 
workers employed by these authorities. on any significant scale were 
rejected. (See Transkei Legislative Assembly debates.) 
9. Between these years the food index had increased by 15.7 per cent 
and wages by 1. 1 per cent. 
10. Natal Regional Survey (1969): 83 
11. Notes on communication (1969): 1. The tradition the dock workers 
had built was rather different: one of militancy and class consciousness. 
12. Dreyer, the Assistant Manager, kept the following books on his shelves: 
Bryant, Olden Times in Zululand, and Zulu History; Davidson, Old 
Africa Rediscovered; Krige, The Social System of the Zulu; Engle-
brecht, The Korana. His ideological orientation was shown by his 
other choice of titles: Ayn Rand, Atlas Shrugged, and Soviet Strategy 
in a Nuclear Age. 
13. For a full discussion of the many taxes to wh ich Africans are liable, 
see Race Relations News, August 1978. 
14. Daily News, 4 and 9 January 1962. Officials of SACTU sup-
ported the workers' demands after the strike had broken out. 
The workers were eventually acquitted after being defended by 
R.I. Arenstein, a leading left-wing lawyer. 
15. Daily News, 10 February, 14 March, and 29 August 1966. The 
workers were charged with having taken strike action and only 
after lengthy court proceedings was their appeal against convic-
tion and sentence of R25 imposed by a Durban Magistrate success-
ful. The state's response in both strikes which were followed by 
prosecution demonstrated a determination to punish severely any 
instances of working class activity against employers. 
16. The recommendation was published in Government Notice No 2030 
on 8 November 1968. 
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17. The tax system was a classical example of racial discrimination with 
African workers allowed no rebates and the threshold of taxation 
beginning at a lower level than whites. A refusal to pay tax made 
the workers I iable to a fi.ne of R400 or 6 months imprisonment, or 
both. SRR 1969: 156- 158 
18. In discussions on this topic Dreyer accepted the facts as set out in 
the pamphlets. He explained that the African clerks at the Bantu 
Commissioner's Office calculated that the stevedoring labourer 
earned roughly between R600-670 per annum. Apparently from 
calculations R 14 per week came to be regarded as the threshold for 
income tax for stevedoring workers. The tax officials obviously 
set the threshold figure as low as possible to reap the greatest revenue. 
19. These details have been assembled from interviews with Dreyer, 1970-
72. There were obviously many other important developments 
before the publication of WD 308 and the Security Branch can not have 
been idle. What was striking is the extent to which the necessarily 
small scale of agitation in the two pamphlets both gripped the atten-
tion of the workers and forced management into unprecedented concern. 
It was also a refle~tion on the disorganization of the resistance move-
ment that no pamphlets had been produced calling on all African 
workers to resist the new tax system. 
20. The Government Gazette is in fact dated 3 April 1969, and the wage 
determination was to come into operation officially on 23 April 1969. 
21. Daily News, 5 April 1969. 
22. In bourgeois democracies obviously the police try to appear as impartial 
upholders of the law, independent of the interests of the employers in 
strikes and disputes, and concerned only to avoid damage to property 
and not property relations. In South Africa; given the national 
oppression of the black masses, such a separation was not thought to be 
necessary, and wring times of crisis the social and political powers 
coalesce. The rising level of strike action has, however, raised 
the need for the police to appear as a distinct and separate power 
independent from the maintenance of the cheap labour system (cf. 
statementsof the police during the Durban strikes). A contra-
dictory state policy had resulted in both an expansion of the space 
of civil society (as penal sanctions in employment contracts have 
been eased) and an increase in the terroristic powers of the pol ice. 
23. Sunday Tribune, 6 April 1969 
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24. The stri ke was illegal in terms of at least two laws: the Bantu Labour 
(Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953, and the Bantu Labour Act of 
1964, as labour was withheld and demands made by the workers. 
The picket mounted by the workers on Saturday morning would also be 
illegal in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act. The workers were 
unimpressed by arguments that they should obey these laws. 
25. Dreyer in an interview in 1970 said this was the response of the 
workers to Jackson's speech; by this they meant they had no further 
use for the DSLSC. 
26. The Natal Mercury (7 April 1969) used the term "being paid off", the 
Daily News (7 April 1969) "dismissed", the DSLSC officials prefer to 
argue that the workers "resigned". The difference is not simply 
terminological, employers often argue that during strikes the workers 
"dismiss themselves" - the employers being the reasonable party. 
27. Sunday Tribune, 6 April 1969 
28. Daily News, 7 April 1969, and Natal Mercury, 8 April 1969 
29. The press gave no information on the wages paid to those workers 
replacing the strikers, although obviously they must have been higher 
than the dai Iy wages set in WD 308 to attract urban workers even for 
short periods. The Bantu labour regulations of 1968 required 
employers to observe strict rules in recruitment but the mobilization 
of the strike breakers indicated a general free-for-all. 
30. Natal Mercury, 9 April 1969 
31. ibid., 7 April, 1969 
32. These comments were made in the context of a review of Alex Hepple's 
pamphlet Workers under apartheid. African Communist, Third 
Quarter 1969, (38): 82 
33. An editorial in the Daily News, 7 April 1969, expressed surprise and 
shock at the demand to more than double the wages of the labourers. 
'Perhaps if they had framed their request more modestly, there would 
have been room for negotiation'. This editorial did not mention the 
workers' demand for changes in taxation and thus separated the econo-
mic content of the workers' demands from the political. 
34. The quote is from 'The revolutionary way out', a document of the 
South African Communist Party published in 1963. Contained 
in African Communists Speak, 1970, Nauka Publishing House: 
Moscow. 
35. The question of the relationship of industrial to the revolutionary 
demands of the working class as a whole is one which demands 
further examination than here: it obviously is intricately bound 
up with the strategy of resistance to the apartheid state, but the 
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issue is also one of the forms of class consciousness under national 
oppression. Do African workers possess a consciousness of them-
selves as crane drivers, weavers, machine operators, and drivers of 
combine harvesters as well as a common consciousness as an exploited 
and oppressed African working class? An important thread in this 
thesis is that the migrant and contract labour system has not prevented 
the formation of class consciousness at all levels: occupational, 
industrial, and intern~tional. 
36. Interview with Dreyer, 1970. 
37. Interestingly the press did not publish any information about the 
pamphlets or the workers' resistance to the Bantu Taxation Act; the 
data presented here comes from interviews with Dreyer in 1970 and 
subsequent interviews with DSLSC workers. 
38. Natal Mercury, 8 and 9 April 1969 
39. Daily News, 7 April 1969 
40. Natal Mercury, 9 April 1969 
41. The rather wild theorizing of management faced by united working 
class resistance shows the weakness of managerial science and ideo-
logy. While many of the employers' statements may be dismissed 
as ideological justification for their oppressive action against the 
strikers, they also indicate the I imit to bourgeois social science in 
dealing with the inevitability of class struggle under capitalism. 
42. During an interview in 1972 Dreyer acknowledged there were files of 
allegations made by the labourers against the corruption of the hiring 
policies of the indunas. Each white foreman was apparently pro-
vided with a number of employment tickets and could determine the 
quota of workers to be taken on by the indunas. 
43. Daily News, 14 April 1969" Key workers s~ou.'d be organ.ized; 15 
April 1969, Meaning of the S.A. way of life; 17Aprd 1969, 
'F ighting for rights'; 24 April 1969, 'Employers blamed for dispute 
on stevedores' pay'. 
44. SACP, 'The revolutionary way out', African Commurists Speak, 1970, 
Nauka Publishing House: Moscow 
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45. In 1972 Dreyer said that the pi ight of the workers who were sum-
mari Iy dismissed in 1969 'makes me cry at night'; a constant 
theme in subsequent strikes was the demand for them to be reinstated. 
46. A scientific assessment .of the efficiency of the port and the produc-
tivity of the workers would have to be based on quantitative statis-
tics on the tonnage landed and loaded per hour, but it was not in the 
interests of the stevedoring companies of the SARH to release this 
information. Even the Chamber of Commerce which led much of 
the agitation about the inefficiency of the port refused to disclose 
data on rates of handling cargo to the author. The Natal Regional 
Survey (1969) which had the full confidence of the SARH and steve-
doring companies did not discuss the issue of declining productivity 
apart from a short statement on page 121. It presents no statistics 
on the question. As in the case of most academic research in South 
Africa the burning questions are more likely to be posed in the 
bourgeois press reflecting the contradictionsof capital rather than in 
polite academic papers: the forced removal of Africans in the 
countryside may be found in the press but not in a single anthropo-
logical, ethnographical, or sociological work. 
47. Marx, ", (1974): 253. The movement of commodities through 
transport is, of course, to be distinguished from the circulation of 
commodities in tenns of ownership which may not involve the move-
ment of those commodities. 
48. ibid.: 254 
49. Daily News, 7 Ap-il 1969 
50. ibid.: 8 and 9 April 1969 
51. The question of the indunas having the right to choose their own 
teams was obviously at this point purely hypothetical; they would 
simply have to take on the workers who were avai lable. 
52. Interview with Dreyer, 1970. At this time the company was assessed 
at a rate of R3. 20 for every R 100 paid in wages, a considerable sum of 
money for a company whose main cost was wages. 
53. There are certain specialized agencies which do not employ workers 
from either the DSLSC or Grindrod, like the manganese ore terminal, 
but these employ relatively insignificant numbers of workers. 
54. Daily News, 23 January 1970. One shipping .company had nine. 
arrivals with an average delay of three days a ship. In effect thiS 
meant that one ship was unemployed for almost a month costing the 
company in lo~esaboutR40,500. 
55. Natal Mercury, 23 January 1970. The agency producing the report 
is not disclosed (it was probably a shipping company), neither is the 
institution to whom it was addressed (definitely the SARH). The 
report apparently gave comparative figures of discharging and 
loading rates for the previous eight years. 
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56. Sunday Tribune, 24 January 1971. The readiness of the shipping 
companies to raise their rates and pass on rising costs to their cus-
tomers can be contrasted with feattempt of the stevedoring companies 
to present their cargo handling tariffs as rigidly inflexible when 
faced with demands for increased wages. 
57. Natal Mercury, 20 May 1971 
58. The openness of the public debate in a sector of the economy regarded 
as strategic was compelled by the depth of the crisis. Public anta-
gonism between private companies and the SARH showed that the 
Harbour Advisory Board was failing to resolve the struggle between 
representatives. 
59. The word 'administrative' is used to describe j:>b reservation in the 
SARH to distinguish its employment pol icies from those of unorganized 
industry which operates a 'conventional' colour bar and industries in 
which explicit job reservation determinations are laid down. The 
SARH has persistently maintained a political relationship with white 
workers, providing them with protective employment and securing 
their dependence on the capitalist state and antagonism to the 
interests of the mass of SARH workers. 
60. Sunday Tribune, 24 January 1971 
61. Unlike other ports, Durban's handling and shipping was in private 
hands until September 1916 (Natal Regional Survey, 1969: 105). 
62. Sunday Tribune, 24 January 1971. With the introduction of 
containerization in later years a larger role for private companies 
in moving cargo both in the harbour and inland was sought by the SARH. 
63. Natal Mercury, 20 May 1971 
64. The Ministry of Transport was not insensitive to criticisms in this area 
and an official said that changes were being made within the neces-
sary spatial separation of workers. 'You can't have a Black crane 
driver there and a White crane driver here.' Sunday Tribune, 24 
January 1971. 
65. Natal Regional Survey (1969): 82 
66. Ibid. In the late 1950s and early 1960s there had been a regional 
campaign to provide jobs for unemployed Indian workers (the question 
of the enormous numbers of African unemployed at the time was ignored). 
In 1968 the Minister of Indian Affairs, Senator A. E. Trollip, promised 
an Indian social worker that jobs for about 500 Indian labourers would 
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be made available in the Durban harbour. Racial welfare policies 
of this kind were guaranteed to build antagonism to Indian workers 
from both African and white workers. Daily News, 17 February 1968 
67. Natal Regional Survey (1969): 82 
68. The railway workers had all the disadvantages of the stevedoring 
workers, such as the prolonged hours, without the advantages: e.g. some 
sort of explicit contract and a guaranteed wage. 
69. The railways were excluded from the Factories Act and could extend 
the hours of work at the will of its management. In the immediate 
post-war period the hours of work were 60 a week. The question of 
the hours worked is, of course, not determined merely by the legal 
maximum of 'ordinary' time. The working week is made up of 
ordinary hours, night shifts, overtime, Sunday time and emergency 
work. 
70. Marx, 1,( 1976): 645' 
71. Natal Regional Survey (1969): 45 
72. ibid.: 44 
73. do.: 98 
74. A.C. Allen, Assistant System Manager of Railways, quoted in 
Sunday Tribune, 24 January 1971. 
75. ibid. 
76. Natal Mercury, 20 May 1971. Imports into Durban accelerated 
rapidly in 1971, rising by more than 50 per cent 'in the past few 
months' . 
77. Daily News, 15 September 1971. Many of the white fork-lift 
drivers were casuals filling in time while looking for other work. 
It was mostly the single white workers who stuck to the job, as married 
men were not prepared to maintain the long hours worked. Per-
sonal communication. 
78. Daily News, 8 July 1971 
79. ibid.: 15 September 1971 
80. The analysis of mechanization is derived from Marx, I, (1976): 
562-566 
81 • Management notes ( 1966), I: 7. The task of management was seen 
as follows: 'to use every opportunity to remove pin-pricks, to act 
immediately where incidents occur which lead to strained relationships 
(abusive language, assaults) and constant guidance in matters relating 
to personal relations in the job situation'. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
85. 
86. 
87. 
88. 
89. 
90. 
91. 
This is not to imply that African indunas could speak all the lan-
guages of the workers (Zulu speaking indunas would not be likely 
to speak Sesuto), or that under African indunas the workers were 
automatically freed from abuse and assaults. The workers' res-
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ponse to these changes are not recorded; studies of African workers' 
attitudes to supervisors (van der Horst, 1964 ) show their conscious-
ness not to be dominated by racial categories, even on the issue of 
supervision which is obviously connected to the general relations 
of subordination in society. 
The employers I power over the indunas was considerably greater than 
over white foremen who were employed directly by stevedoring com-
panies and not by the DSLSC and were in short supply. 
Marx discusses the relationship of productivity of labour to the rate 
of surplus value in Chapter 24, 'The transformation of surplus-value 
into capital', Section 4. He distinguishes between the productivity 
of labour and the rate of exploitation, the two only being equal 
where wages are equal to the value of labour-power. See parti-
cularly I (1976): 753, and 956-959. 
Marx, I, (1976): 533 
This was in a sense a concession to the workers' demand that overtime 
should be voluntary, although they also made the specific demand 
that they should not be required to work two ships in a single day. 
Dai Iy News, 1 June 1971 and WBR (1972): para 88 
Dai Iy News, 27 July 1971 
Interview in 1972. Dreyer was not necessarily th inking that the 
incentive scheme would immediately bring open trade unions into 
being, what he was concerned about was organic solidarity being 
cemented in the gangs and the immense possibi I ity for restricted out-
put. He was quite famil iar with academic work on industrial 
psychology which discussed the formation of small groups in the bbour 
process and workers' control over output. 
Dai Iy News, 5 August 1971 
ibid., 9,April 1969. The likelihood of clash~s in the reserves 
would be increased by the concentration of dock workers recruited 
from particular reserves. 
Taxation of .African workers to contribute even further to the construc-
tion of the Bantustan was stepped up in terms of Proclamations of the 
Bantu Homelands - Constitution /lct of 1971. In KwaZulu the tax 
is R3.00 per annum paid directly to the Homeland government by males 
and females over 18 years old. RRN, Pugust 1978: 2 
92. Isisebenzi, I, c. October 1971 
93. ibid., 5, c. 10 July 1972, and 6, c. August 1972 
94. At the McWillaw Iron and Steel Foundry 200 African workers came 
out on strike demanding higher wages. From news reports it 
appears that all the workers were fired by the employer wh i Ie 70 
police armed with batons stood by. Subsequently, most of the 
workers were rehired and the leaders of the strike sacked. Natal 
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Mercury, 10 June 1971; Daily News, 10 June 1971; Na~ 
Mercury, 11 June 1971; 16 June 1971 i Daily News, 17 June 1971. 
The Department of Labour was reportedly furious that some registered 
trade union leaders were at the protest meeting and had associated 
themselves with the workers' demands. Private information. 
95. Sacks, ", presents an anthropological study of the stevedoring 
workers which concentrates on kinship networks as a basis for associa-
tion among workers and tribal politics as an explanation of strike 
action. He does not even mention the Wage Board investigations 
and the Wages Commission agitation, although it is hard to imagine 
he was unaware of either. The 'bl ind-spots' in h is work are thus 
not empirical, but ideologic al and pol itica!. His thesis is critical 
of the SARH but a major apologia for the DSLSC and its view that the 
stevedoring workers are basically tribally and 'home' orientated and 
that cultural and ethnic rather than material factors explain strike 
activity. His work will be referred to both for its wealth of statis-
tical information on .SARH and stevedoring workers and for a most 
developed view of compound life as encompassed within 'total institu-
tions'. 
96. A notice of the meeting was published in lIanga lase Natal, and both 
the meeting and the McWillaw strike received wide publicity. 
Dreyer was well aware of the strike which caused a flurry of activity 
in the Department of Labour, Security Police, and employers' organiza-
tions. In 1966 McWillaws received publicity as a company provid-
ing key semi-skilled jobs for Africans at good wages, in response to 
criticisms of the cheap labour policy overseas. See Natal Mercury, 
6 January 1966 
97. Daily News, 18 September 1971. Quite why the DSLSC manage-
ment was prepared to have this information publ ished in the local 
press is not clear, possibly there were differences between the shipping 
and stevedoring companies about the way to respond. 
98. Natal Mercury, 20 September 1971 
99. Daily News, 22 September 1971 
100. Natal Mercury, 21 September 1971. Such a level of public 
involvement in a dispute affecting African workers was unprecedented 
in TUCSA's dubious relationship with the organization of African 
1Ol. 
102. 
103. 
104. 
105. 
106. 
107. 
108. 
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workers, and support for Espiels statement from the General Secretary 
was doubtful. Although formally committed to lorganizing the 
unorganized l , TUCSA officials were extremely cautious to avoid 
giving support to striking workers, and were embarrassed that Espie 
had attended the mass meeting in June. Espiels actions were 
partly personal (he had a clear memory of the gross exploitation of 
dockers in his native Glasgow) and partly in response to the rising 
tide of criticism being made by African workers of registered trade 
unions. 
Daily News, 22 September 1971 
ibid. The percentage increases were 30.8, 30.3 and 29.3 respec-
tively; an indication of a slight tendency to narrow differentials. 
Throughout the dispute TUCSA officials made no attempt to get in 
contact with the workers. The TUCSA local committee elected a 
trade union official to the Harbour Advisory Board and he would have 
had some legal authority to meet the workers openly. The problem 
was not spatial (the compounds were just down the road) but tactical 
and political. Following a reformist policy which included appeals 
to the state to change legislation, and denouncing communism and 
the campaigns of support for the liberation struggle, TUCSA officials 
were unwi" ing to support workers under the gui lIotine of repression. 
Daily News, 24 September 1971. The statement also pointed out 
,the anomalies of increasing basic wages without altering the Ipremiuml 
wage rates. At this stage the Wages Commission had very limited 
contact with the stevedoring workers. 
Unlike other wage determinations, those applied to stevedoring do not 
provide for annual increments. The reasoning of the Wage Board in 
recommending annual increments seems to be to phase in wage inc-
reases without increasing unduly the wage costs of industries. The 
stevedoring employers possibly felt it would be better to have a single 
jump in wages rather than small annual increases which would be 
I iable to be rejected by the workers. 
Dai Iy News, 23 September 1971. The radical tone of th is news-
paper did not, however, carry through to criticism of the wages of 
workers employed in the large monopolies. In 1972, the Textile 
Workers Industrial Union conducted research into the appall ing wages 
to textile workers employed by the monopoly Frame Group. The 
editor refused to publish this information for fear of legal action 
being taken. This information only became available to the public 
and other workers when mass str ikes swept through Durban. 
Natal Mercury, 15 November 1971 
Daily News, 15 November 1971. Clerical workers were not 
covered by the wage determinations. 
109. Natal Mercury, 29 November 1971. 
110. Daily News, 8 February 1972. 
111. The shipping and stevedoring companies provided an expansion of 
employment for well educated Indian workers in particular, not all 
of whom had working class solidarity as the guiding principle in 
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their life. Many of the Indian workers who drove trucks into the 
rural areas during the 1969 strike to recruit scab labour were nervous 
about their position both in relation to their employers and the 
African workers. J.N. Reddy, leader of the South African Indian 
Council and a leading banker, started his career as a shipping clerk. 
112. White collar workers could, for instance, have provided the manual 
workers with details of management plans, assisted in producing 
workers' publications, and acted as the 'clerical' component of a trade 
union. As in other capitalist countries there is an acute social dis-
parity between white collar and manual workers in South Africa, African 
clerks displaying as little enthusiasm for the organization and struggles 
of manual workers as do Indian and Coloured workers. Despite the 
distance in consciousness between clerks and labourers, there is not 
much di fference in wages. 
113. The word 'openly' is used cautiously here to distinguish between the 
meetings of workers held under the auspices of the General Factory 
Workers Benefit Fund to which all stevedores were admitted, and the 
secret underground organization of the workers with which the GFWBF 
officials were loosely in touch but which maintained a separate and 
closed network. 
114. Cf. Andy Friedman, 1977, Responsible autonomy versus direct control 
over the labour process, Capital and Class, I, 43-57. 
15. Isisebenzi, I, Ubunzima bezisebenzi (circa October 1971). The 
level of consciousness of the Wages Commission was shown by the 
inclusion of the article by Champion. Ignorant of his anti-Indian 
racism in the 1949 riots and his strike-breaking appeals during the 
1958 stay-at-home, he was approached as a former leader of the 
Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU). 
116. This letter was published in a rather poor English translation in 
Bulletin, 1, 6 December 1971, and was written by J. B. Buthelezi. 
The term 'farm' is often used by African workers in Natal to refer to 
their homesteads in the reserves, and not capitalist farms. 
117. I n Johannesburg at the same time efforts were being made to revive 
the decaying industrial unions which survived their abandonment by 
TUCSA in 1969 under the Urban Training Project. The benefit 
fund aimed, however, at being a national workers' benefit fund, cut-
ting across industrial divisions which would displace grossly 
exploitative insurance schemes run by Homes Trust. 
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118. The GFWBF 's rapid growth soon constituted a problem for organiza-
tion; the members came from a wide variety of industries and factories, 
many joining as individuals rather than representatives of the workers. 
The problems of the GFWBF will not be discussed, however, except 
in relation to the organization of stevedoring workers. 
119. The problems in producing Isisebenzi itself were immense, each 
article had to be written, rewritten, translated into Zulu, and 
printed. The operation depended on a dominant left faction in the 
Students' Union which met the costs. 
120. At one stage approaches were made to the student leaders of SASO 
(South African Students Organization) to collaborate in producing 
Isisebenzi. They were critical of the Wages Commission calling a 
mass meeting of workers to protest against the unskilled wage deter-
mination and rejected any organized cooperation with white students. 
SASO was at this time more geared to cultural projects and theatre 
which attracted the black petty bourgeoisie and white students~ 
121. The Wages Commission considered translating Marx's Wage Labour 
and Capital but thought it too abstract for the majority of workers 
in Durban who were not literate even in Zulu. Some of its ideas 
were incorporated in the article, Yini imhlangano yezisebenzi? 
(What are trade unions?) in Isisebenzi, 2. 
122. Coming from bourgeois families, members of the Wages Commission 
were able to grasp the resistance of black workers to racial oppression 
quite readily, demands on issues such as pensions and sick benefits 
they found difficult to grasp. 
123. The history of the Wages Commission movement is traced in the 
Schlebusch Commission, agents of which stole the letters, Bulletins, 
and other documents of the University of Natal Commission which 
were carelessly kept at the Students Union. It is not known how 
many workers who wrote letters to the Wages Commission were endan-
gered by this lack of foresight. 
124. Isisebenzi, 5, c. 10 July 1972. The workers' ordinary working 
hours would total 56 if the compulsory Sunday work was included. 
Not having had discussions with the stevedoring workers, the Wages 
Commission was diffident about putting forward the R20 wage demand 
of the June 1971 meeting. 
125. The conditions of service, apart from those areas covered by the wage 
determination, were considerably inferior to those of the Factories 
Act. The working week was two hours longer, and the control over 
accident reporting, and other issues, considerably more lax. 
126. Natal Mercury, 15 July 1972. The question of SHIPS was not 
mentioned in the TUCSA statements before or during the wage investi-
gation, and Espie did not make any demands on behalf of white collar 
workers who were expressly excluded from the wage determination. 
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127. The Wage Act of 1957 specifically grants workers the right to appear 
before a Wage Board and protects workers from victimization for 
exercising this right. In practice, these clauses are ignored by 
the employers and there have been no prosecutions for employers 
victimizing workers in terms of the Wages Act. 
128. The quote is a sl ightly reworked version of a poor translation made 
in a hurry before the Wage Board sitting in the afternoon. The 
term 'chased away' is used by African workers in Engl ish as a direct 
translation of the Zulu term 'to dismiss'. 
129. Workers accepted that the RO.75 daily allowance be continued. 
130. The Woge Board tried to reproduce the atmosphere of a court: the 
Wage Board officials seated at a raised dais, the 'works committee', 
CBlB and employers on their left, the registered trade unions and 
workers who managed to get a seat on their right. All those seated 
at the table were required to sign an attendance register. The 
Chairman of the Wage Board attempted to create an atmosphere of 
judicial impartial ity. 
131. Point 10 of the letter. The stevedoring trade is one of the few 
industries in South Africa which could 'allow' a number of workers to 
be present at a wage hearing without being absent from work. Most 
of the leading workers with whom the GFWBF officials were later in 
touch were not able to be present. 
132. The obvious anomaly between the letter he wrote to the Wages Com-
mission and the part J. B. Buthelezi was to take in the repression of 
workers' resistan-:e will be dealt with comprehensively later. 
133. The Wages Commission was, of course, not in existence in 1969. 
What Buthelezi was denouncing was the underground organization of 
the workers. In relation to unemployment, shorter hours would 
have increased employment in the docks. 
134. Horrell (1969): 132. These regional committees apparently only 
came into existence when workers took strike action. They were 
composed of African petty bourgeois: rei igious leaders, 'I iaison 
officers' such as Buthelezi, and retir~d headmasters. While some 
adopted a sympathetic posture to the workers (possibly because they 
had to justify this form of collaboration), others such as traders were 
eager to denounce the idea of trade unions. Drum, 9 June 1973. 
135. The full account of the wage hearing which is presented here is drawn 
from notes made and supplemented by newspaper reports: Daily News, 
18 July 1972 and Natal Mercury, 18 July 1972. The Natal Mercury 
fallaciously claimed that the demand of R 18 would have cost the steve-
doring companies R55 million, a more likely amount based on the 
approximately 3,000 stevedoring workers in Durban would be R 1. 5 
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million~ R55 million was considerably more than the entire turn-
over of the stevedoring trade, and this inflated figure was probably 
published to demonstrate the ludicrousness of the ~orkers' demands. 
136. Natal Mercury, 18 July 1972 
137. At this stage the leading members of the Wages Commission were 
virtually synonymous with the voluntary organizers of the GFWBF. 
As the GFWBF gained increasing support among the workers, the 
Wages Commission members devoted more time to building this 
organization through the support of workers who had been attracted 
to the Wages Commission through the newspaper: particularly the 
abattoir and dock workers. 
138. Bulletin No 342, Natal Employers' Association, August 1972. The 
NEA is the most repressive but intelligent employers' organization in 
Durban. Its representations carried considerable weight with the 
Department of Labou~ from the time of its initiation in response to the 
strike wave in 1942. See evidence of the NEA to the Industrial 
Legislation Commission of Enquiry for confirmation of the deference 
with which state officials approached its leaders. 
139. It is a matter fJr debate whether the amendment in 1973 to the Bantu 
Labour Relations Regulation Act of 1953, which permitted employers 
unilaterally to lay down wages through their employers organization 
in any industry for African workers, resulted from wage hearings such 
as the one on stevedoring or was a general response by employers to 
the crisis in wages after the mass strikes of 1973. 
140. Sack, I, 1976 
141. ibid.: 121-122 
142. do.: 96. Sack simply ascribes all workers from the same districts as 
abakhaya; his discussion of these groups in the DSLSC compound 
approaches an ideal type formulation. Despite this criticism it is 
I ikely that workers from the same district did associate ot work and in 
the compound, although any level of industrial organization and strike 
qction would demand different forms of association and solidarity. 
143. do.: 62. Dota is not presented to support this argument and at most 
this 'closed' relationship between supervised ond supervisors is a ten-
dency and not a law. It is highly unlikely that the right number of 
abakhaya were always available to each gang; workers are regulorly 
going on leave and new workers arriving. 
144. do.: 63fn 
145. do.: 61 
146. do.: 62-63 
600 
147. It is obvious that the collective punishment of black supervisors by 
the workers which broke management's ultimate control over produc-
tion would not be tolerated in the slightest. Any'disciplining' of 
a particular induna would be conducted on the basis of reinforcing 
the justice of their rule over the workers. 
148. He writes that the DSlSC was 'more humane' than the SARH and 
management more interested in the welfare of the workers. Sack, 
I, 1976: 35. See Dorcas Good and Michael Williams, 1976, 
South Africa: The Crisis in Britain and the Apartheid Economy, 
Anti-Apartheid Movement, pp. 5-7, for a refutation of the "enligh-
tened employer" argument. 
149. There is a short description of these events in Survey of Race Relations, 
1969: 64. The trial was given widespread publicity in the local 
bourgeois press and Buthelezi's evidence was received with great 
hostility by all who gave loyalty to the ANC. There was a resur-
gence of open ANC activity after the death of Chief Albert Luthuli, 
the President of the ANC, at Groutville in Natal. The funeral was 
marked by a display of ANC colours and uniforms by a contingent at 
the graveside. In the following weeks women of the ANC mounted 
a vigil outside the Beatrice Street YMCA in Durban. 
150. Survey of Race Relations, 1970: 142 
151. The opportunities for graft and corruption at the local level were 
immense. In the experience of the writer, African workers paid 
fees at these labour bureaux for the 'right' to come to the towns, 
their pass~s stamped with 'X labour bureaux', and the words 'Permis-
sion to proceed to Durban to seek employment granted'. These 
endorsements were completely valueless and the workers summarily 
deported from the towns. 
152. Sack, I, 1976: 230fn. The 'going rate' for a bribe for a KwaZulu 
chief in the early 1970s was said to be a bottle of brandy and R5; 
Sacks, 161 
153. Buthelezi strongly defended his generous salary in the Daily News, 
18 September 1973, and Natal Mercury, 23 May 1972. 
154. Race Relations News, August 1978 
155. In an attempt to revive Zulu traditions and mil itary history, the 
24th September was declared 'King Chaka Day'. Survey of Race 
Relations, 1972: 183. 
156. In an interview with Dreyer in 1972 he questioned the writer about 
his attitude to the KwaZulu authority and in particular about Gatsha 
Buthelezi; the political developments in the reserves were mentioned 
on more than one occasion. Dreyer implied that Chief Gatsha 
Buthelezi was an immature politician and had a lot of lessons to learn. 
The writer put this statement down to his racism and support for 
the apartheid state. The significance of this statement was not 
realized by the writer at the time. The reserves have always 
had an enormous significance on the particular form of the rule of 
capital over labour in South Africa; the relationship developed in 
Wolpe's "Capital ism and cheap labour power in South Africa", 
develops the economic argument of homestead production subsidiz-
ing the value of labour power. The reserves have, however, 
always had a crucial political bearing on the pol itical relations of 
domination; in the 1970s these political developments were being 
taken to their logical conclusion. (Response not to "crisis in 
reserves" but class struggle in the cities~) 
157. On the mines, for example, employers prefer workers from Lesotho 
as lashers and Mozambiquan workers as machinists. These ethnic 
policies are obviously not based on any inherent qualities of parti-
cular groups of workers, but different levels of proletarianization 
as well as the inevitable one of 'divide and rule'. Zulu workers 
are much preferred as private pol ice in compounds and as night 
watchmen: drawing on the military tradition of the Zulu people. 
158. Sack, I, 1976: 45-46 
159. The increase in the number of workers from Mahlabathini is so 
sudden that the writer was not sure whether he had made an error 
in recording the statistics. His table of distribution of workers by 
district was, however, personally checked by Dreyer (who corrected 
his spelling), and it will subsequently be argued why such a drastic 
change would be logical. 
160. Sack, I, 1976: 35 
161. ibid.: 33fn 
162. do.: 34. This figure is arrived at by assuming that workers who 
had been unable to have more than three years education were 
'functionally illiterate'. Some 60 per cent of the workers had not 
been to school at all. 
\ 
163. White householders have found it annoying that African male servants 
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sometimes refuse to c lean lavatories or wash wamen's underwear, but 
these are minor issues in comparison to the employment of Zulu workers 
under conditions which are possibly worse than other African workers. 
164. Sack, I, 1976: 33 
165. Sack provides a lengthy discussion of the religions of migrant workers 
employed by the SARH and has developed the traditionalist/Christian 
dichotomy in part as an explanation for the more mil itant views of the 
stevedoring workers. This is a significant secondary issue, but he fails 
to deal with the primary one of the origins of the class consciousness 
of the workers. In the writer's experience workers who are 
traditionalists have no hesitation in advocating force as a legiti-
mate weapon of struggle, but have had a weaker commitment to 
thorough underground organization. 
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166. In J. B. Buthelezi's letter to the Wages Commission he mentioned 
Mahlabathini first in a list of districts which had suffered victimiza-
tion during the 1969 strike. 
CHAPTER 8 
Trade unionism and mass strikes 
At the Company ••• management-employee relationships were very 
good indeed - and, in my opinion, one reason that the stevedores 
did strike, was that they were confident of a sympathetic response 
from their management. 
Sack, II: 17 
J. B. Buthelezi won't see Christmas~ 
Stevedoring worker, 17 July 1972 
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The consolidation of the Bantustan regimes in the reserves increased 
enormously the political and bureaucratic control over African migrant 
workers. One of the features of the pass system was that despite its 
legalistic and administrative details it never achieved the efficiency the 
legislators intended. Workers continued to pour into the towns illegally, 
and at one point the police even complained it was not their prime function 
to control the movement of workers. The new Bantustan regimes with their 
pretentions to independence from the apartheid state, to a 'national' identity, 
and to citizenship, eased the acceptance of the tightening of the pass controls. 1 
The articulation of some of the demands of workers (for instance the right of 
African workers to join trade unions) and the radical posturing of some of the 
Bantustan leaders against national oppression, secured a measure of toleration 
2 
of the leaders who protested there was no alternative to the Bantustans. 
For some workers, the contradiction between the Bantustan regimes and the 
interests of the working class was not immediately obvious, as the apartheid 
state was blamed for the mass resettlement schemes and desperate impoverish-
ment of the people, all which were the logical steps in implementing the 
3 Bantustan program. While leaders I ike Chief Gatsha Buthelezi protested 
against the way in which the resettlement schemes were being implemented, 
they were careful to be out of sight when the Bantu Administration trucks 
d · 4 W· h h· ·f· t· f . I . h' d' II move In. Itt e mtensl Ica Ion 0 natlona oppression, t e ra Ica 
Bantustan leaders became more outspoken in their expression of black 
nationalism and more ambitious as the leaders of the oppressed masses. 
As the boom of 1970-72 began to recede and the reserve army of 
labour was increasingly trapped by the tribal labour bureaux in the Bantustans, 
the struggle of black workers in the industrial centres became increasingly 
urgent. The rising tempo of class struggle raised fundamental questions 
about the possibil ities of working class struggle, the demands which were 
being made by the workers, and whether any form of open class organization 
was possible for African workers under the conditions of intense national 
oppression. Since underground activity was in evidence in advanced 
sections of the African working class, what would be the relation between 
this level of organization and the works committees, benefit funds, and 
trade unions being establ ished? Was working class organization to be 
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directed primarily at the state which was acting to destroy all organization 
of resistance, or could the struggle against the employers on the wage issue 
develop into mass forms of resistance both against the employers and the 
state which backed with force every decision of the employers? As an 
important secondary issue, would the African petty-bourgeoisie turn towards 
the working class in the forthcoming struggles, and add their support to 
working class demands? These were some of the issues faced by the 
workers and those groups who were assisting in the development of new work-
ing class organizations. The struggle of the stevedoring workers to develop 
a level of open organization and a coordinated strategy provided some answers 
to these questions through the concrete experience of the workers. 
The stevedoring committee 
Following their demands being put forward at the Wage Board sitting, 
the stevedoring workers were determined to become organized in a semi-open 
manner to build up the unity between the DSLSC and Grindrod workers and 
to press their demands on the employers and the Wage Board. 5 The meetings 
of the workers which were held at B:llton Hall where the GFWBF was based 
immediately raised the questions of the tactics of organization, the procedures 
to be ad6pted in developing grievances into demands, and the final objectives 
of the workers' organization. Between July 1972 and March 1973 about 
thirty meetings were held, the grievances of the workers were documented 
and attempts made to defend individual workers through legal means. 
Numerous other consultations were held between officials and leading workers. 
The group of workers from the stevedoring companies constituted themselves 
into a stevedoring committee in writing letters and dec iding general pol icy, 
and elections for the works committees later established in the docks were 
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held before the formal elections at the companies. The meetings ranged 
from between five workers to over a hundred and were fiercely democratic; 
those present representing delegated authority from others not at the meeting 
or at work. Before the stevedoring group can be discussed, however, the 
general strategy of the GFWBF needs to be developed. 
Based initially on African workers in the garment and furniture industry, 
the GFWBF soon came to attract workers from other industries: textiles, 
motor assemblies, the abattoir. The aim of the benefit fund initially was 
to overcome the fear of African workers of associating as workers (the 
national oppression of the African people strongly reinforcing the idea that 
any association of workers was illegal) and to build a mass base from which 
the trade unions could grow. Without a precise plan or strategy other than 
generating a movement of workers in which policies could be democratically 
arrived at, the GFWBF grew surprisingly rapidly. F rom early discussions 
the workers decided on a funeral benefit as the main benefit; the other aims 
of the society were to fight for the benefits which African workers should get 
by law (for instance, unemployment insurance) but from which they were 
excluded by an obdurate Department of Labour or by employers. The 
benefit society also aimed at educating workers in industrial legislation, 
particularly on the formation of works committees, and to help workers with 
their complaints. These aims deliberately fell short of those of a trade 
union: industrial organization, demands on wages and conditions, factory-
by-factory organization, and demands on the state; the intention was to 
provide a basis for association as workers on the widest possible and least 
controversial common grounds. The aims were designed not to attract the 
attention of the police and employers before registration with the Registrar 
of Friendly Societies could be achieved. As in the case of early industrial 
organization of workers in Britain, the attempt was being made to establish a 
benefit society as an embryonic form of trade unionism. Once sufficient 
workers had joined from any industry, an industrial unioh would be organized, 
its financial burden being met initially from all members. 
This particular strategy was dictated by the relatively cautious 
response of workers to the idea of establishing immediately trade union 
organization on an open basis and by the need to manoeuvre within the 
legal system. Initially the workers and officials were testing each other 
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to find out what basis for organ ization existed. 6 These workers demanded 
a legal organization which would not lead to victimization by employers 
and the state, a constitution, and registration as a friendly society. These 
demands were made to overcome the paralyzing fear of organizing as workers 
in a highly repressive society. While the urban life of African people 
abounds with associations in common law: football clubs, churches, stokfella, 
dancing clubs, and even residents' associations, the workers were not entirely 
convinced with the legal opinion that unregistered trade unions were also 
common law associations and thus 'legal'. 7 Despite some doubts about its 
legal standing, subscriptions were taken from workers before registration as 
a friendly society was secured. As membership mushroomed, the fears of 
8 
the leaders of the GFWBF were partly allayed. Members came from all 
sections of society: the self-employed, domestic servants, factory workers, 
unemployed, and commercial workers; hundreds of firms had at least one 
member. Apart from the attraction of the benefit fund as a means of pro-
viding a basis for working class organ ization, African people as a whole were 
enthusiastic because it was African controlled, efficient and cheap, in com-
parison to the grossly exploitative insurance companies or shady township 
operators. I ts fast expansion and wide appea I was, however, not a source 
of streng,th i few workers joined as a coherent and organized group. But it 
was the militant groupings of workers in the abattoir and the docks which 
were to provide the lead in the new period of mass strike action. 
The stevedoring workers were the first group of workers to enter the 
GFWBF with clear industrial demands and a level of internal organization 
which reflected their commanding position at the centre of the labour process 
in the docks. The first groupings in the GFWBF, the furniture and garment 
workers, had a more dependent attitude on the registered trade union in 
each industry and no declared positions on changes in these industries or 
wider political demands. 9 The stevedores had a more 'activist' con-
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ception of the benefit fund, rather than the 'constitutionalist' approach of 
workers in other industries, and met as a group as frequently as was possible. 
The meetings were squeezed in either on Saturdays or days when large 
numbers of the workers were not on call, making regularity difficult to 
achieve. This meant there were problems in getting workers from both 
the DSlSC and Grindrods together at the same time. A further difficulty 
was that the workers were exhausted, some dropping off to sleep during the 
meetings. 
Internal organization and demands 
The meetings of the stevedoring workers with GFWBF officials changed 
as the confidence of the workers in the organization grew. Initially, the 
meetings took the form af 'hearings' at which workers tald the officials more 
about the labour process in the docks and the (sometimes highly specific) 
demands of different classes of workers. With time the meetings evolved 
into a type of executive committee of a trade union as a chairperson was 
elected with a committee. The tendency was, however, for this structure 
to disintegrate on occasion because leading workers were at work or unable 
to attend the meetings, often because they were trying to catch up on sleep, 
or were injured. Because of the changing shift system, overtime, and 
other dis'turbances in the composition of the meeting the dominant atmosphere 
was one of a workers' council with a high level of participation from all 
present, rather than a brisk executive committee meeting. The meetings 
were strongly democratic, with the elected leadership cautiously putting 
forward their views and attempting to reach a consensus. A persistent 
problem {and one which was impossible completely to resolve} was the 
presence of spies in the meetings, an issue which was to affect the level of 
participation of the DSlSC workers. 10 The issue obviously affected the 
possibility of fully democratic decisions being reached by the workers' 
delegates, as some workers were increasingly afraid of meeting openly, 
but the question of underground and secret organ ization was not raised. 11 
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Far from the stevedoring workers being satisfied with their conditions, 
as Sack records after interviewing them with permission from the DSLSC 
management, there was such an avalanche of grievances and demands that 
the question of organization almost became submerged. 12 The winchmen 
demanded a teabreak between 1300 and 2000, they were not provided with 
gloves and cut their hands on wires on the winches. They also wanted 
danger money for working on the electric cranes on the ships which gave 
them shocks. All the workers complained they were not allowed to go to 
the toilet when the docks were being worked non-stop. They were not 
given a night shift allowance. We told them that our wives demand extra 
money - they have to stay at home without us. I The workers got no annual 
bonus despite working almost without a break during the year. The Grindrod 
workers, most of whom live in the townships, complained their wages were 
totally inadequate to meet the cost of rent and transport. When we are 
late because of bad transport we have to rush straight to work without clock-
ing our tickets. Because we have not clocked the ticket we are not paid 
for that day. When we call for a white foreman or an induna to witness 
for us the compound manager says: "You have worked for nothing" • I The 
workers complained they were assaulted by the wh ite foremen at work and 
the company did nothing. 'The compound manager says the wh ites are 
doing a good job when they assault the workers - it makes them work harder. I 
They all fiercely resented the abusive language of the foremen: IYour work 
is up to shit~ liThe compound manager himself assaults the workers - for 
simple reasons like checking the post when we are waiting for a ship. I 
Telegrams from their families were not handed over to the workers - when 
the port was busy the telegrams were hidden from the workers. 13 M.ost of 
all, the workers at Grindrods complained about being denied their hoi idays; 
all were having to work at least two years before being granted leave. 
The time of leave was completely dictated by the employers. 
Even the indunas complained of being reduced to forced labour. 
The employers blamed them if any workers were missing. 'They know we 
do not live in one place. When we tell the employers we don't know 
where the workers are the boss says we are useless. ' The indunas have to 
wait at the office to pick up the list of work to be done on the ships, but if 
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the work ....os not started by the time the white foreman arrivES there was trouble. 
'It is the induna who keeps the list of work to be done; the workers cannot 
start working until the induna arrives. ' The indunas felt their lives were 
endangered by company regulations. When we are right inside the sh ip 
the indunas are told to stand in the centre of the hold. When the crane 
gets down towards the induna and he moves away for safety, the foreman 
accuses him of not being in position.' 
A II workers complained of the poor arrangements for injuries. 
Injured workers were not provided with stretchers, they had to walk off the 
ship to the first aid. The compensation for the high level of accidents 
was completely inadequate, many workers were permanently disabled as a 
result of injuries and the only thanks they earned was their dismissal. The 
two other major complaints were compulsory overtime and the lock of payslips 
d·· • h b b . d t' 14 to Istmguls etween aSlc wages an over Ime. 
The key problems posed by the workers were how to overcome the 
fear of the workers to take action to organize themselves and how to build 
their strength. This fear was of retaliation both by the state and employers: 
police interrogations, firing and victimization, loss of earnings and the ability 
to provide for the family. Oppression took a very concrete form for these 
workers. The GFWBF officials outlined the projected development of the 
benefit fund and argued there should be a workers' committee for each 
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company to replace the collaborators such as J. B. Buthelezi. 'You are 
some of the best workers in the organization, you must provide the leader-
ship of the general workers' organization. As the most militant workers 
in Durban you must be the backbone and provide the leadership of the 
organization.' The strategy for organization which was presented was 
that each worker at the meeting should be required to find another worker 
he could trust. The stevedoring members of the GFWBF at Grindrods 
should meet quietly near work, in the township, or at the office. A com-
mittee should be elected to take decisions between meetings. The officials 
presented mass membership as a means of overcoming the fear of open 
organ ization. • Strength is in numbers. When the management asks: 
Who are you?, you can answer: We speak for all the workers, if you touch 
us, you touch 600 men, beware~ • The members of the GFWBF should win 
over the indunas to the organization but also get an elected delegate from 
every gang. 
The open form of organization which was being proposed for the 
workers at Grindrods did not meet with immediate repression at the DSLSC where 
the management was cautiously regaining the grip over the workers it had 
lost at the Wage Board sitting. Although there was a pervasive fear of 
retal iation, it appears as though changes had been brought about in the form 
of control over the workers. The indunas, stung and humil iated by the 
denunciation of their collaboration by the labourers and impressed by the 
solidarity displayed at the Wage Board sitting where the labourers had been 
supported by the Wages Commission, TUCSA, and the Natal Indian Congress, 
were uneasy in the new conditions of struggle. 15 On the wage front 
demands had been made wh ich even exceeded their earnings and the violent 
antagonism to J. B. Buthelezi could be directed against them. In this 
situation the indunas were careful in their relations with the workers and 
stopped reporting malingerers and ordering dismissals. 
Before taking on a policy of 'frightfulness' which came to charac-
terize relations in the DSLSC, mil itant workers were cautiously picked off 
one by one, management making sure to cover itself by appearing to make 
a careful investigation into each case. Aswill be discussed later, it is 
difficult for the stevedoring workers to make an immediate response to 
victimization because of the nature of the labour process. Workers can 
be called in to the office from the ships and never be seen again, the gangs 
are dispersed over a wide area, and the employers have control over the 
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workers' accommodation. The worker may have been arrested by the Rail-
way Police or other police, or injured and in hospital. 16 There are 
obviously some differences in response from the workers to an individual 
worker who is dismissed for having a private quarrel with another worker or 
for assaulting a foreman. Management in the post-hearing period was 
cautious to emphasize its 'objectivity' in firing workers, and the extraneous 
rather than material factors in dismissals. It was also careful not to pick 
on leading mil itants but to work at the fringes of collective action by the 
labourers. 
The management counter-strategy was clearly demonstrated in the 
victimization of a worker who appeared at the Wage Board hearing who lived 
in the Nkandla district. While at work on Sunday early in August this 
worker was found by a foreman near to a beer tin ta I ki ng to 0 ther workers. 
After an argument about whether he had been sell ing beer to the workers on 
duty (thQ tin was empty), the worker was taken to the DSLSC offices and 
both sides presented their arguments to the compound manager. Although 
the manager said it was impossible that a foreman could lie and say there was 
liquor in the tin, there was some doubt about the case and 'judgement' was 
reserved unti I the afternoon. The worker was then told he had been found 
guilty of selling I iquor and then, importantly, that he would have only been 
reprimanded if he had not been seen at the Wage Board hearing. 
fired because I was going to influence people with Communism. ' 
'I was 
When 
this statement was made the worker refused to sign his acceptance of his 
severance pay which also did not inc lude notice pay. The worker was 
told he was free to leave the DSLSC with nothing, and take his complaint 
to anyone who wanted to hear; if he wanted any money from the company 
he would have to sign his acceptance of his dismissal and the wages without 
notice pay. His signature would declare that he had received all the 
wages due to him. The worker eventually had to sign because of his pass 
irregularities. All he had was an identity certificate, and the worker 
requested a letter giving the reasons for termination of service and as a 
record of work so he would be able to apply for work again at the tribal 
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labour bureaux in Nkandla. The compound manager gave him a document 
which allowed him to be in the Durban magisterial area for three days. 17 
In the middle of the night, however, h~ was woken and expelled from the 
compound by the compound induna. He took his belongings and managed 
to find a place to sleep in a scrap car for the night. Such was the 'bene-
volence' of the Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Company. 
This victimization posed enormous problems for the worker, the 
sol idarity of the stevedoring workers, and the GFWBF. Only the main 
features of the worker's statement are presented here, the details of each 
incident affecting the workers were voluminous with many possibly significant 
side issues. The dismissal was clearly one of victimization in terms of the 
Wage Act or even the Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act, but there 
was no likelihood of it ever reaching the courts. Lawyers engaged by the 
h b •· h 18 GFWBF did not know even OW to start ringing suc a case to court. 
The issue was obviously not primarily a legal one, however; it was a 
question of social power; only immediate strike action by the workers and 
discipl ining of the compound induna could have secured the re-employment 
of the worker or kept the issue a live. As it was, the worker, after signing 
his acceptance of the severance pay and making a statement, said he was 
not wanting to be re-employed by such an oppressive company as the DSLSC. 
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The victimization exposed the powerlessness of the GFWBF 'industrial rights' 
strategy: without an army of expert lawyers and a sympathetic Department 
of Labour no advantage accrued to workers from any of the protective clauses 
in bourgeois law. 19 While it was important to defend workers by all the 
legal means available, ultimately the defence of the workers had to be 
carried out by themselves through their power in production, rather than 
through even an activist 'office'. 
These conclusions were not immediately obvious either to the workers 
who were looking to the 'office' for leadership and a strategy to deal with 
victimization, or to the officials who argued that mass membership of the 
GFWBF was the solution to the fear of the workers. One of the leading 
workers said that more dismissals were likely to take place and that 'drastic 
measures' should be taken. The GFWBF officials suggested that the workers 
could respond by demanding the conditions set down in the WD 308 on sick 
pay, which the workers said was not being paid at either company, and on 
holidays, which was a burning question at Grindrods. The workers agreed 
that the delegates elected from the gangs should be trained as shop stewards 
in the stevedoring section of the GFWBF, that WD 308 should be photocopied, 
and that a handbook should be produced which the workers could carry with 
them at all times carrying, in simple language, the details of conditions of 
service and how to defend themselves. The workers were enthusi.Jstic 
about the mass distribution of WD 308; one of the workers from Grindrod said 
that the ,workers' representatives who had demanded it in 1969 had been dis-
missed, and that he had only survived because his foreman defended him. 20 
The issue of leave was an explosive one at Grindrods; the workers were 
amazed to learn that the wage determination laid down a fortnight's leave 
after the worker had completed twelve months' work, and there were shouts 
of indignation that this knowledge had been denied them.
21 
The difficulty 
with using the leave issue as a counter lever to the reassert ion of the 
employers' control over the workers, as would be discovered later, was that it 
tended to become a question of the rights of individual workers to leave 
rather than an issue around which to mobil ize collectiyely. 
The immediate issue which had been raised by the weakening of 
control over the workers by the collective demands being made at the Wage 
Board was the question of overtime; whether the employers had the right 
to compel workers to do overtime on Saturday or Sunday. At a meeting 
on 5 August 1972 of the workers it was reported that the indunas of the 
DSlSC had been called together and asked whether they had heard anything 
about a rumour that the workers were going to refuse to work on Sunday, 6 
August 1972. They said they had heard nothing, but the officials were 
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concerned and said they should report if they heard anything. This impor-
tant issue was not discussed much further because there were few DSLSC 
workers present and these said they were 'surprised and embarrassed' by the 
absence of the others. 22 The discussion revealed an uneasy relationship 
both between the workers and the employers, and some tensions among the 
workers. 
The dock employers moved on to the offensive during the following 
week by attempting to consol idate the indunas and winchmen against the 
labourers. Meetings were held at both companies at which the company 
officials berated the indunas for their indecisiveness as the demands of the 
labourers gained strength. At Grindrods on Saturday, 12 August at 1130, 
the workers reported that the i ndunas were summonsed and asked why they 
were no longer firing the malingerers as before. They were told to watch 
the workers carefully and to report any faults in their work so they could be 
dismissed because of the strong rumour that the workers were expecting the 
wage increase demanded at the Wage Board meeting. At the Point a large 
meeting of senior indunas, indunas, and winchmen was held on Tuesday, 8 
August 1972, at 1400, at which it was said that the workers were trying to 
be clever' by demanding higher wages, and that the workers should be watched. 
J. B. Buthelezi, whom the workers described as compound manager, was 
reportedly most enthusiastic about tightening up the controls over the 
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workers; his word was to be final on any case of dismissal. The long 
service workers were most afraid they would be fired and new workers taken 
on in their place. The workers were told that all sloppy dress had to end: 
their helmets had to be worn with the visor in the front otherwise they would 
'be putting the company at the back of you' .23 
The policy of 'frightfulness' of the employers was a product of their 
losing control of the direct disciplining of the workers because of the new 
assertiveness of the labourers and their compelling wage demand. The 
indunas were caught in a tight vice of contradictory pressures between the 
rising aspirations of the labourers, and the demands of the employers that 
they should reassert their former powers. Among the workers some sectians 
looked immediately for allies outside the working class, the inhuman policies 
of the DSLSC had to be curbed by any forces available, and the intervention 
of the Zulu Paramount Chief was sought not to advance the workers' demands, 
but to discipline J.B. Buthelezi and stop the dismissals. The shifting 
aJlegiances of the indunas between the labourers and the employers, and the 
question of support for the disciplining of J. B. Buthelezi by the African petty 
bourgeoisie in the reserves, were to dominate the discussions of the workers, 
until the urgency of the workers' demands propelled the workers' movement 
ahead. 
While the new policies of the employers aimed at striking terror into 
the hearts of the long service and militant labourers, many indunas were also 
very unhappy about their position as the tools of the management. In 
discussions with the indunas at the workplace many said they had the same 
fear as the labourers. One of the leading members of the GFWBF spoke 
to a senior induna who was totally opposed to the new regime; this worker 
said that he should come to the GFWBF offices to see that the growing 
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strength of the workers was Inot I ies ' • He felt that if the senior induna 
was won over he would influence the I inferior' indunas against carrying 
out the employers' orders, and the workers' organ ization would be immensely 
strengthened. This worker also mentioned that one of the Grindrod indunas 
had been dismissed although found not guilty in court on a charge of stealing 
goods from the ships.24 This case seemed to imply that any reluctance on 
the part of the indunas to carry out instructions would face them with the 
same fate as the labourers. The DSLSC officials did not hesitate to start 
carrying out the hard line; three workers coming in late from Kwa Mashu 
because they had been delayed by transport were fired immediately. 25 
It was possibly from the indunas that the initiative was taken to 
approach the Paramount Chief about J. B. Buthelezi. 26 Some external 
intervention would remove the burden of having to meet either the demands 
of the employers or the labourers. The worker who reported on the issue 
gave equal approval to both the Paramount Chief and Chief Gatsha Buthelezi 
as being opposed to apartheid. He said that J. B. Buthelezi had been 
summonsed by the Paramount Chief as he was being accused of assisting in 
the oppression of the stevedoring workers, and abusing the workers. He 
said that J. B. Buthelezi was not a member of the Royal Family and that as 
compound manager his only greatness was lording it over the workers. The 
worker suggested that J. B. Buthelezi would be taken to Swaziland in exile 
and would be deprived of Zulu 'national ity' i he was getting on in years 
and had ,no right to fight against the rights of the younger generation. 
The GFWBF officials were surprised by this sudden development, all discussion 
up to this point being fundamentally on the independent organization of the 
workers without considering the question of the growing importance of the 
Bantustans. The approach of a group of the workers to the Paramount 
Chief was unexpected, but if what was claimed was valid, the removal of 
J. B. Buthelezi would significantly weaken the power of the employers and 
enable a rapid advance of the stevedoring section of the GFWBF into a mass 
organization. 
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The reports on the response of the indunas seemed to indicate that 
they were 'coming over' to the side of the workers. The fear the 
employers were intensifying among the labourers was infecting the black 
supervisors. Who could be secure in this new situation? For the first 
time an induna from the DSLSC attended the meeting of the GFWBF and 
expressed appreciation of the growing organization of the workers. Again, 
some of the members of the GFWBF felt that this was a crucial advance, if 
the indunas were drawn to the organization then the workers would have no 
fear in coming to the meetings of stevedores in large numbers or in signing 
the GFWBF membership forms. 
The strategy of some of the workers in approach ing the Paramount 
Chief to get rid of J.B. Buthelezi seemed to have worked. At a meeting 
on Friday, 25 August 1972, the worker who had previously raised the issue 
announced proudly that Jakonia Buthelezi had left the DSLSC on Thursday, 
he had packed everything and had gone. He had been discipl ined 
because at the meeting at the DSLSC on 8 August he had said the workers 
were not to expect a wage increase. The Paramount Chief had called him 
up and told him he was not allowed to continue his work in Durban 'because 
this is a Zulu country'. There was general rejoicing at the removal of one 
of the primary tormentors of the workers. It was said that the reason there 
had not been more workers from the DSLSC at the meetings was because they 
were frightened of J. B. Buthelezi. H is removal was thought to give the 
workers~:m opportunity of reorganizing in the face of the 'frightful' policies 
being adopted by the stevedoring companies. 
This 'turning towards' the traditional African petty bourgeoisie as 
a potential ally to the workers' organization led immediately (at the same 
meeting) to the suggestion that Chief Gatsha Buthelezi should be invited to 
address the stevedoring committee to take the opportunity of his legal position 
within the Bantustan to have a mass meeting of workers; this, it was 
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suggested, would strengthen the workers and 'cause the bosses to respect 
the worker' . It was only with a strong stevedoring committee within 
the GFWBF that the workers could stop the firing of workers. 'When 
we have a strong committee, Mr. Neaves will stop firing the workers and 
give them respect. ' After some discussion it was agreed to invite Gatsha 
Buthelezi to have a meeting with the workers. 27 
The rather abrupt change in the orientation of the workers from the 
mass mobilization which the GFWBF officials put forward as a general 
solution to the problems of the workers' disorganization and fear of victimiza-
tion to searching for allies in the workers' struggle outside the working class 
caused some confusion to the'GFWBF officials. The whole tenor of their 
arguments was that it was the African workers who had the power to transform 
their humiliation and exploitation if sufficient unity could be attained. 
The workers had been encouraged to turn the meetings of delegates into mass 
meetings of stevedores. Meetings of GFWBF members should be held at 
the workplace or in the townships to build up nuclei organizationswithin the 
wider stevedoring committee, and an elected stevedoring committee 
should make decisions which would carry the weight of delegated authority. 
Given the intense support for the demands of the delegates at the Wage Board 
and contained in the letter sent to the Wages Commission from the underground 
organization at the DSLSC, it was assumed that the general forward movement 
of the workers would contain the environment in which a proto-union could 
mature ~nd move into a position of open authority in relation to the steve-
doring employers. The strategy of the workers shou Id be to bu i Id up groups 
of workers in production who were members of the GFWBF, elect delegates 
who would act like shop stewards in the British trade unions, train the shop 
stewards in the collection of subscriptions and industrial demands, and 
develop an executive committee. The GFWBF officials were particularly 
impressed with the growing power and mass membership of a general workers' 
union such as the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) in the 
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United Kingdom which had originally been based on dock workers and felt 
that with an intelligent use of industrial demands within a possibly amorphous 
general organization, recognition would be forced from the employers and 
the workers could then address the pol itical tasks of their organization. 28 
I n the face of the employers' counter-offensive the officials stressed 
the urgency of diverting discussion from the complaints and grievances of 
the workers towards their organization at a number of levels: in the gangs, 
the companies, and as stevedoring workers as a whole; and in particular 
to initiate discussions between DSLSC and Grindrod workers on the ships and 
wharves. The worker who proved himself most capable in supplying infor-
mation on the underworld of repression and victimization at the workplace, 
and most in touch with the general position of the workers at the DSLSC, 
was a Iso the worker who reported on and approved of the action of the Para-
mount Chief. As a capable leader of the workers, having worked long in 
the docks and increasingly active in building the unity of the DSLSC and 
Grindrod workers during the counter-offensive, his position was unchallenged. 
It was, however, a younger worker who suggested strengthening the workers' 
movement by inviting Chief Gatsha Buthelezi to address a mass meeting of 
dock workers. This worker was most enthusiastic about building up the 
GFWBF into a mass organization and took the tasks of patiently explaining 
to workers the purpose of the GFWBF, and bringing workers to the offices so 
they could see the product of organized workers. The differences were 
more of tendencies, rather than fundamental outlook; both seeing the 
unity of the workers as the main issue, one demanding 'drastic measures' to 
prepare the ground for mass organization, the other feeling the unity of the 
workers a matter of accumulating the confidence of the workers in organiza-
tion. 29 They showed differences in approach to the organization of the 
stevedoring workers, the older worker stressing the need to win over the 
indunas and thus the men under them, and the younger the need to convmce 
individual workers to cut across the work groups in production. 
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Having worked from the immediate demands of the workers to the 
question of industrial organization, in the six ,weeks between the Wage 
Board hearing and the call for Chief Gatsha Buthelezi to address the workers, 
the officials had not dealt with the wider questions of the political economy 
or specifically the position of the Bantustans within apartheid society. It 
was not simply a matter of time, although the workers needed to gain con-
fidence in the officials on the basis of a day-to-day struggle, but of strategy: 
by championing the economic demands of the workers it was hoped to expose 
both the class nature of the apartheid state and the liberal bourgeoisie to the 
workers. By organizing the African workers in trade unions and persisting 
in raising their fundamental economic demands, the black working class would 
be able to advance by maintaining the allegiance of the workers through 
forcing concessions directly from employers or through the Wage Board. 
But because the apartheid state was insisting that African workers were 
'temporary sojourners' in the industrial urban areas there could be no accommo-
dation between trade unions which fought for their very existence in these 
areas and the state. While maintaining a mass base, the working class 
movement would be forced into daily combat with the state and would raise 
the fundamental contradiction within the national oppression of the African 
people: the strategic position of African workers in production and the 
state which acted to perpetuate their impermanence in the urban areas. 
The stress on popular economic demands and the insistence on the legality of 
unregistered trade unions was also seen as a solution to the problem of 
differenGes between 'backward' and 'advanced' workers. While some 
pol itically ma,ture workers would real ize from the beginning the incompati-
bil ity between the authentic organization of workers and the apartheid state, 
this could not be the campaigning slogan of the trade unions. The 
advanced workers could take up the question of trade union organization and 
industrial demands as a means of 'forcing the pace' of class consciousness for 
those workers who were politically quiet because of an over-riding concern 
for job and family security. 30 While the GFWBF officials did not see the 
forward movement as everything and the final aim as nothing (the political 
aims of the working class movement were presented in discussions with 
advanced workers in secure surroundings), an evolutionary approach was 
being adopted in the development of political consciousness. As the 
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workers' movement came into conflict with the state so more advanced argu-
ments would be employed to explain the nature of the relation between the 
employers and the state, without destroying the basis for association between 
workers and losing the 'backward' workers. 
This approach has been rigorously criticized by Lenin for not develop-
ing the struggle of the workers on a national political plane, 'not in its 
relation to a given group of ~mployers alone, but in its relation to all classes 
of modern society and to the state as an organized political force'. 31 The 
GFWBF officials were distant from having such a developed class perspective, 
and their pol itical consciousness was constituted around a radical rather than 
a Marxist critique of apartheid society, reflecting rather than decisively 
leading the struggle of the workers. The benefit fund strategy did indeed 
embody a theory of pol itical development of the African working class being 
a process of tactical struggle; that the very foundation of the workers' 
association was likely to be declared illegal, but that the workers would by 
th is stage have the confidence to continue their organizations whatever the 
policy of the state. The tremendous advance which the benefit fund marked 
in the organization of the workers, which was only possible because of its 
apparent,ly legal and non-political character, did not automatically lead to 
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a revolutionary class consciousness. For this level of consciousness to 
be reached: 
The worker must have a clear picture in his mind of the economic 
nature and the social and political features of the landlord and 
the priest, the high state official and the peasant, the student and 
the vagabond; he must know their strong and weak points; he 
must grasp the meaning of all the catchwords and sophisms by 
which each class and each stratum camouflages its selfish interests 
and its real 'inner workings'; he must understand what 
interests are reflected by certain institutions and certain 
laws and how they are reflected. 33 
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The GFWBF officials themselves were far from having such a revolutionary 
class consciousness, and what political understanding they had seemed rerrote 
from the 'proletarian politics' involved in the arguments about forms of work-
ing class organization, the question of legality, and the importance of wage 
demands to the African working class living in desperate poverty. Although 
the GFWBF officials acted in a coordinated manner they in no sense approached 
the role of a revolutionary party which Lenin argues is essential to providing 
the political leadership of the working class. Not having developed their 
own, and the workers' political consciousness to a thorough class analysis and 
strategy, the GFWBF officials found themselves suddenly confronted by an 
issue they would rather have had brought up further in the evolution of the 
workers' organization. There had not been a discussion with the workers 
about the position of the Bantustans within the political economy of apartheid, 
nor specifically the class position of the African petty bourgeoisie in the 
reserves and their relationship to African workers. If the traditional leader-
ship was prepared to take action in support of the workers' demands against 
their enemies (as personified for many workers in the rule of J. B. Buthelezi) 
then their action seemed to point to contradictions between different elements 
which appeared to be responsive to an organized African working class. If 
this was the case, the officials would view the relationship between the 
workers 9nd the traditional African petty bourgeoisie empirically rather than 
from the theoretical viewpoint of a working class party. 
Change in hours and works committee 
Although the workers' suggestion that Chief Gatsha Buthelezi should 
be invited to address them diverted discussions at the meeting of 25 August 
1972 to the question of political support for the nascent workers' organizations, 
the issues which were to dominate the thinking of the workers in the following 
624 
period were thosecfchanged hours, and the possibility of forming a works 
committee at Grindrods. The two issues were closely connected: wi th 
the arbitrary changes in working conditions by the employers, the workers 
sought legal methods of disputing the employers' prerogatives. By mid-
September it appeared that some of the pressure on the workers, the scrutiny 
and threats of dismissal, had eased as larger numbers of workers came to the 
meetings of the stevedoring section of the GFWBF . The question of 
changed hours riveted the attention of the workers on the wage demands and 
demands for an end to compulsory overtime and Sunday work which had been 
made at the Wage Board hearing. 
The most encouraging development for the GFWBF officials and the 
Grindrod workers was the imposing presence of the DSlSC delegates. This 
increase in the level of participation in the stevedoring meetings had been 
stimulated both by an apparent easing of victimization by management and 
the publ ication of Isisebenzi 6 which carried a report of the representations 
made to the Wage Board under the headl ine 'Stevedores demand R 18 a week' • 
The same issue carried a letter pointing out the difference in earnings bet-
ween indunas employed by the DSlSC and other companies in the docks and 
demanding shorter hours and an end to income tax. The letter from the 
stevedoring labourers outlin ing their demands was republ ished. 34 One of 
the leading workers from the DSlSC had been attracted to the meeting by the 
newspaper, but wondered how many workers at the Point knew that these 
meetings were taking place. (The meetings had deliberately not been 
advertized so that the workers present would be likely to know arid trust 
each other.) The views of the DS!.SC workers will be presented in some 
detail as they represent the first major intervention from a group of workers 
at the company, coming as it did after the apparent removal of J.B. Buthelezi. 
As in the case of the Grindrod workers, some of the most 'forward' workers 
with a clear grasp of the labour process and precise industrial demands were 
the graded workers and indunas. 
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The workers voiced a most profound antipathy to the DSLSC, pro-
testing against their oppression with great spirit. In contrast to the 
Grindrod workers who had a sense of the personalities making up management, 
and even some illusions about the impartiality of M. Grindrod, the DSLSC 
workers perceived management as a monolithic organization with malevolent 
intentions. 35 One of the workers who had been employed as a stevedore 
from 1935 had a deep historical consciousness of the workers I struggle. 
The conditions of the workers, he argued, had been getting steadily worse 
since 1959 when the labour supply company had been formed. He had not 
got any information about the Wage Board hearing apart from what he had 
read in Isisebenzi and he had no idea what happened at the Wage Board 
hearing 'because information is not divulged to us at the Point ' . There 
was no committee of workers at the Point: lit is the employers who choose 
the works committee and force us to accept it; that committee does not tell 
us what was soid at the meeting. Usually I read in the newspapers what is 
happening. ,36 This worker felt that industrial legislation must have been 
suspended in the docks because of the extraordinarily long hours. There 
was 'reporting time ' between 0600 and clocking on at 0720 and eventually 
the workers only knocked off at 2100. He pointed out all the anomalies 
in different increases in the components of the wage. 37 He charged the 
DSLSC with not providing the workers with sick pay, or a night shift 
allowance, and said there was no day off or sick leave. 
~ar from the induna being able to command the workers, 'if you are 
an induna you are a slave ' • He argued that the employers squeezed out 
the maxi mum amount of work from the indunas by keeping the ir numbers down. 
When a wh ite from overseas is employed at the Point you are forced to teach 
him the job. ' There were no wages for such instruction. Again, when 
a winchman was not on duty the induna was required to do his job. 'That 
means you are not the induna but all the other workers.' The winchmen 
were not paid the rate for the job, only when they were required to operate 
a winch or a crane, otherwise they received the labourers' rate. 38 For 
all the workers the cargo allowances were by no means guaranteed, 'you 
have to persuade the foreman to give you your allowance'. There were 
problems in getting the work tickets marked with the cargo allowance for 
poisonous cargoes, and 'if you request the increase you are deported to the 
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reserves' . There were at least 300 workers who did not live in the DSLSC 
compound but none of these workers got a travelling allowance. The 
indunas were far from satisfied with their wages; only the senior indunas 
were represented on the committee and 'we don't know if they get an 
increase or not' • The DSLSC indunas w~e fall ing behind other indunas 
in the dock area, those employed by Dusty Millars earned R22 a week and 
earned bonuses in June and December. 39 
This worker who had a thorough grasp of the 'industrial' demands of 
the workers articulated the ambiguous feelings of the operators and indunas 
under the compelling pressure of the employers and the rising .resistance of 
the labourers. The employers were consistently attempting to turn the 
indunas and operators into a 'bloc' against the labourers, a group which com-
manded the technical skills in production against the collective skills of the 
labourers. The contradictions in the position of the indunas, even under 
the whip of dismissal, were cl ear. With the rising demands of the labourers 
for wages which were even higher than their level of wages they would 'turn 
towards' the labourers, temper their power to dismiss or recommend dismissal, 
but brinSl with them into the collective organization of the workers their 'own' 
demands. The underground letter from the labourers repudiated the indunas 
as a whole for their collaboration with management; under these pressures 
the black supervisors could become secret sympathizers, impartial arbiters, or 
tyrants. At no stage, however, could they articulate the demands of the 
workers as a whole to the management no matter how aggrieved they might 
feel. Their manoeuvring under pressure was vividly described by a labourer 
at an earlier meeting. He dealt with the question of the indunas 
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(sympathizers and tyrants) claiming to 'Iead ' the workers, and the disunity 
of the African workers. Iyou cannot speak for the others because you 
are always in the sight of the Company. I ask the leaders why they don't 
speak for the workers when they are in the place of the bosses. When we 
are fighting you go to make peace. Because you are in the workers ' eyes 
and in the Companyls eyes you cannot be a leader for both • .40 The other 
workers from the Point stressed that the demands of the indunas by no means 
meant they were won over to the position of the workers as a whole: Imany 
of the indunas are after us l . One of the workers faced the meeting with 
his predicament. He had spoken at the Wage Board meeting and had been 
told by a friendly clerk that the management had his name and that when he 
would take his leave his services would be terminated. 'What will happen is 
that when my contract expires I won It be taken on again. I Some mark had 
been made in his pass book which he did not understand. II don't know if I 
will get a permit to get another job. I According to the clerk he would be 
thanked for his services to the compony and performing his duties, but not 
re-engaged. This subtle form of victimization would make the company 
completely immune from any possibil ity of being charged in terms of the Wage 
Act for victimization, it would simply make use of the regulations in terms 
of the Bantu labour Act of 1964 which limited contracts of service to a 
maximum of 360 shifts a year. The victimization would in strictly legal 
terms then not be one of dismissal but of refusal to re-engage a worker. 41 
The mark on his pass raised the possibil ity that mil itant African workers could 
not only ,be victimized by one employer but get a 'political ' stamp on his 
documents which would lead to his being hounded by the labour bureaux and 
dismissed from job after job. No solutions to this apparently insoluble 
problem were suggested by the other workers and the GFWBF officials; the 
problem faced the GFWBF with the acute responsibility of acting as a workers ' 
defence organization. The question was, however, not a personal but a 
general organizational one: how to retaliate decisively to the gradual 
weakening of the advance of the workers. The incident showed that the 
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DSlSC was moving more intelligently after the apparent removal of J. B. 
Buthelezi and was cautiously tracking down the leading militants and 
employing a variety of legal strategems to cover itself both from legal action 
or retaliatory strikes.
42 
The lack of a strategy from the GFWBF officials 
and the workers themselves to this insidious counter-assault will be discussed 
in a later section dealing with the severe limitations of the 'industrial rights' 
strategy of the GFWBF and the prob I ems of workers' defence. 
The other workers from the Point voiced a wide range of grievances, 
general demands as well as the industrial questions. One of the winchmen 
complained that as much labour-time as possible was being extracted from the 
workers; after completing the task on one ship they were immediately trans-
fer red to another. The workers were becoming exhausted and wonted a 
reword for finishing the first task as the ship was then free to leave. The 
wages in stevedoring were low, he complained, and had to be 'squandered' 
on the workers' food. On top of the long hours and low wages the workers 
were being taxed on overtime: II get nothing from PAYE'. The conditions 
at the docks were much worse than in the factories which had shorter hours 
and usually an annual bonus. IAII I'll get when I'm discharged is a few 
coins. ' Often workers were injured on duty and had to be in the hospitals 
for months without any wages from the employers. 43 Most of all this 
worker was appalled by the inhumanity of social relations in the DSlSC: 
there was not one day of work in which a supervisor had said the work had 
been well done, although they were always shouting that the goods had to 
be handled with care. Another winchman argued that he was doing the 
work of two men ('a double job') both operating the crane and the winch as 
well as doing the signalling work of the gangwayman. This was the 
grievance of all of the winchmen. As an operator, the winchmen imme-
diately compared their position with that of the white crane drivers on the 
wharves and argued they should be paid the same wage. The African 
workers had the same necessities as white workers. 'When I am at the 
winch I can get the cars out of the ship without damage and I do the same 
job as the white crane driver, but he is higher paid. I have the same 
expenses, I stay at Kwa Mashu where the rent is high, my children want to 
get a good education, all people must be dressed, eat, and be satisfied, 
and now even the bus fares are being increased. I 
The infusion of Point workers with a clear grasp of the issues of the 
workers' struggle into the stevedoring meeting quickened the pace of debate 
and raised the workers ' hopes for an organized strategy. A leading 
Grindrod worker said he was happy to see that the indunas at the Point were 
coming forward to assist the workers to become organized because 'the 
workers fear the indunas may inform the bosses I as in the case of the worker 
who had been warned he was to be dismissed. 'We must now be confident 
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to proceed with our organization. I The reason, he argued, that the GFWBF 
stevedoring group had not grown was because the indunas had dragged behind 
the workers. We will now be very strong as most of the workers were 
afraid there would be informers at the meetings. I He felt that since the 
indunas also had grievances they could advance with the wor kers as a whole. 
Other workers agreed the indunas had grievances but called on them not to 
'force the workers ' because they simply earned a wage from what the labourers 
produced. One worker suggested the indunas should be united with the 
workers on the basis of not dismissing the workers. 
l;he stronger presence of the DSLSC workers immediately brought up 
the idea of setting up a joint committee of DSLSC and Grindrod workers, to 
'speak with one voice ' • One of the Grindrod workers suggested that the 
Point even had some advantages, for instance they had separate pay slips 
for basic wages and overtime. If there were sufficient workers coming to 
the meetings representatives could be elected from the DSLSC to the steve-
doring committee. The problem ra ised by one of the Point workers was 
that there were informers at the meeting as the DSLSC office knew he had 
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a say in its organization, and this meant that the workers could never be 
strong. The only way around this problem, a Grindrod worker suggested, 
was that there should be discussions with the DSLSC workers at the lunch 
44 
breaks. 
Despite the setbacks faced by the workers, with the victimization of 
some of them after the Wage Board sitting and the threat of worse to come, 
the GFWBF stevedoring section was growing steadily in influence and in 
numbers. Although the presence of the Point workers seemed to indicate 
a general forward movement in the organization, the officials were far from 
getting near the structured organization they were wanting: groups of 
workers in production electing delegates who in turn would elect an execu-
tive committee to take policy on all questions affecting the organization of 
stevedoring workers. These problems were not in any sense related to the 
incapacity of the workers for organization but to the pervasive fear of the 
workers. This fear (the word 'fear' or'afraid ' appears on every page of 
the minutes of the meetings) was complex; it was not simply the risk of 
African workers organizing semi-legally under an oppressive state. The 
nature of fear of the African workers gives some insight into the division of 
labour between the employers and the state in maintaining the social order 
of capital. The power of the state to inflict decisive blows against indi-
vidual workers and the workers I organization was not the dominant fear: 
the state in the view of the workers acted as a Ireserve power l of the 
employers. Management took on the prime responsibility for maintaining 
control over the workers on a day-to-day basis, the police only being called 
in when the authority of capital at the workplace was being threatened by a 
rising tide of resistance, as during a strike. The task of management was 
to make profits through the exertion of social controls over the workers, that 
of the police to maintain the public order of capital. An over-dependence 
of the employers on the pol ice would indicate its incapacity to organize and 
rule production. 
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The primary fear of the workers was that of instant dismissal, from 
which the workers were far from immune by collective action in their sup-
port by other workers or by the industrial rights strategy of the GFWBF • 
Without organization there was not likely to be the possibility of collec-
tive support or even a concerted legal bottle over victimization. The 
only way the workers could break out of the cycle of fear of taking the 
first step to becoming organized because of insufficient organization was to 
be a general forward movement of the workers in support of their demands. 
The difficulty in a period when the workers were cautiously advancing was 
that they had to commit themselves to an untested course of action in which 
leading' workers could only be safeguarded by its success. Despite the 
oppression of the workers by the apartheid state and the employers, a common 
resistance to this oppression did not engender united working class action of 
its own accord. The fear of the advanced workers in providing a decisive 
lead in organization was both a product of the informer and spy system used 
by the employers to 'mark ' the leaders and the relative openness of the 
, 45 Th . f h .,.. h bl' d meetings. e oper.atlons 0 testate In maintaining t e pu IC or er 
of capital, particularly in the townships, in political organizations, and in 
enforcing a night aJrfew, were not the primary fears of the advanced workers 
in discussing working closs organization in production, although these were 
the impediments to general resistance to the apartheid state. 
The general questions of organization which were being faced with 
increasing urgency by the workers were supplemented by the decisive issue 
of the changing hours in the docks. The issue was compl icated for the 
GFWBF officials as it did not necessarily involve an actual decline in the 
total number of hours worked a week, but rather adjustments to the definition 
of ordinary hours and the elimination of rest periods. For the workers, the 
issue was simple: the total amount of overtime was being cut and earnings 
reduced. It was the issue of hours which provided a sharp stimulus to the 
membersh ip of the GFWBF stevedoring section and added to the numbers 
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attending the meetings. It also brought about a close study of the possi-
bility of organizing a workers' committee registered in terms of the Bantu 
Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act at Grindrods to turn the arbitrary 
re-or~anization of the hours into a legal dispute with the employers. This 
was finally the question which brought the wage issue to the forefront again 
and brought the stevedores out on stri ke. 
The most substantial changes in hours at the docks had been made on 
6 December 1971 when the 'five-day' week had been introduced. 46 
Coming soon after the demand for increased wages by the stevedores in Sep-
tember, the abolition of work on Saturdays was a concession to the workers' 
demands for shorter hours as well as an attempt to step up the intensity of 
work. The loss of 4 hours 40 minutes work on Saturday was transferred on 
to the working hours Monday to Friday, simply by expanding the proportion 
of the 12 hour 20 minute maximum hours regarded as ordinary hours.
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Thus the workers lost one hour's work a day, between 1700 and 1800, over-
time. This, it was calculated, could lose the workers from R20 upwards 
a month. There was an added benefit to the employers: before the 'five 
day' week it was reported that work started to slacken off from about 1615 
for the end of the working day at 1700 when there was a meal break before 
overtime began. This was not only a benefit to the stevedoring employers, 
but to the commercial and transport compan ies as well. 'Now that the 
harbour working day ends at 1800 harbour carriers are finding it possible to 
continue
l 
normal working until the end of their working day at 1700 - a gain 
of nearly an hour each day. ,48 The shipping companies were apparently 
not satisfied with the rearrangements and advocated a starting time of 0700, 
and after its implementation commerc.ial companies argued that it would be 
essential to return to Saturday work to avoid congestion after the annual 
holiday. This would not be regarded as overtime, they complained, and 
would be very expensive. The difficulty with reinstating Saturday work 
was that the workers had become used to this increase in their leisure time 
and the employers would find it difficult to take it away from them. 
The first news about further changes in the hours oJ work came from 
the Grindrod workers, where a meeting of the workers was addressed by 
Neaves, the compound manager, late in September. Neaves apparently 
told the workers that in the future they would be required to start work at 
0700 and continue through to 1700 with a break for lunch but no more tea 
breaks during the day. Overtime would continue as before to 2100. 
The workers had resisted these new conditions of service despite Neaves' 
arguing this would mean a reduction in ordinary time to 45 hours; the 
workers demanded 44 hours and no change in the tea breaks. 49 The 
workers did not find the return to the end of the 'ordinary' working hours 
at 1700 attractive, even if they would have 3 hours 20 minutes more over-
• 50 
time. The changes in hours would require that they start promptly at 
0700; the workers would have to clock in at 0630. The intention of 
the employers must have been to get more out of the labourers while they 
were still fresh and generally to raise the intensity of labour throughout the 
day. Earlier in the year it had been reported that the 'five day' week 
had caused productivity of the workers to drop at a time when the port had 
not been under heavy pressure. The shipping companies were concerned 
that the 'humanitarian principle' involved in shortening hours by ending 
Saturday work would not be able to be made up during the rest of the week. 
Once the 'five day' week had been introduced it could 'never be withdrawn 
without upsetting the harbour workers'. The shipping companies were also 
concerned that ships which were unable to be completely loaded or dis-
d . . '1 S d 51 charged on Friday would be force to remain In port untl un ay. 
The Grindrod workers were strong Iy opposed to the new hours sug-
gested by Neaves. We are crying because there is no compound and we 
have to use the train. When we are late we will be fired. It is very 
hard to get to work at 0600. ,52 The changed hours proposed raised all the 
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workers' grievances about working conditions. At the end of the week, 
one worker said, there was a note on the worker's ticket instructing him 
he had to work on Saturday, so the 'five day' week was a myth. If you 
did not come to work on Saturday you were fired. With the juggling 
around of the hours the workers were concerned what effect this would have 
on their hourly earnings; 
many hours were worked. 
there were no pay slips to show precisely how 
The change in hours presented the GFWBF officials with a decisive 
challenge: here was an issue which aroused the widest unity of all workers 
against the employers. If it was handled correctly it could establ ish the 
GFWBF stevedoring section as a mass organization of workers in the docks, 
being able to put forward all the demands of the stevedores. There were 
two possibilities: either a mass agitational campaign against the hours 
under the imprint of some other organization, or the establishment of effec-
tive workers' committees in the companies which would be in an unassailable 
position. The first alternative was not given serious consideration as the 
workers were already thoroughly aroused against the new system and so the 
only strategy could be to call them out on strike, a forward position wh ich 
would not necessarily be supported by leading workers in the GFWBF. The 
other alternative involved a study of the works committee system in terms of 
the Bantu Labour {Settlement of Disputes} Act as a means by which the workers 
could declare a dispute without jeopardizing the position of their leaders. 53 
The wor~ers were unenthusiastic about establishing a works committee at 
Grindrods. They said a committee had been in existence some time ago 
with 11 representatives, but all {bar one} had been fired during an argument 
about whether they should have a copy of the wage determination. In 
the discussion it was established that this committee had not been registered 
at all. It had apparently been establ ished on the initiative of Mr. 
Grindrod, the managing director of the company, and Neaves had said the 
works committee 'didn't need the law'. The GFWBF officials would have 
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preferred to have had such a strong representation of Grindrod workers within 
the organization that the workers could have demanded recognition from the 
employers as an autonomous and representative organization, but gi ven the 
fact that only a minority of the workers had joined the organization by that 
time, they suggested that the workers should fight for a representative com-
mittee registered in terms of the Act which could be led by GFWBF members. 
If possible the elections should take place at the GFWBF premises and the 
employers merely notified that the representatives had been elected and that 
they were legally safeguarded in terms of the Act. After some discussion 
it was agreed that the GFWBF officials should write to the Department of 
Labour and ask the officials to make an inspection of the conditions of work; 
the workers would consider whether it was advisable to set up a registered 
k • 54 wor s comm I ttee . 
While the workers were hesitant about going ahead and electing a 
works committee, the Grindrod management (possibly stimulated by a visit 
from the Department of Labour) was most concerned that a committee should 
be constituted. A meeting of the Grindrod workers was held on Friday, 
29 September 1972, at which the workers were addressed by Neaves, who 
asked one of the long service workers to get six other workers to set up a 
committee. The workers, however, refused to put forward representatives 
if the committee would suffer the same fate as the earlier committee, whose 
members had been victimized, and insisted the committee should be registered. 
The workers reserved their position, but by Friday, 6 October 1972, had 
I 
decided to go ahead with elections for a works committee if it was to be 
reg is tered in terms of the Act. 55 
With every meeting of the workers the issue of the working hours 
became more urgent, particularly for Grindrod workers who saw the new hours 
as a definite extension of working time and creating the possibility for more 
dismissals. The issue was slower to develop with the DSLSC workers, 
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possibly because fewer leading workers attended the meetings of the GFWBF, 
and the management was not prepared to risk having meetings of the workers 
as at Grindrods. As the dispute developed, there was a distinct tendency 
for the Grindrod workers to sharpen their hostility to the new hours while 
the DSLSC workers struggled to get a deeper level of organization without 
jeopardizing the security of the leadership. The question of changed hours, 
particularly an earlier reporting time, was a burning question for the Grindrod 
workers living in the townships around Durban and faced with an inefficient 
transport system. The disadvantages may not have seemed so acute to the 
majority of DSLSC workers housed in a compound who were woken early in 
the morning and started to report for work from 0600 in the morning. The 
problems in effective joint organization of the stevedoring workers as a whole 
were made difficult both by the fact that the Grindrod workers spent only 
short work breaks together with the DSLSC workers, and the leading Grindrod 
workers did not know who among the DSLSC workers to trust. For the 
GFWBF officials the Point workers were more remote (the offices in Gale 
Street were a considerable distance from the Point) and there were even 
problems in some Point workers finding the premises. 
Worst of all for the DSLSC workers was the reappearance of J. B. 
Buthelezi as a figure of authority. Quite what had happened in the period 
between his reported removal and his re-emergence, a period of six weeks, is 
not clear. 56 It may well have been that he had seen the Paramount Chief, 
as one of the older workers reported, and had been rebuked for his repression , 
of the workers. It is extraordinary that Buthelezi should have been absent 
from the Company during a crucial period of its control over the workers and 
that the 'frightful' policies of both the DSLSC and Grindrods had been 
blunted. The DSLSC management seems to have been steel ing itself against 
expected strike action by 'marking' leading workers and employing more 
sophisticated techniques of victimization. What is certain is that in the 
period up to the Wage Board sitting in July 1972 there had been increased 
employment of workers from Nongoma, the Paramount Chief's district, and 
a spectacular increase in the number of workers from Mah labathin i, Ch i ef 
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Gatsha Buthelezi's district. What type of plans which the DSLSC manage-
ment must have been making in readiness for the almost inevitable strike 
after the Wage Board recommendations (which the management was well 
aware would nowhere approach R 18) cannot be developed, but in the tradi-
tion of the past it must have been considering its labour hinterland. 57 
The reappearance of J. B. Buthelezi dismayed the Point workers. 'He is 
still there, better send him away. I repeat we don't want him here.' 
Another worker said he had heard that he was to have been removed but now 
he had returned the workers were outraged, even though he was reported to 
have stopped sacking workers as before. Despite this there was some 
tightening of control, especially in pride in the company. Workers who 
took off their hardhats at work because it was very hot were being dismissed; 
even the white foremen were reported to have said this was ridiculous. 58 
Neither the workers (the worker who had reported so authoritatively on the 
subject was on leave) nor the GFWBF drew on the case of J. B. Buthelezi's 
reappearance as an example of the incapacity or unwillingness of the tradi-
tional African leadership collaborating with the apartheid to secure the 
defence of the workers even against other African collaborators. To the 
contrary, some of the Point workers demanded that Chief Gatsha Buthelezi 
should be asked to 'exclude' J.B. Buthelezi. 
~he GFWBF officials did not want to oppose this development if it 
would give the workers the chance of having a 'legitimate' mass meeting 
which could be used to consolidate the GFWBF and put forward fighting 
demands as well as secure the removal of J.B. Buthelezi. A strike now 
seemed to be inevitable, both because of the delay in the Wage Board making 
a recommendation and the unpopular changes in hours, but the important 
question was the timing and effectiveness of strike action. Although the 
meetings were growing in numbers and membership was rising, there was no 
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effective organization at the point of production and it was impossible to 
develop an authoritative strategy for the DSLSC workers. The GFWBF 
officials proposed a double strategy: the drawing up of a 'Dockers I Charter I 
which would put forward all the essential demands of the workers and poten-
tially become the basis for national mobilization, and writing a letter to 
Chief Gatsha Buthelezi to address a mass meeting of stevedoring workers. 59 
The Charter was to be drawn up by the GFWBF officials from the complaints 
of the workers to be discussed and agreed upon by the workers, and then 
form the basis for workers I demands for the fu ture. 
Although the invitation to Chief Gatsha Buthelezi had been first 
suggested at a meeting of the workers on 25 August 1972 for a different pur-
pose, to strengthen the basis for the stevedoring committee, the demand 
being put forward by the Point workers seemed solely to remove J. B. Buthelezi. 
The GFWBF officials had not been completely remiss in carrying out the 
agreement of the meeting, but the relations with Chief Buthelezi were being 
considered on the basis of the interests of the benefit fund as a who Ie. It 
might be possible to have a really enormous meeting of workers, including 
the stevedoring workers, which would transform the organization into a mass 
movement of workers with fighting demands, they argued. A memorandum 
on the benefit fund was drawn up detailing its membersh ip from different 
industries and outlining its possible future development. This was sent to 
Chief Buthelezi and one of the officials telephoned him to ask if he could 
discuss t~e benefit fund with him. 60 A meeting was politely declined. 
When this was mentioned to the stevedoring workers they insisted that a letter 
should be written which should require a speedy response. The workers 
hoped that Chief Buthelezi would frighten the indunas. lit would be good 
for Buthelezi to be here because the indunas are giving trouble and they will 
be scared when they see him. 161 Before the meeting ended on Saturday, 
7 October 1972, th is letter was written and signed by two workers from 
Grindrods and two from the Point, call ing on Chief Buthelezi to address a 
meeting of the stevedores in Durban as soon as possible. 
out some of the concrete problems of the stevedores. 
The letter spelt 
For many years we stevedoring workers have been struggling 
. for better wages and working conditions. Because of our 
actions we have been victimized and we are not allowed to 
organize ourselves into freely elected committees. We 
have a special problem at the Point where the compound 
manager, Mr. J. B. Buthelezi, is firing workers for no reason 
at all, and who is against workers asking for higher wages. 62 
The answer to this letter calling on Chief Buthelezi to support the workers ' 
demands for free organization and the removal of J. B. Buthelezi was fairly 
swift: the workers were reqirected to B.I. Dladla, the KwaZulu official 
in charge of community affairs. 63 The officials and workers who were 
consulted about this response regarded they had been 'fobbed off' by Chief 
Buthelezi, although unsuccessful attempts were made to get in touch by 
telephone or telegram with B.I. Dladkl. The collaborative African petty 
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bourgeoisie, so freely available to meetings of overseas academics, churches, 
and businessmen, were being faced with the contradictions of their position -
an unwill ingness to confront the workers whose exploitation contributed to 
their income. For Chief Buthelezi the stevedores' resistance was also 
focusing attention on his precise relationship with his paternal uncle, was he 
tolerating the oppression of the workers by someone who spoke so authorita-
tively of lour government l , the KwaZulu Bantustan regime?64 
The strategy of getting a mass meeting of stevedores around a personage 
of immunity having failed, the workers were compelled to move into a period 
of sharp struggle without a clear strategy. The contact between the GFWBF 
officials and Grindrod workers with the DSLSC workers became tenuous under 
the strain of the evident weakness of collective action (the reappearance of 
the 'absolutist ' J. B. Buthelezi) and the counter-pressures on the Grindrod 
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workers to agree to the new hours of work. In the absence of an 
authoritative presence of DSLSC workers at the meetings it was difficult for 
the GFWBF officials to gauge how importantly they regarded the change in 
hours, or whether the strategy of demanding a works committee in terms of 
the Act would have secured a tactical advantage to the workers in legally 
rejecting the new conditions of service. The crisis over the change in 
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hours brought out all the weaknesses of the GFWBF organization, its lack 
of support from the depths of the workers' resistance at the Po int, and its 
inability to coordinate agitation on the complete spectrum of demands being 
made by the stevedoring workers. In particular, the pressing needs of the 
moment tended to obscure the long-term objectives of the workers' organiza-
tion and the 'Dockers' Charter~ which would have presented the employers, 
the state, and other workers, with a commanding document of the workers' 
aspirations, was not produced. 
The workers under the most immediate pressure to agree to the new 
conditions of service were the Grindrod workers; there was not the same 
degree of immediate antagonism at the Point. The DSLSC workers were 
merely told they would have to be ready to sign on for work from 0600, to 
have received their tasks at 0630, and start work at 0700. An announce-
ment of these rearrangements was made on Friday, 13 October 1972, and 
the workers asked when they were to receive their pay increase~·. The 
workers were then dispersed. 66 The Grindrod workers were fiercely 
opposed to the new hours, and their opposition took on the form of a pro-
longed struggle against management, and one wh ich is still unresolved 
because of the historic nature of the backpay claim. 
I 
For the Grindrod workers, living in the townships around Durban, 
the new hours posed a direct threat to their job security and even as a means 
of extending the hours worked. These workers argued they were exhausted 
by the long hours, and the changes did not mean any improvement at all. 
Their day started before 0400 when they would have to leave their homes to 
get the trains into Durban. They then arrived at 0500 or 0530 and had 
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time to get some food and to report for work. 67 They changed into their 
overalls and waited for transport. At 0630 no more workers were allowed 
to report. 'When you are not in your overall at that time the indunas 
chase you and say you are late. You are not allowed to be in the queue 
to report present when you are not in your overall. ' After completing 
overtime and having had a shower the workers were only ready to get the 
trains home from 2040, and by the time they got into the townships there 
were no buses to get them home. Often the trains were late and the 
workers got less than five hours sleep, after more than twelve hours hard 
manua I work. 
The appearance of the Department of Labour officials at the company 
premises on Friday, 13 October 1972, brought the hostility of the workers 
into the open. They rejected the new hours, demanded to see the 'owner' 
of the company, M. Grindrod, and told the worker who rang the work bell 
not to ring out the new times. The Deportment of Labour officials, A. van 
Heerden, the Assistant Divisional Inspector of Labour, and P. van der Merwe, 
the Bantu Labour Officer, made I ittle attempt to be impartial in the dispute 
and their 'conciliation' was repudiated by the workers who demanded to see 
the managing director. 68 The officials took down the company numbers of 
the workers who spoke, 'and that made them frightened they may be fired at 
any time' • Two meetings took place: the first between management and 
the workers from 1130 and the second from 1300. Between 1130 and 1400 
there was a work stoppage as the Grindrod workers argued wi th management 
and the Department of labour, and a return to work was on Iy ach ieved by 
threats of dismissals. At the beginning of the meeting management 
announced the new hours and offered some concessions: the workers were 
offered beer in the canteen, an extra RO. 25 for the workers at Shed 13 who 
handled the heavy rolls of paper and drums, and a special bus if the workers 
were required to work up to 2200. The workers refused to accept the new 
hours and said they would not start work at 0630 on Monday, 16 October 1972, 
they would still adhere to the old conditions of work. The workers 
demanded to know how many hours were to be worked a day, but there 
• 69 . 
was no direct answer. The workers said they would have to work 9 
hours 30 minutes ordinary time with the new hours; th is totalled 47 
hours 30 minutes a week ordinary time: where was the 45 hour week? 
After a long argument, van der Merwe said that the government required 
the workers to elect a committee because it was essential that work should 
no t be stopped. The workers replied that they were afraid to elect a 
committee as the representatives would all be victimized. Van der 
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Merwe gave his personal guarantee that the members would be safeguarded, 
but then said that the workers should go back to work even though they had 
grievances because they would otherwise be dismissed. The workers were 
angered by these threats and by their company numbers being taken, but 
went back to work. 
On Monday, 16 October 1972, it seems as though the workers 
arrived early and were again addressed by the Department of Labour officials 
who said that the new hours had to be adhered to. Van der Merwe advised 
the workers to report at 0630 and said they should wait for a meeting with the 
managing director, M. Grindrod, on 23 October. He again suggested that 
the workers should elect spokesmen and that the other workers should go to 
the ships. The workers refused to elect a committee and demanded a 
tho IOU gh explanation of the new system of ordinary and over time. Th is 
discussio,n was cut short when van der Merwe said that if they did not agree 
to the new conditions 'our children will suffer because we will be fired'. 70 
Both the management and Department of Labour officials continued to insist 
that the workers bring forward their leaders and write down their grievances. 
While it hod been suggested by the GFWBF officials that the workers could 
strengthen their case by forming a works committee in termsof the Act and 
making a formal dispute of the new hours, the leaders felt the formal 
guarantees against victimization were insufficient. Hadn't their company 
numbers been taken down by officials at the work stoppage on Friday? 
On Friday, 20 October 1972, Neave reportedly got a clerk to summons 
some of the leading workers to write him a letter containing their 
grievances, but the workers said 'with one voice' they would not do so. 
The clerk said that if the workers did not write down their grievances he 
would say they were satisfied. 71 The workers insisted rather that the 
managing director be brought before them before they put forward all their 
demands. The unanimous rejection of the documentation of the workers' 
demands was both a defensive strategy (the leading workers would be 
expected to sign the letter) and a way of dividing management; why 
should they deal with the compound manager when it was the managing 
director who made the decisions? They also felt that Neaves could not 
be trusted to write down everything they said exactly as they wanted. 72 
Among some of the older workers there was a belief that the distant patriar-
chal figure of M. Grindrod could intervene in a more sympathetic manner 
than the lower levels of management or the Department of Labour. This 
bel ief did not persist long as he had a technique of 'being in conference' 
for extended periods when the workers' demands were at their height. 
Despite the unanimity of the workers in pursuing a definite course 
of action at Grindrods there were severe I imitations in their actions for the 
united action of all stevedoring workers. The workers had accepted the 
new hours as suggested by van der Merwe before the proposed meeting on 
23 Octot>er, and thus had nothing in hand apart from a threat to strike in 
the future. The vigorous protests against the change in hours had not been 
linked, as at the Point, with the demand for a general increase in wages. 
If the workers had decided, it could have been possible for the GFWBF to 
have given wide publicity to their demands and to make the connection 
with the DSLSC workers. The Assistant Divisional Inspector of Labour 
was able to say in the local press: 'There is no difficulty in the docks at 
I d· ,73 this stage and there has been no formal request to dec are a Ispute. 
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In short, the workers had lost the initiative in taking immediate strike 
action in response to the changed hours imposed on 16 October 1972. 
Strike at Point and workers' demands 
With the possibility of united action against the new hours having 
receded with the workers provisionally accepting the new conditions of 
service by not resisting them in strike action, the Point workers were to 
move into action on their own. On the Saturday after the new hours hod 
been implemented the DSLSC representatives at the stevedoring meeting 
showed a rising resentment against the new system, although the meeting 
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was largely dominated by discussion of strategy at Grindrods. The DSLSC 
workers argued they hod not been given any opportunity of vo icing their 
opinion on the new hours, 'we were only instructed that these were the new 
conditions'. The delegates could not explain why the workers hod 
accepted the new hours rather than resisting them, they had simply dispersed. 
They complained there was no longer a tea break or meal break in the new 
hours and that the workers had to work right through from 1330 to 2000 with-
out a break, a period of 6 hours 30 minutes hard manual work. 74 The 
workers now hod to have teo before starting work in the morning. Calculat-
ing the losses in tea and meal breaks and the earlier reporting time, the 
workers insisted 'we are not being paid for an extra hour a day'. This 
insight into the changed hours of work reflected the deepening of resistance 
to the new conditions and the close reasoning of the DSlSC workers; it 
was thes~ arguments which were to form the basis for a prolonged dispute 
with the management at Grindrods. 75 
The changed hours represented on attempt by employers in the docks 
to raise both the amount of labour time on Monday to Friday and on Sunday I 
and to increase the intensity of labour. With the revised hours the 
employers hoped to 'regain working time in the harbour' lost by abolishing 
76 Saturday work. Saturday working would be done only in 'veryexcep-
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tional' circumstances and by prior arrangement with the SARH. (Despite 
these assurances the workers complained continually that some gangs were 
being required to report for work on Saturday.) The changed hours would 
not affect the exports of raw materials from South Africa or the import of 
alumina; the Bluff coaling appl iance, the grain elevator, the manganese 
plant, sugar terminal and Island View berths would continue to work each 
Saturday from 0700 to 1140. The concession to the workers in terms of 
granting a 'free' day was limited to general cargo at other areas. The 
emphasis of the employers was nONonraising the output of the workers in the 
early hours of the day while they were still fresh and on cutting the 'stop-
start' problems of tea and meal breaks which tended to slow production for 
longer than the set breaks. The harbour admin istration claimed that the 
new schedule had been adopted 'after consultation with all interested parties', 
presumably meaning the shipping, stevedoring, and commercial companies, 
but certainly not including the workers who would be expected to carry them 
out. 
The hours were particularly advantageous to the employers. Work 
started earlier (the workers reported that they were expected to start working 
as soon as they arrived at the ships, often at 0650) and by cutting out the 
tea and meal breaks th is meant they could even gain a few minutes extra, 
quite apart from keeping up a steady pace of work throughout the day, broken 
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only by the lunch hour. The only possible advantage to the workers in 
the new hours could be the earlier ending time at 2000, which was only pos-
sible because of the earlier starting time. The workers were most angry 
about the removal of the tea and meal rest periods, and without a wage 
increase to correspond to the tightened and extended hours regarded the new 
hours as extracting additional labour-time from the workers and bringing an 
78 
increase in unpaid labour. 
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The matter came to a head on Friday, 20 October 1972, wh ich was 
also the day the Natal Mercury reported on the dispute over hours at Grind-
rods. At a meeting of the GFWBF stevedoring workers on Saturday, 21 
October 1972, the DSLSC representatives said that on Monday they would 
demand to see the manager because with the new hours the work was 'too 
heavy' . The conditions of service of the DSLSC which were pinned to 
the notice board which provided for a meal break at the end of ordinary hours, 
were not in complete contradiction to the conditions at work. 'The meal 
time is now taken away but they want to say there is not enough money for 
overtime. That is why we want to see the manager. I A week after the 
Grindrod workers, the workers at the Point were facing their employers with 
the same demands. 
When it came the strike was more a demonstration of the workers' 
strength and demands than a decisive struggle. It was, however, a cele-
bration of the exploited: the strikers shouting down Dreyer, manager of the 
DSLSC, providing the liberal press with their precise demands, and confront-
ing the police. The demands which had been put forward in the under-
ground letter from the labourers, and the grievances which had been discussed 
at meetings Saturday after Saturday, were carried extensively in the news-
paper columns, and Dreyer questioned closely about the whole range of 
working conditions at the DSLSC. A" the reporting of the strike, however, 
mystified the position of J. B. Buthelezi and misinterpreted the workers' call 
for ButhETlezi as a request for Chief Gatsha Buthelezi to intervene on their 
behalf.79 The initiative which the GFWBF could have had in presenting 
an authoritative set of fighting demands which could have drawn all the 
stevedoring workers together and attracted the support of other workers in 
Durban and elsewhere was lost. The strike had its limitations in not gain-
ing anything for the workers, being spontaneous, and not able to be sustained. 
A comparison could be made with the prolonged protest against the changed 
hours by workers in Cape Town wh ich started on Tuesday, 24 October 1972, 
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by the workers refusing to work overtime. The two forms of collective 
action were obviously related, and both were forms of pressure against the 
employers and the Wage Board. In neither coses were the workers 
defeated by the employers and the state, and showed their readiness to take 
further collective action in the future. 
The strike on Monday, 23 October 1972, immediately brought work 
in Durban harbour ta a standstill, immobilizing about 20 ships. As 
indicated by the DSlSC representatives at the stevedoring workers' meeting 
on Saturday, the workers did not immediately put forward their demands, 
but demanded that Dreyer provide an explanation of the new conditions of 
service. Dreyer appealed to the workers to return to work when he 
addressed the workers from a balcony in the compound. He asked that he 
be allowed to negotiate with a few spokesmen for the strikers, but there 
were angry shouts from the assembled workers: We will be fired. We 
will be fired. ' There was a heated reaction from the workers when Dreyer 
did not answer a questioner who asked how many times the African dock 
workers had gone on strike for higher wages without being granted increases. 
Amid loud shouting, he eventually told the workers that the Wage Board 
made recommendations on wages and that the final decision rested with the 
Minister of labour. The workers then wanted to know why it was taking 
the Wage Board so long to decide, since it hod heard evidence in July. 
Dreyer replied that the workers would all have a chance to object to a pos-
sible det~rmination by the Wage Board once its recommendation was pub-
lished in the Government Gazette. But this was greeted with jeers and 
shouts: We will not go back to work until we are paid R 18 a week.' 
Several workers challenged Dreyer to say how he would bring up a family on 
a wage of R8 a week. Why had their wages not been increased when the 
working hours were lengthened on 16 October? Dreyer said that the 
SARH controlled the working hours, but the workers rejected this explana-
tion, arguing: 'If they fix the working hours, why don't they pay us?' 
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The workers demanded to know why there were no wage slips inside their 
wage packets and why these were gi ven to the wo rkers open. They 
angrily demanded to know why the indunas were paid so much more when 
they did much less work than the labourers. On several occasions they 
called for J. B. Buthelezi to be brought before them: 'Where is Buthelezi? 
Bring Buthelezi. ' Judiciously I the man variously described as 'compound 
manager', 'Bantu liaison officer', or 'chief induna', kept well away from 
the scene of the strike. 
The workers' grievances and demands expressed at the meetings held 
during the day and to the press ranged widely from industrial demands to 
grievances about their conditions in the DSLSC compound. The workers 
demanded R 18 a week, voluntary overtime, shorter working hours, and com-
plained their living conditions were inadequate and unhygienic. They 
did not know how much was deducted from their wages each week for income 
tax and compound fees as there was no payslip. They rejected completely 
the hand I ing of their grievances by the indunas who were not interested in 
their welfare. Some of the workers only received R6 leave pay a year, 
and there was no sick pay even when they were put off work by a company 
doctor. 80 Some of the demands made to the press covered areas wh ich 
were not generally discussed at the GFWBF stevedoring meetings. Many 
of the workers said that there were not enough bunks in the compounds and 
they had to sleep on the floor. The bunks were cramped together and they 
had to sl~ep on planks. The compounds were riddled with bed bugs. 
The workers also complained the food served to them was not fit to eat and 
that the beer was diluted with water.
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Between the meetings held inside the compound between the workers 
and Dreyer and with the Department of Labour it was possible to discuss the 
strategy of the strike. The workers broke up into beer drinking groups, 
singing songs about the strike, and keeping up an atmosphere of resistance. 
Some of the strikers said they were demonstrating through their strike the 
unity of the black oppressed in South Africa. A group of strikers with 
whom there were discussions said that J. B. Buthelezi would not be coming 
out of his offices that day because he would be killed. 'He is always 
standing like a god at the gates, but look today. Where is he? He 
will die if only we can find him in the street. ' The lebandla 82 was 
approached by a group of indunas and one of the labourers mockingly asked 
them whether they were also on strike. A discussion started about black 
supervisors as another striker said: Where do you come from, have you 
ever seen indunas in any business in our country go on strike?' Some 
felt that the strikers had nothing against the indunas although they did 
nothing about taking up the grievances of the workers with J. B. Buthelezi, 
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whom they feared. A striker vigorously denounced Buthelezi as one who had 
the power of dismissing workers and who kept telegrams away from the 
workers when they were being told of the death of a close relative. When 
we try to get permission from him to go and bury them he asks us if we are 
going to raise them from the dead. If we want to go to the funeral he 
tells us to go for ever and not come back. ' The indunas themselves lived 
in fear of being dismissed for bringing complaints or being demoted. He 
argued the workers had nothing against the indunas, gave one a hug and 
asked him for a shilling to buy more beer. This was given willingly and 
the discussion moved to other topics. Throughout the afternoon there 
were rumours of meetings, and towards the late afternoon, the stevedores 
were increasingly angry that the meetings were being postponed. An 
attempt was made to arrest a striker by the South African Police, but when 
they were threatened with violence the prisoner was released. Squad cars 
were brought in to block the streets around the DSlSC compound, but then 
removed. The strike did not end with a violent confrontation with the 
police, however, as the unity of the workers seems to have become strained 
during Monday night, and the strike dissolved on the following day. 
Dreyer del ivered an ultimatum to the strikers on Tuesday, 24 
October 1972, either to accept that the Wage Board would be making a 
recommendation which would increase wages in the future, or to collect 
their wages and leave. A large contingent of armed police with riot 
sticks backed the threat to dismiss the workers. 83 In the face of such 
formidable and obvious power and growing disunity, the workers returned 
to work at about 1100. Some of the workers blamed the disunity of the 
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workers on a 'tsotsi' element who were brave in defying the police on Mon-
day, but had become scared before the rest on Tuesday, and had led the 
move to go back to work. Despite some recriminations because of the 
lack of success in achieving any of their demands, the workers were in a 
confident mood and determined to organize themselves for the coming 
struggles over the Wage Board recommendation. The overwhelming 
majority of the workers returned to work determined to continue the struggle, 
although it was reported that 14 workers decided to leave the company. 
The stevedores' strike was one of the most important in the increas-
ing resistance of the African workers to poverty wages and their subordina-
tion within the apartheid economy. In the context of the mass strikes 
which followed, the forward movement of the stevedoring workers raised 
the demands and slogans which were to unify tens of thousands of African 
workers in the future. The strike also demonstrated how popular agitation 
such as conducted by the Wages Commission could heighten the conscious-
ness of strategic groups of workers and reinforce the militants within the 
African working class. It also showed quite forcibly how the African 
working class was to engage in a struggle with employers and the apartheid 
state quite independently from the collaborative African petty bourgeoisie, 
which in turn was faced with the problems of either to be seen to oppose the 
strike movement or to develop its own political alliances. The exchanges 
between Dreyer and the workers demonstrated convincingly a higher level 
of class consciousness than in the 1960s: workers successfully rebl..!tting 
the arguments of management and putting in their place the demands of 
the workers. While the employers' response used the language of 
formality and legality, the workers' arguments were based on the real and 
material, attempting to reach the core of the argument. The strike had 
been settled by the use of social and political power. In the words of 
a Wages Commission statement: 
Force has resolved the issues for the present. The 
underlying causes remain - workers dissatisfied with 
very real conditions: long hours, low wages, hard 
and dangerous work, and separation from families. 84 
It is argued that it would be impossible to establish a works committee at 
the Point when genuine leadership quite rightly feared victimization. 
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Since the workers both at the DSLSC and Grindrods were vigorously opposed 
to electing representatives openly to face management, the GFWBF officials 
felt that the stevedoring section of the benefit fund would be immensely 
strengthened to the point where the workers could demand that negotiations 
take place through the benefit fund. 
Resistance and organization 
The strike of workers at the Point and the stoppage at Grindrods 
seemed to give the GFWBF as a workers' organization new possibilities to 
become fully representative of the stevedoring workers and to be able to 
lead their struggles as a permanent organization of workers. The workers 
\ 
who had openly defied the armed police and forcefully countered the argu-
ments of the employers and the Department of Labour could be expected to 
join a semi-legal workers' organization en masse; while the example of 
the Cape Town stevedoring workers in banning overtime work without being 
dismissed also pointed to methods of adopting a variety of methods of resis-
tance to the employers which could be coordinated through various levels 
of organization through the GFWBF. If the fear of the workers had been 
overcome through taking strike action, then there would be unlimited 
prospects for united working class organization and c<?"ective action. 
The basic optimism of the GFWBF officials came from the understanding 
that the workers learnt to organize by taking strike action, that it trans-
formed their consciousness, and would create an immediate impetus for 
class organ ization. As Lenin has argued: 
Strikes •.• teach the workers to unite; they show them 
that they can struggle against the capitalist only when 
they are united; strikes teach the workers to think of 
the struggle of the whole working class against the whole 
class of factory owners and against the arbitrary, police 
government. This is the reason that social ists call strikes 
'a school of war', 'a school in which the workers learn to 
make war on their enemies for the liberation of the whole 
people, of all who labour, from the yoke of government 
officials and from the yoke of capital. 85 
652 
The problem was how to sustain such a level of consciousness and build the 
instruments of future struggles when the employers and the state we re also 
drawing the lesson that the rising strugg les of the workers had to be dampened 
through strategic reforms and more intelligent repre ssion. In the aftermath 
of the Point strike the counter action by the employers, the Department of 
Labour, and the Security Police, only became clear in the struggle to create 
a mass and democratic dock workers' organization. 
The first meeting of the GFWBF stevedoring group, held eleven 
days after the Point strike had ended, was an attempt to carry through 
the workers' militancy immediately into organization. One of the GFWBF 
officials presented the details of the overtime ban by stevedores in Cape 
Town and argued that the stevedoring workers in South Africa were becoming 
86 . 
united in their demands and action. 'As soon as the Wage Board recom-
mendation comes through a meeting of workers must be held to demand R 18.00. 
The workers must be well prepared and the committee of workers ready for 
action. ' Having had an anc-illary part in the struggles at the Point, and 
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fearing that the future struggles of the workers could lapse into autonomous 
resistance at each company, rather than united class action, the officials 
were determined that open or secret action through the GFWBF should be 
taken to reject the recommendations of the Wage Board and lead the 
workers' resistance. Facing the prospect of a decisive struggle rather 
than a demonstration of strength, the GFWBF officials insisted that the 
delegates present take more active steps to increase the GFWBF member-
ship decisively to turn it into a mass organization. If every stevedore 
was a member then the employers could not single out the leading workers 
for victimization and the meetings could take representative and democratic 
decisions binding on all workers in the forthcoming struggles. The dis-
cussions were increasingly urgent, and the delegates even criticized for not 
making concerted attempts to win over whole gangs of workers to the GFWBF 
which could constitute the nucleus of the workers' organization in production. 
The officials were deeply conscious that the leadership of the strike at the 
Point came from the labourers who drew up the underground document for 
the Wage Board and it was this militant strata which was not effectively 
being represented at the meetings. 87 The discussions had tended to 
become dominated by sympathetic indunas {many of whom took a lead in 
joining the GFWBF and provided invaluable 'industrial' knowledge to the 
group but who were totally incapable of working class leadership} and the 
winchmen who possessed similar qual ities but did not express the radical 
combativity of the 'underground' voice of the DSlSC labourers. With a 
larger m~mbership the organization would both reach into the deep pools 
of resistance among the stevedores and allow the labourers' demands and 
mil itancy to dominate the meetings. The GFWBF officials continued to 
attempt to get B.I. Dladla, executive councillor for community affairs of 
KwaZulu Bantustan, to address a mass meeting of stevedores to enable the 
workers to have a platform for the widest and freest discussion among the 
workers before the recommendations of the Wage Board were announced. 
An express letter, telegrams, and phone calls elicited no response. 
It cannot be established from the minutes of 4 November 1972 
whether the Grindrod workers acted jointly in taking strike action with 
the Point workers although there must have been a stoppage as the workers 
were expecting to hear from M. Grindrod on Monday, 23 October. 
Evidently he was not at the company premises on that day, but a works 
committee was elected that week to discuss the new hours and other prob-
lems. 88 The workers were told that M. Grindrod was not immediately 
available but that he would meet with the workers after 30 days and give 
the works committee members letters authorizing them to handle the com-
plaints of the workers. By 4 November this had not been done. 
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The works committee was composed of 2 indunas, 4 gangwaymen/winchmen, 
5 labourers, and 1 fork-lift truck driver, with Neaves as the chairman and 
89 
a clerk as the secretary. The works comm i ttee was to meet on every 
Monday at 0800 and would be allowed to discuss all issues relating to wages 
and working conditions, and the delegates said they were 'happy' with the 
committee. A II representati ves on the works comm i ttee were members of 
the GFBWF . The strength of the benefit fund on the works committee only 
made its weakness more evident among the mass of workers. Of the some 
600 workers employed at Grindrods only about 80 had joined the GFWBF; 
if the workers were confident enough to elect spokesmen to the works com-
mittee why was there not a hundred per cent organization? By raising 
these problems directly with the workers the officials were trying to mini-
mize the tendency of the Grindrod workers to act separately from the DSLSC 
workers in deciding to go ahead with works committee elections away from 
the GFWBF workers' meetings. Similar problems existed at the Point, 
many indunas had joined but few other workers were members (at that time 
there were only 17 paid up members of the GFWBF). The officials asked 
why the workers had not poured into the GFWBF offices after the strike. 
How many gangs were represented by the workers at the meeting? They 
argued that the only way to conquer fear of dismissals was through mass 
membership as all the workers could then say they were members. The 
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officials argued that the workers should also remember that the benefit fund 
provided funeral and independent medical benefits; possibly th is would 
convince those who were afraid of organizing around the workers' demands. 
Analysis of the membership of the GFWBF among stevedoring workers 
which was done by the officials to gauge the actual strength of the organiza-
tion in production and to work out ways of penetrating into all the steve-
doring gangs. The workers reported there were 39 gangs at Grindrods and 
about 90 at the Po inti at the meeting on 30 September 1972 there were 
representatives from 3 DSlSC and 12 Grindrod gangs, and on 7 October 1972 
there were 2 DSlSC and 9 Grindrod gang representatives. These represen-
tatives were supplemented by workers not attached to gangs (particularly night-
watchmen - who were surprisingly militant - sweepers, spare winchmen, 
learner gangwaymen, etc.). The GFWBF officials worked on the assump-
tion that there would be organic solidarity in the gangs as the workers shared 
the same dangers and the discipline of production on a collective basis. 
The membership of the GFWBF in each gang, from the limited data available, 
does seem to correspond to having a leading militant in the organization or 
having the induna join. Where the indunas joined the workers seemed to 
feel there was no immediate danger of being victimized and a fairly high level 
of membership was possible in the gang. The problems of organization were 
particularly acute in those gangs where there were autocratic indunas, and in 
severa I gangs where there were leading members of the GFWBF the other 
workers \tIere reported to be 'too frightened' . The early strategy of the 
GFWBF leaders at Grindrods was to win over the indunas so that the labourers 
would follow and there seems to have been'negotiations' between some lead-
ing workers and indunas who were wavering in their support of the GFWBF, 
but after a few meetings the stevedoring members advised the officials that 
the best way of organizing was approaching the workers 'one by ane' • The 
various strategies of organization throw doubt on Sack's argument that the 
DSlSC gangs were constituted around abakhaya who, coming from the same 
district, were most likely to trust each other. 90 In discussions with the 
workers on the problems of organization there was reported to be deep dis-
trust among the DSlSC gangs on the subject of collective organization and 
it appears that the workers joined secretly. They were certainly opposed 
to having discussion about organization among the gangs at work even 
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though some of the DSlSC indunas had jo ined. 
91 
Only one DSlSC gang had 
more than one member. 
At the meeting on Saturday, 4 November 1972, the GFWBF officials 
attempted to devolve more of the complaints of the workers on to the 
shoulders of the works committee members. They offered to tra in the 
members in understanding the wage determinations, how to get the proper 
amount of accident compensation, and how to organize the workers at the 
point of production. It was suggested that instead of having general dis-
cussions about the situation in the docks the meetings should be structured 
around specific topics so that the workers' delegates could become trained 
leaders. 
The workers were enthusiastic about building up the widest possible 
organization of the stevedores. 'The Point must work together with the 
Grindrod workers. That is why we are standing up here and in Cape Town, 
so that the masters can see we are un ified. If we are united, the masters 
will be afraid.' The problem of organization, as before, came to be 
centred pround the despotic rule of J. B. Buthelezi. The workers feared 
if he could not be removed the workers 'could never make a stand'. His 
presence seemed to symbolize the weakness of the workers' organization, 
the failure of the political initiatives and strike action by the workers, and 
a humil iating reminder of the Bantustan collaboration in their midst. 
Buthelezi was regaining the controls he exercised before his departure earl ier 
in the year. Apparently after the strike, during which he was protected 
by the compound indunas and reportedly by the South African Police, he had 
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said to some workers: 'You people shouldn't be paid so much. ' Knowing 
the rural connections of the workers and operating an effective network of 
informers and spies, the DSLSC delegates at the meeting felt he knew all the 
militants and would fire them at the first opportunity. One of the workers 
said that some col leagues who were coming with them to the meeting had 
disappeared on the way because they had been frightened at the prospect of 
being discovered by Buthelezi. The only answer the workers ha::l to this 
obstacle was a mass meeting addressed by Dladla which would work out a 
method of handl ing the DSLSC compound manager. 92 
The post-strike situation at the DSLSC was fraught with difficulties 
for the workers even though the workers had not been defeated. At the 
end of the week of the strike the workers found they received different amounts 
in basic wage, even though they had al I been on strike: the wages ranging 
from R4.90 to R6.BO. The workers reported they were frightened to request 
an explanation from the office about these differences because they would be 
fired. By the time of the Saturday meeting on 11 November 1972, the 
workers were co~sidering banning overtime as had the workers in CafE Town, 
to force the employers to consider thei r demands. The workers also con-
sidered writing a reply to an article wh ich appeared in the Natal Mercury 
which they regarded as particularly insulting.
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The long-awaited wage recommendations were issued by the Wage 
Board on Friday, 17 November 1972. Instead of a substantial wage inc-
, 
rease the Wage Board recommended only a R 1. 00 increase in the basic wage, 
with proportional increases to the daily allowance and overtime. This 
amounted to an increase of only 11.B per cent in the actual minimum wage 
(as opposed to the 46.2 per cent increase claimed on the minimum wage in 
WD 30B wh ich had been increased in October 1971). The overtime rate 
was increased by 41.4 per cent and Sunday time by 43.4 per cent. The 
ruCSA General Secretary gave an adulatory welcome to the recommended 
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wage increases, causing severe discomfort to the local organizing secretary, 
and losing TUCSA all credibility in the eyes of the workers. IThis is the 
Wage Board IS finest hour. We sincerely welcome this fine example. 
The board is making a significant move to improve wages to a more real istic 
94 
level. I This statement weakened the national campaign which had been 
mounted to demand R 18 a week minimum wage, the demand made by the 
DSlSC stevedores during their strike, and even considered reasonable by 
sections of the liberal press. Espie, the local organizing secretary, who 
had made the attempt to form a white collar dock workers I union, adopted a 
more critical view: II am gravely disappointed in the wage determination, 
the increase is very short of what anybody would desire, and just highlights 
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how grossly underpaid stevedores have been. I The Wage Board recommen-
dations were posted on the notice boards at Grindrods and DSlSC and the 
workers invited to write objections to these wage rates to the Wage Board. 
Both companies, however, stated they would increase wages by the amount 
recommended by the Wage Board, whatever the outcome of the objections, 
on Monday, 27 November 1972. 
The unusual practice of paying the wages recommended by the Wage 
Board before they were promulgated in a new wage determination demon-
strated how concerned the employers were to avoid any delay which could 
give rise to further strike action. It also indicated that they were well 
aware that whatever the objections made by the workers to recommend wages 
the Mini\ster of Labour inevitably approved them as a wage determination. 
The speed with which the employers responded to the recommended wages 
•. . h 96 Th also was a way of pre-empting agitation against t ese wages. e 
other tactic which was employed was to carry out an extensive purge of 
mil itant workers in the DSLSC. By Thursday, 23 November 1972, four 
days before the new wages were to be introduced, more than 15 leading 
workers employed by the DSlSC were victimized. Virtually al I the DSLSC 
representatives who had spoken at the meetings of the GFWBF, and a large 
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proportion of the GFWBF membership, were dismissed. The workers' repre-
sentatives from Grindrods were untouched, but deeply wary of repercussions 
from their employers. The unerring accuracy with which the DSLSC manage-
ment had penetrated the meetings of the GFWBF to mark indunas and winch-
men in particular who were leading resistance to the employers was proof that 
the fears of the DSLSC workers voiced again and again at the meetings that 
there were informers present were true. The rather minor counter measures 
which the GFWBF officials had adopted to attempt to control infiltration had 
proved ineffective, and the workers' organization suffered a substantial loss. 
It may have been that workers other than GFWBF members were also dismissed 
at the same time, as Sack alleges, but the victimizations were an effective 
barrier to any attempts to call together a committee of action against the new 
wage rates on the Saturday before they were implemented. 
The way in which the victimizations were carried out indicated the 
swift execution of a concerted campaign. Individual workers were collected 
from work on the ships as though they were to be transferred to work on 
another ship. They were then taken to the DSLSC offices, thanked for their 
service to the company, and paid off in lieu of notice. After dismissal the 
workers were escorted by a compound policeman who saw to it that they took 
their belongings from the compound and did not hang around. It seems as 
though the management sought out class conscious long service w.orkers as well 
as younger militants, and some workers reported that as many as fifty workers 
were ev~ntua"y fired before the week ending Friday, 24 November 1972. 
The victimized workers who were members of the GFWBF gathered at Bolton 
Hall and made statements on their dismissal to the press. These workers 
said they had been victimized by the company because they had given evi-
dence to the Wage Board hearing in July. The workers said that the manage-
ment had refused to give them reasons for terminating their services, although 
this had been demanded. They had seen a list of names of workers who 
were to be dismissed, th is list being drawn up from the time of the Wage Board 
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hearing when an employee of the company was seen noting the names of all 
97 
the labourers who spoke. The workers were bitterly resentful of the 
indifference of the collaborative African petty bourgeoisie to their plight, 
in particular for refusal to respond to the call of the workers for either Chief 
Buthelezi or B.I. Dladla to address a mass meeting which would enable the 
workers to organize themselves in preparation for the resistance to the Wage 
Board recommendations and to deal decisively with J. B. Buthelezi. In 
response to the criticism of the workers, B.I. Dladla argued the letter to him 
had been redirected from Nongoma and by the time he got it the crisis in 
the docks seemed to be over. He was 'heavily committed' on the dates 
the workers requested he should address them. 'I have written a letter con-
veying my support and promising to meet them on my return from Europe. 
The Kwa Zulu Government is with them all the way. We will attempt to 
get African trade unions legalised. We will do everything in our power to 
help them. ,98 As the axe of victimization fell on the militant workers 
the collaborative African petty bourgeoisie stepped to one side; Dladla's 
forceful rhetoric did not lead to a demand that the workers be reinstated. 
The DSlSC management not unnaturally denied that the workers who had been 
dismissed had anything to do with the Wage Board hearing. A spokesman 
declined to give any reasons apart from that the workers' services were no 
longer required. 
The victimized workers were not prepared to go through the pains-
taking al')d time-consuming task of documenting their victimization for the 
Department of Labour to consider. They felt there was no prospect of their 
being reinstated, and most urgently had to get re-employment in the Durban 
area. Sack presents an argument that the workers who were victimized 
were being used by members of a 'royal' faction who 'were playing out a 
certain power game' in Zulu politics. He claims that of the 15 workers 
dismissed, 12 came from the King's home district and all had kinship ties with 
either the Royal clan or else with the King's indunas. He suggests that the 
victimized workers did not have their case championed by the responsible 
KwaZulu Bantustan official because he was in the opposing Chief Gatsha 
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Buthelezi faction. The workers who had been victimized had been pointed 
out by other stevedores who acted as informers. One of these informers 
who came from Mahlabathini (Chief Buthelezi's home district) said the reason 
he had 'fingered' some of the instigators of the strike was that they had 'tried 
to force him to do something that he could only do if asked to, by either his 
Chief or the latter's induna'. Another informer said that the instigators 
were consciously trying to undermine J. B. Buthelezi's authority and that 'their 
move had been a calculated political ploy', The victimized workers had 
been trying to win votes for the Royalists who were expected to fare poorly 
in any coming election, Other informers corroborated this 'Bantustan 
politics' perspective of the October 1972 strike and the victimizations in late 
November,99 The argument is flawed from a number of approaches, not 
least because it is advanced from a bel ief that the workers' demands and 
grievances were essentially frivolous and that 'most of their grievances were 
distortions of the actual situations which the strike was aimed at improving'. 
Since the stevedoring workers were 'well-paid' and employed by a benevolent 
company, some explanation other than material demands had to be found. 100 
While indisputably the workers were aware of the rift between the King and 
Chief Gatsha Buthelezi which appears to have been over control over the 
chiefs, and some of the older workers looked to the collaborative African 
petty bourgeoisie to rid them of a black tormentor, the 'manipulation' was 
not from the countryside but from the workers. To the most emphatic demand 
\ 
of the African workers, that J. B. Buthelezi should be removed from his position 
of power in the DSLSC to permit the mass organization of the workers, no res-
ponse came from the traditional leadership, The cry of the workers in the 
compound, outside in the streets during the strike, and at the GFWBF meetings, 
was almost obsessively for the removal of J. B. Buthelezi. (The GFWBF 
officials were concerned that as a symbol of their oppression the workers were 
concentrating too exclusively with his personality; his power, they explained, 
came only from that granted by his employers and the apartheid state.) 
Not one worker from the DSlSC or Grindrods ever suggested that this uni-
versal cry was a form of anti-Chief Buthelezi politicking, some of J. B. 
Buthelezi's most ardent antagonists supported the letter to Chief Buthelezi 
calling for his removal. 101 
The whole saga of the workers' attempts to counter J. B. Buthelezi 
revealed only too profoundly the incapacity of the collaborative African 
petty bourgeoisie as a whole to support the concrete demands of the African 
working class. Instead there was a record of tacit and unspoken support 
for a man who operated a network of informers and spies which aimed to 
destroy all forms of working class organization which challenged the rule of 
the employers and the apartheid state in the docks. He may well have 
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wanted to settle scores with some workers who were not industrially organized 
but had good political reasons to fight him as well as a working class opposi-
tion to agents of the employers, but his main thrust was aimed at the working 
class militants who were capable of leading the workers into another strike.102 
While the victimizations were taking place the company was taking on other 
workers as an immediate reserve in case of strike action. A worker sent by 
the GFWBF officials to ask for employment was told by a clerk that more than 
100 workers had been employed and that the last seven had been engaged on 
Thursday, 23 November. It was reported that even workers who had been 
dismissed during the 1969 strike were being considered. More than 17 
workers were said to be sacked (the numbers varied between 20 and 50). 
\ 
The worker was given a promise he would be engaged on Monday by a clerk 
who said that the company had hired 31 workers from Glebelands.
103 
With 
this drastic counter action against the workers, the strike wh ich the GFWBF 
officials thought was inevitable around the demand for R 18.00 a week, was 
suppressed before it began. Inside the compound the fear of being dismissed 
was so intense that the workers stopped reading notices on the boards. 104 
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In the aftermath of repression at the Point, a few of the leading 
workers from Grindrods and the DSLSC managed to meet during the week 
before Saturday, 2 December 1972, to draft objections to the Wage Board's 
recommendat ions. The full text of the workers' objections is not available, 
it appears to have been lost, but a draft of the objections outl ines some of 
the fundamental demands of the workers which were to form part of a 10-point 
'Dockers' Charter'. The objectors demanded that all categories of workers 
should be included in the determination: watchmen, fork-lift drivers, and 
clerks. The hours of the watchmen should be I imited to those of the other 
workers. The fundamental demand for R 18 a week was restated, as well as 
an end to all wage differentials between ports. The objectors stated they 
wanted a 40 hour, five day, 'week, overtime rates at time-and-a-half, and 
double time on the basic Sunday rate. All compulsory overtime should be 
ended. The workers should have three weeks' paid leave a year. Since 
they were required to report for work at 0630 the workers' hours of work should 
be calculated from that time. The objectors also demanded that similar 
requirements for wage envelopes should be specified as in the case of other 
industries. Fina"y the workers demanded that a worker who had been 
employed for more than 10 years should be paid a pension equal to his last 
, . h h" . d 105 year s earnings w en IS servIces were termInate . 
These objections to the proposed wage determination were considered 
by the meeting of stevedoring workers on Saturday, 2 December 1972, in the 
modified form of a 10-point charter. , The workers saw the demands as a 
basis for the unity of the stevedoring workers after the severe setbacks at the 
Point. In addition to the demands put forward to the Wage Board in the 
objections, the Charter called for an end to the migratory labour system and 
compounds as accommodation for workers. This point caused some discussion, 
the workers arguing that life in the compounds was humiliating and also kept 
them under the direct control of the employers, but a straightforward demand 
for the abo I i tion of the compound system was not enough. 'I f we say that 
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the compound system must be got rid of then the rail service must be more 
efficient. I Others argued the demand was essential because when the 
workers were dismissed they were forced to leave the compound, as had 
happened to workers at the Point. It was agreed that the Charter should 
be published with articles explaining how the workers were affected by the 
d . 106 new recommen atlons. 
While at the DSLSC the workers had been disorganized by victimiza-
tions and the power of the employer to create an immediate reserve as a 
threat against strike action, at Grindrod the dispute over hours and wages 
maintained a constant state of readiness for action among the workers. 
Some reduction in the hours ~f overtime work were suggested by the employers 
because of the implementation of the wage increase. The workers res-
ponded by demanding R 18 a week instead of R9. 50 and threatened to stop 
working overtime. A meeting on Friday, 1 December 1972, brought an 
agreement that no changes would be made in the hours and the workers would 
receive their increase from the following week. The workers were con-
cerned because the management was starting to employ a number of new 
workers who were to start in January; this could mean a war of hiring and 
firing against the workers as at the DSLSC. 
The works committee at Grindrods took up some of the primary demands 
of the workers about conditions of service: the assaults by white foremen 
against tpe workers, dismissals, inadequate payslips, and the persistent demand 
for backpay for having to take up the Saturday hours during the hours of work 
Monday to Friday. 107 Some progress was made on the question of assaults on 
the workers with the general and ambiguous formula: 'If a white worker 
assaults a black worker the white worker must be sacked, and if a black worker 
assaults a white worker, or an Indian worker, then he also must be sacked. I 
The summary dismissals at the company were slowed down by an agreement to 
make the foreman get the assent of two other workers, an induna and on 
independent worker. 108 But by Saturday, 13 January 1973, however, the 
committee asked the GFWBF stevedoring meeting to agree it should resign. 
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The dispute over the hours which were worked between December 1971 
and 16 October 1972 became more acute with each meeting. The workers 
argued that when the hours were changed M. Grindrod agreed that the com-
pany would pay for the extra hour each day which was added to the week 
through doing away with Saturday work. During this time the workers lost 
one hour overtime a day. 'Instead of working 9 hours a day we were 
required to work 10 hours a day. This means that we lost 5 hours overtime 
each week. I The workers said that in discussing this point with M. Grindrod 
he had agreed to pay the extra hour at the overtime rate. Neave, the 
chairman, contradicted the workers' arguments and the workers felt that with 
the continual work required of them on Saturday and compulsory overtime, 
there was no point in continuing the discussion of workers' demands through 
the works committee. The dispute developed in the following weeks as 
the strike movement gained momentum in Durban. On Thursday, 24 
January 1973, the Department of Labour official attended a meeting of the 
works committee with Neaves who claimed he knew nothing about the 4 hours 
overtime rate a week but only the extra hour to be worked on Friday. 109 
The workers were denied access to the directors, and they were now determined 
to take their case to court .110 Before the works committee meeting ended the 
Department of Labour official disappeared, probably to deal with the inc-
reasing /ilumber of strikes in the Durban area. 
The running dispute over hours and wages at Grindrods enabled the 
workers to maintain the pressure on management without the victimization 
of their leadership. As the workers in Durban moved into mass action in 
support of their demands for a wage of at least R20 in strike after strike of 
nightwatchmen, brick workers, municipal workers, textile, metal and con-
struction workers, the workers in the docks who had led the demands of the 
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African working class from June 1972 were held back by the disunity wreaked 
on them by an intelligent and despotic management,~nd by a massive show of 
strength by the armed forces in the docks. 
At a meeting of the stevedoring workers on Saturday, 17 February 1973, 
the workers reported that their demands for the immediate payment of R 18 a 
week were not being met, although the employers were promising a review of 
wages in November 1973. When the workers made their demands clear, the 
response of the employers was to call in the armed forces. 111 If the docks 
were to come out on strike at this moment the rul ing class feared a potentially 
insurrectionary situation with more than 50,000 workers out on strike at one 
stage and with every day bringing fresh workers out with ever-increasing 
demands. The mass character of the strike movement disorganized the state's 
response, with the police reduced to dashing from one industrial area to 
another staging large demonstrations of force when management made final 
offers to the workers. Surveys of the mass strikes argue that the strength of 
the strike movement lay in the low-wage, large-scale factories characterized 
by oppressive management, frequent dismissals, and victimization of workers I 
leaders. The textile industry (which is highly concentrated in the Durban 
area) produced some of the most prolonged struggles of the time, although the 
metal industry experienced a higher number of strikes. 112 Striking workers 
called on neighbouring factories to support their demands, mass pickets 
gathered outside the factories to stop any scabs. Virtually without excep~ 
tion the lstrikers refused to put forward representatives, aware that there were 
massive powers of victimization available to the management and the police 
and wary of the compromised leadership of the employers' indunas and 
favourites. The 'negotiations' took the form of workers shouting demands 
for between R20-R30 a week and refusing to elect leaders or return to work. 
Employers and the police responded by threatening mass dismissals and prosecu-
tion, but eventually the employers were forced to offer some minor wage 
increases. The workers then shouted down the offer, but were eventually 
forced through necessity to return to work. But as one factory returned 
to work, another came out on strike, and the momentum of the strike wave 
was ultimately broken only through the growing presence of the police in 
army uniforms flown in from other centres and the lack of strike funds. 
Street demonstrations by workers wh ich threatened to draw all the stri kers 
together, to callout non-striking workers, and to turn the factory strikes 
into a general strike and confrontation with the apartheid state were dis-
persed by the police. In the period from January to the end of March 
1973 there had been more than 160 strikes involving 61,410 workers. 113 
The forces which had been arrayed against the stevedores on 23-24 
October 1972 and which had forced the workers back to the ships without 
any concessions were weakened and divided by the mass character of the 
strike movement. In the face of united mass action the police were 
reduced to saying: 'The police have nothing whatsoever against people 
demanding higher wages - provided they do not break the law', a state-
ment which marked a tactical retreat as African workers lost their fear of 
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pol ice retal iation in acting illegally. In these conditions of working class 
ferment, the workers who had led the African working class in class action, 
rejection of the ideological control of the employers, and in time, were not 
to have a significant part. An explanation can be found not in the fact 
that the workers had recently had a wage increase (which they had rejected), 
but rather in the successful deployment of all the resources of management 
and the state in disorganizing the workers· struggle before the mass strikes 
began. This had not led to the defeat of united action among the steve-
dores, but it would take time for the workers to reorganize in the new condi-
tions of struggle. 
The very success of the strike movement, the sudden spontaneous 
upsurge of action at more than 160 factories, certainly disorganized the 
state·s response and weakened the ability of employers to have hundreds of 
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pol ice on call when delivering ultimatums to the strikers, but also led to 
a lack of cohesiveness in working class action and demands. The 
workers' demands were certainly unified through the press reports of other 
strikes, the original demand of R20 at the mass meeting in June 1971, 
carried through to the 'industrial' demand of R 18 by the stevedores in June 
1972, and then the strikers' demands of at least R20 in January-February 
1973, certainly represented a collective conception of what was a 'fighting' 
demand to be placed before employers and the state. This unity at the 
level of economic demands was, however, not a product of del iberate 
organization, and this constituted a weakness in the strike movement. 
Without a strike committee to gather the demands of al I the workers, the 
strike movement could be dissolved in the fragments of forced retreats, and 
the political nature of the workers' demands could not be developed. The 
Wages Commission, which had led economic agitation from the mass meeting 
of June 1971 and produced more than six copies of a workeB' newspaper, 
failed in the task even of reflecting the radically transformed character of 
the workers' demands. The demands which it had championed at a number 
of Wage Board hearings were now being taken up at a mass level and the 
Wages Commission considered its work was complete in providing an impetus 
to the working class movement and helping to lay the foundations for future 
workers' organization in the GFWBF. The general demands of the black 
working class which were raised implicity by the rejection of the state Bantu 
labour officers, the workers' discipline and united action, raised a funda-
mental d~mand for the right to associate and organize freely. The mass 
defiance of legal subordination and control showed the leading position of 
the black working class in the struggle against apartheid. But these themes 
were not to be translated into the concrete demands of the workers in the face 
of the repression of the employers and the police. The forward movement 
of the workers was to become I imited to the growth and development of trade 
unionism without the formation of underground political working class 
organization. 
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Within these contradictory developments, the workers ot Grindrods 
insisted that the armed forces be removed from the docks. The workers 
asked Neaves why they had been called in; they were not on strike but 
were calling for higher wages. The workers gave evidence of a different 
atmosphere within the company because of the mass strike movement. 
'Neaves is frightened to fire anyone belonging to the benefit fund because 
he feels he will get into trouble. He wants to know before firing a person 
whether or not he is a benefit fund member. ' When the foreman of the 
fork-lift drivers asked them if they belonged to the benefit fund, they repl ied 
they all belonged to their organization. The security officer received a 
letter from the workers saying all the security guards were now members. 
'He told them they were not allowed to belong to any organization because 
they are part of the security of the company. The security guards told him 
that they could belong to any organ ization they wanted to. ' The workers 
claimed that Neaves was unsure of h is own safety and carried a gun. 114 
He had responded to the workers' demands by saying that if they wanted such 
a large increase they should rather resign. When the workers heard they 
had to 'get out' if they wanted an increase they demanded to know what law 
empowered the employers to force them to resign. Neaves repJred that it 
was the regulation of the company. The workers argued this was not an ade-
quate response to their demands. When the police were called in they 
requested to talk to the officer in charge to ask them what they were doing in 
the docks. Neaves refused them permission to speak to the police who 
he claim~d had nothing to do with the demands of the workers; they were 
doing their duties and the workers were not to interfere with them. When 
some of the Grindrod workers were employed at the A Shed at the Point I two 
pol ice sergeants came on board the ship and stared at the workers but said 
nothing. They were accompanied by a Grindrod supervisor. 'The 
workers were highly embarrassed because they were no longer employees of 
h b • .• db h I· ,115 the company but prisoners since t ey were erng scrutinize y t e po Ice. 
The workers' demands concerned the Department of Labour which sent an 
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official, Skene, to ask the workers about the dispute over hours and 
Saturday working. He asked the workers who had told them that Saturday 
was not to be worked. One of the leading workers said that it had been 
mentioned at the Wage Board sitting on 17 July and was generally agreed 
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upon between the employers. The letter the workers sent directly to 
the managing director, M. Grindrod, in the words of the workers made 
Neaves 'feel ill' and caused him to accuse the workers of 'backbiting'. 
As usual, the attempt of the workers to get through directly to the real 
powers in the company, the directors, was parried; M. Grindrod was 
said to be in New Zealand and Ross, the workers were told, was away. 
In the face of the prevarication of the employers and their reinforcement 
through the armed forces, the members of the works committee decided to 
call upon the workers to demand that the indunas and Neaves be excluded 
from the meetings of the works committee.
117 
This would strengthen the 
position of the GFWBF as a workers' organization within the company 
immensely, 
The crisis at Grindrods was precipitated by an upsurge in workers' 
resistance which was being reflected by the decisive actions by the works 
comm i ttee represen tat i ves. When the workers at Grindrods had received 
the wages recommended by the Wage Board they had refused to work on 
Saturday or Sunday. The winchmen had said that the employers would 
have to do their jobs 'because their energy was running at a loss'. The 
workers told the works committee they were not prepared to work weekends 
I 
and wanted to end on Friday night. Why were they not receiving condi-
tions similar to workers employed at Port Elizabeth? The workers com-
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plained of being treated as togts; 'our pay is tantamount to a togt' • 
With this intensity of antagonism to the employers and a growing commitment 
to organization through the GFWBF, the Grindrod management was forced to 
rely more directly than other employers on the visibility of the armed forces. 
The company could not make any concessions which would set the stevedores 
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alight with the possibility of a crack in the unity of all employers in the 
docks. But, equally, the workers were restrained by the level of 
disorganization imposed by the DSLSC through dismissals, the armed forces, 
and the lack of a united set of demands of a strike committee which could 
transform the mass strikes into a political uprising. 
The tension between the increasing determination of the workers 
and an obdurate employer brought almost unbearable pressure on the members 
of the GFWBF on the works committee. Late in January 1973 one of the 
leading workers on the works committee said he wanted to resign because he 
and the others had achieved nothing for the workers. At a meeting of the 
stevedoring workers the other members asked him whether he expected 
changes to come overnight. One of the workers said: 'You do not know 
the aim of our struggle. 'What is being done needs someone who may die 
do ing it. A person who fights does not get harmony, but a hard struggle 
and cannot get afraid. It is not easy to demand our rights from the whites. 
The people who were elected must be prepared for the struggle and have the 
courage to do this worle.' 119 For the worker who was being encouraged the 
reassurance served both to support his work and confirm his leadership. 
Although the workers were unable to go on to the offensive in strike 
action in support of their demands, the prolonged nature of the disputes bet-
ween the workers and management expressed at the works committee meetings, 
and the persistent demands for the R 18 a week demand to be met, caused 
severe strain particularly on the workers' representatives. The mass strikes 
and growing unity of the workers in Grindrods limited the extent to which 
management could retaliate against the workers' leadership. Each assault 
on the workers became keenly contested by th~ workers and taken up by the 
leadership. On one occasion an assault on a fork-lift truck driver by a 
white supervisor had severe repercussions for the supervisors. The driver 
complained about the assault, and after his statement had been corroborated 
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by other workers, the white supervisor was dismissed. Management was 
acting in terms of the agreement on assaults reached between the works 
committee and the employers and probably feared potential strike action by 
the workers. 
Shortly after this incident it seems as though both the employers and 
, the state acknowledged that the combativity of the workers' leaders had to 
be curbed. As management found the resistance of the workers too great 
to contend with, the state became involved. On Wednesday, 28 February 
1973, one of the leading workers was asked to report to the office and found 
Neaves and a white man at the office. He was told to go with an African 
man to a car at Shed 10. He was instructed to get into the car and then 
driven out of Durban in a northerly direction towards Umhlanga Rocks. 
Initially, the white man tried to persuade him to provide him with informa-
tion about the benefit fund because it was not registered with the state. 
I asked him how he knew about me. He told me he had seen 
my name in some documents. He said he was working for the 
Government. He interrogated me about being a member of 
the works committee. He asked me what kind of things we 
do. I explained that we were trying to get better wages and 
working conditions. He accused me of being a Communist 
and tried to intimidate me. 
Two African men in the back of the car who were wearing balaclavas then 
grabbed him by his overalls and tried to throttle him shouting he was a Com-
munist. \ They pulled him out of the car and into the sugarcane fields and 
then told him to stay in the bush until the car left. 
Deeply shocked and bruised, the worker managed to hitch .a I ift back 
to work. One of the workers approached him to ask him where he had been, 
but he did not trust him and said he had been seeing 'his lawyer from Johannes-
burg' • He refused to see Neaves when requested, but on Friday, 2 March 
1973, he asked Neaves if he knew the people who had come for him on 
Wednesday, how those people knew him and what Neaves had told them. 
Neaves claimed to know nothing about them and to have said nothing to 
them. 'I asked him who gave them permission to take me and said he 
wanted to kill me. He asked me if I wanted the company to take legal 
action against them. I refused and gave the company my notice. ' 
This incident symbolized the relations which existed between the company 
and the pol ice for the workers, who were furious. At a meeting on 
Saturday, 3 March 1973, the workers asked the works committee to convey 
their dissatisfaction with the present works committee to Neaves. They 
decided it should be disbanded and another elected without Neaves as 
chairman. 120 The works committee was dissolved. 
Works committees and collective organization 
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In the immediate aftermath of the mass strikes the GFWBF officials, 
who were also acting as union officials in a number of other industries, gave 
considerably less attention to the organization of the stevedoring workers than 
before. The strike wave drew them particularly into the textile industry at 
first, and then into a number of other industries in which it seemed possible 
to make a rapid advance into mass organization on the basis of a sympathetic 
registered trade union and the large-scale character of the factories. 
Attempts were also being made to cement I inks with the trade unions in the 
garment and textile industry in the Transvaal and there were shifts in employ-
ment. This change of emphasis and reorganization broke down some of the 
links whtch existed with the workers and particularly the regular Saturday 
meetings held with the workers. Other GFWBF officials were assigned to 
take over the work of the docks, but the workers found some of the changes 
abrupt, and new relations of trust did not develop to the level of under-
standing achieved between June 1972 and February 1973. These changes 
made it difficult for the workers to work out strategies to work with or resist 
the development of works committees within the companies and to maintain 
the pressure for the demands made at the Wage Board sitting and refined in 
121 
the objections made to the Wage Board. 
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Despite the quite definite hiatus in general organisation of the steve-
doring workers, the GFWBF had a surprising allegiance from the workers and 
membership from stevedoring workers continued to grow. Even at the Po int, 
where the most severe reverses had been suffered, workers continued to join 
the benefit fund as individuals. By January 1973 there were 126 members 
of the GFWBF employed by Grindrods and the numbers of Point workers join-
ing was beginning to pick up again. The workers continued to look to the 
organization of black workers in Durban as a whole as a source of support and 
as the only basis on which any democratic organization of stevedoring workers 
was possible. Most of the workers still felt that a mass meeting with B. I. 
Dladla, the KwaZulu executive councillor for community affairs, could lay 
the basis for a mass stevedoring workers' organization. But with the bitter 
disappointments of the past, the prudent avoiding of the issue of J. B. Buthelezi 
by the collaborating African petty bourgeoisie, the I inks with the KwaZulu 
Bantustan were becoming increasingly contentious. The controversy came 
to a head after one of the leading workers at Grindrods took the initiative to 
collect money to cover the travel and accommodation expenses of Dladla in 
coming to address the workers. 
The collection was made with a slightly ironic intention: to show that 
workers on poverty wages could meet the expenses of a salaried official, to 
shame Dladla into making an appearance. By Saturday, 20 January 1973, 
R44.94 had been collected from the workers. .A leading worker objected 
to makin~ a contribution to the expenses fund; there was no need for the 
collection because Dladla would be using government cars and petrol, and 
during his overseas trip all his expenses had been met. 'Dladla has done 
nothing for us', he argued, and the money should rather have been given to 
the GFBWF official who had worked months with them. He suggested 
the money should be returned to the workers; Dladla was paid to do a job 
but seemed to spend all his time overseas. It was finally agreed that the 
money should be used for organ ization rather than meeting the expenses of 
ff ' . I 122 an 0 ICla. 
The issue showed the growing disillusionment of the workers with 
all sections of the African petty bourgeoisie in the reserves who claimed 
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to represent their political aspirations. The King, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, 
and B.I. Dladla, had all manoeuvred ambiguously when confronted with 
the demand for support from one of the most mi litant sections of the black 
working class, and the strategy of being able to hold a mass meeting of 
workers before the strike of 23-24 October or even afterwards was shown to 
be a false hope. Faced with declining support from the GFWBF officials 
and without the prospect of dramatic external intervention to secure a 
'Iegitimate
' 
basis for a mass meeting, the stevedores turned towards the works 
committees which the employers were now falling over themselves in approv-
ing and establishing. In terms of amended legislation there could be two 
forms of plant committee: a works committee which would be composed 
solely of workers, and a liaison committee headed by an employer IS repre-
sentative with half the workers appointed and the other half elected. 123 
These minor concessions were the furthest the apartheid state would go in 
making concessions after the mass strikes, and the workers, who were funda-
mentally distrustful of any representative committee under the scrutiny of the 
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employers, were forced to make use of them. 
Even before the legislation was amended, the DSlSC made a public 
announcement of providing the stevedores with a Igrievance platform'. 
This was undoubtedly a response both to the October strike and to the growing 
(though r;lUmerically small) membership of the GFWBF. Early in December 
1972 Dreyer announced that he had prepared a draft constitution for considera-
tion by the 'Bantu Safety Committee'. The works committee would decide 
each grade of worker representation. We still have to deal with the prob-
lem of how big the committee is going to be; how the various classes of 
labour are going to be represented; and whether minorities, such as the few 
Pondo workers, will have to be protected by including provisions for nomina-
tion. ' The statement seems to imply that there would be some ethnic 
criteria for election. Dreyer was not prepared to comment on the extent 
of the power which would be permitted to the works committee and did not 
want to compare it with trade unions 'because I don't know enough about 
trade unions' .125 The workers were mystified by the announcement that 
their opinions were to be sought, and like the GFWBF officials had only 
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read about the works committee in the press. It was on Iy towards the end 
of March 1973, after the main force of the mass strikes had been expended, 
that meetings were held with the workers on the subject of the works com-
mittee. On Wednesday, 28 March 1973, a meeting was called by J. B. 
Buthelezi to ask what the workers felt about a works committee. The 
workers immediately responded by saying they did not want a separate com-
pany committee, 'we would like to have a committee in the benefit society'. 
Buthelezi evidently felt he had the situation well under control because he 
did not oppose this suggestion. He said the workers could choose their rep-
resentatives and he would bring them to the benefit society. The workers 
felt this would be a dangerous strategy as Buthelezi had his own group, the 
indunas (possibly more specifically the senior indunas) who were chosen by 
him and not elected by the workers. They felt he might encourage members 
of his 'select group' to join the benefit fund. 'They will perform the duty 
of informers for the management and on the whole the workers are afraid to 
come to the benefit soc iety. ' What was being introduced ot the DSLSC 
was a liaison committee, chaired by a management appointee, with half of 
the members selected by management. The 'democratic' quality of such a 
committtle can be imagined, the workers' representatives focing their foremen 
in discussion, with the chairman having the right to hire and fire them. 
With an effective informer and spy network, the DSlSC management would 
have little to fear from the workers joining the GFWBF, democratic control 
by the workers being completely negated by the axe of victimization. The 
workers complained that none of the demands made in the objections to the 
Wage Board recommendation were being implemented; wage deductions had 
increased, there were still no adequate pay slips, wages were fluctuating 
without apparent reason, and for the first time the workers complained 
strongly that they were being assaulted and that no measures were being 
126 . 
taken against the white supervisors. 
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At Grindrods, management made efforts to revive the works commit-
tee as a 'consultative committee ' in early May 1973 by having an election 
by secret ballot. This was strongly resisted by the workers who considered 
that the employers' control over elections was ridiculous; they wanted a 
show of hands. 127 After the works committee had been reconstituted the 
same demands were made as before, with the exception of the wage demands. 
The answers to the questions posed by works committee members on 26 Septem-
ber 1973 show a reassert ion of control by management accompanied by greater 
clarity in its decisions and typed minutes. The duties of a committee member 
were stipulated as to promote a spirit of cooperation and goodwill by inter-
preting 'employee opinion ' and Ito explain the views and wishes of the Com-
pany to the employees'. The other duties related to accident prevention, 
saving of fuel, transport problems, training and discipline. The item 
discipline is the most exact: 'ways and means of reducing absenteeism, 
eliminating unpunctuality, timeous boarding of transport, cargo security and 
the safety of ships etc. and interpretation and application of the Company's 
rules and regulations'. The clause indicates a clear intention by the 
employers to compel the worker representatives to discipline the workers in 
the interests of the employers. 
Despite the heavy dominance of the interests of the employers in the 
'duties of a committee member', the po ints raised by the workers were funda-
mental. Attempts were made to control arbitrary dismissals, to get covered 
lorries for transport, an annual bonus, more employment for sweepers, special 
allowances, to do away with the necessity of producing passes when collect-
128 
ing pay, and to stop the victimization of African workers by white supervisors. 
To the wide range of demands made at this and other meetings there was a 
definite hardening of the management position in comparison to the rather 
panicky responses in January-February 1973. 'The decision to dismiss 
is the sole responsibility of the Company', came in response to criticism of 
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arbitrary dismissals. The annual bonus was flatly turned down~ Instead 
of agreeing to employ more sweepers (te. more light duty for injured workers) 
the workers should try to keep the company premises clean. The complaint 
about having to produce reference books was met by instructions for Indians 
and Coloureds to produce their Identity Cards when collecting pay. The 
demand to end victimization was said to be not specific enough. In the 
minutes the workers complained that they were perturbed by a lack of positive 
response to their grievances. There were few concessions mode: that 
workers would be allowed to leave work if they had completed working a 
ship at 1500, and that additional workers would be employed to extend 
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unpaid leave to one month. In the absence of thorough collective 
organization together with the Point workers, and a united set of demands 
as in the projected 'Dockers' Charter', these minor concessions were suffi-
cient to keep the works committee alive. The detailed minutes and 
investigations into the points raised by the workers did represent some advance 
for the workers from the informal arguments which the workers' leaders had 
with Neaves. The growing organization and resistance of the workers had 
reached a point where management was becoming increasingly concerned to 
monitor the workers' demands and to make appropriate counter measures. 
The advpnce in independent organization which was marked by the workers' 
openly announcing their membership of the benefit fund and putting forward 
their demands during the flood of mass strike action, was being met by the 
growth of 'scientific management' on the part of the employers. The 
unmethodica I responses of Neaves to the workers' leaders was being replaced 
by detailed discussions in the offices of senior management under the chair-
manship of one of the workers. A concession to the workers which this new 
form of consultation took (the workers were always complaining that directors 
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who made the decisions were never available to the workers when their 
demands were being made), it was also a more sophisticated method of defusing 
the growth of general demands among the workers. A new personnel 
manager was employed in July 1974, apparently to take over the 'personnel' 
questions from the compound manager, Neaves. The development of 
personnel management was one of the most universal responses of the employers 
to the strike movement and aimed at removing the multitude of practices 
wh ich affected the 'hygiene' of the social relations within the companies, 
deploying labour more profitably, and separating the primary issue of wages 
raised during the strikes from the other demands of the workers on which 
compromises were less costly. 
Despite this type of advance in company management, brought about 
by the rising level of class struggle, the command of the employers over the 
workers had to be constantly reinforced through the discipline of dismissal 
and abuse by supervisors. On Sunday, 30 June 1974, one of the leading 
members of the workers' committee was called in to the personnel office and 
told by the night shift foreman that he was said to be a Communist. The 
works committee members were deeply angered by this abuse by the super-
visors and argued that if one was accused then the whole committee was Com-
munist and therefore should be abolished. An emergency meeting of the 
liaison committee was co"ed on Wednesday, 10 July 1974, and the worker 
who was accused said that the company was cooperating with the Security 
Branch who had interrogated and beaten him in February 1973. The 
workers said that the worker who had been accused of being a Communist 
had been informed that the police were coming to pick him up again 'and 
that is the reason he is scared about the matter'. The workers' representa-
tives insisted that there be a full discussion 'to go deep on the matter because 
it affects the committee as a whole'. The management countered the 
hostility of the workers by insisting that 'the matter is going to be treated as 
urgent but through correct channels I • Essentia"y, the workers were 
insisting on the removal of Neaves from the commanding position over the 
workers for acting oppressively and cooperating with the Security Branch 
in suppressing the organization of the workers. Neaves was stung by 
their attacks and said he had been insulted by the committee members and 
that 'the management is also letting him down'. The whole issue illus-
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trates both the necessity of the employers to keep up pressure on the workers' 
leaders and an ability of the workers to manoeuvre within the committee 
structures to isolate certain sections of management. In the context of 
the attempt by the employers to modify worker/employer relationships through 
interaction in liaison meetings, the workers' power was to threaten to dis-
solve the committee structures, and destroy the employers' attempt to stabi-
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Conclusions 
In the period 1972-73 there was a most exceptionally open struggle 
of the stevedores against the employers, 'open' both in the sense of being 
public knowledge to workers in other industries and other employers and in 
the sense of there being a direct opposition of the views of the workers to 
those of the employers. The intimate details of the stevedores' conditions 
of service, their views on their accommodation, the indunas, and all aspects 
of work, previously secret, were abruptly to be found in the newspaper 
columns of the bourgeois press. 131 The openness of the struggle was the 
surface reflection of the deep current of resistance running through the black 
working class . The attempts to transform social action into organization 
sharpened the class consciousness of the African workers, clarifying the 
exact nature of the employers to the apartheid state, and helping to demystify 
the opposition of the collaborative African petty bourgeoisie to some of the 
aspects of national oppression. 
Within this relatively short period the stevedores, as the black 
working class as a whole, moved from forms of resistance which involved 
the grey area of manoeuvre, to the flood of demands and decisive class 
action in strikes and then again on to strategic struggles. With the 
vast powers of the state and the employers deployed against them the 
workers were searching for techniques of resistance which did not involve 
a complete commitment to total victory or failure, to enlarge the field 
of social action which did not bring dismissal. The workers were search-
ing for methods of struggle which could secure the position of the workers 
and be an element in reducing the employers' power; to widen the 
crevices in the granite-like resistance of the employers in preparation for 
the dynamite of strike action. Yet strike action when it came did not 
bring the victories the workers had anticipated, but neither a decisive 
defeat; all forms of class a~tion compelling the question of the most 
effective methods of organization and the nature of class demands. With-
in the working class there was strong evidence of an active minority 
('leaders' not according to election, but in the ability to formulate the 
demands of the workers and carry forward their organization) which cham-
pioned the demands of the workers, which were its own, and acted as its 
'collective intelligence', reasoning out a working class position and produc-
ing documents. It was this group within the workers which was the under-
ground organization, known to a few, but supported by all. 
It was the existence of this underground among the labourers which 
created the support of other associations, such as the Wages Commission, 
for the stevedores and caused the indunas to waver under the pressure of 
contradictory forces. In the struggle for organization which took place 
through the GFWBF, relatively open, and attempting to build a mass base 
within the stevedores, many of the indunas 'came over' to the side of the 
labourers. Ironically, this seems to have affected the character of the 
GFWBF and its ability to provide a platform for the militant labourers. 
The meetings of the stevedores tended to become a talking shop, a place 
for registering complaints, an opportunity for debate, without becoming 
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mass meetings. The attempt to organize the workers 'industrially' on 
the model of a trade union within the GFWBF posed sharply the problem 
of workers' democracy and class organization. The GFWBF officials 
had a clearly defined model of workers' organization in mind, with a 
delegated authority passing directly from the workers to a stevedoring com-
mittee charged with providing the leadership for the workers' struggles. 
Yet th is conception of democratic organ ization was impossible under the 
dictatorship of the employers and the apartheid state, and rested completely 
on the ability of the organization of the workers to 'create the space' for 
democracy. The grievances and complaints registered by the offic ials 
could not be developed into fighting demands for the workers because the 
GFWBF itself was desperately struggling for legal existence as a registered 
friendly society. /l gulf developed between agitation and organization, 
the economic agitation of the Wages Commission based on no open 
organization behind the production of newspapers and pamphlets vulnerable 
to counter-attacks by the employers and the state I wh i Ie the groups of open 
meetings conducted through the GFWBF provided for no agitation wh ich 
could be pinned on the workers. 
The translation of the workers' complaints and grievances into fight-
ing demands was no easy task for the university-educated officials. The 
meetings with the workers exposed the officials to an underworld of arbitrary 
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Without this understanding, the officials were incompetent to provide advice, 
\ 
let alone lead the workers, The complexity of the issues was shown in the 
case of working hours, The docks are characterized by 'five day' weeks 
wh ich are worked Monday to Friday and inc lude Sunday, a 45 hour week 
involving up to at least 60 hours of actual work, and a generally elastic 
definition of working hours. The relatively simple labour process disguised 
the complexity of relations among the workers and of working conditions. 
In the face of these difficulties the meetings tended to dissolve into complaint 
sessions with an over-emphasis on the views of winch men and indunas. 
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The GFWBF strategy was to develop a mass base in the stevedoring 
trade, through the overwhelming preponderance of members, to overcome 
the employers' ability to victimize one worker after another. The idea 
was one of quantity, being membership, becoming transformed into quality, 
a discipl ined organization, through decisive working class action. The 
fa ilure of the GFWBF to be able to provide leadersh ip at crucial moments 
of struggle (apart from providing advice and support) pointed to the need 
for different forms of organization within a mass grouping like the benefit 
fund. Despite the compelling arguments of the workers for fully demo-
cratic associations and direct control over 'leadership', the evidence of 
victimization of leading workers and the abstention of the workers' organiza-
tion in putting forward the general demands of the workers during the mass 
strikes, pointed in the di.rection of a secret and illegal organization, 
capable of acting in the freed.)m denied to the open democratic association 
of workers. 
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Notes to Chapter 8 
1. Chief Gatsha Buthelezi insisted that elections in KwaZulu could not 
be held before all Zulu-speaking people were issued with the new 
'citizenship certificates' instead of the old passes. The citizenship 
certificates go even further than the passes in depriving African 
people of urban and industrial rights, even if the Bantustan regimes 
did not accept the goal of independence. 
2. For other leaders such as Matanzima there were assassination attempts. 
3. Cosmos Desmond, 1972, The Discarded People, Penguin, points out 
that African people were removed even if only a few kilometres to 
secure the 'ethnic' basis for the rule of the Bantustan leaders. 
4. Some of the strongest protests against the resettlement came from the 
white radicals such a~ Cosmos Desmond, who documented the horrific 
conditions in which people were dumped in desert-like areas to starve. 
Their protest provided the impetus for the policy of rural reconstruc-
tion adopted by SASO which vigorously opposed the entire Bantustan 
program, but which looked to the countryside rather than the workers 
as the future arena of struggle. 
5. The word 'semi-open· is used guardedly to convey a spectrum of 
organization ranging from the closed and secret, the ·underground'; 
the ·semi-open' associations which do not deny access to people in a 
particular sector known to each other; and the open organization of 
the publicized meeting and trade union' which admits all workers in 
a sector whether known or not by the organizers. This classification 
is sociological and in the realm of trade unionism, and does not corres-
pond to the categories of trade unionism and the revolutionary party 
developed in What is to be done? 
6. The initial discussions were extraordinarily convoluted possibly because 
the African workers who were approached were in industries covered by 
registered trade unions and suspicious of persons associated with their 
qiscriminatory practices. Many of those 'leaders' were also later 
found to be workers who did not en joy the support of the mi I itants in 
the factories. Particular institutions attracted particular leaders and 
the benefit fund came to be led by fairly conservative workers who were 
not in step with advanced workers in the docks, abattoir and cotton 
industry. 
7. An opinion was obtained from counsel on the legal status of trade unions 
not registered in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act. 
8. As could possibly be imagined, registration was never finally achieved 
despite support from excellent lawyers. Registration was blocked 
both by the hostility of the insurance companies who stood to lose a lot 
from the 'African market', and by the Security Pol ice who became 
increasingly interested in GFWBF activities. The Registrar said 
that the only benefit funds he would register were those joint funds 
established by employers and their employees and underwritten by 
an insurance company. When the contradictions between this 
administrative decision and the Friendly Societies Act was pointed 
out the Act was amended ~ 
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9. Their leaders were those most insistent on registration 'with Pretoria'. 
10. In addition to the police network of spies and informers, companies 
in South Africa (as elsewhere) have their own networks which can 
reach deeply into working class organizations. The spies receive 
a special bonus or other privileges at work. South African Labour 
Bulletin, May-June 1976, Case Study: The Function, Nature and 
Effectiveness of the Statutory Liaison Committee - Pinetex, ppAO-
58. The spies from the DSLSC seem to have had a particular 
relationship to J. B. Buthelezi, who has the right to fire workers, 
rather than to management as a whole. 
11. Secret organization, of course, is not in itself a guarantee against 
informers. 
12. Admittedly most of the stevedoring workers in the early meetings were 
from Grindrods which was nearest to the GFWBF offices, but the 
protests of the DSLSC workers were even stronger. 
13. The telegrams usually carried news of the death of a close relative 
and meant the workers would apply for compassionate leave. The 
workers felt humiliated that they were illiterate and had to rely on 
management to give them their post. 
14. There were a number of other grievances, but these will be returned 
to later in the chapter. 
15. Ironically, one of the weaknesses of the militancy of the labourers 
and the Wages Commission was only in putting demands for the labourers. 
In a sense what was being demanded was the abolition of differentials, 
or at least their substantial narrowing, but by not putting forward the 
dlemands of the winchmen, for instance, this gave management the 
opportunity of separating the machine operators from the labourers. 
The demand for a substantial increase in wages tended to submerge an 
alternative industrial strategy which would have shifted power into the 
hands of the labourers and machine operators against the collaborating 
indunas. 
16. Apart from the direct control over the workers exercised by the employers 
in the docks there are a multiplicity of police forces {railway, SAP, 
municipal police, customs and excise}, protectors of private property 
{nightwatchmen}, and 'special warders' who guard the ships. These 
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forces of repression are the natural enemies of the dock workers and 
there are frequent armed struggles with casualties on both sides. 
(Daily News, 28 March 1974) The clashes often occur when a 
stevedore is injured, but the overall relationship between the workers 
and the police (the workers call African nightwatchmen police) is 
established on the basis of property relations, the most common arrests 
being for stealing goods from the docks. 
17. In th is and other cases the compound manager stamped the pass or 
identity document with the insignia of the Bantu labour officer. 
Apparently he had been granted the powers of an official of the urban 
labour bureau; th is increased enormously the control of the company 
over the workers. Any worker dismissed by the DSlSC could also be 
deported by the same company official from the urban area~ 
18. As in other capitalist countries, South Africa has an over-developed 
legal fraternity which specializes in adjustments of property relations: 
company cases, divorces, etc. During the complete life of the 
GFWBF (June 1972-1974) there was not one lawyer who under~tood 
even the most elementary procedures in trying to make use of industrial 
legislation or common law to advance the organization of the workers. 
The problem was not a legal one but political; one of the most 
brilliant revolutionary lawyers in South Africa, Rowley Arenstein, 
was hounded out of the profession by the state. 
19. The whole question is obviously more complex than is developed here: 
even if action was possible through law this could encourage a 'legalist' 
outlook by workers. Workers want to initiate action after dismissal. 
20. The details of the previous informal works committee at Grindrods were 
obscure but it seems as though the workers had demanded an end to 
compulsory work on Sunday. A worker, Mtembu, had been fired for 
not working on Sunday because he had attended the funeral of his child 
in 1968. There was a stoppage and W. Grindrod and F. Ross, direc-
tors of the company, eventually negotiated with the workers after the 
police had been brought in and had agreed that workers should not be 
compelled to work on Sunday and that replacements should be brought 
ih from Dusty Mi"ar, another company in the docks. The question 
of voluntary overtime, Sunday and Saturday time was persistently raised 
by the Grindrod and DSlSC workers. The clauses in the wage deter-
minations on hours are purposely vague, only the maximum hours are 
defined (48) and there is nothing which makes it clear that overtime is 
voluntary. 
21. The issue was, unfortunately, not quite so simple; in WD308 employers 
were allowed to dictate when the workers were to take their hoi idays. 
22. Minutes, 5 August 1972. 
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23. Minutes, 13 August 1972. At the meeting this point caused much 
comment and laughter, the workers thought these instructions summed 
up how ridiculous the DSlSC was becoming •. , 
24. The worker felt the induna had been victimized because the African 
security guards had no argument against him. This case was taken 
up unsuccessfully by the GFWBF . 
25. It seems as though there was some disturbance at the DSLSC on Monday, 
7 August 1972, as a worker reported that many workers had arrived 
late at work as 'they were scared'. 
26. This strategy was not discussed at any of the meetings and was reported 
to the meeting on 13 August 1972 as a fait accompli. This report 
was initially received by the meeting without comment, although the 
worker making the repart (who was, incidentally, not employed by the 
DSLSC) was favourable. 
27. Minutes, Friday 25 August 1972. Mr. Neaves was the compound 
manager of Grindrods who had been transferred from the mining industry. 
The minutes do not carry any report of what the GFWBF officials 
thought of both of these suggestions. 
28. Both the TGWU constitution and handbook was studied to give some 
insight into how a mature working class was organized into trade 
unions. The projected dockers' handbook was based on the TGWU 
handbook wh i ch sets out the tasks of the T GWU shop stewards. There 
were several attempts to get together this handbook, the main problem 
being that the work of the shop stewards set out in the TGWU hand-
book was utterly utopian in the context of the employers I counter-
offensive. Apparently there is no handbook yet written by any trade 
union or working class movement which describes in simple language 
how working class leaders can survive and develop in the factories the 
industrial and political organization of the workers. 
29. The older worker expressed a quiet confidence in the workers, speaking 
slowly and methodically, the younger worker possibly more cautious, 
making notes, and making few interventions. The contrast between 
their characters: literate/illiterate, traditionalist/Christian; was 
submerged within a wider class loyalty. 
30. The more conservative representatives on the executive committee of 
the GFWBF became quickly aware of this 'unconscious I pol iticization 
and soon accused some of the officials of rushing into action without 
their prior approval. The tensions between the conservative element 
and the officia Is and mi I itants became ever sharper as the chances of 
the GFWBF being registered receded. There was, of course, a real 
basis to their fear - they were eventually prosecuted for administering 
an illegal benefit fund. The officials were house-arrested in terms 
of the Suppression of Commun ism Act, but the independent trade union 
movement continued to develop without either, after the GFWBF had 
served its function. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
Lenin (1902): 400; ON, 5 
The workers with whom preliminary discussions were held made it 
abundantly clear that they would only meet on a legal basis and 
were most emphatic that registration should be secured with the 
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Registrar of Friendly Societies. These workers, who steadily lost 
influence as the working class movement developed, opposed the 
GFWBF taking up the tasks of leading the workers' demands. They 
favoured a secure relationship with the registered trade unions as 
'parallel' unions, even if this meant cutting themselves off from other 
African workers. The reasons for this 'backwardness' cannot be 
gone into here, except to say this was far from being the dominant 
view of the GFWBF members. 
Lenin (1902): 412-3; ON, 5 
The issue contained no information about the GFWBF or about the 
meetings of stevedoring workers, although any workers who spoke to 
the distributors (the Wages Commission) were told that the meetings 
were taking place. Increasingly agitation and organization was 
becoming separated with an over-riding concern for the security of 
leading GFWBF stevedoring members. The issue also did not 
develop some of the 'new' demands of the workers uncovered in the 
meetings: annual leave, an end to assaults at work, gloves for winch-
men, the need for payslips, and for an end to victimization. 
The DSLSC do, however, call Dreyer 'Tekwana' (tickbird) 
because he is tall and wears the ridiculous white ducks of the shipping 
fraternity; it could also possibly infer he picks off his 'ticks' (the 
workers) one by one. 
Information about what is going on in the harbour is gleaned by the 
workers from the English language I iberal press, wh ich devotes regular 
columns to shipping, and from Ilanga, the monopoly-controlled Zulu 
language newspaper. An important tool in the hands of the employers 
and the state was also to be Radio Bantu which is popular among Zulu-
speaking people solely for its entertainment value, particularly presen-
tation of Zulu music. 
\ 
This worker had a fine grasp of the details of the wage calculations 
some of which is presented in the earlier chapter. These detai Is and 
the precise changes in the proportion of ordinary to overtime in the 
changed hours which were later introduced caused the GFWBF officials 
who were university graduates much mental anguish~ 
These workers called themselves 'spare winchmen' • A similar system 
which saves employers the costs involved in training workers operates 
in the textile industry ( 'spare weavers') and very probably throughout 
all industries in South Africa. 
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39. This worker was well aware of the trade union tactic of 'leap-
frogging' in wage setting; forcing employers to pay the rate for 
the job in other companies and industrial areas. The indunas at 
Dusty Millars were said to be paid considerable bonuses, R80 in 
June and R260 in December. The demand for a bonus represented 
the view of the workers that some of the accumulated labour should 
be returned to them, particularly when their labour power was 
exhausted (at 'retirement') which took place eft an early stage in 
the demanding stevedoring trade. 
40. Minutes, 9 (?) September 1972. This worker saw the intervention 
of Chief Gatsha Buthelezi as necessary to reconcile the indunas to 
the changes in power relations at the workplace. H is statement 
provides, however, an analysis of Buthelezi's position within 
the apartheid system: granted leadership standing by the state and 
being watched by the workers. 
41. This system was simply being adapted to the new conditions of class 
struggle in the docks, the company used these powers widely on other 
workers who for a number of reasons (their popularity, suspicion of 
stealing, insurbordination) would not be immediately dismissed but 
not provided with a 'call-in card' and re-engaged. The contract 
labour system, particularly after the 1968 regulations, reinforced con-
siderably the powers of employers to sift out the 'chaff' without 
having to face the threat of immediate strike action. 
42. The 'cleverness' shown in Company policy displays the hidden hand 
of the Natal Employers' Association of which the DSLSC is a leading 
member. The NEA makes a special study of industrial legislation 
and provides expert advice to employers, far in advance of the well-
intentioned legal advizers providing free legal services to the GFWBF • 
43. The Government Gazettes wh ich carry the details of workers who have 
not received the benefits due to them from the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Commissioner are full of the names of workers employed by the 
DSLSC. The efficient system of compenseftion which is claimed in 
Management notes (1966) does not exist. 
44. Minutes, 16 September 1972. 
45. The low level of working class organization under highly repressive 
capitalist states is not simply a product of the operations of the state 
apparatus, important though this is. The over-riding question is the 
class consciousness of the workers and their knowledge of the tech-
niques of class organization. Highly repressive state apparatuses 
are often genuinely ignorant of the non-work activities of the workers. 
The explanation of low levels of working class activity because of the 
operations of the state leads to a mechanistic interpretation of social 
action. 
46. The 'five-day weeki is actually a six day week as Sunday work is 
compulsory. The hours in the wage determinations only refer to 
ordinary hours, there are no regulations about· the amount of over-
time worked. 
47. Workers could be required to do overtime up to 2100 after starting 
at 0720. There were persistent complaints that the workers had 
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to start at 0700 on Fridays to 'make Upl for the loss of Saturday time 
to the employers. (Minutes, 16 September 1972) But by adjust-
ing the ordinary hou~s of work by adding one houris work a day 
there would be a total of 48 hours 18 minutes a week, so this tamper-
ing with the ordinary hours was illegal. 
48. Daily News, 1 December 1971 and 8 January 1972. 
49. These were at 1000 (a tea break) and 1700 (a meal break). The 
meal break was specified in WD 308 as to be granted between 1700 
and 1900 for those workers doing overtime, with the change in the 
end of ordinary time this could have been taken at 1800. WD 308, 
5 (4) b. 
50. This is the difference between the 5 hours 'gained ' and the 1 hour 
40 minutes 'Iost ' through starting earlier. 
51. The Daily News shipping correspondent (17 March 1972) claimed that 
'the five day week scheme has failed ' • See also Natal Mercury, 
21 March 1972. 
52. The workers ' complaint that there was no compound at Grindrod was 
far from demonstrating acceptance of the migrant labour system but an 
argument against extending hours. This is an important question 
and will be considered in relation to the I Dockers I Charter ' . 
53. The works committee system had not seriously been considered before 
this point because the officials were opposed to the works committees 
as part of the apartheid labour system and saw an alternative to having 
to use these committees in a mass workers
' 
organization which would 
be an irresistible force against the employers. 
54. Minutes, 23 September 1972. Getting a works committee registered 
in terms of the Act was no easy task when the Department of Labour 
sensed there was independent organization associated with the demand 
for registration. In the case of the abattoir workers, the GFWBF had 
to keep up correspondence (which was not acknowledged) for months 
before the Department accepted and recognized the works committee 
there. Being registered in terms of the Act by no means guaranteed 
the workers I representatives from victimization but it probably did 
restrain counter action from management. 
55. Minutes, 8 October 1972, 
56. Buthelezi was reported to have been removed on 24 August 1972 
and the workers complained he had returned at a meeting on 7 
October 1972. . None of the Point workers mentioned him, his 
presence or absence, in the meetings held during the period. 
57. It cannot be completely implausible to suggest that promises were 
made of special consideration for the employment of workers from 
particular areas, especially of the politically important Zulu 
heartland. 
58. Minutes, 8 October 1972. 
59. The idea of a 'Dockers' Charter' came fromareadng of the history 
of the British labour movement. It would not simply be a state-
ment of demands, but 0 proposal for fundamental changes in the 
conditions of dock workers including the migrant labour system. 
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60. Chief Buthelezi was staying at the home of a wealthy Indian person, 
on other occasions he stayed at the home of the United States Consul 
General when in Durban. He was at times prone to extravagant 
'populist' anti-Indian statements, so the point is mentioned to illus-
trate the ambiguity of his politics. 
61. Minutes, 9 September 1972. 
62. Letter to The Chief Executive Officer, 7 October 1972. 
63. Letter from M.G. Buthelezi to the Stevedoring Committee, 12 
October 1972. 
64. Dladla was later to have an important role in supporting both the 
strike movement and the fledgling open trade unions in Natal when 
the workers proved themselves capable of militant action indepen-
dently of the Bantustan regimes. The forward movement of the 
African working class would eventually cause a split between him-
self and Chief Buthelezi. 
65. There were 4 DSLSC workers at the meeting on 7 October, 1 or 2 on 
14 October, and 2 on 21 October 1972. The level of participation 
qf these workers was noticeably lower than in previous meetings. 
66. This account is necessarily abbreviated, the DSLSC workers at the 
meeting on 14 October were possibly overawed by the vociferous 
debate being conducted by the Grindrod workers. 
67. Minutes, 21 October 1972. I t does seem unusual that the workers 
should arrive so much earlier than the latest reporting time, but 
similar conditions are found throughout industry in South Africa. 
In the textile industry the workers are concerned that they will get 
a loom to work that day, as more weavers are employed than looms 
available. In most industries, however, the very early reporting 
is a product of the fear of the workers of being dismissed for arriving 
late. With mass unemployment these fears are real. 
68. As many officials of the apartheid state in a similar situation, the 
officials did not identify themselves, but simply stated they were 
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from the Department of labour. Their identities were establ ished 
from subsequent newspaper reports. Natal Mercury, 20 October 
1972. Similar functionaries of the state do, however, demand 
the identity of workers who have the courage to represent the general 
will of the workers~ 
69. The issue was far more contentious than it appears. Was 0600 to be 
regarded as the starting time in law if the workers were required to 
be present then? At one point the workers stated the Department of 
Labour officials said there would be eight hours ordinary time a day. 
70. The precise details on what happened on Monday are not clear from 
the minutes of Saturday, 21 October 1972, as the discussion is 
reported on without a date being mentioned. 
71. This remark illuminates the type of relationship between African white 
collar and manual workers. Despite a relatively small wage inc-
rease over the manual workers, the African clerks are often arrogant 
and bureaucratic in relation to the labourers. Reflecting the class 
prejudices absorbed in the schools, the clerks like to differentiate 
themselves from the labourers in dress and manner. There are very 
few 'office' as opposed to 'factory' clerks in unregistered trade unions. 
72. Minutes, 21 October 1972. 
73. Natal Mercury, 20 October 1972. 
74. The Factories Act lays down a maximum of five hours unbroken work 
before a work break has to be provided. Technically, the employers 
were not contravening WD 308 5 (4) b which lays down the meal 
intervals to be observed by the employers, because these were to be 
provided if the workers wer e required to work overtime after 2000. 
By shifting the hours forward to 0700 and ending overtime at 2000, 
the employers could legally eliminate the meal break. The mor.ning 
tea break was not laid down in WD 308 and appears to have been a 
customary arrangement, but again workers would be required to work 
d five hour stretch 0700 to 1230 without a break. 
75. The GFWBF officials were virtually baffled by the complexity of the 
issues involved in the changes in hours and what this meant for the 
hourly earnings of the workers. Was the 0630 reporting time to be 
included in the working hours? Was a working week of 45 ordinary 
hours now operating? Had the workers been paid for the tea breaks 
and meal breaks before the change in hours? Should the workers 
demand a 40 hour week and a double shift system? It was an 
inability of the GFWBF officials to understand the changing nature of 
the exploitation of the workers which was one of the primary reasons 
for their indecisiveness in providing the workers with a lead. They 
felt a straightforward wage demand would have been much simpler. 
76. Daily News, lS October 1972 
77. Under the hours introduced in December 1971 there were 12 hours 
and 20 minutes worked each day, ordinary and overtime. Even 
though the ordinary hours now ended at 1700 instead of lS00, by 
starting at least 20 minutes earlier, eliminating the morning tea 
break at 1000 (although there was some dispute about whether all 
gangs got this break) of about 10 minutes, and the meal break of 
at least 20 minutes after 1700, there would be more than 12 hours 
actual time worked. If the reporting time of 0630 is taken, as 
the workers insisted, as the starting time, the total hours worked 
would be over 12 hours 30 minutes. 
7S. That is, unpaid labour in terms of a bourgeois service contract: no 
extra wages for longer hours. The workers were also conscious of 
the concept of unpaid labour in the theory of the working class, 
693 
i.e. that wages were not equal to the value created by their expendi-
ture of labour power.' 
79. A" the local newspapers printed reports that the workers called for 
Chief Buthelezi, although there can be no question that the man they 
were demanding was J. B. Buthelezi. The only report which comes 
near the truth (because it employed an African reporter who spoke to 
the workers) was the Daily News, 27 October 1972, which found 'that 
the attitude of the company's chief induna was resented'. The mis-
take was not accidental, the liberal press encouraging illusions in 
Chief Buthelezi and not finding it conceivable that an African could 
be in such a repressive position as J.B. Buthelezi. Despite an 
attempt to correct this misunderstanding, the error was repeated in an 
article in Race Relations News, December 1972, and the Survey of 
Race Relations, 1972. 
SO. It was quite likely that some workers would have received this amount 
of leave pay if they had worked for a contract of less than six months, 
leave pay being calculated on the basis of number of months worked. 
WD 30S does not necessarily require employers to pay sick paYi S (1) 
i,ii permits employers to 'set off' the sick pay due to the worker for fees 
paid by the employers to hospitals or medical services. Similar 
clauses in industrial agreements and wage determinations are widely 
used to deprive all workers of the sick pay due to them in terms of the 
Factories Act and other industrial legislation. 
Sl. This complaint is not as ridiculous as the liberal press tended to make 
it, beer for the majority of the working class in Europe, for instance, 
constituting a conventional part of working class diet. The question 
is also more 'political' than that of the necessary element in the 
reproductian of labour power; in South Africa, African beers made 
from sorghum are produced under a liquor monopoly by the munici-
palities and now administration boards. 
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82. A small drinking party. 
83. Some of the police in squad cars were armed with machine guns. 
84. The account of the strike is derived from the Daily News, 23 and 
27 October 1972; Natal Mercury, 24 October 1972; Rand 
Daily Mail, 25 October 1972; as well as from personal observation 
and reports from black employees of the GFWBF . 
85. Lenin (1896), Draft and explanation of a programme for the Social-
Democratic Party. ON 2. 
86. The tremendous strugg Ie of the stevedores in Cape Town under the 
harsh regime of contract labour (as are the DSLSC workers) to resist 
the new hours and to survive as employees of the stevedoring com-
panies, is developed by Maree, SALB 1(8} January-February 1975: 
58-63. 
87. The workers demands and grievances expressed to the press were item 
by item identical to those put forward in the underground letter. 
88. Natal Mercury, 31 October 1972. 
89. These figures demonstrate that the labourers were substantially under-
represented, and that what was being formed was not strictly a 'works 
committee' in terms of the Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act 
but rather a 'liaison committee' as defined by the amending legisla-
tion in 1973, i.e. one convened and chaired by management. 
90. Sack, I: 62 
91. Minutes, 7 October 1972. 
92. Minutes, 4 November 1972. Sack, I I: 29, muddles the question 
of the dismissal of workers after the strike because he has not grasped 
the role of J. B. Buthelezi. None of the workers who were forced 
to resign immediately after the strike were connected with the GFWBF 
or apparently with any groupings in the DSLSC, the victimizations 
which were to follow were the crucial ones. Sack develops an 
argument that the strike was caused by factional ism among the workers, 
one section loya I to the King and the other to Gatsha Buthelezi, and 
that the grievances of the workers were 'basically groundless'. (p.26). 
In his paper he does, however, relate that some workers were involved 
in 'fingering' the militants and informing on them and this could well 
be a coterie around J. B.Buthelezi. 
93. Natal Mercury, 4 November 1972. This article was discussed at 
the meetings of 7 and 11 November and it was agreed to write a letter 
refuting the claims that the workers paid nothing for accommodation 
and were provided with 'appetising' food. The letter was to be 
written by the workers and translated before being sent to the Natal 
Mercury editor. At the meeting on 11 November it was reported 
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that the letter had been sent directly to the editor, but it was not 
published. Sac~, II, seems to rely on this glowing report on 
conditions in the DSLSC compound which refuted the workers' claims 
and the criticism of the company implicit in much of the reporting in 
the Dai Iy News. 
94. Natal Mercury, 18 November 1972. Later he said the wages were 
a disgrace and perpetuated the practice of sweated labour and 
gave substance to other countries' accusations against South Africa. 
Natal Mercury, 27 November 1972. 
95. Daily News, 24 November 1972. 
96. The GFWBF officials were slow to respond to the recommended wages 
with agitational material pointing out the contradiction between the 
workers' demands and the recommendations, particularly on the ques-
tion of hours. WD308 did not even stipulate a 45 hour week for the 
docks even though the SARH had already implemented a 'five day' 
week throughout all South African docks; it simply left the hours of 
work at 48 a week. The employers made a point of arguing they 
were prepared to retain the 45 hour week as a concession to the 
workers~ 
97. Among the workers who were victimized was the one who said at a 
meeting on 9 (?) September 1972 that he would be victimized by 
his contract not being renewed. He was fired on the date of termina-
tion of his contract during this week. 
98. Natal Mercury, 24 November 1972. There had, of course, been 
numerous telegrams and telephone calls made directly to his office, 
and significantly the letter promised never arrived. Like most 
Bantustan pol iticians at this time, Diadic wcs involved in extensive 
tours of Europe and the United States arguing why the 'historic com-
promise' with the apartheid state had been necessary. It was only 
after receiving vehement criticism for his support of the KwaZulu 
Bantustan overseas and after the mass strike had shown the workers 
would move ahead independently of the African petty bourgeoisie that 
li>ladla came to champion the cause of African trade unionism. 
99. Sack, ,,: 26-30. Because Sack muddles the forced resignation of 
14 workers on the dat.e the strike was crushed (T uesday, 24 October 
1972) with the victimizations wh ich took place on the week preceding 
Friday, 24 November 1972, when 15 workers were reportedly dismissed 
(the workers claimed many more had been victimized), it is quite 
unclear which group of workers Sack is referring to as dominantly from 
the Ngoya district. This factual confusion does not, however, 
detract completely any significance from his argument, or his disclo-
sure of an informer and spy network with in the DSLSC. 
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100. These quotes are from Sack, II: 27. 
101. There are many other logical fallacies in Sack's arguments: if those 
who were victimized were of the King's faction why would they be 
foolish enough to appeal to J. B. Buthelezi's nethew? Why should 
not the King make a statement demanding J. B. Buthelezi end his 
oppression of the workers if he had nothing to lose and the support of 
all the African stevedoring workers to gain? From the evidence of 
the workers some rebuke was given to J. B. Buthelezi in August, but 
his reappearance afterwards shows that whatever differences there 
were were patched up possibly on a mutually beneficial basis. 
102. Two of the workers lived in the African townships around Durban and 
managed to get other employment without much difficulty. Another 
worker managed to get employment at Richards Bay and attempted to 
form a branch of the GFWBF there. The one worker who did come 
from Ngoma and came in to the GFWBF offices had been endorsed out. 
A II workers who were victimized and stayed on in Durban were pro-
vided with food hampers from a friendly registered union. The 
Grindrod workers made a collection for their support. 
103. A hostel area near Mobeni industrial estate. The information pro-
vided by the clerk was corroborated by three other workers in the 
vicinity of the offices. 
104. Minutes, Meeting 25 November 1972. 
105. Virtually all these demands and objections were published in a news 
report in the Natal Mercury, 1 December 1972. Dreyer's response, 
which is an attempt at a detailed refutation of the demands on hours 
and wage envelopes, was published on the following day. Natal 
Mercury, 2 DeceTlber 1972. 
106. Minutes, 2 December 1972. The Charter and articles were eventually 
not published for reasons wh ich are not clear. 
107. Minutes of meetings, 9 December 1972, 15 December 1972, 13 January 
1973. 
108. Minutes of meeting, 15 December 1972. 
109. When Saturday work was reduced (it was never entirely el iminated) 
the hours of work on Friday were extended by up to one hour extra 
overtime. 
110. Minutes of meeting, 24 January 1973. 
111. There was some debate among the workers whether the groups of armed 
uniformed men were the police, army or navy. Possibly the confu-
sion was caused by the first deployment inside South Africa of new para-
military units in camouflaged uniforms, although there may have been 
occasions when the army and navy made displays of force in the docks. 
112. See Douwes Dekker, 1975; Boulanger, 1974, liE, 1974. 
113. House of Assembly Debates, 1973. No. 11, Cols.687-690. 
Many strikes took place at small factories which were not likely to 
be included in the statistics, 50 the total number of strikers was 
likely to be considerably larger and represent the overwhelming 
majority of African factory workers in Durban and Pinetown. 
114. Minutes of meeting, 17 February 1973. 
115. Ibid. 
116. The state officials and employers argued the workers were ignorant 
and illagical in saying that anything had been agreed at the Wage 
Board sitting. The workers made use of the sitting in subsequent 
disputes to say that their arguments had not been contested by the 
employers and therefore agreed. The workers' argument was 
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strengthened by the employers' response to their demands as reported 
by the Daily News, 18 July 1972: 'A spokesman for the employers 
told the board the wage demands were justified and should be met. I 
The employers were, of course, referring to the vague pleas of J. B. 
Buthelezi and not to the R 18 a week demand of the workers. 
117. Minutes of meeting, 17 February 1973. 
118. The 'free' form of labour which the togt system represented; the 
'freedom' for a togt worker to have employment on any day or not is 
by this stage being seen by the weekly paid workers as degrading. 
Whenever the police arrived at a dispute or strike in the docks 
the workers taunted the employers by calling themselves 'prisoners'. 
Prison labour is used extensively in the dock area to supplement the 
SARH workers and is housed at Point Prison, near the DSlSC com-
pounds. letter from Grindrod stevedores to GFWBF, 12 December 
1972. 
119. Minutes of meeting, 27 January 1973. The 'abnegation' of the 
worker representative was also related to a shift in leadership among 
the Grindrod workers towards those who were having a larger role in 
speaking at the works committee meetings; there was a tendency 
for the younger, more I iterate, workers to be more capable of press-
ing the workers' demands in the possibly intimidating atmosphere of an 
employers' 'consultative committee'. The somewhat older leader-
ship, quite as representative of the workers and as mil itant became 
overshadowed by their incapacity to read minutes and make notes. 
Among all workers public disclosure of illiteracy can be deeply humilia-
ting, and the humility of the younger worker was partly to demonstrate 
his lack of ambition against the older leadership. 
120. Minutes of meeting, 3 March 1973. For the worker who was beaten 
up the issue was by no means closed and the GFWBF officials got in 
contact with lawyers on his behalf to take up a case of assault. The 
main, and most obvious, difficulty was that the security pol ice did 
not identify themselves. 
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121. The Wage Board did not have the courtesy to reply to the well-drafted 
and typed objections to the recommendations. 
122. Minutes of meeting, 20 January 1973. A collection had also been 
made after the Point members were victimized. Apparently Dladla 
was in hospital with a lung infection during the strikes; he was in 
poor health and eventually died in 1978. 
123. Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Amendment Act of 1953. 
124. The GFWBF officials wavered between condemning the works committees 
outright and destroying their influence (which would not be a very 
difficult task in most factories where workers consider they are a fraud) 
and posing instead the mass mobilization of workers in independent 
trade unions, or being reduced to making tactical use of the works com-
mittees to secure some basis for workers' association within the plant. 
Policy was eventually made which specifically prohibited officials from 
encour aging works committees where there was the possibility of trade 
union organization to distinguish the growing independent trade unions 
from the 'stages of trade uni:m' concept of the Urban Training Project. 
In practice, employers were becoming active in forming liaison com-
mittees, and the independent trade un ions have now adopted strategies 
of taking over these committees as a voice for the union in the factory. 
125. Daily News, 4 December 1972. 
126. Minutes of meeting of DSLSC workers, Saturday, 31 March 1973. 
There were, of course, assaults taking place on DSLSC workers before 
this time but what seems significant is that at Grindrods this was a 
burning question whereas it had not previously been brought up as a 
grievance by the Point workers. 
127. As workers in trade unions in the United Kingdom, so the Grindrod 
workers insisted on being able to gauge the feelings of their fellow 
workers rather than making individual autonomous decisions. The 
qdded point about a show of hands is that many of the workers are 
ill iterate. 
128. There were 22 questions addressed to the employers on the meeting of 
26 September 1973 and only the most important are mentioned here. 
At a meeting on 11 September 1973 there were 11 questions, includ-
ing 'too many bosses' to which the response was 'The Company is 
investigating this point and will do all possible to improve the position'~ 
129. 'Points raised by works committee at liaison meeting', 11 September 
1973 and 26 September 1973. 
130. Minutes of special committee meeting held at Mr. Bennett's office on 
10 July 1974. 
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131. Even the stevedores themselves were forced to rely on the press for 
information on what was happening in the docks. The circulation 
of information of this noture caused much resentment from employers 
and the state wh ich realized that workers were becoming able to com-
municate among themselves in the most publ ic manner. While pre-
viously the news of strikes c.:>uld be repressed, with the mass strikes 
the news of strike action was as important to all classes of society as 
to the strikers themselves. 
132. In What is to be done? Lenin describes how he had to spend weeks 
examining a worker to get material for a description of just a single 
factory. He argued that the legalization of the trade unions would 
relieve revolutionaries of having to burden themselves with such 
detailed study. 1975: 187 fn. 
CHAPTER 9 
Class action and consciousness 
Nearly 20,000 dockers in eight West German seaports went on strike 
yesterday in support of higher wage claims. It is the first organised 
stoppage in Germany's North Sea and Baltic ports for 82 years. 
The Guardian, 26 January 1978 
Many researches have been undertaken to trace the historical stages 
through which the bourgeoisie passed, from the commune up to its 
constitution as a class. But when it is a question of gaining a clear 
understanding of the strikes, combinations, and other forms in which 
the proletarians are achieving, before our eyes, their organization as 
a class, some are seized with genuine fear, while others display a 
transcendental disdain. 
Marx (1975): 160 
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A study of the history of class formation and action in the Durban 
.docks provides an extraordinari ly rich source of material on the nature of 
the African working class, class consciousness, and the relationship bet-
ween working class action and the struggle against the apartheid state. 
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The advantages of studying a particular group of workers over a long period 
are those of establishing objective criteria for evaluating the level of prole-
tarianization of workers whom capital has del iberately recruited from the 
most remote and pol itically 'backward' and 'tribal' areas, both their depen-
dence on wage labour for survival and their consciousness of their oppression. 
By studying the concrete, the precise relationships between the exploitation 
of the working class in South Africa and the operation of state policies are 
particularly well illuminated; points of detail (such as the implementation 
of the tax system) often exposing crucial issues which are often ignored in 
the development of research into the political economy of apartheid. This 
method of approaching the organization of the African working class also gives 
us some insight into the relationship of different elements of the working class 
to each other; 'leading ' and 'following ' , migrant and urban, supervisors 
and supervised. It also provides a necessary focus for a study of a decisive 
group of African workers for a period over a century wh ich helps us to assess 
the relative maturity of the African working class in opposing the interests of 
their employers and the state. The actions of the employers and the state 
are placed in the perspective of a continuing struggle between capital and 
labour, responding to the advances made by the workers with repression and 
'strategic reforms' wh ich secured the continued domination over the workers 
in the docks and elsewhere. Yet the dock workers ha¥e to be seen in rela-
tion to the working class as a whole. From the colonial period to the present, 
their weight within the working class has tended to decline although their power 
to paralyze the movement of cargo in and out of Durban has increased in signifi-
cance as Durban has developed as the major port of South Africa. 
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The danger in isolating the specific and particular is that the subjects 
.appear as particularly outstanding figures against a general struggle of African 
workers against their oppression which is not fully developed here. They 
can also appear as uniquely different from the conditions of other dock workers 
in other countries and continents. What is argued, although it is not pos-
sible to present the comparative evidence in all its detail, is that the dockers 
in Durban are part of the international working class united by capital, raising 
many of the demands of dockers in the United Kingdom, United States, or 
India, as well as the demands for the abolition of the apartheid state. With-
out raising the industrial demands of dockers they would-appear as 'uncommitted' 
as workers, as transient casuals, as 'peasants in the city' attempting to limit 
wage labour only to the immediate needs of themselves and their families. 
And without championing the general resistance of the African people ogainst 
all forms of national oppression, the workers would appear as bounded by 
economistic demands in an egotistical struggle for piecemeal advance. With 
the growth of world trade on an extensive basis in the nineteenth century a 
world-wide division of labour took place, and the struggle of workers such as 
the dockers, who are closely affected by the waves of slumps and booms tends 
to follow simi lar patterns on a world-w ide basis. The early and ex ploratory 
offensives of the late nineteenth century were followed by desperate resistance 
during the depression, advances during the Second World War, and strong 
resistance to containerization from the late 1960s. Although the dockers in 
Durban have not marched in step with workers in the advanced capitalist 
countries in all phases of expansion and contraction of world trade (and parti-
cularly in resistance to containerization), in broad outl ine the peaks and 
troughs of working class action in the docks correspond with those elsewhere. 
Isolated by the controls imposed by capital, by language, and by distance, 
from the workers' leaders in docks particularly (as well as from political 
working class movements) in other continents, the dock workers in Durban 
have nevertheless conducted similar struggles against their employers and 
states. 
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This perspective is denied by an approach which considers that forms 
.of working class action in the periphery of the world economy are fundamentally 
dissimilar from those in the advanced capitalist countries, as advanced in the 
theory of the 'Third World Strike' . At its most developed, it has been argued 
that 'the trajectory of capitalist development in the Third World is quite dis-
similar to that of the metropoles', and that this presupposes fundamentally dis-
similar forms of class struggle. Since capitalism has developed by conserving 
non-capitalist forms of production which are constantly being undermined by 
commodity relations, strike action by African workers can be seen as a struggle 
to force capital to compensate for use-values destroyed through the extension 
of capitalist relationships. 1 Capitalism does not revolutionize social relation-
ships in the non-capital ist sector. 'There is no way in which sustained 
economic growth in the periphery can be seen to "free" the working class from 
the particularism of "archaic" relations: that is, freed from the heterogeneity 
of relations that characterised the conditions of their production and reproduc-
tion during earlier periods of industrialization and capitalist development.' 
The apparent similarities between working class action in the advanced capita-
list countries and in underdeveloped countries are superfic ial and conceal the 
more fundamental dissimi larities which are permanent. The African working 
class thus remains underdeveloped and powerless, tied to the reserves through 
reciprocal obligations and kinship networks. 
A Ithough employing a language modified by the current debates on the 
nature of capitalist relations with in South Africa, the argument expresses a 
similar view to other writers who describe the African working class as incom-
pletely developed, as stunted by the myriad of controls exerted over the work-
ing class by the apartheid state, and incapable of class action and conscious-
ness on the scale of the working class in developed capitalist societies. 
Ironically, the very development of the intervention of the state into all aspects 
of the mobility of labour, the purchase and sale of labour power, which is 
described as one of forced labour for black workers, is used as an argument to 
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reinforce the notion of a helpless and 'unconscious' African working class . 
. If proletarianization is the product of the intervention of the state in forcing 
African workers into wage labour, then the largest section of the working 
class in South Africa is inherently unstable, wi" be unable to put forward 
industrial demands, and will participate in the struggle to abolish the apartheid 
state only as a significant component of the African people as a whole who 
suffer under this state. The corollary of forced labour is an undifferentiated 
and massified group of workers quite incapable of sustained class action. The 
argument tends to over-emphasize the vitality of non-capitalist production in 
the reserves and to describe the African working class as predominantly migrant, 
the most popular phrase being 'peasant-workers'. This approach concentrates 
on the impermanence of the African working class, its subjugation and oppres-
sion, without developing the contradictions in the political economy of apart-
heid - the massive growth of the working class and the crisis of profitabil ity. 
'They see in poverty nothing but poverty, without seeing in it the revolutionary, 
subversive side, which will overthrow the old society. ,2 Because of the 
single-minded study of African workers from the reserves ignoring the 
rapid development of the urban working class, the African working class has 
become characterized as 'peasant-workers'. {The urban/rural distinction 
within the African working class, or indeed the wide variety of national origins 
of the African workers in South Africa is, of course, not the essential question 
in a discussion of the unity of the African working class and its class conscious-
ness but the point needs to be made because of the exceptional omission of the 
urban African working class from much of the literature of Marxist writing on 
South Africa.} At its extreme, a view of the level of proletarianization 
derived from an articulation of modes of production, capitalist and non-
capitalist, results in the conclusion that the African working class 'are not 
workers in the real senseI. 3 The particular form of proletarianization of 
African workers in South Africa and the denial of urban residence to the majority 
of African workers makes such an absurd view possible. By understanding 
that proletarianization has resulted through the limits on land :>wnership com-
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pelling African workers to engage in wage labour, the possibi lity is raised 
that the I iberation of black people from serfdom and the return of the land 
to the people could recreate pre-capitalist forms of wealth and re-establish 
the peasantry. Although this is an extreme formulation, this concept lies 
behind the 'intermediary terminology' applied to the black proletariat. 
Woddis argues that in Africa imperial ism .has destroyed the existing communal 
villages and subsistence agriculture and left the masses impoverished. 
Imperialism has 'plunged the African peasant down to the utmost depths of 
poverty and disaster, producing as a result that peculiarly African phenomenon, 
the continually migrating peasant-worker, confronted with the "loss of his old 
world" yet "with no gain of a new one". 14 The precise method by which 
the capitalist state and employers maintain this form of migrant labour and 
reasons why the whole system does not disintegrate are not developed. The 
terminology has, however, been taken up in relation to the black proletariat 
in South Africa, in particular to agricultural and mining workers, and repro-
duces a notion of a stunted working class unable to secure its independence 
within the national movement and lacking the capacity of developing political 
class consciousness. 
A contrary position has been to deny any difficulty in assessing the 
proletarianization of .African workers. Mhlongo, for example, states that 
South Africa presents a 'unique spectacle ' in relation to the rest of Africa, 
Asia and Latin America in that there are no peasants. 'Much rubbish has 
been written on what has variously been referred to as "semi-peasants", 
\ 
"neither peasants nor workers", "landless peasants", and so forth. 1 He 
argues that the term 'Iandless peasantl is as meaningless as 'capital-Iess 
capitalist', that 'semi -peasants 1 do not exist I and that 'neither peasants nor 
workers 1 describes a state of non-existence. 5 For Mhlongo, the formation 
of a black proletariat completely separated from the land is unproblematic, 
and all terms which detract from the concept of a fully developed proletariat 
are guilty of limiting the role of the proletariat in the struggle for liberation 
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in South Africa. Any study of the maturity of the black proletariat in 
.South Africa has, however, to take the material conditions of its reproduction 
into account, and to develop a fully theorized account of its development. 
A full discussion of the struggle of the black proletariat for the emancipation 
of all people in South Africa has to take into account the development of 
migrant into contract labour and the attempt by the apartheid state to main-
tain the workers' link to the land. Politically this policy now takes the form 
of the creation of the Bantustans and the corresponding policy of turning black 
workers into aliens in the centres of capital accumulation. 
As has been argued in the preceding chapters, the massive intervention 
of the state in the control over the African working class has proceeded as a 
response to the struggles of African workers. The upward movement of wages 
in the 1870s in the Durban docks was met with the togt regulations, the strikes 
and resistance to the employers at the turn of the century by amended regula-
tions, and the formation of the DSLSC itself dictated by the necessity to curb 
the 'runaway' militancy of the stevedores and to provide long-term solutions 
to the problem of control. Every extension of the state and employers' 
organization into the monolithic structures of the 1960s was an attempt to 
secure domination and efficient exploitation for the next period of struggle, 
management finding new contradictions with every phase of 'absolutism'. 
The conditions of the workers' subjugation, their perpetual migrancy, are 
determined by the response of employers and the apartheid state to the struggle 
of the workers as well as a general policy of maintaining a cheap labour force. 
So far from the nature of the African proletariat being determined by the 
imposition of exacting controls by the apartheid state, the contrary tendency 
is demonstrated: the activities of the apartheid state arising from the level 
of proletarianization and struggle of the African working class. 
The relations of domination over the workers in stevedoring are not a 
straightforward extension of the legal-bureaucratic regulations over a powerless 
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section of the working class, but rather a dynamic manipulation of the instru-
.ments of control by employers and the state (the power to dismiss, the pass 
system, calling in the police, etc.) to constantly re-establish domination. 
Given the evident lack of success of the stevedoring workers in transforming 
their conditions of labour and the steady extension of the powers of the state 
and employers, it could be argued that strike action is a 'blunt weapon' in 
the struggle against apartheid and exploitation. This has been argued by 
Gann who presents the African working class as incapable of disciplined 
national collective action; 'at present, the black labour force in South 
Africa is pol itically too isolated, too heterogeneous in character, too poorly 
organized and occupationally too unstable'. Strike action can always be 
neutralized by the 'great reserve army of migrant labour' from beyond South 
Africa's borders and from the Bantustans. 6 The strikes which do take place 
have also been presented as grossly economistic and readily diverted from 
political resistance, 'easily manageable' and 'quickly dealt with' by manage-
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ment. These theorists devalue the contribution to the struggle against 
national oppression and exploitation made by the African working class, and 
make strike action appear as a number of isolated incidents having no parti-
cular significance. 
But despite the harsh disciplining of the stevedoring workers through 
dismissals, police action and the use of the unemployed to replace strikers, 
employers have not been able to immunize the trade from the pressure working 
alit,.! to, ""',,gi tk ..t- "fuNM,.!,?j'I"!;/ "" ". ... ""'II''!. 
class action has had on the rate of exploitati0'i- Quite decisive changes 
are evident over a long period in the relationship between the mass of wages 
and the mass of profits, SUI plus va luelvariable capital (s/v). The high rates 
of surplus value extracted from the stevedoring workers in earl ier periods are 
no longer possible even though unemployment has reached unprecedented levels 
and the powers of the employers and the state have been vastly extended. 
Table 9. 1 
Rate of exploitation in stevedoring 
Mass of wages Profits s/v 
(ROOO) (ROOO) % 
1938 246 98 40.0 
1962/63 2,205 636 28.8 
1970 6,278 887 14. 1 
1975 21,726 3, 162 14.6 
(Sources: WBR on unskilled labour, stevedoring trade, Census 
of Transport, 22-01-01) 
The surprising decline in the rate of exploitation in stevedoring during the 
period of strike action and enforced decasualization (roughly from the 1940s 
to 1960s), and again in that of resurgence of strike action, indicates that 
working class resistance has compelled the companies to lower the amount of 
unpaid labour extracted from the workers. This has occurred despite the 
enormous weight of impoverishment and bureaucratic control shifted on to 
African workers in the whole period under review. In part the companies 
have responded by raising the productivity and intensifying the labour of the 
workers, bringing profits/worker up to R722 in 1975 from R 119 in 1962/63. 
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But over the same period wages were increased tenfold whi Ie profits on Iy five-
fold. An increase ;n the mass of profits was only possible with a decline in 
the rate of profit. 
These statistics indicated that for capital in stevedoring there were 
limits to the exploitation of labour expressed by working class resistance. 
Despite the politico-legal restrictions on the African working class which 
rendered the workers ultra-exploitable, the enormously high level of 
exploitation possible in previous periods could not be sustained. The 
increasing restrictions over African labour (with, for example, the DSLSC) 
were made Inecessaryl to capital to be able to prevent further decline in 
the rate of profit. 
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For the stevedoring workers, a10ther migratory workers, wage labour 
is the principal occupation. By the early 1960s from the moment African 
migrants first entered employment, wage labour comprised more than two-
thirds of male workers 1 active labour time. 8 Migratory workers are integral 
to the working class in South Africa not only in terms of the labour time allo-
cated to wage labour, but also in terms of their participation in the political 
and industrial struggles of the black working class. 'Ignoring migratory 
workers as part of the working class would amount to recognizing a possibil ity 
of capitalist production without the working class, which, naturally, is 
absurd. 19 The objective conditions of the proletarianization of African 
workers having been established, the decisive question of the subjective 
factors, the class consciousness of migrant workers in particular, remain to be 
developed. 
Class consc iousness 
The question of the class consciousness of the African working class is 
necessarily related to the conditions in which the class struggles and repro-
duces itself. The consciousness of African workers is both a produce of their 
harsh experience of the discipline of capital in the labour process as well as 
the totality of their oppression under the capitalist state. The dialectical 
relationship between the experiences of African workers as 'Iabour units 1 in 
production and in society have been the cause of misunderstanding of the 
nature of class consciousness in apartheid society. At one level the very 
efficiency of control over African workers by the state and their perpetual 
migration has retarded class consciousness; at another level national 
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consciousness is seen as a substitute for class consciousness. Repression 
. and labour migration, to deal with the first issue, have, it has been argued, 
seriously retarded the consciousness of migrant workers. 
The perpetual rotation of Africans under intensive police sur-
veillance has had a crippling effect on African labour and 
political organization. The fear of being 'endorsed out' of 
towns has been a major deterrent to mass action against apart-
heid. Labour migration accordingly delays the process of 
consolidating Africans into a class-conscious proletariat. 10 
Whilst it is undo\}btedly true that the aim of state policy is to suppress class 
consciousness, the question is whether uniform ideological subordination has 
been achieved, and whether there has been any greater acceptance of the 
rule of capital with its harsher implementatic:>". These questions are closely 
bound up with the nature of the oppression and exploitation of African workers: 
do African workers merely reflect national consciousness as a direct response to 
the oppression of the racist state? 
It has been argued that black workers are subjected to the most exact-
ing exploitation and oppression by capital in the form of racial labour legis-
lation. The intensity of exploitation and the form which the legalized 
oppression takes has led to the concept of the superexploitation of African 
workers arising from the 'colonial' nature of apartheid society. The super-
exploitation of .African workers is more than simply the fact of a higher rate 
of exploitation of the working class than in advanced capitalist countries. 
'African workers', it is argued, 'are exploited both as a class and as a race •.• 
national consciousness supersedes class consciousness, but serves the same 
. . f fl" 5 h Af . , 11 purpose. National antagonism IS a orm 0 c ass antagonism In out rica. 
This formulation equates nationalist ideology with class consciousness as a form 
of 'proletarian nationalism' and makes the development of class consciousness 
unproblematic. 
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The class consciousness of African workers is inseparably linked with 
class action and,ithasbeenargued, the ruthless extension of state power 
against the working class in South Africa is bound up with the resistance of 
the workers and the level of proletarianization. If, for example, African 
workers returned 'automatically' to the land after completing a contract there 
would not be the need for the vast apparatus of control, which the liberal 
bourgeoisie often complains is so expensive and destructive of good 'race 
relations' . While extreme oppression does not necessarily produce an equal 
and opposing resistance, both industrial and mass strike action since 1972 
should disabuse any ideas that African workers see themsel ves as helpless 
before their employers and the state. The actual consciousness of the 
African working class is a response to the overall level of class struggle with-
in society aswell as a view of their day-to-day exploitation. 
It is not a question of what this. or that proletarian or even the 
whole proletariat momentari Iy imagines to be the aim. It is 
a question of what the proletariat is and what it consequently 
is historically compelled to do. 12 
The distinction between the immediate state of mind of the working c lass and 
the goal of the working class in abol ishing all forms of exploitation and oppres-
sion is important in relation to dock labour. The relationship between the 
actual and the essential, it will be argued, can only be established through 
the concrete movement of the working class, in ideological and material 
resistance to capital. The manifestation of this consciousness does not come 
from the, attitudes of the workers alone, important though this is in under-
standing their aspirations, but from closs action and organization. In th is 
sense the historical struggles of the workers are as germane to the question of 
consciousness as the immediate resistance to the employers. 
The questions of the actual consciousness of the dock workers involve 
a number of related issues: an understanding of their "exploitation by their 
employers, a sense of their historical struggle as stevedoring and African 
workers, development of a critique of capitalist arguments, solidarity in 
.resisting their employers, and an understanding of their oppression by a 
capitalist state. All these questions are brought together in collective 
action such as strikes which mark on explosion of working class aspirations, 
often accompanied by a leap in consciousness. Without these elements 
of consciousness being expressed by the workers, one could not detail their 
consciousness with any confidence, except a5 national consciousness of 
African people under the apartheid state. 
For bourgeois industrial relations theorists the high level of strike 
action among dock workers internationa lIy has posed a problem of exploita-
tion. Why should groups of workers such as dockers, seamen, miners and 
textile workers have a persistently higher strike record? For Kerr and 
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Siegel who studied evidence from eleven countries economic and technologioll 
factors were insufficient to explain 'the bulk of the facts' and they chose to 
stress 'the location of the worker in society' • 
The miners, the sai lors, the longshoremen, the loggers, and, to 
a much lesser extent, the textile workers form isolated masses, 
almost a 'race apart'. They live in their own separate communi-
ties. . . These communities have their own codes, myths, heroes, 
and social standards. There are few neutrals in them to mediate 
the conflicts and dilute the mass. All people have their grievances, 
but what is important is that all the members of each of these groups 
have the same grievances. 13 
These workers readily develop a consciousness of collective grievance, have a 
strong attachment to their unians, and are insulated from 'societal norms depre-
cating overt industrial conflict', i.e. forms of bourgeois idealogy. The idea 
of solidaristic working class action based on communities is not unattractive, 
but it will be argued, is not the principal reason for the ability of workers like 
dockers to sustain a determined struggle against the employers. The unvar-
nished nature of exploitation in the docks, it is argued, leads to a high level 
of consciousness among the workers. Although the stevedoring workers are 
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separated and isolated from other industrial workers in compounds, a 'com-
$"1:1~ /e,5 to SI/rt/'.e 
. munity' of workersA' under the direct control of the employers and 
in the absence of women and children. Although from the 1920s and pos-
sibly earlier, the stevedores referred to themselves as inyati (in Zulu, buffalo, 
i.e. strong men), this 'self-consciousness' is derived directly from production. 
It is also arguable whether all stevedores have identical grievances; from 
the 1950s onwards the employers have insisted on differentiating the work 
force and there has been a definite increase in 'occupational' demands, parti-
cularly by winchmen. 
Unlike factory production where the extraction of surplus labour is 
mediated through machinery wh ich can be set to increase the pace of work, 
in dock labour the low level of mechanization partially 'demystifies' the 
exploitation of the workers. The capitalists are seen by the workers to be 
making profits directly from the 'pure' expenditure of labour power based on 
the physical strength of the workers. In 1961/62 the total amount of capital 
employed could be replaced, for example, by allocating profits to reinvest-
ment for eighteen months. Because of the low level of mechan ization and 
the central importance of the gang in production, the dock workers have a 
relatively advanced consciousness as they see themselves as 'instrumental' 
(the chief instruments of production) in the labour process in the docks; their 
labour is central to all work in landing and shipping cargo. The view of the 
workers was expressed at a stevedore meeting by one who said: We are not 
scared of work. We have built the companies which have grown big with the 
money they get from our work but they don't feel any shame for the workers. ,14 
In an industry where management is so transparently primarily concerned with 
the command over the workers, the resistance of the workers to managerial 
control is likely to be correspondingly high. The workers have a keen sense 
of their historical position in resistance to the employers and the state despite 
the 'purges' which have accompanied strike action. During the phase of 
open organization in the GFWBF many workers brought in old union cards and 
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some even had strong memories of the Industrial and Commercial Union which 
flourished in Durban in the late 1920s. 15 Strikes served as highwater marks 
in the workers' struggle even when defeated and the 1969 strike which was 
followed by mass expulsions from Durban was constantly remembered by the 
workers as an example of the savagery of the DSLSC and the support given the 
company by the aparthe id state. 
All the components of class consciousness converge during strike action, 
a time when the worker-intellectuals put forward the arguments of the workers 
and demolish those of the employers. The shouted exchanges during the 
1972 strike by leading workers blending in the mass gives some indication of 
the vitality of intellectual resistance among the workers, exposing the contra-
dictions in the position of management and presenting detai led al ternative 
demands. The workers' critique of the apartheid state as a capitalist state 
is less developed than the thorough demolition of the arguments of the employers 
although it was the stevedoring workers who championed resistance to the new 
tax system in 1969 without assistance from organizations outside the companies. 
Again it was the stevedores who demanded to see the police officers to know 
what they were doing in the docks during the mass strikes and who united 
strongly when a leading member of the Grindrods' works committee was inter-
rogated and beaten up. The failure of the collaborative African petty 
bourgeoisie to respond to their demands advanced considerably the workers' 
understanding of the Bantustans and their importance in maintaining pol itical 
contro lover the workers. 
The workers' tactics during strike action give further insight into their 
consciousness. Their maturity is shown by the organization of underground 
agitation and direction to the strikes. They refused to accept the 'right' of 
the employers to dismiss workers on strike and shouted down state officials who 
declared their strikes to be illegal. When threatened during the strikes they 
refused to resign and return to the rural areas, but as in the case of the 1969 
715 
strike stood firm and were subjected to mass dismissals. The wage demands 
~hich were made by the workers (particularly those in 1949 and 1972) were 
considered by the employers to be completely unrealistic, involving an inc-
rease in wages of more than 100 per cent. This, however, demonstrates the 
revolutionary temper of the workers, their demand for a radical transformation 
of society in their interests. 
I n the attempts to organ i ze the stevedoring workers in 1972/73 a 
variety of strategies came to the surface related to the consciousness of the 
workers. An idea deeply engrained in the minds of the workers is that of 
a workers' council, a meeting of delegates of workers to discuss the conduct 
of the struggle, to resolve differences among the workers, and to reach co"ec-
tive decisions. The stevedoring meetings held under the auspices of the 
GFWBF were strongly democratic, not only because of the 'self-abnegation' 
of the leadership, but also because the workers are cautious and suspicious of 
leadership not directly under their control. The stevedoring meetings ran 
parallel to the drive to get a high level of membership in the GFWBF as a form 
of trade unionism, but at times there were conflicts between the organizational 
objectives laid down by GFWBF officials and the democratic decisions of the 
meetings. The workers insisted, for instance, that all the grievances of the 
workers be recorded even though the officials argued it was more important to 
set a definite agenda and objectives for mass organization. At another meet-
ing a black supervisor who had been ostracised from a gang {for what reason is 
not clear} described how he was also exploited like the other workers. These 
differences from the objective of mass mobil ization set by the GFWBF officials 
demonstrated a deep yearning among the workers to reach fully democratic 
decisions and to resolve the issues obstructing the unity of the workers. A 
cathartic function for the stevedoring meetings was not seen as important by 
the GFWBF officia Is, but there was a sense in wh ich the workers were express-
ing a desire for a different type of organization combined with the trade union 
aspects of the GFWBF. The closest approximation to the workers' idea of 
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organ i zation was the workers' counci I; free assemb Ii es of workers' de I ega tes 
.rather than leaders based on the 'self-direction of production, self-direction 
of the class struggle, by means of workers' councils'. 16 The difficulties 
with this form of organization were immense: free, open association being 
readily infiltrated by spies and informers, an inability to follow a set pattern 
of making decisions, and most of all an insufficient level of participation to 
be truly representative of the workers. The open assemblies of delegates in 
a form of workers' council demonstrated all these problems which Pannekoek 
d d · 17 oes not ISCUSS. 
Despite these reservations, the ideas of delegation of authority, work-
ing class democracy, and collective decisions, dernonstrated the advanced 
consc iousness of the workers. The democratic aspirations of the workers 
were sharply developed both as a guarantee against the collaborating indunas 
at work not subject to election or recall, and the experience of strike action 
at which the workers had refused to be 'fooled' into electing leaders to nego-
tiate with the employers. 
Conclusions 
The extreme national oppression of the African workers in South Africa, 
itself re-defined and developed as a response to earl ier phases of resistance, 
has not submerged class consciousness within an undifferentiated national con-
sciousness. Indeed, it was this class consciousness and independent under-
ground organization which enabled the stevedores to break through the blanket 
of repression of the 1960s and conduct the agitation which preceded the 1969 
strike. It was also the struggle of the stevedoring workers to develop their 
organization in the GFWBF which brought out the contradictions in national 
consciousness and demonstrated to other workers the inability and unwillingness 
of the collaborative African petty bourgeoisie to support their resistance to 
employers and the apartheid state. Through their independent organization, 
openly in the GFWBF insofar as it was capable of being a vehicle of the workers' 
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aspirations and underground in the nuclei of pamphlet and letter writers, the 
workers showed their awareness of class oppression and exploitation, consistent 
ideological opposition to the employers' viewpoint especially during strikes, 
and the ability to develop working class practices such as pickets and a variety 
of forms of class action such as overtime bans and strikes. Through their total 
rejection of the induna system the labourers demonstrated their resistance to a II 
forms of capitalist domination, including that of agents suffering the same forms 
of national oppression. 
Despite the extension of the migrant labour system ihto one of contract 
labour which forms the basis of national oppression, class consciousness has been 
accelerated rather than reduc'ed. The expansion of migrant labour, the 
'purging' of the labour force during strikes, and the constant victimization of 
mil itants has not meant that the consciousness of the workers is a tahtda rasa to 
be imprinted only by the daily facts of national oppression under the apartheid 
state. The class actions taken by the workers demonstrate a collective 
memory even over sharply discontinuous periods (for instance, the R 14 a week 
demand resurfaced only two years after the mass dismissals of 1969) and indicate 
an attempt by the workers to free themselves from the mystifications of capita-
list rule: the view that tribal identity is paramount and that the DSLSC is a 
benevolent company aware of the real interests of the workers, for instance. 
The high level of strike action and class consciousness show that the apartheid 
state and the employers have been unabl e to negate the forward movement by 
black wqrkers, although they have dealt out punishing blows to the confident 
assertion of the power of the workers in the docks. 
A study of the stevedoring workers provides the basis for an evaluation 
of whether the apartheid state has been able to suspend proletarianization at a 
level at which the workers are able to enjoy a subsidy to wages from the reserves 
and to hold back from collective action with other workers in the urban areas. 
State policy contains the contradictions of capital: both the attraction (in the 
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form of taxation} and repulsion ('endorsing out') of African workers into and 
.out of wage labour. But the tenuous land holding of many of the African 
migrant workers has not produced a situation in which African workers from 
the reserves are suspended as a 'semi-proletariat'; the state I imits on the 
tendency of capital to repel workers abso lutely from the means of subsistence 
is itself a response to the struggle of the African working class in the cities. 
The class action of migrant workers in employment, their demands and strike 
action, contradicts the view of the under-development of this section of the 
African working class. The view that strike action by African workers is a 
demand for compensation for the loss of use values in the reserves (wh ich would 
place an emphasis on the purely material compensation without any conception 
of a transformation in the consciousness of migrant workers) cannot be upheld 
from a study of the stevedoring workers. The wage demands were the collec-
tive response of both migrant and urban workers (DSLSC and Grindrod workers) 
and included many important industrial and occupational demands which go 
well beyond the 'crass economism' of wage demands alone and attempt to limit 
the powers of the employers. 
These struggles have sharpened the contradictions between the workers 
and the Bantustan governments which are dependent on increased taxation of 
workers and their po I itical control for survival. The apartheid state expects 
these regimes to exercise eflux control during a time of massive unemployment. 
As importantly the Bantustan leadership I ike Gatsha Buthelezi encourages a 
type of popul ist black nationalism wh ich serves as a base for repudiating cam-
paigns of solidarity internationally and attempts to dissolve the contradictions 
between the African working class and the collaborative petty bourgeoisie. 
The long history of struggles by the Durban dock workers demonstrates 
conclusively that activity by the working class is not ultimately dependent on 
political liberties which allow open organization in trade unions, although 
trade unions have enabled the workers to sustain resistance and defend their 
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achievements. These workers have shown a remarkable ability to organize 
.themselves and put forward demands to transform their conditions of work and 
the society in which they live. For over a century the dock workers have 
shown by their actions that they were conscious of their exploitation and 
oppression and determined to make changes in their interests and in the 
interests of the vast majority of the working population. While coming into 
social activity at about the same time as workers in advanced capitalist coun-
tries (with demands for higher wages in 1874 and a first strike in 1895), the 
dock workers in Durban have faced enormous difficulties in being able to 
develop permanent class organization. During the period of growth of mono-
poly capital in South Africa, class and national oppression of the African work-
ing class has grown out of all proportion in relation to the previous history of 
capital in South Africa, but so haJlethe numbers and strategic positioning of 
African workers in production. As the working class in advanced capital ist 
countries is now entering into a phase of increasing strikes and resistance to 
the burden of the capitalist crisis, it can be expected that the uneven develop-
ment of working class activity internationally will be increasingly overcome. 
In the coming struggles the dock workers of Durban, who have had a decisive 
part in the initiation of mass working c lass resistance in South Africa, wi" be 
likely to take up a leading role. 
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CARGO LANDED a ~GES AND E~LOYMENT2 DURBAN 1874-1975 
APPENDIX A 
Wage rate Employment Cargo Food price per day Worker action 
R av monthly landed index 
1874 0.15 500 Demand increase 
1978 800 
1879 0.30 900 Demand increase Zulu War 
1880 1,000 
1886 726 
1887 743 
1888 960 
1889 1,175 
1890 0.25 1,560 
1891 1,500 
1892 1,390 
1893 1,204 
1895 1,377 88.4 
1896 1,757 545 100.0 
1897 2,751 513 98.2 
1898 2,326 441 117.9 
1899 2,509 521 117.0 
1900 2,832 795 110.7 
1901 3,790 944 120.5 
1902 0.35 4,753 Demanded 0.40 1,103 126.8 
1903 5,125 Struck; refused to bunker ships 1,288 126.8 
1904 5,116 787 125.9 
1905 1,934 748 120.5 
1906 1,794 314 123.2 
1907 1,172 482 123.2 
1908 1,290 437 116.1 
1909 1,035 615 112.5 
1910 1,636 912 23.8 
1911 2,187 867 26.0 
1912 2,320 976 27.3 
1913 2,325 939 27.7 
1914 2,134 755 27.3 
1915 1,499 741 29.2 
1916 1,615 704 30.3 
1917 1,865 574 33.7 
Continued .•••••••• 
TABLE CONTINUED ••••• 722 
Wage rate per Employment Cargo Food 
day R Worker action prlce av monthly landed index 
1918 0.30 Demanded RO.50 594 37.1 
1919 0.45* Demanded more 640 37.1 
1920 0.40 Struck for Rl.OO 597 48.7 
1921 886 39.6 
1922 590 32.4 
1923 1,455 712 32.0 
1924 1,573 917 32.8 
1925 1,663 1,090 32.8 
1926 1,628 1,082 32.2 
1927 1,626 Strike against tax 1,191 32.3 
1928 1,715 1,389 31. 9 
1929 2,000 Strike against dismissal 1,469 31. 5 
1930 2,075 1,546 30.1 
1931 1,714 1,347 28.6 
1932 Strike against wage reduction 1,110 26.2 
1933 1,053 879 26.9 
1934 1,147 28.3 
1935 1,497 27.8 
1936 1,769 27.7 
1937 Strike for wage increase 2,093 28.0 
1938 2,279 29.4 
1939 1,992 29.1 
1940 0.40 2,032 30.1 
1941 0.64 Strike demanded RO.86 2,655 32.3 
1942 Strike demanded RO.80 1,830 35.5 
1943 1,732 38.6 
1944 1,624 40.3 
1945 1,529 41. 3 
1946 1,679 42.3 
1947 2,553 44.6 
1948 Phungula R2.50 a day demand 2,428 46.0 
1949 0.82! Riot followed by strike demanded 3,053 47.3 
R65 per month 
1950 2,637 50.0 
Continued •••••••••• 
TABLE.. CONTINUED 723 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
Wage rate 
per day 
R 
Employment 
av monthly Worker action 
Cargo 
landed 
2,854 
3,147 
2,669 
2,759 
3,447 
Food price 
index 
53.6 
62.9 
66.3 
66.8 
69.0 
1956 1. 25 
1957 
3,905 
4,244 
70.3 
72.8 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1.40 
2,419 
2,245 
2,486 
2,748 
3,065 
2,422 
2,644 
2,106 
2,211 
No overtime worked 
Strike for increase, labour 
pool introduced 
Demanded R14.00,strike 
Demanded R18.00, strike 
4,571 
4,269 
4,551 
4,454 
4,584 
4,880 
6,707 
8,930 
9,498 
4,217 
2,787 
2,618 
4,217 
4,561 
3,732 
5,138 
5,796 
5,908 
75.6 
75.8 
76.4 
78.6 
78.2 
79.0 
82.6 
87.5 
90.7 
93.9 
95.4 
96.9 
101.2 
106.1 
113.6 
131.0 
150.6 
173.1 
* Workers employed bunkering coal. 
Sources: Average monthly employment 1874-1933 from Mayor's Minutes of 
respective years, 1961-1969 from DSLSC figures for July of each year. 
Cargo landed in harbour tons 1896-1908 from Reports of the Harbour Master, 
1909-1966 from Natal Regional Survey (1969); 1967-75 in metric tons on an 
unspecified new basis Statistical Yearbook (1971). 
Food price index 1895-1909 for Durban 1896 = 100, S.P. 13 p.70; 1910-1975 
from Statistical Yearbook (1976) on the base of prices in major urban 
areas, April 1970 = 100. 
APPENDIX B 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE STEVEDORING TRADE 
Date 
1872 
1874 
1878 
1879 
1880 
1888 
1889 
1890 
1895 
1902 
1902? 
1903 
May 
1903 
June 
Wage rate 
Is 6d 
3s + food 
45 
2s 6d 
+ food 
45 a day 
6s per trip 
35s-40s 
a month 
3s 6d 
Action by workers, employers 
and the state 
London stevedores form a union. 
(Pelling, 1977:98). 
Workers respond to imposition of 
togt regulations by demanding higher 
wages. Refused by the municipality. 
(Council Minutes). 
Togt barracks opened with a public 
meeting. (Mayor's Minute, 1878). 
Under the favourable conditions 
created for strike action during the 
imperialist war against the Zulu 
people .togt workers refuse to work 
at the wage rates of the togt regula-
tions. 
Point barracks constructed but togt 
workers refuse to occupy them. 
Dockers strike in Hamburg, Bremerhaven, 
and Rotterdam (1889). (Hobsbawn, 1964: 
218). 
London dock strike wins 6d per hour, 
roughly 4s a day for 8 hour day. 
(Pelling, 1977:98). 
Togt workers in Durban area earn 2s 6d with 
food for an eight hour day. 
Durban dockers strike for 6s a day. 
(NBBNA, 1895:93). 
State coordinates attempts to reduce 
wages, resisted by employers concerned 
about losing skilled workers. 
Dockers strike for a day in demand for 
4s a day, evicted by police from 
barracks. (SANAC 111:28,295). 
Strikers at St. Paul's wharf arrested 
for refusing to work. (Natal Mercury, 
1 June 1903). 
Stevedores employed to load cargo 
refuse to carry coal. Brought before 
magistrate and fined. (Natal Witness, 
16 June 1903). 
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1904 
May 
1906-08 
1909 
January 
1915 
1916 
September 
1918 
August 
3s a day 
6s a night 
1919 
16 July 
17 December 
1920 4s a day 
5 March 6s a night 
£2 5s -
£2 lOs per 
month 
African workers support demand for lOs 
a day made by White workers employed in 
the same jobs. (SANAe III: para. 
28,390). 
Stevedores refuse to carry heavy timber. 
~ANAC III: para. 30,107). 
When accommodation charges are raised from 
2s 6d to 5s a month, 811 (about 17 
per cent) leave work. (SANAC III: 
para. 28,171). 
Bambata uprising supported by many 
Durban workers who take up arms, employers 
try to hold on to workers in barracks, 
brutal suppression of resistance and 
extensive reprisals. (Marks, 1970). 
Beer monopoly established by the 
munic~pa1ity and petty brewers closed 
down. (Native Beer Act, 1908). 
Compound manager complains of workers 
drinking and asks beerha1ls to be closed 
1600-1800. Request refused by municipality. 
State takes over Durban harbour administra-
tion 4 years after Railways and Harbour Act, 
stevedoring separated from wharf railway 
workers. (NRS, 1969:105). 
Workers strike for 5s a day and lOs a night 
and for overtime pay on Saturday afternoon. 
General grievance of 5s additional 
dipping fee. Strikers arrested and 
charged, employers pay £1 fines. (I1anga 
lase Natal, 23 August 1918). 
Workers bunkering coal strike demanding 
4s 6d increase in daily wage. Militants 
arrested and reprimanded by magistrate 
who had broken the strike. (Times of 
Natal, 17 July 1919). 
Cape Town dockers demand 8s 6d and strike 
for two weeks: ICU's first and only 
sustained industrial battle. (Wickens, 
1978: 28-36) • 
1,200 dock workers demand lOs a day 
increase for togt labour and £5 increase 
for monthly workers. Pickets stop work and 
occupy wharves until major counter-
demonstration by police and South African 
Mounted Rifles. Demands refused. (Natal 
Mercury, 6 March 1920; OYB, 4, 1921:321). 
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1925 
14 October 
December 
1926 
January 
1927 
16 June 
1929 
June 
November 
1930 
16 December 
1932 
2 April 
1935 
August 
£2 5s -
£2 7s 6d 
a month 
4s 6d 
New poll tax imposed. 
Cases of 'insubordination' by workers. 
First case workers refused to work 
for oppressive white foreman, fined 
£1 or 14 days IHL. Second case 
refusing orders of white foreman, 
fined £2 or one month IHL. 
(Natal Mercury, 19 December 1925). 
ICU campaigns for national minimum 
wage of 8s and an end to contract 
labour. 
Workers employed for l5~ hours a day 
carrying sugar fined £1 or 14 days IHL 
for dispute with supervisor. (Workers 
Herald, 15 January 1926). 
1,500 dock workers strike demanding 
release of 20 dockers arrested for not 
paying poll tax. (Natal Mercury, 
17 June 1927). 
Workers demand end to beer monopoly 
and put forward grievances about the 
compound system. Beerhalls boycotted 
and compound offices stoned. Police 
intervene to break pickets. 
Massive police raid coordinated on 
national basis to regain control over 
Point barrack~ and to enforce tax 
collection. Mass trials of workers 
follow. 
Pass burning and attempt to start 
demonstration through town violently 
suppressed by police. Johannes Nkosi 
killed. 
Workers strike against imposition of 
60 hour week and reduction of wages. 
788 strikers immediately replaced. 
(OYB, 15, 1932-33:187). 
Demonstration 
Italian ships 
in Ethiopia. 
1935). 
strike against loading 
bound for Italian troops 
(Umsebenzi, 7 September, 
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1937 
24 April 
1937 
12 August 
1937 
30 August 
1939 
26 May 
1939 
1940 
1941 
17 August 
1942 
28 July 
June-
December 
1948 
June 
4s 
3s 
2s 6d 
4s a day 
6s overtime 
or nightshift 
4s 
4s 6d a day + 
COLA of 6d 
Overtime 8d per 
hour 
Sunday overtime 
lld per hour 
Workers strike to regain overtime 
for Saturday afternoon work lost 
during depression. Win demand. 
(Natal Mercury, 26 April, 1937). 
Railway togt workers demand 4s a 
day and hold up shipping for 14 days. 
Scabs brought in on monthly contracts. 
Strike ends without increase, 
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hut many strikers re-employed. (Natal 
Mercury, 13-27 August 1937, and Umsebenzi, 
21 August 1937). 
400 togt workers employed by timber 
company, W.F. Johnstone and Co. in 
unloading ships demand 3s 6d. Replaced by 
monthly contract workers who were granted 
wage increase. Strike lasts three days, 
workers sacrificing £150 in wages. 
(Natal Mercury, 31 August 1937 and 
2' Septemb~r 1937). 
Togt workers employed by timber merchants 
strike for two days, sacrificing £60 
in wages. (ARDL, 1939, and OYB 
(21),1940:258). 
Wage Board investigation. 
Wage determination includes stevedores 
as 'unskilled' labour but provides 
no wage increases. (WBR). 
Workers strike demanding 8s a day. 
War-time Controller of Industrial 
Man-Power intervenes and offers 
wage increases which are reluctantly 
agreed to under duress. 
Again workers strike for 8s which they 
claim was promised by employers. After 
strike of four days workers expelled 
from urban area under emergency 
regulations. 
Strike wave in Transvaal and Natal 
(Stein, 1978). 
Workers strike after new regulations 
introduce penalties for absenteeism, 
for taking extended leave, and for 
'slacking' at work. 
September 
1949 
13 January 
1949 
2 May 
1950 
1951 
1952 
2 June 
1954 
1 July 
1956 
1 August 
1957 
1958 
5 March 
8s 4d per day 
4s 2d COLA = 
l2s 6 a day + 
special 
allowances 
l4s 
Phungula issues a report on the 
impoverishment of migrant workers 
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and campaigns for a general strike in 
support of wage demand of £1 5s a day or 
£32 lOs per month. Leadership of 
African trade unions oppose strike 
movemen t • 
Dock workers participate in riots. 
Strike of dock, ship painting, baking 
and milling, whaling, timber, sugar, and 
chemical workers in support of demand for 
£32 lOs a month. (Natal Mercury, 
3 May, 1949). 
Railway workers strike demanding 
increased wages. 
367 railway workers employed at Cato 
.Creek strike. 
Scaling and chipping workers strike 
for 15.1/4 days. 
Congress of the People adopts Freedom 
Charter calling for the abolition of 
compounds and contract labour, and the 
nationalization of monopolies. 
Stevedoring workers strike for 7 days 
demanding increases. Workers charged: 
95 found guilty and fined lOs each and 
others discharged. Central Native Labour 
Board ,intervenes. (ARDL, 1954). 
New wage scales prescribed by Central 
Bantu Labour Board. 
Go-slow action by Port Elizabeth dock 
workers who demanded 25s a day. Workers 
replaced by convicts and contract 
labour. (Horre 11, 1961: 103-104) • 
After Verwoerd, Minister of Native 
Affairs, demands barracks at the 
Point should be removed employers 
appeal successfully for exemption. 
SACTU demands £1 5s a day at first 
Wage Board investigation into 
stevedoring (WBR, 1958). 
18 April 
1959 
25 February 
25 March 
1961 
27 December 
1965 
30 November 
1968 
1969 
April 
1971 
January 
September 
Workers ban overtime and strike 
during national stay-away. Increase 
of Is 6d a day and 3d an hour 
overtime granted. 
When WD 183 provides no wage increase 
for labourers while significant rises 
for indunas, workers, come out on 
strike. Employers refuse demands 
for increase and strikers evicted from 
barracks. Workers guilty of 
trespassing fined RIO. 
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Workers stop overtime to demand increases. 
Entire labour force expelled from 
Durban and new workers recruited from 
Zululand and other rural areas. DSLSC 
formed in post-strike situation. 
.Workers employed by Consolidated Stevedor-
ing and Forwarding strike demand 
annual bonus. Defended by SACTU when 
107 workers charged. 
Workers employed by C.G. Smith at Maydon 
Wharf strike demanding increase in wages, 
tea break, overtime, and overalls. 110 
charged with striking on 10 February, 1966, 
again appeared 14 March, and sentenced 
to fine of R25. Sentence quashed on 
appeal, 29 August 1966. 
Republic Transport Workers' Union demands 
R16 fur labourers at Wage Board 
investigation. (WBR 1968) 
Bantu Taxation Act No.92 of 1969 taxes 
Africans an income above R360 p.a. 
Workers demand R14 a week and come out 
on strike. Employers and the state 
coalesce to break strike with mass 
expulsions from urban area. 
Port congestion; employers attack 
~ob reservation in the holds and on the 
wharves. 
Workers again demand R14 and threaten 
to strike. Employers offer R8.50; 
an increase of R2. 
1972 
23 October 
24 October 
1973 
January-
February 
1974 
5 October 
In response to delay in new wage 
determination and changes in hours 
workers strike demanding R18 a week, 
voluntary overtime, shorter 
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working hours, and improved accommodation. 
Strikers forced back to work after 
employers' threat of mass dismissal 
backed by the police. (Daily News, 
27 October, 1972). 
Cape Town dockers initiate a ban on 
overtime in support of unspecified wage 
demand. Discipline maintained by 
pickets. (Budlender, 1976:46-48). 
Mass strikes in Durban 
between R20-30 a week. 
by parmilitary. 
as workers demand 
Docks occupied 
Dockers in Cape Town refuse to work 
overtime for a month in support of demand 
for increased wages. Comes to an end 
after change in hours which results in 
decasua1ization and provides incentive 
bonuses. (Budlender, 1976:54-55). 
APPENDIX C 
PORT WORKERS AND SEAMEN! 
PREPARE FOR ACTION 
Day by day the conditions at the South African ports become 
worse. Mass employment resulting in the assembly at all the 
docks throughout the country of thousands of Dock and Harbour 
workers, vainly trying to secure employment in the face of the 
fact that the employed workers are securing only one or two 
days work a week on the average, reflect the critical situa-
tion now obtaining amongst the South African Transport 
workers. 
Further dismissals of Dock and Harbours workers take place 
at all ports and speeding up the work of gangs, the 
reduction of the numbers of ·workers in the gang intensifies 
the process of exploitation increasing from day to day. The 
recent increase of the transference of cargo from Capetown 
Docks to Durban on account of the cheaper labour there, 
reflects the new attacks on the conditions of the workers; 
through the increased short time and dismissals at the 
Capetown Docks and in the tremendously increased speed-up 
of work at the Durban Docks and also the transference of 
Durban Native Railway Workers from Greyville to the Docks 
at Durban on Saturdays to perform extra work without 
pay, in order to handle the cargo thus diverted from 
Capetown. 
All these attacks on the Conditions of the Dock and Harbour 
workers are taking place when throughout the world 
Seamen Dockers and Harbour workers are being increasingly 
drawn into the Imperialist War activities which at this 
moment result in the transportation of war materials and 
troops to crush the heroic struggles of the Chinese workers 
and peasants who are seeking the revolutionary way out 
of this crisis of Capitalism, and also for the crushing 
of the successful building of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. 
where the workers and peasant are completing their first 
five year plan and are preparing the second plan which has 
its objective, the creation of a classless society. 
Fellow Dockers, Stevedores, Lightermen, Quay Workers and 
Coal Loaders. 
The increased attack on our standards of life, are 
manifested in many ways. Whether it is directly through 
the cuts in wages, speed up dismissals, or through the 
favouritism in giving out the tickets for work, which 
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means that work is not evenly distributed, we must fight 
against these attacks at the same time as we mobilise 
our determination to prevent the Dockers and Harbour 
workers being used to further the war activities of the 
Imperialists. We must organise for action against our 
miserable conditions of life and work by preparing 
to set up committees of struggle under the leadership of 
the Communist Party and the Seamen and Harbour Workers' 
Union to organise for strike action,which will unit the 
fight of the Dockers and Harbouer workers in all 
South African Ports against these worsened conditions 
and against Imperialist War - establishing fighting 
solidarity with the Seamen and Harbour workers in all 
the ports throughout the world. 
The rumoured new wage reductions have been delayed but we 
must begin now to prepare action against these reductions 
which are only in line with the attacks on all other 
sections of workers in South Africa and which have only 
been held up because of the clearly demonstrated 
revolutionary determination of the Dockers and Harbour 
workers in the struggles at Durban and at Port Elizabeth, 
and in the determination manifested by the Capetown 
Dockers and Harbour workers consequent upon the 
anticipated reduction in wages recently. 
In these attacks the role of the reformist union leaders 
as the Stevedores' Union at Capetown and the I.C.V. at 
Durban must be clearly understood as that of betrayers who 
will seek to draw any dispute into the channels of 
conciliation. Only by building independent committees 
of action of all workers under revolutionary leadership 
can effective preparation for strike action be carried. 
In the August First demonstrations against War organised 
by the Communist Party, the Seamen and Dockers throughout 
the country must begin active strike preparations against 
the new attacks being planned by the bosses. 
Build Committees of Action in every port to fight for:-
Maintenance of a minimum wage scale of 8/1 a day for all 
workers irrespective of race or colour - quay workers, 
stevedores, lightermen. Harbour workers, Native coal 
loaders, etc. 
No dismissal of Dock and Harbour workers. 
Return of the P.T.O. for all Dock and Harbour workers. 
Abolition of the quarter day system. The working day 
to be divided into two four hour shifts. 
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The distribution of tickets to be handled through elected 
committees of the workers. These committees to be 
composed of Coloured, Native and White Dock and 
Harbour workers. 
A quaranteed minimum wage of 32/- a week for all Dock 
and Harbour workers working less than four days. 
Complete abolition of overtime. 
A minimum of thrity workers in each batch. 
For the redistribution of cargo now being diverted 
to Durban, to Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and East 
London. 
Compensation at the rate of full wages to be paid by 
the Stevedoring Companies or S.A.R. & H. to all workers 
at the Docks in case of accident, injurty, sickness 
during the entire period of employment. Full 
compensation to be paid to the families of any and all 
Dock and Harbour workers in case of death. 
For the immediate enactment of the Harkers' Unemployment 
Insurance Bill proposed by Communist Party of S.A. 
Refuse to load any ship with men, munitions, 
stores or supplies for the Imperialist War on China and the 
U. S. S. R. 
Build the Seamen and Harbour Workers Union on a national 
scale. 
Set up Committees of Action 1n ev~ry port to prepare 
for Strike action. 
Umsebenzi, 20 August, 1932. 
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WAGE DEMANDS OF TRADE UNIONS, 1958 
Durban 
Port E Ii zabe th 
Cape Town 
Labourer 
R2.50 
100 
R2.50 
100 
R1.90 
Labourer's wage = 100 
Source: WBR 1958 
Gangway/winchman 
R2.70 
108 
R3.00 
120 
R2.09! Gangwayman 
109 
R2.25 Winchman 
118 
APPENDIX D 
Induna 
R3.00 
120 
R3.25 
130 
R2.80 
147 
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DEFI~ITION OF BULK, DIRTY AND TOXIC CARGO IN WAGE DETERMINATIONS 
WD 183, 6 February 1959 
Bulk cargo means any cargo 
such as sulphur, ore or 
grain which is not packed 
in containers and which has 
to be stowed in or removed 
from a ship in a loose 
form but does not include 
a cargo such as timber, 
steel plates or rods or 
pieces of machinery 
which, while not packed ~n 
containers, is conveyed by 
the piece or in bundles, 
10c/day. 
Dirty cargo means cement, 
basic salg, yellow ochre, 
carbon black, soda ash, 
sulphur or coal, in 
containers, 
lOci day. 
APPENDIX E 
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WD 251, 24 July 1964 
Bulk cargo means any cargo 
such as grain (other than 
maize) gypsum, ore, potash 
or superphosphate which is 
not packed in containers and 
which has to be stowed in or 
removed from a ship in a loose 
form, but does not include 
cargo such as timber, steel 
plates or rods or pieces of 
machinery which, while not 
packed in containers, is 
conveyed by the piece or 
in bundles, 
l5c/day. 
Dirty cargo means basic 
slag, cement, carbon black, 
coal, ochre, soda ash, 
sulphur,triple super-
phosphate, whalebone meal, 
or lucerne meal in hessian 
bags, or maize in bulk, 
20c/day. 
WD 308, 3 April 1969 
Bulk cargo means any cargo 
such as grain (other than 
maize), gypsum, ore, potash 
or superphosphate which is 
not packed in containers and 
which has to be stowed in or 
removed from a ship in a loose 
form, but does not include 
cargo such as timber, steel 
plates or rods or pieces of 
machinery which, while not 
packed in containers, is 
conveyed by the piece or 
in bundles, 
l7c/day 
Dirty cargo means: 
a) basic slag, carbon black, 
cement, coal, ochre, 
oxide, soda ash, sulphur, 
triple superphosphate, 
wet hides or whalebone 
meal; 
b} maize or phosphates ~n 
bulk; 
c) chalk, clay, lucerne 
meal or-pitch in hessian 
or paper bags; 
d) asbestos in hessian or 
paper bags ~n open 
compressed bundles, 
23::: /czr:. 
WD 348, 15 December 1972 
Bulk cargo means any cargo such 
as copper bars when not uni~d, 
gypsum, ore, potash or super 
phosphate which is not packed in 
containers and which has to be 
stowed in or removed from a ship 
~ a loose form, but does not 
include cargo such as timber, 
steel plates or rods or pieces of 
machinery which, while not packe 
in containers, is conveyed by the 
piece or in bundles, 
2lc/day. 
Dirty cargo means: 
a) basic slag, carbon black, 
cement, coal, ochre, oxide, 
soda ash, sulphur, triple 
superphosphate, wet hides or 
whalebone meal; 
b) grain or phosphates in bulk; 
c) chalk, clay, lucerne meal or 
pitch in hessian or paper bag, 
d) asbestos in hessian or paper ! 
bags or in open compressed i 
bundles, i 
29c/day. j 
Toxic cargo means cargo which ha 
chemical properties that cause 0 
are likely to cause injury to a I 
human body exposed l' 
or coming into contact therewith 
36c/day. 
LEVEL AND STRUCTURE OF WAGES, STEVEDORING LABOURERS 
Wage 
Measure 
WD 183 
6 Feb. 
1959 
1963 
WD 251 
24 July 
1964 
WD 308 
3 April 
1969 
1 Oct. 
1971 
WD 348 
15 Dec. 
1972 
Wage 
Order 
21 Dec. 
1973 
Components of wage 
Basic wage R6.00 
Overtime 22.5c/hr 
Sunday 83c + l7c/hr 
As above, plus 
Daily allowance 
l5c/day 
Basic wage R6.00 
Daily allowance 
SOc/day 
Overtime 25c/hr 
Sunday Rl. 05 + 
19c/hr 
Basic wage R6.50 
Daily allowance 
65c/day 
Overtime 29c/hr 
Sunday Rl. 25 + 
22c/hr 
Basic wage R8.50 
As above 
Basic wage R.950 
Daily allowance 
Rl/day 
Overtime 4lc/hr 
Sunday Rl. 95 + 
3lc/hr 
Basic wage R12.00 
Daily allowance 
Rl/day 
Overtime 48c/hr 
Sunday R2.30 + 
36c/hr 
Sample wage* 
Overtime 
& Sunday 
4.34 
4.34 
5.76 
6.71 
6.71 
9.66· 
11.30 
Earnings 
10.34 
10.94 
13.76 
15.81 
17.81 
23.16 
27.30 
APPENDIX F 
Hourly 
earnlngs 
l8c/hr 
19c/hr 
24c/hr 
28c/hr 
31c/hr 
4lc/hr 
48c/hr 
*Basis for calculating a hypothetical wage taken as four days work 
on Monday to Friday rates, Sunday work added, and 12 hours overtime, 
making the total number of hours worked 57 per week (5 x 9 = 45 
hours normal time + 12 hours overtime = 57 hours). These hours are 
an attempt at an approximate average working time for a stevedoring 
labourer. The earnings do not include cargo allowances which were 
consolidated into basic wages in the 1973 Bantu Labour Wage Order. 
This consolidation exaggerates the rise in wages between 1972 and 
1973. 
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APPENDIX G 
• 'J_~' 
. '
ABASEZITIBITOLO BAFUNA 
UR18.00 NGESONTO 
APPENDIX G cont • 
Ephepheni lethu lokugcina le-Isisebenzi sanika 
inothisi yomhlangano wo Mnyango weza Maholo (Wage 
Board) oyokwenzelwa eThehlini. Umhlangano wawu 
ngo ~lli1aka 17 kuJuly. Inhloso yalomhlangano kwa-
kuwukuzama ukubeka obala imali encane engase ikho-
khelwe abantu abasebenza ezitibitolo obasi babo. 
ErnhlangamoJeni kwakukhona abantu abangaphezulu kwama-
200 basezitibitolo. Into abayisho kwi Wages Board: 
"Sifuna nisiholele u R18,00 ngesonto. Asifuni uku-
setshenziswa ama-ova ngenkani. Sifuna ukusebenza 
izinsuku ezi~hlanu kuphela ngesonto." Iningi lezi-
sebenzi aliphumelela nga ukuza ernhlanganweni we 
Wages Board. Imbangela ya10khu kushicilelwa le11-
phephandaba ukwazisa okwenzeka emhlanganweni lezozi-
sebenzi ezingaphumelelanga ukufika. 
Ubani owakhuluma emhlanganweni na? Yilaba 
(1) Umnuz J B Buthelezi (Ophethe inhlangano yase-
zitibitolo - Durban Stevedoring Labour Supply Co). 
Wathi umele zonke izisebenzi zenkampani. Lona 
omele izisebenzi wathini. Akutshela i-Wage Board 
yilokhu: 
* Ukuthi abaningi _ emsebenzini bayalwa nezisebenzi 
* Ukuthi labantu (esho iWages Commission) bakhipha 
amaphepha kanti futhi bane ncushuncushu abayida-
layo phakathi kobasi nezisebenzi. 
* Nokuthi izisebenzi aziludingi usizo oluvela nga-
phandle. 
* Nokuthi izisebenzi "zazikancane" kanti futhi 
ziyadukiswa kalula yilamaphepha esezawafunda. 
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